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CIAO DATE: 12/02
International Affairs
July 2002
The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) states that democracy and good governance are preconditions for development. Given the fact that Black Africa is currently suffering widespread economic crisis and political disorder, how probable is it that electoral politics as it has been instituted over the last decade will lead to good government — which all, inside and outside Africa, now claim is the basis for sustainable economic growth?
On the face of it, the argument is simple: democracy should reduce the scope for conflict and make good government more likely. In turn, good government should bring about the political stability, the institutional consolidation and the operation of the rule of law that are universally seen as the necessary framework for investment. Greater investment should facilitate economic growth. Growth provides the foundations for development.
This article investigates the extent to which the political changes that have occurred in the last decade have made the possibility of good government and development more likely in Africa. It offers an analysis of why it is that the nature of politics in Africa today makes good government difficult and reconsiders the changes that have taken place in the exercise of power over the recent past.
This article provides an overview of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) in the context of Africa's current economic and governance crises, the attempt to establish an Africa Union, and the interest in Africa displayed by the G8 leadership and in particular by the UK's prime minister Tony Blair.
NEPAD has to be seen simultaneously as a 'big idea', a new way of doing business, and a comprehensive development framework. The 'big idea' is to put Africa's concerns on the table of the G8 and seek a much better deal for Africa in terms of international aid, debt relief and access to markets. The new way of doing business is a new form of 'enhanced' development partnership that makes both donor and recipient mutually accountable for development outcomes. The development framework is a long — and expanding — list of programmes and projects, akin to those that have been tried before.
The heart of NEPAD is a commitment to good governance, operationalized through a radical plan for 'peer review' of governance performance. This promises a radical new approach to development partnership, but it also faces political hazards. The governance component is also analysed in the context of the pan-Africa institutions envisaged by the African Union. There is a need for coordinating and rationalizing peace and security initiatives. NEPAD may unlock additional financing for development, but it should not be seen as a cash cow.
The challenges for NEPAD include opening up the process to make it more participatory, including greater focus on HIV/AIDS. NEPAD faces the real danger of being over-sold and of raising unrealistic expectations among Africans. It is, nevertheless, an outstanding opportunity for Africa's development.
The value-added of a new partnership with Africa lies precisely in the opportunity to manage and to give impetus to relations and negotiations across a whole range of issues — conflict management, trade, debt relief, and aid — taken together rather than separately. Partnership, however, is not a new concept, in general or in development, and there are different models on offer. This article reviews these and sets out the choices facing new African partnerships with respect to a) participation b) coverage c) the form of partnership, and d) the structure of partnership. The article argues: against selectivity and in favour of building partnerships even with difficult cases; in favour of deploying all possible instruments, including economic, political and military; in favour of the principles of reciprocity and mutual accountability; in favour of institutionalizing mutual accountability through contractual or quasi-contractual forms. The characteristics of one particular, and far from easy case, Rwanda, reinforce these conclusions.
There are also implications for the G8 engagement with NEPAD. The article recommends a broad-based partnership, managed on the developed country side by the OECD, and that proposed monitoring by peer review be reinforced by joint parliamentary scrutiny.
This article, first given as a talk to a seminar of the Uganda Parliament in 2000, is a reflection on that aspect of the colonial political legacy that passes for common sense in the region of the African Great Lakes. The author takes a fresh look at recent events leading to civil war in Uganda (1981-6), Rwanda (1990-94) and eastern Congo (1997-.) The article contextualizes three issues: citizenship, civil society and political majorities and minorities as outcomes of the democratic process. To explore how notions of these issues have been changing over the past decade, the author examines the dilemma of a particular cultural group in the Great Lakes region — the Banyarwanda.
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has identified water and sanitation as a principle area of focus for the forthcoming World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD). It is fitting that this meeting is being held in Johannesburg, as water resources management issues are of primary importance to the southern African region. There is a new water architecture being developed in the region, one that hopes to correct abiding structural inequalities of access between and among states, communities and peoples. Part of this new water architecture includes an enhanced role for the private sector and 'the market' in the provision and management of this crucial resource. This is a role that many feel will exacerbate rather than alleviate historically derived problems of underdevelopment. It is a role, therefore, that may undermine many of the positive developments that have taken place in the region over time. If regional leaders are interested in sustainable and equitable water resources management, they must be prepared openly to debate this issue with all interested parties not only at the WSSD, but also in the region and beyond.
As Africa enters its third decade of structural adjustment pressures, the promised advantages of economic restructuring — as hailed by the various lending bodies — have not been forthcoming. The indelible picture emanating from the continent is one of a people relegated to a position of extreme poverty as state managers and the international community either fail to, or seem unable to, pursue policies that will secure the basic needs of its citizens. To compound matters, HIV and AIDS are threatening to erode the continent's already fragile development capacity. Predicated on the continent's limited economic capabilities, this article charts the relationship between poverty, debt relief and the politics of effective response to HIV/AIDS in Africa. The article begins with an assessment of the societal causes and consequences of the epidemic, moving on to contextualize the case for debts cancellation. It concludes by examining the crucial relationship between debt relief and the successful implementation of effective strategies against the pandemic in Africa.
This article examines how the British government has responded to Zimbabwe's ongoing crisis. This case raises several wider issues for British foreign policy, most notably the question of how much leverage London can exercise on the international scene in general, and over relatively small and weak states like Zimbabwe in particular. Zimbabwe's crisis also raises profound questions about the appropriate balance between bilateral and multilateral policies, and between engaging in public criticism and conducting so-called 'quiet diplomacy'. While bilateralism clearly has not worked, multilateralism has revealed its own frustrations, especially given the reluctance of many African elites within a number of organizations to criticize President Mugabe's policies. This reluctance threatens to unravel the British Labour government's stated objectives in Africa while at the same time raising important doubts over the credibility of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), and whether an 'Africa moment' can be discerned in the manner articulated by prime minister Tony Blair.
This article traces the evolution of development non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Africa, and suggests that their role represents a continuation of the work of their precursors, the missionaries and voluntary organizations that cooperated in Europe's colonization and control of Africa. The authors maintain that the work of the NGOs today contributes marginally to the relief of poverty in Africa, and significantly undermines the struggle of the African people to emancipate themselves from economic, social and political oppression. Development NGOs have, unwittingly or otherwise, become a part of the neo-liberal system that has resulted in widespread impoverishment and the loss of the authority of African states to determine their own agenda. NGOs could, and some do, play a role in supporting an emancipatory agenda in Africa, but it involves breaking with the 'missionary position' by disengaging from their paternalistic role in development.