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CIAO DATE: 06/02
International Affairs
January 2002
A reiteration of the concluding section of 'The paradigm that lost its way' (International Affairs, October 2001) explains that the attitudes which shape Western behaviour and its approach to international relations are a product of the circumstances that prevailed from 1945 to 1953, which became entrenched by the Cold War. The article argues that this 'adversarial national security paradigm' is increasingly dysfunctional; it is ill-suited to the global problems that lie ahead and the West should shift to a 'cooperative global security paradigm'. The reflexive aspects of international relations are highlighted and the utility of attitudinal paradigms is discussed, before turning to consider how a paradigm shift might be engineered. Drawing on recent examples, the prerequisites are shown to be: an impulse for change (common fears, a shared vision); the removal of obstacles to change (usually the most difficult); an engine of change; and a precipitating event or agency. The rest of the article discusses how these prerequisites could be met and shows how Britain could act as precipitator. A postscript considers the relevance of 11 September 2001 to these ideas.
Pakistan's status as a nuclear power, which was made manifest when it carried out six nuclear tests in May 1998, came under renewed international scrutiny following the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001. Of most immediate concern was the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, which was believed to be vulnerable to Muslim terrorist groups with close links to the al-Qaida organization, headed by Osama bin Laden. However, the international crisis centering on the 'war against terrorism' is bound to revive debate about Pakistan's involvement in the nuclear non-proliferation regime; the risks of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan over Kashmir; and the need for tighter curbs on the export of nuclear technology to politically volatile regions in the Muslim world. These debates are likely to be overshadowed by Pakistan's own perceptions of the danger it faces of a military threat from a nuclear-capable India; its aspirations as a regional power; and its desire to be recognized as 'first among equals' in the Muslim world community of nations. Any attempt to draw Pakistan into the non-proliferation regime and to persuade it to assume its responsibilities as a nuclear power will need to address these concerns. Ultimately, however, it will be for Pakistanis to decide how long they wish to subordinate their country's economic well being to the pursuit of a nuclear programme whose priorities are defined by an unaccountable military regime.
The events of 11 September 2001 and their aftermath have prompted several obituaries of the so-called 'Anti-globalization movement'. Even before that date, the movement was struggling to cope with the problem of violence at its set piece summit protests in Genoa and elsewhere. This article explores the origins of the movement and its likely response to these events.
Three broad trends can be identified in a movement made up of different currents and thinking, but concerned with the present direction of economic globalization: statists who wish to rebuild the developmental role of the states; alternatives seeking grassroots 'small is beautiful' models of development; and reformists who wish to improve the workings of the current institutions and rules governing globalization to address concerns such as rising inequality, the need to tailor economic policies to national conditions, and the lack of accountability of transnational corporations. There has been some change with regard to these issues in recent years, but the introduction of reforms have posed a challenge to the unity of the movement, threatening to drive a wedge between its reformists and its rejectionists.
The impact of the events of 11 September on the movement will depend mainly on how it affects the shape of political and economic governance. If the West responds with a national security crackdown and a return of Cold War mindsets, then the political space and appetite for protest is likely to diminish. However, there are encouraging early signs that the West is pursuing a broader goal, seeking to achieve long-term stability by addressing the sources of political, social and economic exclusion and injustice. If this turns out to be the case, then the movement may even come to be seen in hindsight as the true defender of globalization.
This article assesses the new thinking on Jewish security, both inside and outside the state of Israel, since the collapse of the Oslo peace process and in the aftermath of 11 September 2001. To what extent are Jewish diaspora voices and concerns being heeded in Israel, and how are new manifestations of anti-Semitism being addressed in this context? What is the new role that Israel ascribes to the diaspora in its redefinition of itself and its security environment? In addition, how is the diaspora responding to these new challenges and how is it defining its own role? All of these elements are examined by the authors in the different contexts of Israel, western Europe and the United States.
At the end of 2002, NATO will again decide to enlarge its membership. This process of enlargement of the Alliance is driven by summit timetables; summits require commitments and grand gestures, and in Prague that could involve invitations to seven or more states to accede to the Washington Treaty. But there are three sets of issues into which this plays uncomfortably. First, there is an EU-NATO and EU security agenda (also including enlargement) which is a significant and difficult set of issues. Second, NATO itself is undergoing change, particularly after the attacks of 11 September 2001 and enlargement complicates those reform processes. Third, the wide European agenda, and in particular relations with Russia, throw out complicating factors. Is there a way of managing all of these dilemmas?
Turkey occupies a peculiar position in both international relations and economic policy-making. On the international front, the country is still in many senses a frontier state defining a major part of its policy outlook in terms of a political metaphor that has as much to do with the Cold War of the past as the east/west divide of the present. In the economic arena, Turkey is still one of the increasingly rare emerging markets which has never really broken free from the high growth/high inflation spiral. This article seeks to explain these apparent anomalies in terms of political structures within Turkey. The problems facing Turkish policy-makers and their inability to triumph over them is related to the weakness of political institutions within Turkey itself. Turkish political parties lack the legitimacy, policy coherence or firm base of public support easily to embrace programmes which might be perceived to threaten either the historic international position of the state or the well-being of the clients of the large state-controlled part of the economy. This weakness derives from the manner in which modern Turkey was created in the first half of the last century, a process that produced flaws in political structures which the following fifty years of democratic experience has not entirely erased.
France's Africa policy has undergone significant change in recent years, particularly in its military aspects. In practical terms troop numbers have fallen; bases have closed; and financial and military resources have been reallocated or redirected. Politically, the will for forceful, unilateral French action in Africa seems largely to have dissipated. However, this does not mean that France seeks to disengage from the African continent. Rather, multilateral initiatives for maintaining influence are sought, including the possibility of diplomatic and potentially military action alongside the United Kingdom. However, it remains to be seen whether these policy reorientations will suffice to fulfil Prime Minister Lionel Jospin's dictum: 'not to do less but to do better'.