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International Affairs
April 1999
The Rambouillet process sought to re-establish autonomous governance andhuman rights for Kosovo, under the protection of the international community. However, the Kosovo authorities had committed themselves to outright independence while the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia consistently rejected any international interest in the affairs of Kosovo, which it considered an entirely domestic matter. To reconcile these irreconcilable views, an initial attempt was made to establish self-governance for Kosovo for an interim period, without touching upon the issue of the status of that territory. As the Rambouillet conference progressed, the Contact Group moved significantly towards the FRY/Serb demand of expressly confirming its continued sovereignty and territorial integrity over Kosovo. While this and other concessions did not help to engage the FRY in the negotiating process, itjeopardized the acceptance of the agreement by Kosovo. The negotiations werebacked by the threat of the use of force, which could only be innovatively justified by reference to the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, inasmuch as there existed no formal Security Council mandate. However, the credibility of that threat was initially undermined by splits within the Contact Group during the actual negotiations, which also extended to implementation of the agreementupon acceptance by NATO. Moreover, the negotiations were hampered by thefact that one of the three principal international negotiators openly sided withone of the parties and essentially represented it. Encouraged by these divisions, Belgrade manoeuvred itself into a position of direct confrontation with NATO, which could now genuinely argue that the grave humanitarian emergency in Kosovo could only be addressed through acceptance of the Rambouilletaccord by Yugoslavia, even if sustained military attacks were required to achieve that end.
Against the background of the Pinochet affair, the author considers that a new era of international politics is in the process of being created. The House of Lords' ruling which has allowed extradition procedures against the former Chilean dictator, is understood as a formidable and groundbreaking decision in international law based on the defence of human rights against crimes committed by authoritarian and unlawful rulers. The decision taken under the European Convention on extradition and the setting up of a Permanent International Criminal Court in the summer of 1998 are, according to the author, signs that international law and international politics are moving in the direction of a universal acceptance that violators of human rights must bepunished. However, the author is also cautious about the tension between the new path opened to international politics and the old power politics based on the absolute and indivisible sovereignty of the state. Double standards will certainly prevail and powerful states, in particular the United States, are reluctant to accept that international law and international politics are in the process of change.
The author seeks to analyse the repercussions and consequences of the Pinochet affair for Chilean domestic politics. He explains how the legacy of seventeen years of authoritarian rule has shaped the deep divisions within Chilean society regarding the prosecution of the Chilean former dictator in the London courts. Chile is an incomplete democracy and Pinochetism is very much alive in Chile today. The author is very critical of the role played by the current Chilean government and political class, for their behaviour during the affair. In granting a special mission to the General which gave him immunity and later supported his legal case after initial hesitation, the government has shown confusion that has not advanced the case for full democratization and justice in Chile. The ambiguous behaviour of the political class during the episode has discredited its prestige in the eyes of public opinion. Chilean society, according to the author, has missed an opportunity to advance justice and the dignity of the country.
Why does biodiversity conservation matter, and what can be done about it? The article discusses the options in the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, drawing on the results of a Darwin Initiative project on the ecology and economics of biodiversity conservation in the continent. It uses the case of Sub-Saharan Africa to illustrate both the consequences of biodiversity loss and the constraints within which policy-makers operate. To most people the biodiversity loss that matters is not the global extinction of species, but the effects of local change in flora and fauna on watershed protection, soil conservation, habitat, productivity and amenity. For this reason, biodiversity conservation concerns even the poorest communities. But because poverty, indebtedness, insecurity of land tenure and other social conditions affect the way in which people respond to incentives, the policy options for biodiversity conservation may be different in different parts of the world.
The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) is an unusual international environment agreement in that it does not concern an international or global resource. Most of the resources whose regulation is implicit in the CBD are in fact domestic terrestrial species, everything from elephants to medicinal plants. The rationale for international intervention in the sphere of national land use planning lies in the recurring themes of underprovided diversity: underfunded, underappreciated, undermanaged species. In many different areas of international affairs-ranging from the trade in endangered species to the management of agricultural gene banks-these same problems arise. How is it possible to induce countries hosting diverse biological resources to expend theresources necessary to maintain them? The CBD represents the confluenceof all these various movements, and it constitutes the recognition of the importance of a global perspective regarding national land use decision-making.
Germany has sought 'reconciliation' with former foes as an ideal in foreign policy since 1949. Reconciliation remains a priority of new the SPD-Green coalition, as for all previous German governments since the Second World War, for both moral and pragmatic motives. In four bilateral cases of reconciliation in German foreign policy-with Israel, France, Poland, and the Czech Republic-the mix of pragmatism and morality differs depending on history, institutions, leadership, and the international context. Reconciliation with France and Poland is more institutionalized, more open, more embedded in the European Union, and more pragmatic than in the other two cases. In relationswith Israel and the Czech Republic, history and moral claims are more prominent. Institutions are important in all four cases, but they are not as dominant in the latter two cases. Political leadership is central in all four cases, navigating the relationships through periods of domestic opposition to bilateral partnership in processes of reconciliation that strive for an unachievable idea.
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