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CIAO DATE: 12/02
International Affairs
April 2002
Since the end of the Cold War, Americans have been divided over how to be involved with the rest of the world. In the wake of the 11 September terrorist attacks, the debate between those who favour a unilateral foreign policy and those who advocate a multilateral approach has been brought to the fore in American politics and the media.
In this article, Joseph Nye proposes a conception of the American national interest grounded in multilateralism. He argues that, although the United States remains the world's leading power, it cannot act alone to solve global problems such as transnational terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and global warming. Although the United States is the only country in a position to take the lead in protecting 'global public goods', such as an open international economic system and international stability, it will maintain its current predominance only if it works to establish international consensus on issues of global importance.
In this article, Anatol Lieven argues that the collapse of the Soviet and communist threats and the triumph of capitalism and bourgeois values gave the United States an unprecedented chance to act as a status quo hegemon, dominating the world with the consent of other major powers. The United States threw up this chance by acting instead as a 'dissatisfied' and even revolutionary power, creating a sense of menace and resentment across much of the world. After the 11 September attacks, the near-global threat of Sunni Islamist terrorism and revolution gives the United States another opportunity to rally much of the world behind it, in a kind of new 'Holy Alliance' of states against threats from below. But by mixing up the struggle against terrorism with a very different effort at preventing nuclear proliferation, and by refusing to take the interests of other states into account, the US risks missing this opportunity for a second time, and endangering itself and its closest allies such as Britain.
One of the most interesting consequences of the war against international terrorism is the discovery by many analysts of American power. However, if the experts had been more attentive they might have noticed that a power shift in favour of the United States is not just some recent phenomenon arising from US victory over the Taliban or the new Bush military build-up. Rather, it can, and should be, traced back to important trends of the early 1990s. What the war has done is to reveal the extent of America's renaissance in the postwar decade while its position as true hegemon was being consolidated. However, victory in war may not bring order in peace if the United States does not draw the correct lessons.
In his recent novel Alain Crémieux imagines what might happen in Europe without NATO and US military forces and security commitments. Numerous border and minority conflicts break out, coalitions comparable to those in Europe's past begin to form, and the European Union is divided and ineffectual — until pro-peace and pro-EU forces rally. Most European countries then unite under a treaty providing for collective defence and security and a new central European government. The novel raises questions of international order: to what extent have the Europeans overcome their old 'demons' (distrust, power rivalry etc.), notably through the EU? While many theories purport to explain the peaceful relations among the EU member states, critical tests of the Union's political cohesion would come in circumstances without the US-dominated external security framework, including US leadership in NATO. To what extent could the EU maintain cohesion and resist aggression or coercion by an external power against a member state, contain and resolve external conflicts affecting EU interests, and defend the Union's economic and security interests beyond Europe? To determine whether the US 'pacifying' and protective role has in fact become irrelevant, thanks in large part to the EU, would require a risky experiment — actually removing US military forces and commitments. The challenges and uncertainties that would face Europe without NATO argue that the Alliance remains an essential underpinning of political order in Europe. Moreover, the Alliance can serve as a key element in the campaigns against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. To revitalize the Alliance, it is imperative that the Europeans improve their military capabilities and acquire the means necessary for a more balanced transatlantic partnership in maintaining international security.
This article analyses some of the international legal issues arising out of the events of 11 September 2001. Those who perpetrated the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were guilty of serious offences under United States law and possibly also under international law. The fact that their conduct was a crime does not, however, preclude it also being a threat to international peace and an armed attack. The author argues that the United States and its allies were entitled to respond to that attack and the threat of future attacks by using force against Al-Qa'ida and that, in the circumstances, it was also legitimate to take military action against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan which had sheltered Al-Qa'ida and permitted it to conduct operations from Afghan territory. The article also examines the application of the laws of armed conflict to the ensuing fighting and the status and treatment of those captured and held at Guantanamo Bay.
Martin Wight's Systems of states is renowned for setting out a grand vision of the sociology of states-systems which has undoubted importance for contemporary efforts to build connections between historical sociology and international relations. Wight's interest in the fate of conceptions of the unity of humankind in different states can be developed in a study of the impact of cosmopolitan harm conventions in states-systems. What is most interesting from this point of view is how far different international systems regarded harm to individuals as a problem which all states, individually and collectively, should strive to solve. A central question for such an approach is whether the modern states-system has progressed in making unnecessary suffering a moral problem for the world as a whole.
The attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September appeared as something entirely new in the escalating terrorist 'War on America' declared by Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qa'ida network in 1998. While there are undoubtedly novel elements in the atrocity which cost nearly 3,000 innocent, non-combatant lives, the strategic motivation of the attack, aimed at the protectors of the ruling Saudi dynasty, was not inconsistent with earlier patterns of Islamic revolt against Muslim governments and their European backers, notably the Sudanese mahdiya of 1881-99. Though spearheaded by technically sophisticated Islamist ideologues, the overwhelming presence among the hijackers of Saudis from the Asir region, with its Yemeni tribal links, is indicative of a pre-modern pattern of rebellion that fits in with the paradigm of cyclical revolt and dynastic renewal discerned by the Islamic philosopher of history Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406).
This article argues that the rebirth of interest in the just war tradition, both academically and practically, over the last few years rests on a shaky foundation. It suggests that the character of the just war as a tradition is ill suited to certain aspects of the contemporary intellectual and political world and that historical developments in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have combined unhelpfully to narrow the tradition's concerns. It also suggests that, especially after 11 September, there is a growing temptation to resent the restraints that the tradition is held to impose on warmaking and thus to ignore or abandon the just war as a way of thinking about the relationship between war and politics. Nevertheless, the article argues, to abandon the just war tradition would still bring about more loss than gain and that as an aid to moral reflection and practice on the use of force, it is still a powerful tool and an invaluable aid.