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case vignettes—Sri Lanka (K. M. deSilva), Euskadi (Cynthia Irvin and James Rae), Palestine (John Wallach), South Africa (Timothy Sisk), and Ulster (Darby himself). The cases are well encapsulated by people who know their subject well and provide a setting for the analysis, although they do not address the analytical question themselves.

The analysis begins with a breakdown of the topic into agents of violence—the state, militants (rebels or militia), and the community, and secondary issues of violence—prisoners, disarmament, security forces. The policy implications, from the point of view of maintaining the momentum of the peace process, point to a strategy of reciprocal changes, a sort of ratcheting process of confidence-building measures, mutual disarmament, restored security and legality, and cooperative anticipation and monitoring. In the end, violence can be a catalyst for peace, both in producing a stalemate in the beginning of the process and in providing the demand for mechanisms to prevent future violence. The analysis concludes with five propositions: ceasefires that last past the first few months are likely to hold; peace agreements must include everyone who could destroy the agreement; zealots can be neutralized only by former militants; leaders in a peace process need to deliver their own people and only secondarily assist their opponents; and militants need to be reintegrated into normal society, but they also need to be held accountable for the effects of violence during the conflict.

There is wisdom in these conclusions, but they do not end the debate, as Darby would doubtless agree. We understand the effects of social processes when they happen, but we do not yet know the cause. Should peace agreements involve everyone who can destroy the agreement or everyone who can produce/enforce/deliver an agreement, which is a very different matter? Should leaders in a peace process build solidarity on their side for an agreement or build bridges to the other side above all? How can the goals of integration and accountability themselves be reconciled? This book leads us to think seriously about these dilemmas of peacemaking.

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The Diplomacy of Hope: The United Nations since the Cold War by
Newton R. Bowles. Ottawa, *The United Nations Association of Canada*, 2001. 216 pp. \$18.95.

The Diplomacy of Hope is an aptly named volume covering the range of United Nations activities between the end of the cold war and the beginning of the new millennium. Newton R. Bowles has been closely associated with the United Nations in one way or another for many years. He knows the organization well and is not unaware that in many respects it has not lived up to expectations. Yet, he is never without admiration for what has been accomplished or without

hope for the UN's future. This is a book that refreshingly emphasizes the positive as it assesses the United Nations in the perspective of the Millennium Summit Meeting of the General Assembly and the many initiatives undertaken by Secretary-General Kofi Annan to prepare the organization for a new era.

The book is not a scholarly work. There are no footnotes and no bibliography. This makes for an easily digestible and felicitous read. Still, since the sources of much of the information provided are unidentified, the uninitiated reader may be left to wonder as to how seriously it should be taken. This is a shame, since from my own sources I can testify that most of what Bowles reports is on the mark, albeit a mark seen through a rose-colored prism.

The Diplomacy of Hope was written before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the renewed outbreak of hostility between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, the devastating violence in the Middle East, and the negative positions taken by the new Bush administration in Washington on UN-related initiatives that came afterward. Some of the optimistic assumptions about the prospects for global security (under the aegis of the UN) seem naïve in the light of these developments. Moreover, as in any book that covers such a broad sweep of UN activities in a sparse 178 pages, a number of factual errors have crept in. While authorship of the preamble of the United Nations Charter is claimed by several people, Archibald MacLeish is not one of them. He helped draft the UNESCO Charter not, as Bowles states, the UN Charter. The account of the disastrous UN experience in Somalia is so summary as to be misleading, and the statement that the United States unilaterally declared General Mohamed Farah Aideed an enemy is inaccurate. For better or worse, this was a Security Council decision, no doubt prompted by the United States. The Department of Disarmament Affairs was created long before Kofi Annan became secretary general. Annan only restored its status after Boutros Boutros-Ghali had downgraded it. There are other such minor errors of fact, but they are not sufficient to impair the worth of this book.

The extensive quotations that Bowles has culled from the records of the General Assembly and other UN bodies are of special value in conveying a sense of prevailing attitudes among member states. Speeches given in the UN forum by national representatives seldom receive media coverage and are hardly recalled outside the limited audience of other national permanent missions to the UN. Bowles has taken the time and patience to find especially revealing excerpts that most readers would otherwise be unaware of. He has done the same in the case of speeches and reports of Kofi Annan, for whom he has unstinting admiration. He is discriminating but fair-minded in giving us quotations from all sides, some of which provide a useful counterweight to the generally optimistic disposition of the author.

In brief, *The Diplomacy of Hope* is an informative book written from the perspective of a man who has an insider's knowledge of how the UN works and a largely uncritical faith in the good works and hopeful prospects of the world organization.

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