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Another American Century? The United States and the World After 2000 by Nicholas Guyatt. New York, St. Martin's Press, 2001. 258 pp. Paper, \$17.50.

In 1941, *Life* magazine publisher Henry Luce issued what was to become a famous plea: the United States should act so as to fulfill the possibility of an “American Century.” It could do so, Luce argued, only if it wholeheartedly abandoned isolation and used its tremendous potential power to spread its values across the globe. Soon thereafter, Vice President Henry Wallace made an impassioned rebuttal, cautioning against an imposed American world order and arguing that global development should reflect economic and social justice. From Nicholas Guyatt’s perspective in *Another American Century*, the six decades since Luce’s article have witnessed the triumph of his vision—in Guyatt’s view, an imposed, corporate-driven world order. In a sustained populist critique of American foreign policy during the late twentieth century, Guyatt argues that the world has been the loser.

The heart of the book consists of three issue-specific substantive chapters—one each on U.S. foreign economic policy, U.S. policy toward the United Nations, American military policy—and a fourth essay on the opinion leaders and academic experts who explain and critique these policies at the margins, but mostly, according to Guyatt, simply justify their core purposes and the instruments used to achieve them. Guyatt contends that American foreign economic policy has reflected an unyielding neoliberal consensus on market-driven solutions to national and world economic problems, reinforced by corporate self-interest and corporate power within the U.S. political system. As a result, governments that evaluate globalization or some of its effects more critically are marginalized by world financial markets or U.S.-controlled multilateral economic institutions. U.S. officials have similarly viewed the United Nations through a prism of narrow self-interest, ignoring or disparaging any efforts by UN officials to forge a more autonomous role and acting unilaterally, whatever their putative obligations to do otherwise, whenever it suits their purposes. In the chapter on military power and strategy, Guyatt asks why there was no substantial peace dividend for the United States following the cold war. He finds the answer, not surprisingly, in elite politics at home: neither U.S. military organizations nor the defense contractors that depend on them could accept a radical downsizing of the U.S. defense establishment. The result has been an effort to identify new threats that would continue to justify a large, technologically state-of-the-art military establishment, even as the American public remains reluctant to use force in a way that might produce significant casualties. In his fourth substantive chapter, Guyatt argues that opinion leaders both inside and outside academia typically interpret U.S. foreign policy uncritically, either blatantly accepting official values and rationales for major programs and actions or failing to offer significant counter-arguments.

Guyatt concludes that “the U.S. has created and fostered a world in which inequality and injustice are either encouraged or harboured, and in which ef-

forts to address systemic inequities and looming crises are deterred by American economic or military power” (p. 243). He laments not just these outcomes, but the absence of any serious, sustained critique of contemporary U.S. foreign policy within the United States itself. Victory in the cold war and a tight economic orthodoxy in favor of market-oriented solutions to economic and social problems have produced a virtually unassailable consensus in favor of globalization on the American model. Only the street protests against globalization witnessed at recent World Trade Organization and International Monetary Fund meetings seem to offer him hope of a broad-based populist resistance against official American priorities.

As with similar critiques of U.S. foreign policy in the past, this book can serve a useful gadfly purpose even for those who disagree with its conclusions. Mainstream post-cold war elite debate on foreign policy *has* been constrained. NATO expansion was accomplished with very little public discussion of its long-term costs and risks; decades of American arrears in payments of UN dues have been accepted as essentially normal, or as a legitimate tool to coerce reforms in the organization; foreign governments and other constituencies with serious reservations about U.S. environmental, financial, and military policies are preached to or ignored by official Washington, but rarely consulted or treated as anything other than obstacles. Yet Guyatt paints with too broad a brush. Much of the rest of the world wants to join U.S. alliances and begs for U.S. military intervention to right local wrongs; most have also accepted the ground rules embodied in the major multilateral economic organizations Washington dominates. In a sense, the United States is playing a role of global hegemon because, as collective action theory suggests, no other actor or coalition is able or reliably willing to do so. That such a hegemon would seek to promote its own values—which in America’s case are overwhelmingly individualistic rather than collectivist in nature—is no surprise. If readers want an intellectual foil for contemporary U.S. policy, they will find it here. They will have to look elsewhere for a measured critique that might contribute toward the kind of sustained debate the United States could use.

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When America Fights: The Uses of U.S. Military Forces by *Donald M. Snow*. Washington, DC, *Congressional Quarterly Press*, 2000. 221 pp. Paper, \$24.95.

This book has not been completely overtaken by events. Because it attempts to make sense of the foreign policy dilemmas facing U.S. officials between the