

# The Academy of Political Science

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## POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

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Volume 121 · Number 4 · Winter 2006-07

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*Political Science Quarterly*  
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persuasively demonstrates how an analysis of political hierarchies based on their organizational form (states, empires, occupations) allows one to identify significant differences in governance, both within hierarchical peripheries and sectors, and across. Or, put differently, Cooley develops a sophisticated conceptual framework of organizational forms in the political realm that allows him to shed light on how hierarchies are organized and how they differ with respect to governance costs, information flow patterns, and types of opportunism.

He then addresses the likelihood of institutional change, thereby introducing a much-welcomed dynamism, and examines what happens after a hierarchy collapses. Whereas peripheral U-form sectors “tend to be reconfigured, change, or collapse” (p. 125), he finds that M-form sectors, for the most part, remain intact.

In a nutshell, there are three reasons sure to secure this thought-provoking book an important place in the political science literature. First, parsimony: simply differentiating between different forms of hierarchy allows Cooley to account for significant variation in political institutions. Second, generalizability: not only does the author examine cases from both the security and economic realms, but the broad geographic scope—Soviet Central Asia, Yugoslavia, Korea, Iraq—makes this study particularly attractive. Third, predictive power: Cooley provides us with the analytical tools to speculate which forms of hierarchy are likely to endure versus which are likely to fall by the wayside, and thereby allows us to generate policy prescriptions of great use to a plethora of transnational actors.

As Cooley makes clear, his firm-type model is not the only way to make sense of hierarchical governance structures in international politics. There are ideational (sociological) and power-based (realist) competitors, yet these are best viewed as complementary rather than mutually exclusive. In fact, it is precisely the interdisciplinary nature of Cooley’s approach—borrowing from “the fields of management scholarship, institutional economics, organizational sociology, and political science” (p. 179)—that makes it so appealing.

Last but not least, this timely book promises applicability to current events. As Cooley demonstrates himself, his firm-type model can shed light on recent forms of monetary integration (currency unions, dollarization, currency boards), the rise of tax havens, and credit-rating agencies. It is therefore conceivable that his analytical framework might also be of help to decision makers in the Middle East who are confronted with the difficult task of restoring order and bringing about hierarchical governance structures that will mitigate the effects of anarchy.

KATJA WEBER

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**Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War** by Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 2005. 288 pp. \$32.95.

Critics of the George W. Bush administration’s justification of the Iraq war as regime change for democracy laud this book. The authors proclaim it not as a

refutation of democratic peace theory, only as an important qualification. But under scrutiny, the qualification provides few grounds to reject a policy of peaceful democratization.

The book continues the authors' ambitious decade-long research program. It drops their widely debated 1995 claim that newly democratic countries in general are dangerous to peace. They then narrowed that claim to apply to incomplete democratic transitions—states that liberalize somewhat but fall short of full democracy. This book introduces new theory and a new variable from the old Polity III data set: central concentration of state authority. They now argue that the *combination* of some aspects of incomplete transition with weak central institutions is what makes war likely.

The volume combines statistical analysis and case studies. Two statistical chapters address the influence of democratization on wars, allowing a welcome focus on big events with major consequences. Yet wars—especially by democratizing states—are rare events, raising the risk of explaining only a few cases meeting very particular conditions.

They track every country in the world in each of 176 years, providing over 9,000 country-years. In 537 country-years, some state experienced some degree of democratic transition by one or more of four indicators (p. 175). The first statistical chapter addresses the onset of all external wars, including colonial and imperial wars. But since virtually all the world's people now live in independent countries, the contemporary implications may be limited. The next chapter addresses only the seventy-nine interstate wars. They analyze by pairs of countries to control for particular characteristics of each pair—for example, whether democratizing countries fight democracies or dictatorships. Another move looks at the initiators of wars, while cautioning that states sometimes start a war because they fear attack. They find little evidence that complete democratic transitions often lead to war, but some incomplete democratic transitions may, especially if central authority is weak.

They consider in detail the “ten case studies that comprise all of the democratizing states in our data set that initiated interstate wars,” correctly omitting some communist states whose partial “democratization” is highly questionable (p. 169). But the case studies and the statistical analysis do not match well. A key variable—exclusionary nationalism, hard to measure statistically—appears only in the case studies, where they always find it. Because these are all war cases, however, we have no idea how common exclusionary nationalism (or a long list of other exacerbating variables from p. 67) is in non-war outcomes. Of the ten cases, they claim seven as starting a war through the causal processes they specify (p. 225). Yet four are not listed in the Appendix (pp. 285–287) as even experiencing a war following an incomplete transition. France 1849 arguably made a complete transition (pp. 186–187 and the Appendix). Serbia 1885, Iraq 1948, and Turkey 1974 do not appear in the list for any kind of war, and anyway Turkey's transition was complete (p. 223). The three remaining incompletely democratized initiators are Prussia/Germany

and Chile from the nineteenth century, and Argentina 1982. Argentina “liberalized” in 1981 from 1 to 2 on a single five-point scale, and had an average—not low—level of concentrated central authority (p. 116).

The evidence does not support their wide claim (p. 37) that “democratizing states are highly war-prone.” Some changes in the research program might be productive. Examining the nearly 500 country-years of peaceful democratic transition could tell us much about how countries’ leaders and their international supporters usually manage even partial democratization peacefully. Another move would ask whether peace is more likely from democratization carried out by a country’s own citizens rather than imposed from outside.

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**Presidential Commissions and National Security: The Politics of Damage Control** by Kenneth Kitts. Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner, 2006. 194 pp. \$49.95.

The 9/11 Commission has sparked a renewed interest in studying the dynamics and politics of presidential commissions. Although blue-ribbon panels are nearly as old as the Republic, the 9/11 Commission stands in a league of its own: its 2004 final report became an instant national best-seller, and its lobbying campaign for intelligence reform attracted more television news coverage in the summer of 2004 than the war in Iraq. When a 567-page government document commands that kind of attention, you know something interesting is at work.

The academic literature about commissions is old but surprisingly small, thin, and focused on domestic policy. For decades, scholars have periodically returned to the same questions: Why do presidents delegate political authority to blue-ribbon panels? What makes some commissions more effective than others? What general lessons or observations can be discovered by comparing different commissions across time? To date, however, there are few satisfying answers. This is a field ripe for development.

Kenneth Kitts’s book, *Presidential Commissions and National Security*, seeks to make a significant contribution by examining the 9/11 Commission alongside four of the most important national security commissions in modern American history: the Roberts Commission, which investigated the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor; the Rockefeller Commission, which examined Central Intelligence Agency abuses in the 1970s; the Scowcroft Commission on the MX missile; and the Tower Commission, which investigated the Iran-Contra scandal. Kitts’s book is the first serious treatment of national security commissions in the literature, and it is long overdue.

The book’s greatest strength is its thick description of each commission’s creation and operation. The Tower Commission chapter is particularly