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ther), neither can be considered a pluralistic country like the United States. The state is still an important reality in both countries, deeply involved in, for example, labor-management negotiations as one interpretation of Catholic social theory suggests that it should be. However, the authors add, in this respect the Iberian countries are not greatly different from France. It is possible to be democratic and civil and support a free market economy (EU-style) and still retain something of the corporate style of the Catholic past.

Catholic Roots and Democratic Flowers is an admirable textbook for students who are entering a study of the history and politics of the Iberian countries. Its low-key, balanced style and its careful, restrained judgments will help the introductory student to approach phenomena about which they know little without any burden of ideological memories that may no longer be pertinent. The inquisitive student might even ask the most important question about contemporary Iberia: Given where they were not so long ago, how did they get to where they are today?

It might also tempt the senior sociologist or political scientist who has paid little attention to Spain or Portugal in the last quarter century to ask the same question and perhaps to revise some obsolete stereotypes about the two countries, about Iberian Catholicism, about how to “modernize,” and about what it means to be European.

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Politicians Don’t Pander: Political Manipulation and the Loss of Democratic Responsiveness by Lawrence R. Jacobs and Robert Y. Shapiro.
Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2000. 425 pp. Cloth, \$50.00; paper, \$18.00.

Presidents and members of Congress don’t pander to public opinion. That is the central point of this book, which takes as its foil the idea, or perhaps the caricature of an idea, that American politicians find out what public opinion is and then manufacture their positions on issues so as to match exactly what they find. “Public opinion,” in this account, is the median viewpoint that surfaces on issues in national opinion surveys.

Instead of pandering, the authors argue, politicians once in office try to advance their own policy ideas. To this end they use opinion surveys a great deal, but they do that to figure out how to sell their own policies to the public. Politicians need to make such pitches while they are holding office, not just during election campaigns. Policies need to be successfully merchandised in this way if they are to be enacted. The public is not a blank slate on most matters, but it can be influenced. Therefore, elected officials draw on opinion surveys to help

determine how to educate or manipulate the public, to frame or “prime” issues, to justify their own views, or to counter or plant doubts about opposition views. They engage in “crafted talk.” Readers of John Zaller’s recent work on public opinion will find this line of analysis familiar.

Jacobs and Shapiro make this case convincingly—at least regarding President Bill Clinton’s drive to reform health care in 1993–1994 and Newt Gingrich’s drive to enact the “Contract with America” and overhaul the federal budget in 1995–1996. Those politicians certainly did try to advance their own ideas. No less certainly, according to the authors’ impressive evidence drawn from many interviews and other sources, the politicians drew on the expertise of pollsters to sell those ideas, not to arrive at them. For example, the White House wheeled Democratic pollster Stanley Greenberg into action after its 1300-page health-care plan had been formulated, not before (p. 103). In my view, the most rewarding parts of this book are chapters 3, 4, and 8, where the empirical case that the politicians acted in this fashion is made.

Does this mean that politicians are oblivious to getting reelected? Well, not really. Sometimes they actually do cater to the arguably exogenously existent median voter, as on welfare reform in 1996. Also, one way for politicians to serve reelection needs is to craft public opinion and then benefit from catering to its crafted version. All this is true. Yet the authors of this book have performed a major service by spotlighting the elected politicians as prime movers in the scheme of things. The basic argument of their key empirical chapters is fresh and convincing.

I was less convinced by a declinist argument that animates the early sections of the book and appears occasionally afterward. “Public opinion is not propelling policy decisions as it did in the past. Instead, politicians’ own policy goals are increasingly driving major policy decisions . . .” (pp. xv–xvi). Also, the “responsiveness” of government officials to the public has been declining (at least before September 11, 2001), as can be seen, for example, in a 63 percent match between public opinion preferences and actual government policies in 1960–1979 as opposed to a 55 percent match in 1980–1993. I have doubts about this kind of matching analysis. There is ordinarily too much of a chasm in meaning between one-line survey questions and real, complex government policy options for the analysis to work well. As for a new era of priming and manipulation, the politicians of the 1990s could have taken lessons from Senator Joseph McCarthy. The insurance industry’s use of “Harry and Louise” ads against Clinton’s health-care plan was a page out of the American Medical Association’s campaign of public persuasion against President Harry Truman’s health-care drive in 1949–1950. Perhaps the Clinton White House just lacked imagination. I cannot recall any image from the health-care drive of 1993–1994 that rivals President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s use of manipulative “quarantine” and “garden hose” metaphors to shape American opinion regarding foreign policy in the runup to World War II.

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