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to be buried in the Pantheon (mentioned twice in the book). The harshest criticism is reserved for Jürgen Habermas, however, whose appeal for reasonable communication masks soft totalitarian social engineering and who is also overly preoccupied with Fascism. A breathtaking transition then links Habermas to the hard-nosed American colonels and Nuremberg lawyers who tried to de-Nazify Germany after the war.

This is a strange minestrone of intellectual history. The topics included, the grounds for including them, and the order of the argument are remarkably idiosyncratic. Were Gottfried really looking for the most-European post-Marxist attacks on what remains of bourgeois society, he might have considered the varieties of post-modern thought. He has not. Looking for significant post-Marxist political trends might have brought him to social democracy, currently facing dramatic theoretical and practical adjustments obliged by the end of the Cold War, post-industrialism, market liberalization, and globalization. Nary a word. Why were European leftists concerned more about a renaissance of Fascism than about the crimes of Stalin? Often, they were partly blind to history. It is more significant, however, that the Fascists did much of their massive murdering in Germany, Italy, France, and elsewhere in Western Europe, whereas Stalinist crimes were relatively far away. There were, thus, good grounds for worrying about a renaissance of extreme-right hate politics. *The Strange Death of Marxism* is a curious piece of work, answering questions that few have asked. Then again, this reviewer may lack the antennae needed to perceive the threat that Habermasian post-Marxists pose.

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Losing Iraq: Inside the Postwar Reconstruction Fiasco by David L. Phillips. New York, Basic Books, 2005. 292 pp. \$25.00.

The book's title says a great deal, both about its substance and its point of view. Although David Phillips, a former State Department official and consultant to the ill-fated Future of Iraq Project, is intent on detailing what the George W. Bush administration did wrong in Iraq, the book's major contribution is elsewhere. Without excessive detail and written with an understandable combination of passion and frustration, its value lies in its first-person narrative of the Future of Iraq Project, the interagency initiative set up in April 2002 to "meld the talents, experience, and expertise of Iraqis in the service of a new Iraq" (p. 37) and its suggestion that Iraq might look different today had the Bush administration heeded the advice of this body.

With more than a decade of experience working on Iraq and traveling to the region, Phillips was asked to lead the Project's Democratic Principles Working Group. Although led by the State Department, the Project was a unique interagency body that included seventeen federal agencies and over

200 Iraqis from across the political spectrum and including every ethnic group and major political party. The goal of the group was modest but pointed: to build a sense of solidarity and common purpose between Iraqis (p. 38). Given Iraq's current state, this seems like a grand, if not unattainable dream. The Project did not resolve any of the issues that divided Iraqis, but it certainly seemed to have a handle on what the United States could expect once Saddam Hussein was gone.

Ultimately, the Project's recommendations and its participants were marginalized, and the President established the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) within the Defense Department. In what could be a far longer section, Phillips explains the seeds of the current fiasco: ORHA's reliance on private contractors, the absence of State Department experts, and the few Arabists involved in the Pentagon's "rolling transition" plan. As alarming and disturbing as the events in Iraq proved to be, Phillips is not surprised; he acknowledges that after an October 2002 meeting, he "feared the worst" for a post-Hussein Iraq, because of the divisions within the Iraqi opposition and the glaring problems with Ahmad Chalibi, the man the Bush administration naively believed could transform Iraq into a liberal democracy (p. 87). At the same time, the author remains astonished at the Bush administration claim that the United States "didn't really have enough time to plan." It had, but neo-conservatives with a different agenda just ignored the plans that had been developed.

While the first half of the book is unique and compelling, the second half hardly differs from the numerous other books that are currently available. This is because by the time of the invasion, Phillips's hands-on experience had ended, and the insider became just another—although far more credible—critic of the Bush administration.

Losing Iraq concludes with a short, even awkward chapter on lessons in nation building. Although not unlike other, far more sophisticated lists developed by those who have closely and comparatively studied nation building, this final chapter is poignant because it largely points out the obvious. Perhaps Phillips consciously chose such an ending because he knows first-hand that expertise, substance, and even facts are regularly ignored by the current administration.

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Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order

by Jeffrey W. Legro. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 2005. 253 pp. \$39.95.

Foreign policy ideas fundamentally shape international order. In the wake of World War II, the United States espoused an internationalism discordant with its isolationist tradition, and Germany, destroyed and defeated, emerged as a