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trying to institute a universal American empire. Schell's book assembles and brings into focus all of the reasons that only the first course can succeed in the twenty-first century.

The only gap worth mentioning in this remarkably comprehensive book is the failure to mention the pioneering work of Gene Sharp, who came to conclusions about the nature of political power similar to those of the author. To its great detriment, the field of political science mostly ignored Sharp and is now long overdue for a paradigm shift that can parallel the transformations of violence and politics that have actually occurred in the world. I know of no better statement of this new paradigm than *The Unconquerable World*.

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Fixing Intelligence: For a More Secure America by William E. Odom.
New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 2003. 288 pp. \$24.95.

Reform proposals advocating changes to intelligence agency organizational structures or processes are scattered throughout the intelligence literature, but most have never been implemented, and as a result, in the aggregate, they have had minimal effect on actual intelligence community operations. Now, with the post-September 11, 2001 examination of the intelligence community's flaws in full swing, William Odom, a retired Army Lieutenant General and former director of the National Security Agency, revisits a number of proposals originally put forth in a 1997 study and argues that substantial structural and managerial reforms are necessary to improve the functioning of the United States's burgeoning intelligence bureaucracy.

Odom's goal is to "look for malfunctions (due to underlying structural and organizational problems) and prescribe needed repairs" (p. 7). Accordingly, he argues that the cause of many of the imperfections in intelligence community effectiveness are due to overlapping authorities and responsibilities between the fifteen organizations that make up the intelligence community, inadequate means to assess intelligence agency effectiveness, and inefficient mechanisms for prioritizing and allocating spending. Odom's ambitious plan to address these problems and "fix" intelligence consists of simplifying areas of responsibility and lines of control by redrawing the structural responsibilities of the various intelligence community entities and expanding the ability of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI)—the nominal coordinator of the entire intelligence community—to carry out already-existing authorities by modifying the relationship that he and his staff have with the rest of the intelligence community.

Specifically, Odom argues that for purposes of efficiency, the authority for intelligence collection should be centralized into single institutions corresponding to the various methods used to collect intelligence, such as human intelligence (espionage), signals intelligence, and imagery intelligence. He also argues

that analytic capabilities should be more widely distributed and closer to the users of the intelligence, including on policymaker staffs. In order to more clearly delineate the responsibilities of the DCI and those of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Odom recommends that the DCI be organizationally and physically separated from the CIA and that both be provided with larger staffs able to evaluate programmatic effectiveness and allocate funds accordingly. In addition, Odom recommends that the DCI's analytic staff be expanded by enlarging the National Intelligence Council and reassigning the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence in order to assist the DCI in managing intelligence community collection and analysis as well as to supplement his ability to provide intelligence to the nation's top policymakers.

Odom's structural reform proposals boldly challenge conventional intelligence community management thinking, but the potential effects that the reforms might have on the intelligence community's effectiveness are impossible to evaluate because he does not address organizational processes. Intelligence agencies have established standard operating procedures, informal processes, task forces, and working groups as malleable mechanisms to bridge the inadequacies of organizational structure. Insofar as it does not address existing processes, Odom's assessment is incomplete. Structure and process work together in a complementary fashion, and structural changes alone without corresponding changes to existing processes would simplify the workings of the intelligence community in some ways, but cause greater complexity in others.

Structural reforms also entail substantial costs to organizational effectiveness as new roles and systems are created to replace the old and should be undertaken only when a clear need is demonstrated and the benefits of the new system would outweigh the costs of the transition. Unfortunately, Odom's exclusive focus on structural issues ensures that his account alone is insufficient to make that determination. Nonetheless, for purposes of acquiring a rare perspective on the complexity of intelligence community management from a former practitioner who has "been there and done that," Odom's book is worth a careful examination by those interested in the contribution that the intelligence community makes to national security policy making.

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The Vietnam War Files: Uncovering the Secret History of the Nixon-Era Strategy by Jeffrey Kimball. Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 2004. 384 pp. \$34.95.

As its title suggests, this is not a conventional history. Rather, after a forty-page tour of Nixon's policy on Vietnam, the book is given over to documents, prefaced by brief summaries and bits of connective material. Readers who are unfamiliar with the issues will probably get lost, and experts who have followed