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cantly from the higher-risk military interventions, perhaps they should be considered more favorably as effective alternatives. Given the excellent job he has done on this first volume, one can only hope that Regan will turn to the conceptually more complex case of diplomatic interventions in future work.

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NATO's Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment
by Benjamin S. Lambeth. Santa Monica, CA, RAND, 2001. 276 pp. Paper, \$20.00.

The debate over the efficacy of air power is one of the most prominent in strategic studies. For air power proponents, strategic air power enables coercive success at relatively low cost and with minimal risk. For critics, coercion is difficult, if not impossible, to achieve without boots on the ground. After every major military engagement, strategic theorists revisit this debate, and military officers from various services continuously justify their budgets by either praising or denigrating air power.

Benjamin Lambeth's superb *NATO's Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment* is a valuable contribution to this debate. The book offers both a narrative review of the conflict and analytical chapters that examine Slobodan Milosevic's eventual decision to concede defeat, the effectiveness of the air power employed in the campaign, operational problems that arose during the war, and strategic missteps that hindered the mission. In the end, Lambeth persuasively demonstrates that strategic air power played an essential role in the ultimate coercive success of the Allied Force, but that the lack of a credible ground threat and a poorly designed strategy made air power less effective than it could otherwise have been.

Lambeth's analysis is objective and even-handed. While he praises the performance of particular military systems such as the B-2 bomber, he is also comprehensive in his enumeration of the flaws in the operation, ranging from poor allied coordination to the bungled Task Force Hawk effort to deploy U.S. Army Apache helicopters.

The author's harshest criticisms, however, are directed at two key actors. First, he is repeatedly critical of the early civilian decision to take a ground invasion off the table. By doing so, the civilian leadership unnecessarily revealed its strategic intentions, which enabled the Yugoslav army effectively to hide itself from allied air power. Certain that NATO tanks were not going to be flowing over its borders, the Yugoslav army did not have to deploy to defend against a ground invasion. Had a ground invasion been credibly threatened, the air effort to destroy the Yugoslav army would have been considerably more effective.

Second, Lambeth criticizes the military leadership for its failure to design a better strategy for defeating Yugoslavia. Among other strategic missteps were an initial misguided belief that the war would be over in a matter of days, stringent rules of engagement intended to limit civilian casualties, and a highly inefficient process for approving targets. Both of these central criticisms are insightful and offer useful lessons as the United States and its allies contemplate future operations.

The book is not without its weaknesses. For those unfamiliar with the debate over air power, this book is not the best introduction. Lambeth could have done more to place his analysis within the context of larger debates over how best to achieve coercive success. In addition, although the domestic and international political contexts form an important backdrop to the story, the book could have more explicitly discussed the political decision making in both Washington and Brussels that influenced the conduct of the war.

These are relatively minor criticisms, however. In the end, Lambeth demonstrates that while strategic air power was clearly successful in Operation Allied Force, it would have been even more effective if it had been combined with the credible threat of a ground invasion and implemented with a better-designed strategy. Neither the newest stealth bomber nor the latest artillery system is inherently the perfect weapon, for even the most technologically advanced weapon system will not achieve its potential unless a wise strategy guides its employment. In almost all cases, this strategy will call for neither strategic air power nor ground power alone, but rather the integration of both.

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To Moscow, Not Mecca: The Soviet Campaign Against Islam in Central Asia, 1917–1941 by Shoshana Keller. Westport, CT, Praeger, 2001. 384 pp. \$64.95.

Shoshana Keller's important new book is particularly timely. As the world has suddenly focused on Central Asia in the wake of September 11, governments and universities have been dismayed to find how little serious scholarship on this region exists, whether historical, political, anthropological, or sociological. Keller's book is one of the first to explore the Soviet treatment of Islam in Central Asia in this period, the revolutionary first decades of Soviet rule. In intensive work in new archival materials made available since 1991 in both Moscow and Tashkent, Keller uncovers a wealth of material to enhance our understanding of the first twenty-four years of Soviet rule in Central Asia.

From the perspective of a political scientist, the Soviet failure in transforming traditional identities is the main argument of Keller's book. Until recently, most scholarship has assumed that the Soviets were successful in chang-