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will pursue "real reforms that will improve [the] system and further democracy" (p. 177).

For the student of campaign finance reform, these two works make an excellent match, albeit in support of one side of the issue. Both provide a comprehensive history of campaign finance reform efforts and make the case that those efforts have imperiled the foundations of the principles upon which the nation was founded.

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University of New Hampshire

Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea *by Jeffrey T. Richelson. New York, W.W. Norton, 2006. 702 pp. $34.95.*

Because much of the information remains classified, no treatment of American nuclear intelligence can be definitive. But it is likely to be quite some time before anyone offers a more comprehensive, detailed, and fair-minded treatment than Jeffrey Richelson's. The strength of the book is in its meticulous research, drawn from both secondary sources and a wealth of documents, supplemented by interviews, and a coherent narrative that covers the nuclear programs of America's adversaries (and allies, since France and Taiwan are included) as well as what the United States knew about them. Many readers will want to look only at the chapters on countries that concern them, but mavens will want to read it through. Where the account falls short is in analysis and generalization. Richelson is not interested in stepping back from the rich stories to relate them to more-general arguments in social science or public policy.

His account reveals that while the recent intelligence failure on Iraq's nuclear program has its unique aspects, it is not a sharp break from the previous record. Judging others' nuclear programs is extremely difficult, especially when the country is a dictatorship. One might think that as technical intelligence systems have grown in sophistication, the problem would be easier. Perhaps it is, but it is still very difficult. Overhead photography reveals a great deal, but not what is under roofs; communication intelligence can yield some strong evidence, but few messages can be intercepted; human intelligence remains invaluable, but it is often excruciatingly difficult to separate good information from fabrications. Richelson's account shows that the United States has done best when all three kinds of information are available and each can be used to corroborate and supplement the other. As long as any one is missing, intelligence is likely to be incomplete or wrong, often very much so.

American attempts to probe the Nazi nuclear program encountered several difficulties that would recur. We did not want to tell potential sources and even analysts too much about what we were looking for lest the security of the Anglo-American program be compromised. An additional difficulty that appeared in other World War II intelligence was that to say too much about

what you were looking for was likely to produce confirming reports from sources that wanted to be helpful, a problem that arose in the Iraqi case. Tracking individual scientists proved useful during World War II, and was also valuable later, but it was also difficult. In this and later cases, Richelson shows how important it was to keep track of all sorts of details, many of which at first seemed irrelevant (and which often came from unclassified or open sources) and yielded significance only when they were all combined. Meticulous record keeping and tedious research lacks the glamour often associated with intelligence, but pays off.

So does luck. Richelson confirms other accounts in stressing how many of the most valuable human sources were "walk-ins," that is, people who literally walked into an American facility and volunteered their services. Of course, it was a challenge to separate the sincere from those who were sent by the enemy or who were just deranged. Every intelligence service has made errors in both directions, but it is striking that for all the attempts to lure people into becoming agents, volunteers have probably been of greater value.

The judgments about what others were doing were difficult, and the U.S. government often was split. Not surprisingly, the Defense Department's intelligence arm usually produced very high estimates, the State Department's usually implied there was room for negotiations, and the CIA's varied, although it was not always the most accurate.

Along the way, the reader learns some good stories and nice tidbits. The sensor that the United States dropped to gain data on Chinese nuclear tests was designated Tobasco, the flash detectors on the Vela satellites that detected nuclear explosions were called bhangmeters, and, more substantively, in April 1961, the French detonated a nuclear device before it was ready in order to ensure that the nuclear material did not fall into the hands of the rebelling generals in Algeria.

ROBERT JERVIS
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The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South *by Matthew D. Lassiter. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2005. 376 pp. $35.00.*

In his book's dense, intricate introduction, Matthew Lassiter presents multiple provocative arguments about race, class, and politics in the South of the 1960s and 1970s. His bold revisions are based on an examination of metropolitan politics at the neighborhood level. He challenges the "southern strategy" as a top-down Republican exploitation of a white southern reaction to the civil rights movement, and he rejects the "artificial distinction" between de facto and de jure segregation. He also criticizes "race-reductionist narratives" that neglect class, and he introduces urban geographical or spatial relationships to the study of race (p. 4).

Lassiter provides close analyses of metropolitan politics in Atlanta and Charlotte during brief periods of controversy. Before addressing the two