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Greek-Turkish Relations in an Era of *Détente* by *Ali Carkoglu and Barry Rubin, eds. New York: Routledge, 2005. 166 pp. Cloth, \$100.00; paper, \$36.95.*

Since 1999, the so-called “seismic diplomacy” has fostered a significant thaw in Greek–Turkish relations, and for the first time in the last sixty years, there is a real opportunity for a breakthrough. The book traces the motives behind the rapprochement and explores the record in business contacts, cultural perceptions, security environments, and defense expenditures in both countries. Despite some gaps and drawbacks, the result is an interesting account of the issues, prospects, and limitations of bilateral contacts.

On the positive side, the book is a truly collaborative product of scholars from both sides of the Aegean, edited by Ali Carkoglu and Barry Rubin. The reader is treated to an in-depth analysis of the political and cultural changes in Greece that made the rapprochement possible, as well as the impact of the United States, the carrot of EU membership for Turkey, a snapshot of Turkish public opinion, and the issues associated with defense budgets in both countries. There are surprising findings, such as the absence of an action–reaction sequence in defense expenditures in either country, and a bit of theory at the end, where Carkoglu injects a two-level games perspective into the discussion. All this makes the book readable and interesting.

There are, however, drawbacks and omissions. As an edited volume, the book suffers from the lack of a common framework. The introduction is short and weak, and does not give a road map of the big picture. So the reader is left to figure out why the essays are related and how they illuminate the big picture. This is not a trivial matter. Ahmet Evin, for example, provides an interesting summary of the changes in Greek perceptions of Turkey that made the rapprochement possible. He is right to argue that it still remains mostly an elite-driven process that has hardly touched the masses. But we are left wondering whether it was only changes in Greece that made this possible. The implicit argument is yes, but that appears one-sided. Surely, the end, from a military perspective, of the Kurdish conflict and the general crisis of the Turkish political system and economy in the late 1990s created the requisite conditions for a change in Turkish attitudes. But we are not given this perspective in the form of a full-blown essay. Similarly, a marvelous and very informative essay on the state of Turkish public opinion shows in unmistakable terms the obstacles still needed to be overcome before full normalization in bilateral relations takes place: Average Turks are deeply xenophobic, with Greeks and Armenians (both Christians, the authors point out) at the top of the enemy list; Greece is seen as by far Turkey’s worst friend and the country most likely to attack Turkey. Despite such views, however, there is still considerable desire to normalize relations. Unfortunately, we are not given a similar analysis of Greek public opinion. Although I suspect the results would be somewhat different (not by much, I fear), it is impossible to gain a full

picture of bilateral obstacles without looking at the Greek side. Moreover, because the survey (a commendable effort, to be sure) was taken in 2001, insufficient time has elapsed to allow discernment of any significant change as a result of seismic diplomacy. One hopes there will be similar surveys given repeatedly over time.

Perhaps the most disappointing aspect of the book is that it omits policy recommendations. We know much about what causes conflict but precious little about how to defuse it. Greek–Turkish relations in the last five years or so are the perfect example of how to do it. Although it remains an insightful book, the editors miss a wonderful opportunity to provide a road map that will set an example of conflict resolution for generations to come.

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The Vital Partnership: Power and Order, America and Europe Beyond Iraq by Simon Serfaty. Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005. 187 pp. \$24.95.

Simon Serfaty's new book on the partnership between the United States and members of the European Union (EU) is as timely as it is insightful. In a refreshingly balanced appeal for a revitalization of transatlantic relations, he illuminates the structural reasons and compelling long-term trajectories that underline why a close cooperation between these two centers of Western power is mutually beneficial, if not a necessity.

In light of past difficulties in forming multilateral coalitions, he identifies a temptation for the United States, coming from a position of unparalleled military strength and a robust economy, to pursue its national interests unilaterally. Yet, he warns that unilateral actions in imposing a democratic order on the rest of the world are neither credible nor sustainable. With Iraq as his prime example, he sees the United States answering an imperial call to impose its vision of a democratic world order without Americans being willing, attracted, or destined to maintain such an order. Instead, Serfaty argues that a superior European wisdom and culture exists and could serve to balance American brute strength. This European component would then assure domestic and international audiences of the benign intentions of the West.

For the Europeans to be a credible peer to the United States in this process, however, the EU has to become stronger militarily and more united politically. Only a united Europe has the political clout with the international community to alleviate fears of American unilateralism. Ideally, the membership of the EU should converge with that of NATO (including Turkey), thereby providing a streamlined interface between the two sides of the Atlantic. For this to take place, the United States will have to appreciate the fact that a stronger EU, freed from its "provocative [anti-American] instincts," is ultimately in America's