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inevitability of conflict depend on some uncomfortable assumptions: states must be both untrustworthy *and* incapable of learning about the reliability of others for the most pessimistic “war of all against all” scenarios to come to fruition. Permitting even slight variations in these assumptions opens the door to levels of cooperation that are difficult to reconcile with portrayals of international politics that emphasize persistent conflict.

Methodologically, Kydd suggests that analysts can use observed behavior to draw inferences about the trustworthiness of states, even if direct evidence about their motivations is unavailable. This is an interesting idea, given the difficulty of measuring trust and of gaining access to the kinds of data typically required to assess intentions. Kydd argues that what scholars need in order to draw conclusions about trust are predictions about the types of behaviors that trustworthy and untrustworthy states are likely to exhibit. For example, Kydd sides with scholars who conclude that the USSR was untrustworthy after WWII, based on its efforts to dominate smaller states, like Poland, because trustworthy states are unlikely to engage in such behavior.

Kydd also makes some questionable claims. For instance, he finds that making states more powerful makes them less trustworthy. However, asymmetric power relationships, in which one actor gives another control over something of value, are central to trusting relationships. Initial capability differences between potential trustors and trustees should not matter at all. Rational actors know that trusting others means that their interests may be damaged, and yet they do it anyway, because they believe that their counterparts will not take advantage of them. The underlying problem is Kydd’s conceptualization of trust. Although Kydd portrays trust as the expectation that others will cooperate, it is better defined as the expectation that others will advance rather than harm interests placed under their control. Using this latter definition would have made it difficult to conclude that *ex ante* power relations are significant, but it also might have forced Kydd to reconsider his claim that binding commitments are critical for establishing trusting relationships. Binding commitments may help states cooperate, but because they limit the discretion of trustees, they are a substitute for trust, not a cause.

These objections aside, Andrew Kydd’s book is a model of systematic thinking about important subjects. The field of international relations is stronger because of its publication.

AARON M. HOFFMAN
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Trust and Rule by Charles Tilly. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005. 216 pp. \$19.99.

At least since the publication of Robert Putnam’s seminal *Making Democracy Work* (*Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*, Princeton,

NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), trust, whether personal, societal, or embedded in particular social institutions or networks, has been a central preoccupation of social scientists. As Putnam and others have contended, trust is the central component of the social capital that greases the wheels of democracy. Moreover, trust, in almost all of its guises and virtually everywhere, from the industrially advanced West to the remote confines of the Third World, appears to be in decline. This development, in turn, is thought to place democracy, both at home and abroad, at considerable peril.

Charles Tilly's treatment of the subject of trust does not depart far from these central conventional wisdoms about the importance of trust to a well-functioning democracy. Nonetheless, in *Trust and Rule*, he brings to light a host of discreet interactions between trust and democratic politics largely overlooked by other scholars. Arguably, the book's most important contribution is unpacking how trust affects the processes of democratization and de-democratization at the national level. This is one of the weakest points of the renewed emphasis that scholars have placed upon the concept of trust.

For the neo-Tocquevillean school of thought pioneered by Putnam, trust is a by-product of the configuration of civil society. Strong civil societies are rich in trust, whereas weak ones are, on the whole, devoid of trust. This simplistic analytical formulation leaves unclear how and why trust matters to the development or detriment of democracy at the national level. Tilly himself directly addresses this point by noting that "Putnam's work on Italy and the United States puts the connections between trust and democracy prominently on the agenda of democratic theory without actually stating a clear argument concerning the causal chain between trust and democracy" (p. 132).

Tilly views trust as a historical product rather than a phenomenon whose variation can be explained without reference to history. In particular, he contends that trust is best understood in terms of risks. He writes: "Trust networks consist of ramified interpersonal connections, consisting mainly of strong ties, within which people set valued, consequential, long-term resources and enterprises at risk to the malfeasance, mistakes or failure of others" (p. 12). Trust's relationship to democracy is an interactive one: the integration of trust networks into public politics promotes democracy, whereas the withdrawal of trust networks weakens democracy.

Tilly theorizes that democracy combines extensive integration of trust networks into public politics with the heavy reliance of rulers on commitment rather than coercion and as means of ensuring political compliance. This leads him to conclude that the future of democracy depends on the capacity of states to hang onto trust networks, because their withdrawal from public politics damages democracy. This withdrawal is likely to occur not only because of bad political performance, but also as a consequence of a host of other factors, including privatization of social security or health care, withdrawal of elites or minorities from public schools, and substitution of electronic communication for direct contact among political activists.

Few scholars are likely to disagree with Tilly's well-reasoned theories, although many are likely to object to the methodology he adopts to prove them. Typical of his approach to the study of political phenomena, his historical-analytical framework is literally all over the place. It spans centuries and incorporates a disparate collection of empirical experiences ranging from medieval Europe to contemporary Mexican and Spanish politics. Certainly, this is likely to be a source of frustration for those who like their social science research agendas neatly packaged into well-defined historical narratives.

A more substantial criticism of the book, however, is the way in which Tilly and many others continue to regard trust (however defined) as the only compass for understanding the workings and fate of democracy. It is high time to re-discover the democratic virtues of a guarded—and indeed mistrusting—public.

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From Elections to Democracy: Building Accountable Government in Hungary and Poland by Susan Rose-Ackerman. *New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005. 272 pp. \$50.00.*

Susan Rose-Ackerman's latest book is the clearest statement yet of the inadequacy of mechanistic indicators of democracy. Free elections, the existence of political parties, and even freedom of speech and association are necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for a government that is answerable to the citizens it serves. They can help to remove officials from office, and introduce their replacements; but they cannot ensure that governments will fulfill their electoral programs, provide public goods instead of seeking private benefits, or reflect popular needs.

This study of the channels of accountability in two post-communist democracies powerfully demonstrates that to achieve policy-making accountability, in which policies reflect the "interests and needs of the population" (p. 5), several additional institutional channels have to connect governments and citizens. Rose-Ackerman examines five of these: the demands of external organizations, specifically the EU; formal institutions of oversight and control, such as ombudsmen, constitutional courts, or audit offices; decentralized government institutions, such as elected local officials and regional governments; government procedures for public consultation and participation in policy making; and civil society groups and the policy input they provide.

The key finding of the book is that as critical as these five channels are, they have developed unevenly, and often with considerable flaws, in post-communist democracies. For example, even nominally independent audit commissions and ombudsmen are subject to parliamentary approval, and thus to political nominations. Civil service organizations, whether environmentalists in Hungary