

# The Academy of Political Science

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## *POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY*

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Volume 120 · Number 1 · Spring 2005

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*Political Science Quarterly*

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classical peacekeeping is accurately described as the deployment of peacekeepers into a conflict situation to provide a space in which a peaceful relationship among the parties in conflict can be restored. This usually has been between states, as the term Westphalian would suggest, but by no means always. Few, if any, traditional peacekeeping operations have been deployed to facilitate a liberal international polity.

Dag Hammarskjöld identified the traditional form of peacekeeping that he developed at the time of the Suez War in 1956 as a *provisional measure* as defined in Article 41 of the UN Charter, which means an action implemented without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali also identified the more robust form of peacekeeping that he called “peace enforcement” as a provisional measure. This identity as a provisional measure is the clearest distinction that can be made between peacekeeping in all its forms and enforcement action taken (or authorized) by the Security Council against an aggressor under articles 42 and 43 of the Charter, as happened when Iraq invaded Kuwait. This distinction does not emerge clearly from the terminology used in *Understanding Peacekeeping*.

Notwithstanding such presentational problems, *Understanding Peacekeeping* is a valuable book. The authors have made an especially useful contribution in making understandable the extent and complexity of UN peacekeeping operations of all types in today’s global environment and in explaining just why these operations have sometimes succeeded and almost as often failed.

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**Power and Purpose: U.S. Policy Toward Russia After the Cold War** by James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul. Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press, 2003. 450 pp. Paper, \$19.95.

This book gives the reader more than its title indicates. Its authors trace U.S. policy in conjunction with both Russian foreign policy and changes in Russian democratization, human rights issues, and economic development from the late 1980s into 2003. Their focus is on U.S. policy toward the USSR and Russia after the Cold War, particularly during the presidencies of Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin. James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul have made use of their contacts to interview many of the actors involved.

Their theme is that ideas count, that “the worldviews of key decision-makers play a central role in the making of American foreign policy” (p. 333). Ideas change with administrations and contest each other within administrations. In U.S.–Russian relations, the ideas and actions of the United States under George H.W. Bush featured a “prudent realism” (p. 9) (felicitous term!), foregoing attempts at influencing democratization in Russia, favoring the status quo of a power balance.

The idealistic efforts of the Clinton administration involved assisting regime transformation and promoting democratization and economic reform. Its idea of mission can be traced back to the vision of America as a “city on the hill” that we hear so much about these days. But as this detailed account makes clear, the complexities of the U.S.–Russian relationship have prompted the tempering of idealism with realism in setting policy priorities, and have tested the reliability of reformist assumptions.

Ideas may carry particular weight at times of rapid change. But perceptions of change in Russia may overestimate possibilities for reform, as this account reminds us. U.S. perceptions lagged behind in regard to such changes as the diminution of Russia’s power. The administrations of both George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton (during its early years) overestimated the military power of Russia. Perhaps not without long-term benefit, one should say, this spurred efforts to incorporate Russia into a framework of cooperation with the West, such as befitted and might mollify a great power. Tensions had arisen in relations with Russia over NATO’s eastward expansion and over U.S. opposition and military response to Serbia’s genocidal policies against Kosovar Albanians. The deal with Russia included its membership in the oversight “quartet” of the EU, UN, United States, and Russia. The United States helped to arrange a special relationship with NATO and in 1998, Russia’s entry into the G-7 group of leading economic powers.

Such concessions to Russia seem to have carried no serious cost. But in trying to support Russia’s departure from the Communist legacy of state economic centralism, the U.S. administration overestimated Russia’s receptivity to economic reform of the shock therapy variety. In fact, the book might have dug even deeper—were it a study primarily of internal politics—into whether there was some validity to the objections of the parliamentary opposition to Yeltsin-supported shock therapy in 1992–1993. Support for “loans for shares” privatization in 1995–1996 induced the emerging oligarchs to support the reelection of Yeltsin, purported champion of democracy, in 1996.

Shares securing bank loans gave bank owners—the oligarchic new billionaires—access to Russia’s economic (and, for a time, political) commanding heights. From there they could look down in relative safety on the financial collapse that wiped out the savings of millions of less fortunate compatriots. And, as the book points out, at least U.S. robber barons created new wealth, whereas the Russian oligarchs were then merely grabbing existing assets. One might add that after seven decades of Communism, and with an all but demolished private sector and semblances of legality, Russia had little or none of the “fire in the ashes” that Theodore White discerned in Western Europe after World War II.

The attacks of September 11 brought a new level of cordiality into relations with Russia. Yet the Bush administration’s worldview injected new strains and ironies into relations with Russia. That happened when President George W. Bush’s vision of a crusade against evil sent U.S. and allied forces to invade

Iraq. But no Cold War split of East and West resulted here. Yeltsin's successor, President Vladimir Putin, aligned himself with France, Germany, and other parts of "old Europe" against the U.S. invasion, in the name of adherence to international law, the UN charter, and Security Council resolutions. The Russians pointed to the absence of convincing grounds for invading Iraq, and to double standards for pushing democracy in Iraq and Iran but not in Egypt or Saudi Arabia. Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov added to his extensive criticism of the U.S. invasion of Iraq "serious doubts about a democracy imposed by Tomahawks" (p. 328).

For all their differences by early 2003, including Russian military sales to Iraq, Putin and Bush maintained a certain cordiality, while U.S. reservations about Russian attempts at reform and concern over the ongoing horrors of war in Chechnya faded from top priority "once the war was over" (p. 329). But how quickly things changed after the writing of this book. The war in Iraq only seemed to be over. Also, I must question the notion that Bush was simply promoting "Wilsonian ideals"—in either principle or practice. The National Security Strategy document of 2002 briefly cited in the book (p. 14) departs from Wilsonian idealism in principle (in its emphasis on the U.S. ability and willingness to go it alone, if necessary) and in practice, by bypassing inter-governmental institutions.

Considerable detail supports the finding that for all its power, the United States has turned out to be either unwilling, or when willing, unable to significantly influence domestic change in Russia. But as an observer of Russia on and off since the 1950s, I suggest keeping in mind for the future the long-term influence of diffuse and persistent nongovernmental contacts related to cultural exchanges, human rights, and religious revival.

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**Human Rights: Between Idealism and Realism** by *Christian Tomuschat*.  
New York, Oxford University Press, 2003. 370 pp. Cloth, \$72.00; paper, \$39.95.

This book is based on a series of lectures that Christian Tomuschat delivered two years ago at the Academy of European Law of the European University Institute. The author, who is a professor of constitutional and international law at Humboldt University and has written extensively on human rights issues, focuses primarily on procedures and mechanisms of implementation. There is very little discussion of the conceptual debates concerning the origins and nature of human rights or of the relationship between human rights and democracy that have so dominated recent scholarship in the field. Rather, as the author states at the beginning, it is focused "particularly [on] the mechanisms designed