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prove of broad interest to students of Congress. Chapters 6 (the House) and 7 (the Senate) serve to empirically test Larocca's informational theory, going through each of the twelve congresses. Some readers may have a problem with Larocca's use of ordinary least-squares regression for dichotomous dependent variables. His explanation is unpersuasive because of recent advancements in interpreting coefficients in standard logistic regression. However, most readers will be reasonably confident of Larocca's findings, given his extensive use of control variables and obvious familiarity with an impressive data set. *The Presidential Agenda* is an important contribution to our understanding of presidential-congressional relations and should be widely read.

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The Race to 270: The Electoral College and the Campaign Strategies of 2000 and 2004 by Daron R. Shaw. Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press, 2006. 216 pp. Cloth, \$50.00; paper, \$20.00.

In the golden age of party bosses, George Washington Plunkitt, slinging barbs from Tammany Hall, cheerfully dismissed his academic allies as unnecessary ornamentation. Many scholars are happy to keep a safe distance from party politics. However, in *The Race to 270: The Electoral College and the Campaign Strategies of 2000 and 2004*, Daron R. Shaw demonstrates that political scientists can offer valuable assistance to political campaigns by using analytic tools developed within the social sciences. Having served as adviser to both of George W. Bush's presidential campaigns, Shaw is well positioned to rebut Plunkitt's thesis. Indeed, Shaw takes advantage of a rare opportunity in political science: he is the victor who gets to write about his own history with a national campaign.

This book is no axe-grinding polemic. *The Race to 270* carefully analyzes two razor-thin campaign triumphs from the perspective of a social scientist who has full access to the results of insider campaign polling. Shaw uses his data to answer a key question in the literature on American elections: do campaigns matter? Most scholars acknowledge that campaigns affect outcomes to some degree; the problem is measuring the impact and significance of campaign activities. Shaw's solution is to reconstruct the early targeting plans for the Democratic and Republican presidential campaigns in 2000 and 2004 and then to study the allocation of media expenditures and candidate appearances, as well as the seeming effect of these activities on voters. Shaw finds that, generally speaking, the campaign organizations did in fact pursue their initial plans. Moreover, a pooled time-series analysis shows that media buys seem to nudge voter support in the intended direction, if only slightly, and the data appear to demonstrate that "candidate activities had a positive and often significant impact on both vote share and candidate favorability" (p. 137).

Scholars who read Shaw's work closely might quibble over a few points. There is a strong tradition of case-based scholarship that deserves more attention than it receives in *The Race to 270*, and the contributions of political science to the practice of American politics might be slimmer than Shaw suggests. Still, these are minor issues compared to the major thrust of Shaw's book, which is to illustrate the manner in which presidential campaigns strategize an electoral college victory.

Presidential campaigns view the electorate not as a single unit, or even as 50 distinct state units, or even as a targeted set of "median voters" in selected states; rather, a wise presidential campaign strategist sees the political map as the intersection of battleground states and media markets. When Shaw was working for the Bush campaign, he routinely "calculated the relative cost efficiency of advertising for each of the media markets within our list of battleground states" (p. 61); the rankings that this calculation produced would then drive the campaign's media expenditures. This aspect of presidential elections—ranking media markets for persuasive efficiency—is a form of strategic behavior that many scholars have overlooked in their study of presidential elections, but one that can no longer be ignored.

The Race to 270 cannot settle the "campaign effects" debate once and for all. While Shaw deftly shows that voter support seems to follow campaign activities, scholars wedded to the notion that campaign effects wash out in the end will continue to argue that waves of support have little impact on the overall electoral tide, that the final vote count remains dependent on outside forces. Nevertheless, for students of presidential politics—both the management of campaigns and the analysis of outcomes—Shaw offers a unique contribution to the field, combining the diagnostic skills of a political scientist with the intuitive sensibilities of a political professional. The result is a unique, robust analysis of electoral college targeting.

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Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power
by Randall Schweller. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2006.
182 pp. \$29.95.

There is no longer any strong current of opinion that believes that the theory of realism predicts national behavior in response to the threat posed by another state. Realist theory may suggest that those who refuse to balance against a potent aggressor will be penalized, but the doctrine does not say what states will actually do. This means that states can react aggressively or relatively passively. With a given amount of power, states can seek to exercise more or less than they possess. Frederick the Great exercised more power than he actually maintained in the mid-eighteenth-century European system, and barely emerged