

The Academy of Political Science

475 Riverside Drive · Suite 1274 · New York, New York 10115-1274
(212) 870-2500 · FAX: (212) 870-2202 · aps@psqonline.org · <http://www.psqonline.org>

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

Volume 122 · Number 3 · Fall 2007

No part of this article may be copied, downloaded, stored, further transmitted, transferred, distributed, altered, or otherwise used, in any form or by any means, except:

- one stored electronic and one paper copy of any article solely for your personal, non-commercial use, or
- with prior written permission of The Academy of Political Science.

Political Science Quarterly is published by The Academy of Political Science. Contact the Academy for further permission regarding the use of this work.

Political Science Quarterly

Copyright © 2007 by The Academy of Political Science. All rights reserved.

strategy, or lack thereof. The author portrays Bush as being devoid of any sense of “policy process” (p. 225), and far more interested in results (such as the capturing of terrorist suspects) than in process. The defining of strategy and operative details were left to Vice President Dick Cheney, “the global thinker of the pair” (p. 213), who devised the “one percent doctrine” of the book’s title, namely that a decision to go after a suspect need not be based on anything more substantial than 1 percent certainty.

The overall impression the book conveys, then, is that of a nation under centralized authority taking on global terrorists and pursuing “postmodern rules of international behavior” (p. 214). This is a rather frightening picture of the world’s super-power presiding over a global village of terrorists. The book is almost entirely about U.S. decision making, not about terrorists, and the effect it produces on the reader is one of irrelevance, the irrelevance of U.S. power at the disposal of a leadership pursuing a 1 percent doctrine to wage a war on terrorism that is getting nowhere. Terrorists continue to thrive. But, at the same time, one could argue, so does the global community, which has not been decimated, either by the terrorists or by the U.S. “postmodern” unilateralists. To ponder reasons why would be a worthy undertaking for scholars and non-specialists alike. And one of the book’s virtues is to encourage us to ask that question.

AKIRA IRIYE
Harvard University

China and Iran: Ancient Partners in a Post-Imperial World by John W. Garver. *Seattle, University of Washington Press, 2006. 401 pp. Cloth, \$50.00; paper, \$24.95.*

It was a strange sight when Mao Zedong’s premier, Zhou Enlai, hosted a state visit by Empress Farah of Iran’s right-wing Pahlavi dynasty in 1972, and bizarre again when the Islamic Republic’s theocratic ruler Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini welcomed Chinese premier Li Peng in 1991. John Garver draws a bright thread between these visits and other events as well, making sense of one of the most complex, puzzling, and important diplomatic relationships in recent history.

Despite drastic changes of ideology on both sides, the leaders of Iran and China have pursued strategic benefits in their ties for 35 years. Iran has a large population, major resources, and a strategic location, but its ambition to be the dominant power in its region has been frustrated by its neighbors’ enmity and the competing objectives of more-distant great powers—at different times, Britain, Russia, and the United States. China is the only big power for whom Iranian dominance in the Persian Gulf would be a good thing. Similarly, few powerful states look with pleasure on China’s rise to great-power status, certainly not Japan, India, or the United States, and Russia’s tolerance for China’s

rise may be temporary. Iran is one of the few major countries for whom the rise of China is an unadulterated plus.

Global events keep pushing Chinese and Iranian interests to converge. In the 1970s, both countries were threatened by the rise of Soviet influence. Now both want to see American dominance restrained. Both want to keep Pakistan strong to counterbalance India. China has the wherewithal to help Iran get nuclear technology, and Iran is able to help China solve its energy needs.

This is not a perfect marriage. The two countries have different visions for Central Asia—theocratic versus secular—and Iran has even tried on occasion to export Islamism to China's sensitive Xinjiang province. Persian negotiators drive business deals so hard that even Chinese companies sometimes cannot stomach them. But to a remarkable degree, the two countries share a strategic vision. As Garver describes it, "A Chinese anchor in East Asia paired with an Iranian anchor in West Asia could well emerge as a central element of a post-unipolar, China-centered Asia circa the middle of the twenty-first century" (p. 295).

Garver's analysis of the past and future of the relationship is thoroughly researched, analytically astute, and lucidly presented. As in his authoritative book on China–India relations (*Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001), Garver sees the relationship he is studying from the inside—what it means to the participants in their own mental worlds, from the outside—how it works geostrategically, and from all around, in historical, cultural, diplomatic, strategic, and economic dimensions. If I had a quibble, it would be to question what is added by emphasizing what Garver calls the "spiritual" dimension, which looks to me like feel-good rhetoric about one another's great civilization to dress up a relationship based on strategic and economic interests.

Garver's analysis supports in different ways both the "China threat" and "peaceful rise" analyses of China's trajectory. Here are two very substantial countries that do not like American hegemony. In Garver's view, if America weakens, the China–Iran tie could undergird a new Asian order that would be adverse to U.S. interests across a broad swath of the map. He also shows, however, that both countries have limited power and that China places priority on maintaining its hard-won smooth relations with the United States. Beijing has pulled back from cooperation with Iran whenever the United States has made a vociferous enough case that missile sales, nuclear cooperation, or supplies of chemical weapons precursors (component chemicals) have threatened core American interests.

But in making this argument, Garver also shows how hard it is for Washington to get Beijing's attention. His case study of what it took to get China to stop selling Silkworm missiles to Iran in the late 1980s is worth several readings by commentators who like to pronounce on what the United States is achieving or not achieving in its relations with Beijing (or for that matter, with Pyongyang, Islamabad, or any other capital that has a complicated agenda, as

most do). Engagement, bargaining, sanctions—all these things can work, but a look inside the diplomatic kitchen shows that like sausage-making, they don't work as smoothly as the end product may suggest. China lied and twisted and dealt double to try to accommodate both U.S. and Iranian pressure before finally complying—maybe—with American demands.

With close attention to Chinese, Iranian, Indian, and Pakistani foreign policy goals and methods, Garver guides us away from the simplistic idea that other countries are either allies or enemies, that they see things either our way or the wrong way, and that with friends, cooperation is automatic and if there are differences, it is a sign of malevolence. Rather, the grown-up reality is that some of our interests are compatible with those of other major nations and some are not. Both Chinese and American foreign policies are the result of complex cross-pressures. In any diplomatic relationship, there is a mix of trust and distrust, and pathways to cooperation are found through friction and conflict.

ANDREW J. NATHAN
Columbia University

Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid by Jimmy Carter. New York, Simon & Schuster, 2006. 288 pp. \$27.00.

Any serious discussion of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict must take as its point of departure the fact that Israel has occupied Palestine for 40 years; has dispossessed hundreds of thousands of Palestinians from their villages, properties, fields, and orchards; has built Jewish settlements (or “neighborhoods,” as Israel prefers to call the settlers in Arab East Jerusalem) in some of the most desirable areas of the West Bank; has impoverished most of the Palestinian people; has prevented them from exercising their political right of self-determination; and has repressed all Palestinian resistance to these policies—all Palestinian resistance, meaning not just terrorism against Israeli civilians, not just armed revolution directed against the Israeli occupying forces, but also nonviolent resistance.

Thus, it is the Palestinians and not the Israelis who are the main victims in this conflict. This is now widely understood everywhere in the West other than in the United States; indeed it is understood by many Israelis themselves, as is evident to anyone who follows the vigorous and highly self-critical discourse in the Israeli press.

By now, it should be obvious on its face that Israel, for reasons both of justice and its own long-term self-interest, must end its intransigence, withdraw from the occupied territories, and allow the Palestinians to create a genuinely independent but militarily limited Palestinian state in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem—providing that the Palestinians end all forms of violence against an Israel that has returned to its own internationally recognized borders. Indeed, these central moral and empirical truths are so evident that their repetition has become almost a cliché.