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too little” (p. 140). In addition, the Belgians had no say in Allied strategy. Disappointed when their commandos were assigned to General George Patton’s decoy operation in the lead-up to the Normandy invasion, Belgians joined the front lines when the British advanced on Brussels in September 1944.

Allen explains how the Belgian government struggled to balance its commitment to the Allied military effort with meeting the survival needs of its civilian population and pursuing its political priorities. One issue was the Resistance. It preserved the port of Antwerp and, during the Battle of the Bulge, identified numbers of German SS troops disguised as Americans before they could do damage behind Allied lines. (Excessive saluting by these “Americans” was one give-away.) The popularity of the Resistance, however, especially the communist-led *Front de l’Indépendance*, worried the conservative Pierlot. The British helped by taking 30,000 resistance men to Northern Ireland for military training. A larger difficulty was coping with pervasive malnutrition, disrupted trade, closed factories, and ruined transportation networks. The Belgians nevertheless provided Allied forces with coal, food, labor, and transport through Lend-Lease. Widespread discontent led to the formation of a new government in February 1945.

This fresh approach is a welcome addition to the tons of World War II scholarship devoted to the great powers. Allen’s work contributes to our understanding of how the wartime experiences of a small nation inspired many of its leaders to promote postwar international cooperation.

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Globalization and State Transformation in China by Yongnian Zheng.
New York, Cambridge University Press, 2004. 320 pp. Cloth, \$70.00; paper, \$25.00.

This book purports to describe the ways in which “globalization,” defined (p. 19) as “a process of selective importation of Western state products, [a concept borrowed from Bertrand Badie] i.e., ideas on state-building,” affects and is dealt with by the Chinese state. Yongnian Zheng presents as his goals the assessment of problems resulting from globalization, the examination of the state’s ability to cope with globalization, and the identification of future challenges emerging from the encounter with global forces. Thus, the book is an ambitious one—unfortunately, perhaps too ambitious, given its many problems.

The chief weakness of the book is the nearly total disconnect between the author’s aims and the body of the study. After two somewhat abstract introductory chapters and a third stimulating chapter connecting globalism with nationalism (portions of which, however, draw upon Zheng’s 1999 book on nationalism), Zheng proceeds to cover a range of 1990s political and social developments. Almost nowhere, however, does he explore the linkage between

China's global involvements and the empirical material he is presenting. If "products" were truly "imported," Zheng must tell the reader which Western practices and institutions were drawn upon and how. But he never undertakes that project. Worse, he never supplies any empirical reference whatever for the concept "state products."

The initial framework lends the impression that the state's adoption of Western "state products" was rationally undertaken by leaders bent on integration with the world community. And yet, in the subsequent chapters, we see practically nothing of this. Instead, the analysis unfolds in accord with who is allied with whom, who is conservative or liberal, and who stands to gain or lose by various institutional alterations (pp. 93, 102, 114), the rational choice to align China's governance with Western models disappearing from sight.

A chapter contrasting the views of conservative and open-minded intellectuals on a range of issues is skillful and insightful. But the same cannot be said for much of the rest of the information offered. Zheng maintains—without documentation—that capitalism had been "publicly advocated" by "many social groups" and chosen by leaders in the early 1980s (pp. 64–65, 156), when the evidence shows that economic reform unfolded piecemeal and without blueprint, certainly without a vision of installing capitalism.

Internal contradictions, repetitions, and errors abound in the chapters on economic policy. Just to list a few: pages 85 and 102 give the date of the creation of the State Economic Commission as 1982, but on page 90, this date is given as 1979. On page 123, the author states that "the Asian financial crisis had a major impact on the regional and world economy, including China's"; on page 125, however, he says "China was one of the few economies in Asia that were largely spared from the adverse impact of the 1997 Asian financial crisis." Zheng gives as one reason for this that "the renminbi was not easily convertible for capital transactions," but it is simply *not* convertible for capital transactions. On page 129, he states, incorrectly, that foreign investors are "denied access to SOEs" (state-owned enterprises), but on page 133, he states, correctly, that some SOEs "sought foreign partnership." On page 130, Zheng states that "no substantive results were achieved" in the reform of SOEs in the 1980s, whereas on page 157, he says, "The economic performance of SOEs improved considerably during the reform years." Pages 131–132 and 156–157 offer different dates for the introduction of the policy of concentrating on large SOEs. And while Zheng attests that "by the end of 1999, China could boast a fairly comprehensive banking and financial structure" (p. 123), there is no reference to the critical problem of nonperforming loans. At times, identical information appears twice, on consecutive pages (pp. 7–8, 127–128) or even just a paragraph apart (on both pp. 127 and 128).

The chapter on protest, although factually unproblematic, labels peasant and worker resistance "social movements." Although Zheng knows the social movement literature, he does not establish that these protests meet the definition of "movements." Indeed, the inability of localized protesters to combine

and the frequent arrests of their leaders work against such an interpretation. This chapter also tosses the terms “state-building,” “state-rebuilding,” and “state making” about without explaining their differences, if any, while implying that so long as recentralization has occurred, the state has been “built.”

A final problem is the failure to consult authors whose work is pertinent to his subject, including Dali Yang, Margaret Pearson, Joseph Fewsmith, or Kevin O’Brien. It is a pity that neither author, manuscript reviewers, or editors at the Press paid sufficient attention to this publication.

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The Canadian Senate in Bicameral Perspective by David E. Smith. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2003. 263 pp. \$50.00.

Protecting Canadian Democracy: The Senate You Never Knew edited by Serge Joyal. Montreal and Kingston, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2003. 371 pp. Cloth, \$85.00; paper, \$32.95.

When Canada was created in 1867, its political institutions formed a set of checks and balances as intricate as those found in the United States. The collective Cabinet was to be a check on both individual ministers and the prime minister. The House of Commons was to be a check on the executive, whereas the appointed Senate was to act as a check on the elected House in order to protect minorities as well as to act as a forum where regional/sectional interests could be effectively represented so as to check the more populous provinces, who would dominate the popularly elected House. In addition, the Queen’s representative, the Governor General, was both symbolic head of state and, because Canada was still a colony of the United Kingdom, an officer of the British government, who would protect its interests. One by one, the checks and balances have been eroded, to the extent that the terms “elected dictatorship” and “democratic deficit” have become part of the popular contemporary lexicon.

The first of the institutions to see its role significantly diminished was the Senate. Its legitimacy as a voice of regional interests and as a check on the elected House was almost immediately called into question. The central problem was that it was an appointed body, whose members were selected solely by the prime minister and subject to no checks other than his political considerations and needs. Within a decade, there were calls for reform, through election or provincial nominations, and when these went unanswered, for abolition.

The years have not been kind to the Canadian Senate. As the editor of *Protecting Canadian Democracy*, Serge Joyal, a senator himself, writes: “The Senate is likely the least admired and least well known of our national political institutions. Its work attracts neither the interest of the media, the respect of