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freshman classes to be anomalous in their appreciation of institutional norms. Indeed, given that many of the younger members of the 104th Congress were products of a Gingrich-led GOPAC "farm team" of candidates schooled on how to "talk like Newt" about the shortcomings (even "corruption") of the Democratically controlled House, it is not surprising that these members have less regard for House norms than do their more-senior colleagues.

These criticisms notwithstanding, this is a well-constructed study that properly centers its analysis on the attitudes of House members. In a field that sometimes tends to view the House primarily through highly stylized theoretical lenses, Choate's calls for increasingly tapping members as a resource and a greater behavioral focus are well taken. Though problematic at times, this book will undoubtedly lead its readers to reconsider the importance of congressional norms. For this alone, it is well worth reading.

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The United States and Coercive Diplomacy *edited by Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin. Washington, DC, United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003. 464 pp. Cloth, $45.00; paper, $19.95.*

U.S. diplomacy leans heavily on its military might. Building upon the work of scholars such as Thomas Schelling and Alexander George, this volume, edited by Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin, explores the limits of coercive diplomacy, the attempt to get a state or nonstate actor to modify its behavior with "either the threat to use force or the actual use of limited force" (p. 6). When married to military power, diplomacy becomes "forceful persuasion," acting to compel changes in an opponent's foreign policy with measures short of war.

As Art notes, coercive diplomacy is an attractive tool of foreign policy. The strategy seems to promise results "on the cheap," obtaining desired goals with minimal costs (p. 5). Yet, as the contributors to the volume argue, coercive diplomacy is a difficult undertaking, one that entails inherent risks. If the United States fails to coerce another state, politicians must either back down—risking their reputations—or escalate the crisis to war.

Coercive diplomacy's unique challenges are aptly demonstrated in the volume's eight case studies. Written by scholars and practitioners, these chapters seek to demonstrate the successes and failures of U.S. coercive diplomacy in the post–Cold War world, from 1990 to 2003. The details of most of the cases, including the U.S. intervention in Somalia, NATO's bombing of Serbia, and the containment of Iraq, will be well known to the reader. Yet, the studies provide significant insight into contemporary coercive diplomacy. Martha Crenshaw, for example, convincingly argues that many characteristics of terrorism complicate the use of coercive diplomacy. With terrorists, targets of coercion are "multiple, shifting, and diffuse," their assets hidden and thus difficult

to threaten, and their behavior more risk-acceptant than that of states (p. 314). Similarly, William M. Drennan's discussion of North Korea demonstrates the limits of coercive diplomacy when faced with weapons of mass destruction, showing how failures of U.S. and North Korean bargaining almost led to dangerous crisis escalation in 1994. Dealing with the more-conventional arena of Great Power struggle, Robert S. Ross's excellent analysis of the 1995 Taiwan Strait confrontation demonstrates that both the United States and China successfully deployed coercive diplomacy, with China convincing the United States to reduce its support for Taiwan while the United States maintained credibility with its Asian allies.

If there is any weakness to *Coercive Diplomacy*, it is in its discussion of the theory—under what conditions is coercive diplomacy likely to succeed or fail? As with many edited volumes, there is no framework uniting the different case studies. At times, the cases seem more focused on contingent events—Jimmy Carter's role in North Korea, or particular personalities bargaining in Haiti, for example—than they are on generalized statements about coercive diplomacy.

Moreover, in the end, this volume does more to confirm hypotheses than to develop new ones. In his conclusion, Art draws many of his arguments from George's earlier work on coercive diplomacy, including his emphasis on whether positive inducements, the "balance of resolve," and the type of demand made to an opponent influence the success rate of coercive diplomacy. Art's conclusion will certainly be useful for scholars interested in testing theories of coercive diplomacy in different historical settings, but it may be less useful for those wondering whether these hypotheses are still valid in a world in which conventional security threats are augmented by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and transnational terrorist networks. Nevertheless, Art's conclusion, that coercive diplomacy exhibits mixed results at best, is an extremely important finding for academics and policy makers alike, making this a significant contribution to the fields of diplomacy and conflict resolution.

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Trade Threats, Trade Wars: Bargaining, Retaliation, and American Coercive Diplomacy *by Ka Zeng. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 2004. 324 pp. $57.50.*

This book addresses the question of why some countries (particularly China) successfully resist U.S. trade threats, leading to what the author believes is a related question: why are pairs of democratic countries prone to trade wars? The author answers these questions by way of deductive reasoning, statistical tests on U.S. Section 301 actions (a part of the Trade Act of 1974 that authorized the executive to retaliate against foreign countries that practiced "unjustified" and "unreasonable" trade practices), and a selection of case studies involving U.S. trade disputes with China, Japan, Canada, and the EU.