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POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

Volume 118 · Number 3 · Fall 2003

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Political Science Quarterly

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for a long time the rather unusual alliance in which Japan's military role was very limited. While most works on the subject focus on their bilateral relationship, Searight puts it in the framework of multilateralism and points to a very interesting phenomenon: Japan's increasing interest in playing a significant role in international organizations, in contrast to the diminishing commitment on the part of the United States to such cooperation, something that became apparent during the 1970s. The author notes that "Japan has sought to bind the United States to multilateral rules that would constrain the unilateral exercise of its power" (p. 173). Although such efforts seem to have failed more often than not (for example, the Kyoto protocol and the Iraq war), this divergence is likely to grow in importance.

Singling out these essays for mention should not imply that the other contributions are of lesser value. While they deal with topics about which reams have been written—on security, economics, the media, and technology—they do offer interesting suggestions about the future direction of U.S.-Japanese relations. Here, there are some disagreements among the authors. Michael J. Green thinks "the international distribution of power" (pp. 31–32) will be the key to the future of the security alliance, whereas Steven K. Vogel, the volume editor, asserts that "military power is [today] less dominant because it is irrelevant to a growing proportion of the international relations agenda" (p. 269). In either case, there is recognition of the importance of the regional picture, a perspective that is shared by many other contributors. William W. Grimes notes that since 1991, "a larger share of Japanese exports has been with Asian countries than with the United States" (p. 52), while Keith A. Nitta speculates, "If the United States [expects] a continued Japanese subservient role on every issue, Japan may turn to regional organizations as arenas for action, moving from a foreign policy of open regionalism to closed regionalism" (p. 90).

These observations suggest that the bilateral relationship will be increasingly embedded in the regional context, which may, in turn, be defined by what is happening globally. The development of a bilateral relationship into something more multilateral, regional, and ultimately global is a fascinating story, and the essays in this volume help us understand this evolution from many pertinent perspectives.

AKIRA IRIYE
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Yellow Smoke: The Future of Land Warfare for America's Military by Robert H. Scales, Jr., Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. 208 pp. \$24.95.

Major General Scales has written an important book. Although it joins a growing number of others that treat future land warfare and offer prescriptions

for modernizing the U.S. military, this volume should not be pushed aside as more of the same. The author was the commandant of the Army War College before his retirement, and he led a lengthy study meant to help the army leadership decide how best to modernize and adapt to the post-Cold War political, fiscal, and technological realities. Thus, he provides readers an exposure to the methods of thought and analysis that have guided U.S. Army doctrinal change and force development since the Vietnam War.

Scales does a first-rate job of showing the complexities and challenges the U.S. Army faces in an environment of political and technological change. He argues that land forces must undergo more change—both technological and intellectual—than sea or air forces. The latter face no big, new threats at sea or in the air while land forces confront a plethora of new adversaries. Moreover, the relative simplicity of sea and air space is not comparable to the complexities of ground terrain, weather, and hostile populations confronting land forces.

One might quarrel with some aspects of his description of the changing geostrategic environment and where and why U.S. military forces may be used, but one also has to admit that he meets his stated criterion: not to be terribly wrong about them. He identifies the two key changes from the Cold War environment. First, an overwhelming American military faces numerous small and far less competent potential adversaries. Second, they will most often be positioned very far away from deployed U.S. forces. That makes time and distance critical variables for operational planning. In turn, these variables become central determinants for designing forces and lift capabilities to move them.

He traces the changes in the importance of these variables from the Korean War through Vietnam, Panama, Somalia, Kuwait, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, insisting that the U.S. military adapted more effectively than generally recognized in dealing with time and distance as they affected maneuver and firepower in highly varied terrain and political contexts. The recent war in Iraq fits neatly with the trends he identifies from this evolutionary process, yielding what he calls a unique “American style of war.”

Scales is willing to challenge conventional Pentagon wisdom. For example, close combat soldiers, that is, infantrymen, who compose only 4 percent of the army’s personnel, do not get the priority they deserve in modernization programs. New technology makes their tasks mentally more demanding. Yet, they are largely recruited from the low IQ ranks. No other soldiers face the physical and psychological demands they do. But the army’s assignment system denies them the social cohesion and intense training they require. Their importance, Scales insists, is grossly underappreciated. Aircraft, artillery, and ships cannot finish wars, only combat infantrymen can. For another example, while Scales accepts the need to lighten ground forces to make them more mobile, he insists that light forces should never be left to fight without Abrams M-1 tank units for support.

The war in Iraq vindicated both of his judgments, even for the layman watching television coverage of the 3rd Infantry Division moving north to seize Baghdad. Army heavy forces, with M-1s and close combat soldiers, proved more critical than any other type of force. The book is not easy to read, but it will be invaluable for university courses in national security policy making as well as for congressional staffers and journalists.

WILLIAM ODOM
Georgetown University

Democracy and Post-Communism: Political Change in the Post-Communist World by Graeme Gill. *New York, Routledge, 2002. 272 pp. \$95.00.*

This book addresses one of the most fascinating questions of the post-communist transition: Why did some post-communist states achieve stable democratic political systems while others did not? The subject of Gill's study are twenty-six post-communist countries that he categorizes into three broad groups: democracies, façade democracies, and non-democracies. The book's central argument is that these different political trajectories can be explained by the strength of civic society forces vis-à-vis the regime at the time of regime change. Prospects for democracy were greater in the post-communist countries where civic society forces were stronger and played an important role in the negotiations at the initial stage. Alternatively, where civil society was weak and regime transition was left in the hands of the old regime elites, an authoritarian outcome was more likely. Depending on the position of civil society forces vis-à-vis the state, the author identifies six basic patterns of regime change that lead to one of the three outcomes in the post-communist states.

The book begins with a typology of post-communist regimes and critiques of existing explanations of the divergent trajectories pursued by the post-communist countries. The following chapters cover the period of regime change and the subsequent political and institutional developments that took place in these countries in the 1990s, the history of the civil society in the post-communist countries, and party systems developed in the post-communist period, including data on the nongovernmental organization sector development and public activism in them as well as on privatization progress. Gill concludes with an analysis of state policies on economic reforms and constitutional engineering.

The book's central argument that the strength of civil society and the role it played at the time of regime crisis determines whether a country will become a democracy is plausible and compelling, even if not entirely new. The theoretical framework of the book, however, has some limitations. If the strength of civil society is so important for the developmental trajectories the post-communist