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*Political Science Quarterly* is published by The Academy of Political Science. Contact the Academy for further permission regarding the use of this work.

*Political Science Quarterly* Copyright © 2005 by The Academy of Political Science. All rights reserved. throughout the book a range of economic, social, and racial issues, concluding, ultimately, that economic issues concerning the growth of government best explain the gradual partisan change. Lublin argues that race was not the issue causing partisan change in the decades immediately following the civil rights movement in part because there was little difference between white Southern Democrats and white Southern Republicans on race. In his conclusion, the author acknowledges that racial issues, such as affirmative action, and social issues, including abortion, are rising in importance today.

The book is clearly written, well organized, and well documented; the argument is carefully developed, albeit at times repetitive. Lublin offers evidence and authority at every step of his tightly drawn thesis. Although this is not necessarily a good undergraduate classroom book, the book is ideally suited to scholars and serious journalists. *The Republican South* should also be of considerable interest to partisans plotting long-term party-building strategy. This author proffers constructive advice to partisans of both stripes, especially in the concluding chapter "The Future of Southern Politics." Ken Mehlman and Howard Dean, call your local bookstore now.

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**The Formation of the National Party Systems: Federalism and Party Competition in Canada, Great Britain, India, and the United States** *by Pradeep K. Chhibber and Ken Kollman. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2004. 272 pp. Cloth, \$50.00; paper \$24.95.* 

Reading this ambitious volume, I was reminded of Willy Sutton's response to the journalist who once asked him why he insisted on robbing banks. Sutton allegedly replied, "Because that's where the money is!" The authors hypothesize that political parties emerge and then are driven to organize and compete wherever, among levels of government, the locus of effective power over public policy may be.

This seems like a reasonable idea, if not pushed too far; but this pitfall has not been avoided here. The overreach itself is spurred by some imprecision in the definitions of key concepts and/or unpersuasive measures used to establish where the weight of their empirical evidence leads.

Impressive quantities of district-level electoral data, as well as information about national and local public expenditures and bureaucracies and selected historical events are provided for Great Britain, Canada, India, and the United States. These countries were chosen as test cases for the above proposition because they share similar electoral systems of the single-member-district-plurality-wins variety. The electoral data permit the authors to explore as well whether, in such systems, Maurice Duverger's so-called law about the prevalence of only two competing parties in such countries actually holds (Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties*, London and New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1954, pp. 207–228). The law seems to work quite powerfully, but only at the electoral-district as opposed to the national level. The authors note that this is true even of India, a country with huge numbers of language, class-and-caste, wealth, and religious cleavages. On the other hand, Canada and Great Britain are designated as sometimes exceptions to the rule, and it is a pity that the authors acknowledge (p. 223) that they have essentially nothing to say about why this may be so. It is, after all, the puzzles about politics that invite attention.

The persistent claims the authors make—that their key hypothesis is validated, and that it represents *the* superior explanation for the emergence and development of political parties and party systems and, equally important, for the changes that both the parties and party systems experience over time—are, at best, only weakly supported. They do show that despite stability in the electoral rules of the four countries, the number of "effective parties" within them at the national level has changed from time to time, and that these changes seem to correspond to moments of greater concentrations of public policy authority at the national or sub-national levels (pp. 161–179). But there is a complicated cause-and-effect problem about this that is not investigated in the depth it deserves.

In the closing pages, the authors do consider that there may be other explanations than theirs as to why these shifts in authority and power concentrations may occur. They also acknowledge that, indeed, it may be the political parties themselves that, in responding to the challenges they cite—war, economic depression, nation building, and the creation of the welfare state—actually bring about these power and authority shifts between center and periphery. They also cite the existence of much research that would tend to show that parties can be powerful independent variables that bring about, or impede, such changes.

These alternative claims, however, are then dismissed with the comment that, after all, parties are not "mostly" or "solely" responsible for such transformations (p. 227). However, none of the studies they cite, or others I have read, make any such claim. If, as the authors suggest, something called "the state" also brings about these changes (which, in turn, drive the parties in one direction or another) much more direct analysis of this possibility would be needed than is found here.

Most political scientists and historians would argue that political parties, along with several other agents of change, have typically been considerably more than organizations that react to power shifts engendered by war, depression, welfare legislation, post-independence nation building, and so many other challenges. Contemporary Iraq is a striking example of when and how political parties of another country, and the leaders of these parties, can actually become the proximate causes of events that bring about major shifts in the locus of governmental power in both places.

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