Political Science Quarterly
Volume 114 No. 3 (Fall 1999)

 

A World Transformed: The Collapse of the Soviet Empire, The Unification of Germany, Tiananmen Square, The Gulf War
By George Bush and Brent Scowcroft. New York, Knopf, 1998.
Reviewed by Thomas A. Schwartz

 

A wise senior colleague of mine, commenting on an essay I had written about American diplomacy in Europe after World War II, wrote, “Be careful with success stories. We academics generally don’t care for them.” I would guess that many academics will not care for this volume by President George Bush and his National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft. The book depicts an extraordinarily successful period in American diplomacy, during which the United States achieved such cold war objectives as the end of Soviet control over Eastern Europe and the unification of Germany within the NATO alliance. These goals seemed unrealistic dreams when Bush became President in January 1989. Bush and his team accomplished these long-sought objectives without humiliating Mikhail Gorbachev and the Soviet leadership, or as Bush disdainfully puts it, “dancing” on the Berlin Wall. In the end Bush and Scowcroft even engineered the diplomacy that would help prevent the final collapse of the Soviet Union in August 1991 from leading to widespread conflict. Although known for his modesty, President Bush allows himself a moment of justified pride when he and Scowcroft write in their prologue that because of their efforts, “We eluded the shadow of another Versailles” (p. xiv).

The book is not a comprehensive look at the Bush foreign policy. Noteworthy by its absence is any discussion of the administration’s lack of response to the initial break-up of Yugoslavia, a time when some believe that Slobodan Milosevic’s trouble making might have been nipped in the bud. On the other hand, Bush and Scowcroft are forthright in dealing with one of the most controversial aspects of the Bush foreign policy, their reaction to the Chinese government’s massacre of students in Tiananmen Square. Both men condemn the action, and both were appalled by the behavior of the Chinese leaders. Yet it is also clear that each had quite a stake in China. Both were involved in opening up the country to America in the 1970s, and neither wanted to see the relationship endangered by the violent suppression of the Chinese democracy movement. Within days of the event, Bush sent a private letter to Deng Xiaoping, with the offer to send a special emissary—ultimately Scowcroft—and pleaded that “We must not let this important relationship suffer further” (p. 102). The authors make the case that their efforts helped elicit Chinese cooperation with the administration, especially during the Gulf War. But the unseemly haste with which they courted Beijing, especially in contrast to their strong warnings to Gorbachev against violence in Eastern Europe and the Baltic states, does leave one wondering about a double standard in American foreign policy. What is it about China that has entranced Americans and distorted their judgment since the Open Door notes of a hundred years ago? We seem to find it difficult to develop a policy toward China consistent with both our values and interests. With the recent revelations about Chinese nuclear espionage, this debate is unlikely to end soon.

But give credit where credit is due. The George Bush in these pages is an incredibly knowledgeable and skilled leader, with a remarkable gift for personal diplomacy and coalition building. Bush and Scowcroft recapture the tension and suspense before and during the Gulf War, and remind us how difficult it was to convince Congress and the American people of the importance of that conflict. Many of their critics now look somewhat foolish, and although the authors do not seem particularly intent on settling scores, they provide a compelling defense of the administration’s policy, including leaving Saddam Hussein in Baghdad. Curiously enough, this book about American successes ends with a dire warning against isolationism, and an insistence that we in America “live up to our responsibilities” (p. 566). Will we be hearing such a theme in a campaign speech from another Bush in the very near future?