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Volume 13, Number 1, February 2001
Contributors
Introduction by Amnon Varon
China and the Pursuit of State Interests in a Globalising World by Stuart Harris
From the time of Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms in 1978, China has adopted policies designed increasingly to enable it to take advantage of the processes of globalisation. Although it puts the emphasis on economic globalisation, its increased integration with the globalising international system poses difficult domestic and international choices for the governing regime. Domestically the growing importance of private enterprise and entrepreneurship raises difficult questions, notably about the role of the Chinese Communist Party. Internationally, there are concerns about the vulnerabilities involved in interdependence. Moreover, domestic policies to maintain stability or actions internationally to maintain sovereignty often detract from the image of a responsible international power which is needed to achieve China's economic development in a globalising world. Despite the tensions, integration will continue.
A Testing Ground for China's Power, Prosperity and Preferences: China's Post-Cold-War Relations with the Korean Peninsula by Taeho Kim
Strategic divergence between China and the United States complicates, rather than benefits, the inter-Korean reconciliation process, which in turn could accentuate, and at a minimum has increased uncertainty over a host of regional issues as well. It is thus likely that profound peninsular and regional uncertainty would intensify and diversify hedging strategies by all actors, as the recent surge in diplomatic activities has amply shown.
China, Taiwan and the United States by Gary Klintworth
Sino–US relations are the most problematic of all the great power relationships in the Asia–Pacific region, and in that relationship it is the question of Taiwan and its future that is the most difficult. However, through trial and error over the last 50 years, China and the United States have established a workable framework in which to manage their relationship and any crisis that might arise over the Taiwan issue. Essentially, China and the United States are sticking to certain rules that make conflict over Taiwan avoidable and unlikely, despite outbursts of posturing and rhetoric. The rules are that the United States will intervene only if China uses force against Taiwan, but China will use force only if Taiwan declares independence or continually refuses to negotiate. The new and eminently pragmatic Taiwanese President, Chen Shui-bian, however, has said he will not declare independence if China does not attack. He has also indicated a willingness to open up negotiations with Beijing. The sticking point is the definition of 'one China' but there have been subtle signs of some flexibility on this issue. There are any number of variables that might upset the chance of China and Taiwan settling their dispute over the meaning of 'one China', with disastrous consequences for both parties, for China–US relations and for the Asia–Pacific region in general. Most recently published articles are uniformly pessimistic. In the author's view, however, the prospects of a redefinition of the meaning of 'one China', to the satisfaction of both sides, are improving and the likelihood of a confrontation over the issue, at least in the foreseeable future, is receding. If so, this will remove one of the irritants in Sino–US relations.
China's Relations with ASEAN: Partners in the 21st Century? by Lee Lai To
Though Sino–ASEAN relations improved in the 1970s, Indonesia and Singapore did not establish diplomatic relations with Beijing until 1990. China's rise as a major power, its 'open-door' policy, the end of ideological bipolarity, and the uncertainties surrounding America's future role in the region contributed to ASEAN's reassessment of its attitude to China. Underlying the new cordiality was not only the prospect of mutually beneficial economic relations but also China's greater willingness to engage in ASEAN's multilateral processes and institutions. Yet not all ASEAN states were fully convinced that this new climate would continue to prevail. Lingering suspicions of China's future intentions would lead some to stress the need for a residual US presence in the region. Generally, however, ASEAN's response was a pragmatic one. For the moment and the near future, the promise of economic co-operation with China seems to outweigh security fears. What has yet to be determined is the relationship between short-term and long-term expectations, on the one hand, and between security and economic considerations, on the other.
South Asia in China's Foreign Relations by J. Mohan Malik
This article examines the key characteristics underlying China's policy and perceptions about South Asia and surveys China's relations with South Asian countries in the 1990s and beyond. Beijing's South Asia policy is tied to China's military security concerns vis-à-vis that of India and territorial disputes. Chinese leaders regularly visit Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka to demonstrate a continuing determination to remain involved in South Asia and to reassure China's friends that improvement in Sino-Indian relations would not be at their cost. Beijing insists on the resolution of bilateral problems and disputes in accordance with the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and remains critical of India's coercive diplomacy to guard its security interests. Beijing's entente cordiale with Pakistan continues to flourish, underpinned by nuclear and missile co-operation. New Delhi continues to keep a close eye on the political and strategic relations between China and India's neighbours. Current strategic and economic trends indicate that South Asia's importance in China's national security calculus is likely to increase in the 21st century. A Sino-Indian rivalry in southern Asia and the northern Indian Ocean may well be a dominant feature of future Asian geopolitics.
From Horse to Horsepower: Energy in China's Relations with Central Asia by Yitzhak Shichor
The growing gap between China's oil and gas production and consumption has led not only to a considerable increase in imports but also to unprecedented investment in oil and gas production sharing and pipelines abroad. Central Asia is playing a leading role in these policies which also involves additional global, regional and domestic political, strategic and economic benefits. Despite initial reluctance, stalling and difficulties, Beijing appears to be moving ahead in underscoring the predominance of energy in its relations with Central Asia, along with resolving border, water and security issues and resistance to separatism, terrorism, religious fundamentalism and 'hegemonism'.
The Quadrilateral Relationship between China, the United States, Russia and Japan at the Turn of the Century - A View from Beijing by Jiemian Yang
China attaches great importance to maintaining constructive relations with major powers. This article deals with the background and characteristics of the relationship between China, the United States, Russia and Japan. These countries are the four major powers in the Asia–Pacific region and indeed in the world. Their relationship contributes to the reshaping of the global configuration of power, especially international political and economic orders. Since the end of the Cold War, this quadrilateral relationship has been undergoing changes and readjustment. Although they compete and differ with each other on a number of issues, these four nations are trying to create co-operative economic and security mechanisms. To achieve this objective they need to adjust to the new era of political polarisation, economic globalisation and cultural integration. As we look into the new century, this relationship would follow the same patterns of friction, contradiction and conflict.
The Role of History in China's View of the World Today by Thomas Bartlett
Since the end of the Cultural Revolution, with its extreme emphasis on internal class struggle, universalist 'scientific' Marxist historicism has yielded to a culturally distinctive nationalist approach to history, defining a conceptual and rhetorical orientation for much of China's view of its new involvement with the world. Self-justification by reference to history figures prominently in many Chinese statements about international relations. Because the assumptions underlying China's historical outlook are not well understood by many otherwise well-informed foreign observers, there exists a serious gap in perceptions, so that exaggerated and tendentious claims are often not subjected to appropriate criticism. For example, the year 1840 remains in the official historiography, originally defined in Marxist terms, as the watershed between China's 'ancient' and modern periods. This artificially late date obscures important but currently controversial issues in Chinese politics and international relations.
Book Reviews