Pacific Affairs: An International Review of Asia and the Pacific

Volume 73, No. 1

 

Peace And Conflict In The Southern Philippines: Why The 1996 Peace Agreement Is Fragile
By Jacques Bertrand

 

Abstract

The 1996 agreement between the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the government of the Republic of the Philippines ended more than two decades of hostilities. Its cornerstone was the creation of an expanded autonomous region in Mindanao, which must be conrmed in a plebiscite in 1999 or 2000. For the rst time, the government of the Philippines and Muslims in Mindanao agreed on a shared understanding of the territorial claim of the Muslims. Muslims gained some protection of their way of life and a recognition of a right to self-government. Furthermore, MNLF leaders were given the opportunity to rule during the transition to a fuller autonomy.

Nevertheless, these achievements have been insufcient to attract the support of Christians, Lumads, and even many Muslims. Many factors have weakened the peace process. First, the transitional structures of autonomy do not provide a good test for future autonomous institutions because of mismanagement and corruption. Second, these structures received little support from groups other than the MNLF, including non-Muslims as well as Muslims, such as supporters of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. Third, the agreement did not address the issue of land rights. Fourth, the peace accord has not produced many of its expected benets, especially an improvement in living standards for Muslims. By the end of 1998, the peace process had been severely weakened. We could expect that the plebiscite on expanded autonomy will have little success. While the article argues that the 1996 peace agreement is fragile, it also concludes on some options that might strengthen it.