Center for Nonproliferation Studies
The Nonproliferation Review
Volume IX, Number 3/Fall-Winter 2002

Abstracts

 

Nuclear Regionalism in Russia: Decentralization and Control in the Nuclear Complex
by Adam Stulberg

One of the dangerous casualties of Russia’s democratic and market transition has been the weakening of centralized control over the country’s nuclear complex. Preying on this weakness, a mélange of independent-minded bureaucrats, enterprise managers, organized criminal networks, and other “insiders” have complicated the formulation and implementation of Russian nuclear policies. While analysts have identified the conditions that confront specific nuclear institutes, there has been a dearth of systematic inquiry into how “regionalism” has affected the management of Russia’s nuclear complex.

Although many presume that Russian nuclear policy remains centralized, Adam Stulburg of the Georgia Institute of Technology uncovers considerable evidence of intrusion by oblast- and local-level political elements into the formulation and implementation of Russia’s nuclear policies and related cooperative assistance programs. Stulberg reviews the shifting sands of regionalism in Russia, underscoring the scope of post-Soviet center-periphery relations and the limits to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s attempt at restoring federal control over policymaking. The article also recounts the general uncertainties surrounding the ability of Russian policymaking to manage the nuclear complex and outlines how sub-federal politicians exploit the strategic situations in which they have been placed, specifying the different dimensions of regional intrusion into Russian nuclear policymaking. Finally, the article assesses the various implications that regionalism has for controlling and stabilizing Russia’s nuclear sector and offers practical guidelines for refining U.S. cooperative nonproliferation assistance programs to cope with the challenges posed by regionalism.

Misapplied Lessons? 9/11 and the Iraq Debate
by Jeffrey W. Knopf

The 9/11 terrorist attacks changed the way many Americans view the world, making them more willing to use force against a potentially hostile country. This change has had a large impact on the U.S. debate about whether to use military force to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Baghdad. Using analogical reasoning based on the experience of 9/11, many Americans have concluded that it makes sense to strike Iraq before it attacks the United States. Such reasoning, however, overlooks the findings of cognitive and social psychology, which highlight the potential for analogies to earlier events, such as the 9/11 attacks, to be misleading.

In this article, Jeffrey W. Knopf of the Naval Postgraduate School draws heavily on the “lessons of history” or “analogical reasoning” approach to examine the impact of 9/11 on U.S. decisionmaking regarding Iraq. Knopf argues that the apparent role of 9/11 in convincing the United States to embrace the option of a preventive war against Iraq fits quite well with the expectations of the analogical reasoning approach to explaining foreign policy decisions. Knopf goes on to contend that on careful examination, 9/11 does not strengthen the case for a preventive attack on Iraq as much as many people seem to think. As suggested by research on analogical reasoning, the article concludes that many of the purported lessons that people have drawn from 9/11 are probably misleading when it comes to the case of Iraq.

The Impact of the Nuclear Posture Review on the International Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime
by Jean du Preez

The Bush administration provoked controversy with the January 2002 release of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)—a strategic planning document that integrates nuclear weapons into broader aspects of U.S. defense planning. According to administration officials, the NPR reduces the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security policy, as it makes strategic nuclear weapons only one of three legs of a new strategic triad. Critics of the NPR, however, view the document as increasing the importance of nuclear weapons, assigning them new missions in U.S. military planning, and signaling that the United States intends to develop new nuclear weapons and possibly resume nuclear testing. Reflecting these views, international reaction to the NPR was largely negative.

In this article, Jean du Preez of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) provides an analysis of the international reaction to the NPR in the context of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Du Preez assesses the negative impact of the NPR on key aspects of the regime, including the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The article also analyzes the impact of the NPR on the security assurances provided by the United States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states. Du Preez concludes by examining the impact of the NPR on the strengthened NPT review process, in particular the disarmament commitments agreed to by the United States and other nuclear weapon states at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

The Case for an Enforceable Consensus against NBC First Use
by Lewis A. Dunn

In the uncertain world of weapons proliferation, how does one prioritize the potential threats to global stability? On a region-by-region basis, for instance, it is possible to identify today’s toughest nonproliferation problem countries—from Iraq and Iran in the Gulf to North Korea in East Asia. Another approach would highlight challenges to the overall set of nonproliferation institutions, organizations, and treaties, and propose possible responses. Still another approach might place priority on responding to unexpected developments that have dramatically changed the nonproliferation landscape.

This viewpoint, by Lewis Dunn of Science Applications Corporation International (SAIC), advocates a new and innovative approach. Dunn maintains that first, the gravest current proliferation threat is the use of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weaponry, whether by a state or a terrorist group. Second, it is necessary to go beyond individual national efforts aimed at dealing with this threat to establish and implement an enforceable international consensus that the first use of NBC weaponry cannot and will not be tolerated. Achieving such a consensus may be very difficult if not impossible in the near term. Nevertheless, Dunn argues that it is important to consider the elements of such a consensus, its potential payoffs, and possible interim steps toward its adoption.

China’s Fissile Material Protection, Control, and Accounting: The Case for Renewed Collaboration
by Nathan Busch

Since 9/11 international concern about possible terrorist access to fissile materials has intensified. For good reason, the majority of international attention has focused on the risks posed by inadequately secured fissile materials in the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union (NIS) and Pakistan. In its efforts to improve nuclear security, however, the United States and the international community should not overlook the potential risks posed by fissile material stocks in the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

Because the Chinese system of nuclear material control is partly based on that used in the former Soviet Union, Chinese controls could suffer the same weaknesses during domestic crisis that the Soviet system has exhibited since 1991. To address this issue, U.S. national laboratories began the China Arms Control Exchange (CACE) in the mid-1990s, aiming to encourage increased transparency and mutual understanding of nuclear security issues. However, this program was halted in 1998 following allegations of Chinese espionage targeted against U.S. nuclear facilities. This viewpoint, by Nathan Busch of the University of Georgia, proposes reviving the CACE program to improve the security of Chinese fissile materials, assesses the current risks associated with the Chinese fissile material stockpile, and identifies a number of potential weaknesses in China’s MPC&A, particularly during times of domestic upheaval.

Second Tier Proliferation: The Case of Pakistan and North Korea
by Guarav Kampani

Pakistan’s alleged trade of sensitive uranium enrichment technologies for North Korean Nodong missiles highlights the broad range of problems caused by proliferation in South Asia. South Asia is not simply a likely site of a potential nuclear war in the future; it is now also a potential supplier of sensitive nuclear and missile technologies. Islamabad’s nuclear-for-missile trade with North Korea indicates the extent of Pakistani resolve to create an operational nuclear strike force against India. The exchange also violates Pakistan’s solemn assurances to the international community that it would abide by global nonproliferation norms.

In this report, Gaurav Kampani of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) reviews the open-source evidence about Pakistan’s alleged nuclear and missile links with North Korea. Kampani argues that these links pose vexing questions about nuclear decisionmaking institutions and procedures in Pakistan. Kampani contends that the evidence leads one to question the extent to which military decisions on strategic policy in Pakistan are subject to review by civilian authorities and rival governmental institutions. The report concludes with a preliminary assessment of how the new disclosures about trade with North Korea might affect U.S.-Pakistani relations, and contends that Pakistan’s proliferation behavior demonstrates the dangers of over reliance on sanctions to manage proliferation.

Homeland Security in America’s Dairyland
by Benjamin Heath

Wisconsin is not generally considered a prime terrorist target. However, like other states around the country, Wisconsin placed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism preparedness on its formal agenda soon after federal funding became available in 1997 through the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act (NLD). The 9/11 terrorist attacks have refocused attention on the subject and pose serious questions about terrorism preparedness in this country. These questions seem especially urgent as research conducted between 1999 and 2000 by the Stimson Center described NLD as a “colossal boondoggle”—one growing out of control with no end in sight, with front-line responders only marginally better prepared now than they were before the program began.

This report, by Benjamin Heath a graduate student at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), takes a snapshot look at Wisconsin’s progress on WMD terrorism preparedness since 1997. Heath analyzes the steps taken in the fields of public health, law enforcement, and emergency management in three Wisconsin counties. The report identifies WMD terrorism preparedness efforts Wisconsin is making at the local and state levels, examines state grant proposals, and reviews recent legislation regarding both WMD and terrorism. The report uses both open-source media reports and interviews with local and state officials as source material. Heath concludes that although some problems remain, Wisconsin has significantly improved its level of WMD terrorism preparedness.

The G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction
by Charles L. Thornton

On June 27, 2002, The Group of Eight (G8) Leaders issued a statement from their summit in Kananaskis, Canada, announcing a new initiative to formalize multilateral nonproliferation cooperation. According to the statement, the G8 nations will commit up to $20 billion to fund the implementation of projects to prevent terrorists and other proliferators from acquiring nuclear, chemical, radiological, and biological weapons; missiles; and related materials, equipment, and technology. Intended initially to direct projects toward Russia, the G8 Statement leaves open the possibility of expanding similar efforts in the future to other regions of proliferation concern.

This report, by Charles Thornton of the University of Maryland, reviews the general and specific issues surrounding the G8 Global Partnership. It provides an overview of the partnership’s goals and intentions, reviews Russian reaction to the G8 Statement, discusses past experiences with multilateral threat reduction efforts, and assesses the lessons that can be drawn from the U.S. Nunn-Lugar programs. The report analyzes several major issues that will impact the implementation of the G8 Partnership, reviews selected clauses of the G8 Statement, and concludes with recommendations that would enhance the partnership’s opportunities for success.

Recent Developments in China’s Export Controls: New Regulations and New Challenges
by Jing-dong Yuan, Phillip C. Saunders, and Stephanie Lieggi

After years of resisting U.S. pressure, China recently issued comprehensive new export control regulations that cover missile technology, chemical weapons precursors and technology, and biological agents. The government also amended the regulations controlling exports of military products. These new and amended regulations and their corresponding control lists have largely brought Chinese export controls in line with existing multilateral weapons of mass destruction (WMD) export control regimes. This policy shift can be attributed both to China’s increased recognition of the dangers that WMD proliferation pose to its own security and to a concerted Chinese effort to improve relations with the United States.

However, as this report by Jing-dong Yuan, Phillip C. Saunders, and Stephanie Lieggi of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) points out, the regulations by themselves will not necessarily limit China’s trade of controlled items. How the new export controls are implemented, and how rigorously the Chinese government enforces them, will determine their ultimate effectiveness in stopping exports of Chinese technology that can be used to produce WMD and their delivery systems. Yuan, Saunders, and Lieggi urge the U.S. government to continue efforts to shape Beijing’s perspectives on nonproliferation by engaging China in strategic dialogue. Effective implementation of the new regulations will depend on the resources China’s central government is willing to put into improving and strengthening its export control infrastructure. The United States could play an important role in helping the Chinese government accomplish these goals.

Illicit Trafficking in the Southern Tier and Turkey Since 1999: A Shift from Europe?
by Lyudmila Zaitseva

After the collapse of the former Soviet Union in 1991, illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material emerged as a serious international concern. The economic and social conditions that followed the collapse left nuclear and radioactive material often poorly guarded and vulnerable to theft. In the early 1990s, Europe observed a sharp increase in nuclear smuggling incidents, as stolen nuclear and other radioactive material was brought from the former Soviet republics to Western Europe in the hope of finding a market. Since 1994, however, reported illicit trafficking incidents in Europe have declined. By contrast, since 1999 there has been an increase in such incidents in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Turkey. Analysts have long speculated that nuclear smugglers would exploit this region—known as the southern tier—as a transit corridor.

This report, by Lyudmila Zaitseva of Stanford University, looks at the illicit trafficking situation in the southern tier and Turkey in an attempt to establish whether these regions have become new routes for smuggling nuclear and other radioactive material. It discusses reported incidents of illicit trafficking in these countries, assesses their responses to the threat of trafficking, and evaluates foreign assistance provided to the region to combat this smuggling. The report concludes with recommendations for improving international anti-nuclear smuggling efforts.