Center for Nonproliferation Studies
The Nonproliferation Review
Volume IX, Number 2/Summer 2002

Abstracts

 

U.S.-DPRK Missile Negotiations
by Gary Samore

Although North Korean WMD programs have long concerned U.S. policymakers, the North Korean nuclear program has traditionally dominated U.S. policy. Only after the August 1998 Taepodong-1 test did missile issues become the main focus of U.S. diplomacy toward North Korea. The clock ran out on the Clinton administration, however, before a comprehensive missile deal with North Korea could be completed, and the Bush administration has adopted a different strategy, seeking more North Korean concessions while offering fewer inducements for good behavior.

In this article, Gary Samore, Senior Fellow of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London (formerly Senior Director for Non-Proliferation and Export Controls at the U.S. National Security Council), reviews past and current U.S. efforts to negotiate limits on the indigenous missile program and missile exports of North Korea. Samore argues that the Bush administration's current negotiating stance is unlikely to produce near-term progress on the missile issue, although North Korea will remain under strong pressure to extend its current moratorium on long-range missile tests beyond 2003. Without a comprehensive missile deal, however, North Korean missile exports are likely to remain a continuing problem, and European countries, Russia, and China should join the United States in urging restraint on North Korea, Samore concludes.

The Neglected Dimension: Controlling Cruise Missile Proliferation
by Dennis M. Gormley

Cruise missile proliferation is currently regarded by many as a second-class threat. Existing treaties and informal export control regimes—such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)—primarily address the spread of ballistic missile technology and have done little to counter the spread of cruise missiles. Nevertheless, because they are accurate, accessible, and relatively inexpensive, cruise missiles represent a growing threat independent of ballistic missiles.

In this article, Dennis M. Gormley of the International Institute of Strategic Studies outlines the factors that have contributed to cruise missile proliferation. He explains that export controls have not kept pace with rapid technological expansion. Cruise missiles can be adapted from dual-use technologies ranging from kit airplanes to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to reconnaissance drones. This availability, combined with cruise missiles' precise delivery and ability to evade radar detection, makes them ideal for third-world and sub-state actors seeking to challenge a U.S.-led coalition with conventional air superiority. Gormley suggests that the United States consider modest defenses against off-shore cruise missile launches and advocate strengthened control of cruise missile technology by the MTCR.

The Global Control System and the International Code of Conduct: Competition or Cooperation?
by Yuri E. Fedorov

The growing horizontal and vertical proliferation of missiles and missile technology is among the principal factors shaping the global political climate and strategic milieu. Because it is closely linked with the spread of weapons of mass destruction, missile proliferation magnifies the risks of regional and local conflicts and wars. Consequently, missile proliferation can be highly damaging to both global and regional strategic stability.

In this article, Yuri E. Federov of the PIR Center (Moscow, Russia) examines two leading proposals to enhance the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which critics contend is not currently adequate to meet the threat of missile proliferation. Russia has suggested a Global Control System for the Nonproliferation of Missiles and Missile Technology (GCS), while MTCR members have drafted an International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICoC). Federov analyzes whether the GCS and the ICoC will compete with or complement each other. He concludes that the proposals could form the basis for a more effective missile nonproliferation regime, but that even if fully implemented, they would still not address the full range of factors driving missile proliferation.

Layered Defense-Layered Attack: The Missile Race in the Middle East
by Mohamed Kadry Said

The Middle Eastern political environment in the past ten years has been shaped by conflicting forces. Although important progress has been made toward improving regional security through dialogue and conflict resolution, the prevailing approach to security in the region emphasizes arms acquisition and preparation for war.

Since the 1957 and 1967 Arab-Israeli Wars, Middle Eastern countries have competed in the development of both offensive and defensive missile systems. In this article, Mohamed Kadry Said, Military and Technical Advisor at the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo, describes the various factors that have compelled countries in the Middle East to engage in an arms race—one that has triggered the development of a layered-attack architecture of long-range missile systems, medium-range precision-guided munitions, and short-range guided and unguided munitions. Said concludes that only time will tell whether the search for stability in the region through nonmilitary means will ultimately bear fruit. For the moment, it appears that terrorism, war, and weapons proliferation continue to endanger a vision of peace, stability, and cooperation.

Missile Issues in South Asia
by Naeem Ahmad Salik

The current standoff between the two South Asian nuclear rivals, India and Pakistan, underscores the dangerous missile race in the region. Owing to the geographical contiguity of the two antagonists, short ballistic missile flight times may leave little time for decisionmakers to respond during a crisis. In this situation, the proliferation of short- and medium-range missiles highlights the volatility of the regional security environment and is justifiably viewed as a destabilizing element.

India's status as a major missile power puts great pressure on its main regional rival, Pakistan, to follow suit. In this article, Naeem Ahmad Salik, a Brigadier in the Pakistan Army and currently Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Directorate at the Strategic Plans Division, Joint Staff Headquarters, traces the development of the Indian and Pakistani missile programs. Salik argues that while Pakistan has been subject to sanctions for missile development, testing, and technology transfer, similar Indian activities have gone virtually unchecked. He contends that efforts to negotiate a settlement of Indian-Pakistani differences will have better chance for success if an equitable, evenhanded, and unbiased approach is adopted. He also concludes that unless the underlying conflicts—such as Kashmir—that divide the two countries are resolved, the incentives for them to continue their arms race will remain powerful.

A Japanese Perspective on Missile Defense and Strategic Coordination
by Ken Jimbo

Since the 1998 Taepodong-1 missile test by North Korea, Japan has moved toward joint development of missile defenses with the United States. More recently, U.S. President George W. Bush's policy of modifying the traditional concept of nuclear deterrence—which has served as the basis of the U.S.-Japan alliance—to include both offensive and defensive elements has posed new challenges for Japanese policymakers. They must carefully consider the implications of working with the United States on a layered missile defense system that integrates theater and national missile defenses.

In this article, Ken Jimbo, Research Fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs, explains the history of U.S.-Japanese collaboration on theater missile defense research. Jimbo outlines the regional and strategic considerations that have shaped Japanese policy. While Japan originally supported joint missile defense for political reasons, since 1998 Japanese policy has become threat driven. Jimbo assesses the economic and political costs of Japanese participation in the new, layered missile defense system, and also considers its advantages, including increased military-technological cooperation with the United States, and possible bargaining leverage in future negotiations with China. He concludes that the U.S.-Japan alliance should move forward cautiously with developing shared ballistic missile defense technology while also seeking to build a new relationship with China.

Missile Issues in East Asia
by Zhong Jing

Although the Cold War has been over for a decade, the proliferation of missiles is producing new instabilities and potential conflicts. Existing export controls and defenses are not adequate to deal with the threat posed by missiles. In particular, when equipped with weapons of mass destruction, missiles can inflict devastating damage. In these circumstances, the acquisition and development of missiles and missile technology have become a shortcut for many countries to augment their military power.

As in several other regions of the world, missile proliferation presents significant risks in East Asia. Zhong Jing, a fellow at the National Defense University (Beijing, China), argues that missile proliferation in Northeast Asia poses particular difficulties. Zhong contends that a number of countries in the region—including North Korea and Japan—have overt or covert missile programs. If there is a breakthrough in the acquisition of long-range ballistic missiles by one country in Northeast Asia, she maintains, other countries are almost certain to follow. Zhang concludes that a unilateral, confrontational approach to missile issues in East Asia will prove counterproductive and urges all concerned countries to adopt a multilateral, cooperative approach.

Missile Defense: More May Be Better—for China
by Wade L. Huntley

When the United States announced plans in December of 2001 to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in order to pursue an ambitious missile defense system, the People's Republic of China expressed strong opposition. Chinese leaders objected to the disregard for multilateral cooperation demonstrated by the U.S. decision and worried that even theater missile defenses in East Asia would pose a threat to China's small nuclear deterrent force.

In this article, Wade L. Huntley of the Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, argues—in contrast to conventional wisdom—that a larger missile defense system constructed outside the confines of the ABM Treaty may impinge on Chinese strategic interests less than the limited system the United States originally favored. China perceives that any ballistic missile defenses will undermine its ability to use short-range ballistic missiles to deter Taiwanese independence. Since pursuing the one-China policy is central to the legitimacy of the ruling regime, a small-scale theater missile defense system is as threatening to China as a large-scale layered one. But, a more complex system presents China with possible advantages, since it will consume more U.S. resources, generate greater international controversy, and be more likely to drive Russia to seek strategic cooperation with China. Huntley concludes with a discussion of post-September 11, 2001, scenarios in which construction of an ambitious missile defense system by the United States would positively impact Chinese security.

Transparency and Predictability Measures for U.S. and Russian Strategic Arms Reductions
by Oleg Bukharin & James Doyle

On May 24, 2002, U.S. President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed the Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions. Under this new treaty, the United States and Russia will reduce their operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads by nearly two-thirds by December 31, 2012. Although it has been criticized for lacking verification measures, the implementation of the Moscow Treaty provides an opportunity for the development of transparency measures that could build mutual confidence and provide the basis for more comprehensive future agreements.

This article, by Oleg Bukharin of Princeton University and James Doyle of Los Alamos National Laboratory, provides a detailed proposal for the phased implementation of transparency and monitoring measures that could support the new treaty. Such measures can provide mutual confidence that nuclear arms reductions are taking place as declared, serve as building blocks for establishing more comprehensive transparency and predictability in the U.S.-Russian nuclear posture, and provide a solid foundation for bilateral cooperation in furthering an improved strategic relationship.

Why Do States Rely on Nuclear Weapons? The Case of Russia and Beyond
by Nikolai Sokov

Although nuclear arsenals in the United States and Russia have continued to shrink, nuclear weapons still maintain a high profile in the national security policy of both countries, despite the absence of a systematic superpower confrontation. In addition to establishing the basis for mutual assured destruction, it has long been recognized that nuclear weapons can serve to compensate for the weakness of conventional armed forces. However, despite ongoing economic difficulties in Russia and new reductions in conventional forces, the Russian government has adopted a series of decisions to decrease reliance on nuclear weapons. Conversely, recent U.S. discussions about greater reliance on nuclear weapons come at a time when U.S. conventional armed forces have reached an unprecedented level of efficiency.

Nikolai Sokov of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies seeks to develop an explanatory framework for determining why states rely on nuclear weapons. Without an answer to this question, observers cannot predict whether the role of nuclear weapons in national security policy might increase, nor can they predict under what circumstances it might do so. To this end, Sokov outlines conditions that favor reliance on nuclear weapons and delineates issues that require further examination. Sokov concludes that a better understanding of these conditions can help reduce the probability that nuclear weapons ever make the transition from virtual to actual instruments of security.

Illicit Nuclear Trafficking in the NIS: What's New? What's True?
by William C. Potter & Elena Sokova

Since the events of September 11, 2001, news reports have suggested that the black market for nuclear material is far more active than most in the Western nonproliferation community had believed. Although few of these accounts provide much concrete information, they have created the impression of a resurgence in the trafficking of proliferation-significant nuclear material.

This article by William C. Potter and Elena Sokova of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies reviews the proliferation-significant cases of illicit nuclear trafficking involving the former Soviet Union in the past ten years. The authors compare cases in the 1998-2001 period—which have not yet received adequate analysis—with those in the 1992-1997 period in an effort to discern possible trends in illicit nuclear trafficking. They point out a number of shortcomings with current efforts to collect information about illicit trafficking, which seriously hamper systematic analysis. They conclude with recommendations for the sharing and coordination of information and intelligence, a reassessment of current data, and an improvement in the analysis of cases involving low-enriched uranium and inventory discrepancies.

Unilateral Security? U.S. Arms Control Policy and Asian-Pacific Security
by Xu Weidi

In the years following the Cold War, U.S. leaders have increasingly turned away from established arms control agreements in order to pursue a unilateralist security agenda. This trend has alarmed allies and adversaries alike and has sparked intense debate about the goals of U.S. foreign policy in the 21st century.

Colonel Xu Weidi of the National Defense University (Beijing, China) presents a Chinese view of recent U.S. arms control policy. Citing evidence such as the 1999 rejection by the U.S. Senate of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the refusal of the Bush administration to continue negotiations on the Biological Weapons Convention verification protocol, and U.S. abandonment of detailed arms control agreements in favor of the brief Treaty of Moscow, Xu traces the evolution of arms control from a central position in U.S. foreign policy to its current marginalization. He examines the strategic logic of this change and concludes that it was driven by the shift in the international power equilibrium in favor of the United States, technological advances in missile defense research, and the pursuit of a lasting Pax Americana. Xu argues that U.S. unilateralism has had a negative impact on U.S. ties with China and North Korea. He concludes that to avoid antagonizing China and provoking Muslim terrorists, the United States should further its interests through cooperation with other states in a multipolar international system.

Establishing Confident Accounting for Russian Weapons Plutonium
by Thomas W. Wood, Bruce D. Reid, John L. Smoot, & James L. Fuller

U.S.-Russian relations verge on unprecedented levels of cooperation, yet significant uncertainty remains about Russian weapons-grade plutonium production. During the last decade, cooperative U.S.-Russian programs have made considerable progress in strengthening security and accounting systems, providing secure centralized storage facilities, and planning programs for the disposition of weapons plutonium. The agreements signed at the May 2002 Moscow summit secure a continuing commitment to this agenda. Yet the fundamental question of how much weapons-grade plutonium was produced in Russia remains shrouded even as concern about terrorist groups underscores the need to adequately monitor and guard fissile material stockpiles. Ultimately, confident management and disposition of this material hinges on the development of some sort of comprehensive transparency regime.

In this report, a team of authors from the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) provides a detailed examination of a possible method of generating an accurate estimate of Russian weapons plutonium. Such an estimate would be an essential element of any meaningful transparency regime, which would demand that all plutonium has been accounted for and remains either in existing nuclear weapons, in safe storage, or has been rendered useless for weapons by disposal. The authors describe the Graphite Isotopic Ratio Method (GIRM), and argue that it can provide such an estimate. They conclude by suggesting steps that Russian and U.S. scientists could take to begin the process of estimating Russian weapons plutonium production using GIRM.