Center for Nonproliferation Studies
The Nonproliferation Review
Volume VIII, Number 2/Summer 2001

Abstracts

 

Thoughts about an Integrated Strategy for Nuclear Cooperation with Russia
by Siegfried S. Hecker

Following the chaotic collapse of the Soviet Union, the threat of "loose nukes," braindrain of weapons scientists, and the "clear and present danger" posed by Russia's large and poorly secured stock of weapons-usable nuclear materials emerged as threats to international security. Addressing these threats requires cooperation between Russia and the United States. Several cooperative U.S.-Russian programs have been established since 1991 to help cope with the challenges faced by the Russian nuclear complex. The good news is that despite serious challenges, nothing drastic has happened in the complex over the past decade. But on the other hand, tensions in U.S.-Russian relations, bureaucratic obstacles, and the lack of clear overall strategic objectives have hampered the cooperative programs from adequately addressing these challenges. As a result, while fortunate enough to avoid disaster, the United States has lost many opportunities to positively influence Russia's future direction and its nuclear policies and to build a more secure future for both countries. While many observers continue to view Russia as "neither friend nor foe," nuclear cooperation with Russia remains one of the principal factors shaping the future security environment. A revitalization of cooperative nonproliferation programs could help transform the U.S.-Russian relationship.

In this article, former Los Alamos National Laboratory Director Siegfried S. Hecker reviews the current status of these cooperative programs and makes recommendations for their future development. Hecker offers three different models of future U.S.-Russian relations and examines how U.S.-Russian programs to stem nuclear dangers might fare under each. To make further progress, Hecker argues, the spirit of trust and partnership that has waned in recent years must be renewed, and a common set of objectives must be developed to meet the national security interests of both states. Hecker concludes that the new Bush administration should provide the leadership for a renewed bipartisan effort to rethink and intensify nuclear cooperation with Russia. If the Bush administration can generate strong support in Congress for such a policy and establish a management structure that integrates and coordinates the disparate programs and objectives of the various U.S. executive branch agencies, properly targeted cooperative activities with Russia will enhance U.S. and, indeed, global security.

An Analysis of Iraqi WMD Strategy
by Amatzia Baram

Although the details of Iraqi efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have been well-documented, a debate continues over the precise nature of Iraqi WMD strategy. While Iraqi President Saddam Hussein dramatically threatened to use WMD on several occasions during the 1990-1991 Gulf War, for example, these remarks have been frequently regarded as mere rhetoric. Some analysts have argued that Iraq did not use WMD during the Gulf War, demonstrating that Saddam is essentially a rational leader who understands that the consequences of WMD use would far outweigh any possible benefits. Others, however, have contended that the Iraqi leader's statements should not be simply dismissed, and that Saddam's WMD strategy may not conform to the expectations of Western strategists and deterrence theorists.

In this article, Professor Amatzia Baram of the University of Haifa, Israel, describes the development of the Iraqi WMD program in the early 1970s, when it was intended mainly as a deterrent. Baram maintains, however, that as the program advanced, Saddam felt that these weapons could also be used "to re-shape the map of the Middle East," apparently through nuclear threats. In particular, Baram argues that Saddam's threats—combined with what is now known about his plans for the possible use of WMD during the Gulf War—strongly suggest that he does not view WMD merely as a means of deterring an enemy from attacking Iraq with WMD. Rather, it appears that Saddam views those weapons as tools of coercion and a potential method to ensure the survival of his regime in Baghdad. His rhetoric and the pre-delegated authority he granted to his missile force commanders during the Gulf War undermine the view of those who argue that Saddam acted with restraint. Baram concludes that if the more pessimistic view of Saddam's WMD strategy is correct, the acquisition of a nuclear capability by Iraq may hurl the Middle East into an era of great strategic instability.

Economic and Technological Trends Affecting Nuclear Nonproliferation
by Stanley A. Erickson

Nuclear proliferation is driven by politics, economics, and technology. Each of these factors exhibits trends of various types. In turn, these trends affect the motivations for nuclear proliferation and influence the choice of recipe for nuclear proliferation; that is, what materials, source of materials, explosive device design, delivery method, concealment, and facility security measures are selected by a state seeking nuclear weapon capability.

Stanley A. Erickson of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory begins this article by discussing the motivations of potential proliferant states and reviewing trends that have helped slow proliferation in the past. The article then examines emerging changes in such motivations that may stimulate additional proliferation in the future and the effects of several economic and technological trends that could erode existing barriers to proliferation. Next, Erickson reviews possible responses to these disturbing trends, with special attention to counterproliferation measures, the military and political requirements necessary to pursue such efforts, and possible defensive measures that might be employed by a new proliferating state. Erickson concludes by summarizing future proliferation and nonproliferation paths and providing recommendations for strengthening nonproliferation efforts.

The Costs and Benefits of Japan's Nuclearization: An Insight into the 1968/70 Internal Report
by Yuri Kase

International speculation about the possibility of Japan developing nuclear weapons is not a new phenomenon. A report written as early as 1957 by the U.S. Department of State considered the possibility of Japan developing its own nuclear weapons under a succession of conservative governments. However, since the mid-1990s, discussion of this issue has again intensified owing to the emergence of factors that some believe could push Japan toward nuclearization. These include: North Korea's ambiguous nuclear and missile development program; initial Japanese opposition to the 1995 indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; the Japanese plutonium recycling program and a growing plutonium surplus; and an increasingly assertive Chinese military posture.

Against this background, Yuri Kase, a Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), analyzes a critical juncture in the development of Japanese nuclear policy in the late 1960s, as Japan was considering how to respond to the 1964 Chinese nuclear test, how heavily to rely on U.S. security guarantees, and whether or not to join the NPT regime. As a window into these decisions, this article examines an analytical report on the costs and benefits of nuclearization that was commissioned by the Japanese government in the late 1960s, referred to as the 1968/70 Report. Published by the Japanese press only in 1994, the 1968/70 Report provides unique insights into Japanese policymaking. Kase comprehensively analyzes the 1968/70 Report and examines its conclusion that owing to a range of political, economic, and technical factors, nuclear weaponization would be a poor choice for Japan. Kase uses the framework of the 1968/70 Report to analyze Japan's current security environment and concludes that for many of the reasons pointed out in the original report, nuclear weaponization remains a bad option for Japan.

The Determinants of Nonproliferation Export Controls: A Membership-Fee Explanation
by Richard T. Cupitt, Suzette Grillot, & Yuzo Murayama

International nonproliferation regimes originated during the Cold War, and some expected that they would decline with the end of that conflict. Nevertheless, despite the demise of Soviet communism, the increasing ease of transferring sensitive technology in the information age, and divergent views on which countries constitute a proliferation threat, nearly 40 countries from six continents have now become partners in at least one of the four major multilateral export control arrangements. From Argentina to South Korea, new participants have diversified these arrangements since the early years of their existence, when the members were primarily rich industrialized countries. Today, even a number of governments that do not belong to these regimes have adopted at least rudimentary forms of nonproliferation export controls, including several countries of proliferation concern, such as China, India, and Israel. In addition, thousands of companies in Europe, Japan, and the United States have set up expensive programs to comply with export controls on dual-use and military items.

Richard T. Cupitt of the University of Georgia, Suzette Grillot of the University of Oklahoma, and Yuzo Murayama of Osaka University of Foreign Studies attempt to explain this unexpected convergence in government policies in this article. They construct an explanatory framework for state decisions to develop national systems of export control that comply with international standards, based on a combination of factors drawn from economic rationalist and constructivist approaches. Cupitt, Grillot, and Murayama then derive hypotheses from this framework and test them by comparing export control policies in 20 countries. In conclusion, the authors explore a number of the theoretical and policy implications of their findings.

New Challenges to Arms Export Control: Whither Wassenaar?
by Ron Smith & Bernard Udis

It is widely recognized that arms exports can negatively impact national security; as a result, there are almost universal national controls on this industry. There are also a variety of international organizations that attempt to regulate the international trade in arms through the coordination of suppliers. Of the large number of export control organizations that exist, this article focuses on the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (WA). The end of the Cold War allowed the formation of the WA, the first multilateral agreement covering both conventional weapons and sensitive dual-use goods and technologies. The WA was designed to prevent destabilizing acquisitions of weapons and technologies through a formal process of transparency and consultation.

In this article, Professor Ron Smith of the University of London and Professor Bernard Udis of the University of Colorado at Boulder examine the institutional features of arms export controls: the practical and logistical issues involved, the international organizations working to regulate exports, and factors that determine the effectiveness of the various arrangements. While some believe that international export controls are necessary and vital to international nonproliferation efforts, others find that the mechanisms to restrict the spread of WMD lack efficacy. In trying to evaluate the challenges faced, this article looks at what is currently controlled, why these particular items have been chosen, and how the controls are instituted. Second, the article presents general theoretical issues that arise in international agreements of this sort and, in particular, the ways in which arms export controls differ from classic arms control. The authors then address the potential of technical change to disrupt arms export controls and return finally to examine the role of the WA today.

WMD Proliferation: An International Crime?
by Barry Kellman

The international community has recognized approximately 25 international crimes. This essay considers whether a twenty-sixth should be recognized: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). If so, what should be the content of that crime? And most important, what would be accomplished by the application of criminal law to proliferation?

Professor Barry Kellman of Depaul University College Of Law notes in this viewpoint that WMD proliferation tends to be regarded as falling squarely in the domain of diplomatic/military affairs; rarely is a proliferation problem handled exclusively or even primarily as a law enforcement matter. Kellman asserts that international law enforcement need not displace nonlegal responses to proliferation, but criminal law mechanisms should be available at maximum strength; their absence may force adoption of a nonlegal approach in cases where the application of legal mechanisms might be preferable. A primary incentive for characterizing proliferation as an international crime, therefore, is to enable decisionmakers to take advantage of law enforcement mechanisms without undue obstacles. More specifically, established principles can identify certain behavior as an international crime, and identifying criminal conduct triggers important law enforcement tools. However, WMD proliferation incompletely satisfies the doctrinal bases of criminality at this time. Thus, the purpose of this viewpoint is to prompt international lawyers and nonproliferation experts to consider initiatives for clarifying the criminal status of proliferant behavior.

Integrated Safeguards: Status and Trends
by Victor Bragin, John Carlson, & Russell Leslie

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides states parties with an opportunity to demonstrate to the international community their compliance with treaty obligations, by cooperating with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the application of safeguards. These safeguards constitute an important part of the complex structure of international confidence-building measures designed to provide a high level of assurance that all states parties to the NPT do not use nuclear material and facilities for military or unknown purposes. The original system of "classical safeguards" devised at the inception of the NPT was a balanced compromise between technical requirements and competing concerns of national sovereignty.

Three officials of the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, Victor Bragin, John Carlson, and Russell Leslie, discuss the ongoing efforts to strengthen "classical safeguards," the limitations of which were vividly revealed by the case of Iraq in the 1990s. During the last 10 years, the effort to improve international safeguards has evolved from the implementation of safeguards strengthening measures within the IAEA's legal authority under comprehensive (INFCIRC/153-type) safeguards agreements, to work related to the implementation of measures contained in the Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540) and the development of what are termed "integrated safeguards." The authors highlight the background of and philosophy behind IAEA safeguards strengthening measures: the origins of the "Program 93+2," issues related to implementation of strengthening measures, and the need for complementary authority to apply some of these measures. They then discuss different views concerning integrated safeguards, highlighting the need to move from mechanistic to flexible, "smart" safeguards. In conclusion, the authors argue that with the new safeguards techniques provided by INFCIRC/540, the IAEA may be able to gain confidence that an inspected country is not engaged in clandestine nuclear activities. In such cases, the authors urge, the agency should adopt an "integrated safeguards" approach that reduces routine inspection activities at less sensitive nuclear facilities, such as nuclear power plants.

Prospects for Arms Control and Proliferation in the Middle East
by Nabil Fahmy

Under current conditions, discussion of international arms control and nonproliferation regimes, as well as future prospects for arms control in the Middle East, is of utmost importance. Global and regional arms control are often analyzed separately as two distinct issues. However, it may be more instructive to address them within the framework of a global/regional interface. Any slowing or reversal of the global arms control process may create synergies affecting the credibility of the international nonproliferation regime.

In this viewpoint, Nabil Fahmy, Ambassador of Egypt to the United States, contends that any weakening of the international nonproliferation regime will impact regional proliferation, particularly in the Middle East. Analyzing this linkage, Fahmy contends that arms control and proliferation are inversely related: if arms control is not pursued as an ongoing effort—at both the global and regional levels—a weakening or reversal of nonproliferation efforts may be triggered, which ultimately raises questions regarding the credibility of the multilateral nonproliferation regime itself. Furthermore, the weakening of the global nonproliferation regime could relieve pressure on states, including those in the Middle East, to curtail their weapons of mass destruction programs. Such a development, Fahmy concludes, would leave regional proliferation, which has accelerated in recent years, unchecked, triggering unpredictable and dangerous consequences.

Security Challenges in South Asia
by Maleeha Lodhi

Since the nuclear tests by India and then Pakistan in May 1998, the focus in this region has been almost exclusively on the nuclear dimension of the confrontation between the two states. In reality, security in South Asia is challenged by an interplay of several factors operating at three different levels: domestic; regional or bilateral; and global. The twin phenomena of strategic peril and economic promise pose a daunting challenge that must be met for South Asia to be in sync with the great global transformations of our times.

Maleeha Lodhi, Ambassador of Pakistan to the United States, offers a Pakistani perspective on how to establish peace and security in South Asia. The approach seeks to address the sources of insecurity at the domestic, regional, and global levels. Its key elements include: nuclear and missile restraint by Pakistan and India; an agreement for conventional arms control in South Asia; peaceful resolution of all outstanding disputes and sources of tension, especially Kashmir; and economic and social revival of South Asia through regional cooperation and global integration. Lodhi contends that a peaceful and stable South Asia would generate economic and trade benefits for the global economy and a peace dividend for the people in the region.

Missile Messages: Iran Strikes MKO Bases in Iraq
by Amin Tarzi & Darby Parliament

On April 18, 2001, Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) launched an unknown number of unidentified surface-to-surface missiles or artillery rockets at several Mujahidin-e Khalq Organization (MKO or MEK) camps in Iraq. The MKO, which the United States designates as a "Foreign Terrorist Organization," had admitted to launching over a dozen mortar attacks around Tehran earlier in 2001 as part of efforts to overthrow Iran's Islamic government. Since 1994, Iran's actions against the MKO have included at least four missile attacks against the group's bases in Iraq (a chronology of earlier attacks is included as an appendix), but the number of missiles allegedly used in this most recent event is unprecedented. Lingering uncertainties over the quantity and type of missiles used against the MKO raise questions about Iran's intended message.

Amin Tarzi, Senior Research Associate at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), and Darby Parliament, a Graduate Research Assistant at CNS, analyze this missile attack—in both political and technical terms—in an attempt to understand these remaining questions regarding Iran's "message" as well as the various responses mentioned above. On one level, the authors argue, Iran's missile strikes can be seen as a direct retaliation for the MKO's increased terrorist activities. On another level, the attacks, along with the responses from the MKO, Iraq, and the United States, raise broader concerns about the use of ballistic missiles and rockets as an acceptable means of solving political disputes.

The Complex Politics of Foreign Assistance: Building the Landysh in the Russian Far East
by Cristina Chuen & Tamara Troyakova

Since its inception, political controversy has dogged a project to construct a Japanese-financed liquid radioactive waste (LRW) treatment plant in the Russian Far East. The facility removes radioactive contamination from water that has circulated in submarine nuclear reactors as coolant. The plant's processors compact the resulting radioactive sludge, and this solidified waste is cemented in barrels for further disposal, with clean water to be discharged. While the project, located in Primorskiy Kray, one of Russia's Far Eastern provinces, was initiated as a result of environmental concerns, the processing of LRW has also constituted a potential bottleneck in the nuclear submarine dismantlement process. Liquid radioactive waste treatment, therefore, is more than an environmental issue.

Despite seven years of attention and money dedicated to solving this problem, and the fact that construction of an LRW facility was expected to take only one or two years, it was only in 2000 that LRW processing facilities began operation in both Russia's Northern and Pacific Fleets. In this report, based on extensive interviews and contemporaneous news accounts, Cristina Chuen, Research Associate at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), and Tamara Troyakova of the Russian Academy of Sciences examine the problematic history of the Landysh LRW processing facility project. They conclude that the history of the project offers an important cautionary lesson regarding the difficulties of international cooperation in the nuclear sphere. The authors also point out how some of these problems might have been mitigated with better planning by both the Russian participants and foreign donors.