The National Interest
Thanksgiving 2001

A Test by Terrorism

by James Schlesinger

 

. . . The crucial—and difficult—question is what comes next, after the Taliban has been removed and bin Laden has been killed, captured or put on the run? It is then that the President will be obliged to make a decision that is laden with complexities and burdened by risks. We have asserted that the war on terrorism involves not only rooting out the terrorists themselves, but also those who harbor them. To do so is a demanding and a lengthy task, and, realistically, we must recognize that it can never be wholly successful. We may assert that we will root out all "terrorism with a global reach", but not all agree on just who are the terrorists and who are the legitimate resistance fighters. When and if we go after other nations—other than the obvious culprits in Afghanistan—we must expect international support to diminish and the international coalition to fray. That in itself poses a simple but critical question: Is the creation and preservation of an international coalition a means to an end, or an end in itself?

Our rhetoric about confronting those who harbor terrorists almost obliges us to take further action. We have regularly spoken of the "next phase." But unavoidably, that next phase will be fraught with difficulties. We must bear continuously in mind the injunction that failure would be far worse than taking no additional action. So, as we move into that next phase, we must assure ourselves that the political and logistical problems that might preclude success have been meticulously examined and redressed in advance.

The target of the next phase most discussed in Washington has been Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. If it turns out that Iraq has been the source of the anthrax bacteria planted in various places in the United States, that would clearly provide us with sufficient justification for action against Iraq to ease the concerns of most members of the coalition, though not all. We must anticipate vehement objection to any possible American action by some other nations, and particularly by Iraq’s Arab neighbors. Such action might destabilize one or more of the moderate regimes in the region.

To move successfully against Iraq, one must have appropriate bases. Yet even Turkey has of late been moving toward warming its relations with Iraq, and, given its preferences, would wish to take no part in any such action.

The situation in Saudi Arabia is even more problematic. The Saudi regime has long practiced a balancing act, in which limited collaboration with its Western protectors is weighed against support for conservative elements within the Kingdom that resent the association with and the presence of those protectors. It has long been a fiction of many in the West that there is a substantial liberal opposition in Saudi Arabia seeking greater openness, transparency and tolerance. The real opposition comes from conservative elements that passionately believe that the Saudi government has gone much too far in accommodating Western "infidels." That has been the source of bin Laden’s support. The great irony is that charitable contributions from Saudi Arabia go to support the religious schools outside of the country that are undermining the regime and seeking its overthrow.

Since it is scarcely in the American interest to weaken a government that is partly responsive to our desires, and even less so to contemplate what a successor government might look like (bin Laden himself would emulate Khomeini), careful assessment of the consequences in Saudi Arabia of any American decision is essential. The bases in Saudi Arabia are almost a necessity for successful action against Saddam Hussein. To be sure, bases in Israel might be a partial substitute, and the government of Israel likely would be amenable, but that raises difficult political questions even as it solves logistical ones. The fragility of Saudi Arabia and the delicacy of our own relations with its government underscore the need for caution. One must reiterate that any action taken against Saddam Hussein must be successful—or it should be avoided, at least for the time being. . . .