The National Interest
Spring 2001

A Choice of Europes

by David Calleo

 

. . . The United States also has broader handicaps for the role of world hegemon. Impulses toward "isolationism" and "unilateralism" are deeply rooted in the political culture. Constitutional arrangements, which limit the power of the federal executive and the professional civil service, make it difficult to sustain balanced, coherent and well-administered long-term policies, sensitive to the needs of other countries. The United States, of course, has conducted a hegemonic foreign policy with notable success through a good part of the past half century. But this required a severe distortion of the Constitution —in particular, a dramatic extension of presidential power, provoked by the shocks of two world wars and the prolonged Cold War that followed.

Since the late 1960s, the country has been drifting back to its traditional balance. Doubtless the problems of the Clinton presidency were rather special, but nearly every other presidency since the days of Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon has had its own variety of constitutional imbroglio. The other constitutional elements —the Congress, the courts and the states —have been banding together to cut the imperial presidency down to size. Given the special circumstances of the recent presidential election, the new Bush administration seems unlikely to reverse a trend that reaches back over seven of its predecessors. In short, although visions of world hegemony may beguile large sections of America's political elite, the country generally has less and less tolerance for the burdens and discipline needed to exercise such a role. In such circumstances, it is all too easy for enthusiastic elites to get overextended, with commitments that the country will prove unwilling to sustain. . . .

A Choice of Three

Logically, three models present themselves for organizing Pan-Europe: bipolar, unified and tripolar. In bipolar Pan-Europe, the West claims its Cold War victories; Western institutions enlarge; NATO and the EU eventually include most of the countries liberated by the Soviet collapse, except for Russia itself; a crippled Russia receives compensatory aid and perhaps diplomatic respect, but is kept at arm's length.

In the second model, unified Pan-Europe, the old East and West of the Cold War join intimately to create a closely integrated Eurasian system. The European Union and NATO extend eastward —and eventually embrace rather than exclude Russia.

In the third model, tripolar Pan-Europe, the EU, Russia and the United States form three distinct but articulated poles. Each, while tied to the others, remains sufficiently distinct so as not to undermine its own cohesion. Neither the EU nor NATO becomes Pan-European. Instead, each remains a critical Western element within a larger and looser Pan-European superstructure. The European Union, for example, extends full membership only to Central and East European countries whose political economies are sufficiently convergent with the West to be absorbed successfully. The EU does not imagine including Russia but nevertheless develops close economic relations with it, and also with the other former Soviet states. The United States remains present in Pan-Europe through NATO, but less as the active manager of European security than as the ultimate guarantor of Western Europe against a resumption of Russian (or German) aggression, or an explosion of violence in the Near and Middle East or the Mediterranean. NATO thus grows more European and less American-dominated, as the EU develops autonomous diplomatic and defense institutions capable of acting efficaciously either inside or outside of NATO. Russia does not actually join this more European NATO, but cooperates closely with it through some overarching Pan-European security structure. . . .

Why Pan-Europe?

If the heterogeneity of the constituent Pan-European elements so limits their integration, why envisage Pan-European structures at all? Beyond the EU and NATO, why not rely on the existing global organizations —the UN Security Council, International Monetary Fund, World Bank or Groups of Seven or Eight? Why is a Pan-European layer of organizations needed? There are several answers.

To begin with, many countries in Central and Eastern Europe, or even in Central Asia and the Middle East, passionately desire to join the EU or NATO but do not fit —economically, militarily or politically. Economically, it is important that these countries be included in structures that promote whatever degree of Pan-European economic assistance and intercourse is sustainable. Politically, former Soviet countries are re-inforced in their new democratic habits by belonging to a fellowship of advanced democratic societies. Militarily, as Russia revives, some of these countries may have to accept de facto Russian hegemony, as indeed others, like Serbia, may have to accept Western hegemony, even if they do not like it. It is important that such countries belong to some Pan-European organization that sets common principles for the rights of states and individuals and provides collective institutions to foster those rights. In practice, of course, the efficacy of such institutions must depend on whether the three major poles actually subscribe to the self-limiting principles of Pan-European cooperation.

This brings us to perhaps the real reason for Pan-European institutions. The ideal of "Europe", for all the ambiguous and bloody history behind it, retains a powerful capacity for promoting consensus around a variety of humane political values —not only among the members of the EU and their would-be partners in Central Europe, but also in Eastern Europe and in Russia itself, perhaps even in nearby parts of the Muslim world, and certainly in America. The concept of Europe is therefore a powerful asset to promote ideals that ought to be universal but cannot be reliably sustained on a global basis. This is not to say that the humane ideals associated with Europe should not be promoted and defended globally. But it is to acknowledge a special obligation to make these ideals prevail in Europe —an obligation shared by all the children of European civilization, Americans and Russians included. . . .