The National Interest

The National Interest
Summer 2000

Extracts from
The Forgotten Player

by Michael J. Green

 

Until his stroke this past April, Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi's ruling coalition had repeatedly challenged the pacifist consensus that has prevailed in Japan since 1945, knocking over half century-old taboos and replacing them with the symbols of a "normal" state. A telling example occurred in March 1999, when Japanese destroyers fired on North Korean spy boats, driving them from Japan's territorial waters. The fusillades were the first fired in anger by the Japanese navy since the Second World War, and though they were only warning shots, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) promptly crafted legislation that would enable Japanese ships to fire for effect the next time. Support for the Obuchi cabinet increased by 5 percent in the wake of the confrontation.

Subsequently, the Japanese Diet passed legislation authorizing logistical support for U.S. forces in the event of a military conflict in Asia--support the United States had sought without success since the 1970s. In August the Diet passed laws awarding official recognition to the hinomaru flag and to kimigayo, the national anthem, which opens with a refrain revering the emperor. Then in February of this year, two commissions in the Diet opened a debate on amending Japan's postwar constitution. This came on the heels of polls showing that 60 percent of the Diet's members supported revision and 40 percent were dissatisfied with its "Peace Clause." All this has been accompanied by a chorus of commentators and editorials championing a more assertive Japanese stance toward China, North Korea and the United States.

The sudden transformation of Japan's strategic culture has not been unanimously well received. "Japan Returns to Nationalism", trumpeted the Asian edition of Time magazine last year. In a more sober assessment, a June 1999 memorandum prepared by the U.S. National Intelligence Council cautioned that Japan is "pursuing greater autonomy or independence." The official Chinese press has warned of a return to the Japanese militarism of the 1930s. In a survey last year of Asian business executives, a majority expressed the opinion that Japan was becoming more nationalistic. Commentators throughout the region are today echoing Lee Kuan Yew's famous quip that encouraging Japan to play a larger security role is akin to feeding a reformed alcoholic chocolate liqueurs.

But Japan is not returning to militarism or embarking on a campaign of revanchism. Taboos have fallen, but the framework of postwar pacifism remains in place. Japan's allergy to nuclear weapons remains strong, and Tokyo continues to hold an idealized view of international institutions such as the United Nations. Japan's aging demographics also conspire against resurgent militarism--Japanese rightists will not build a new Kwantung Army out of the aging "salarymen" who constitute the country's bulging demographic middle. In many respects, indeed, the Japanese are developing a more transparent, liberal and civil society; the same Diet that blessed the anthem and flag also passed sweeping legislation for the establishment of nonprofit and charitable organizations. More important, Japan is not bolting from the U.S.-Japan alliance, which lately has become even more crucial to Japanese security given uncertainties about China and North Korea. Quite the contrary: for the first time in postwar history, all of Japan's political parties (except the Communists) openly champion the alliance.

Still, Japan is changing. After years of cautious international behavior and paralyzing domestic debates about security policy, a broad consensus is emerging that Japan should assert its national interests more forcefully and be a more "normal" nation. In part, this new wisdom reflects the pent-up ambitions of Japanese leaders of a younger generation that appears more comfortable on the world stage and less encumbered by war guilt than its elders. In part, it reflects a growing realism about threats to peace in Northeast Asia posed by North Korean and Chinese missiles.

There is a nationalistic dimension to the changes in Japan as well, one rooted in resentment toward a domineering American foreign policy and anxiety about the nation's economic future. Taken together, this mixture of ambition, realism and angst has so far yielded more passion than strategic coherence, but the momentum behind a more independent Japanese security policy has become irreversible.

For the United States, the emergence of a more normal Japan represents an opportunity rather than a threat, but it is an opportunity that is being squandered. Ironically, after years of cajoling Tokyo to assume a larger security burden, Washington has lost its bearings. While seven years ago the Clinton administration was alarmed at the prospect of a formidable economic competitor across the Pacific, today Japan rarely receives attention above the middle layers of the bureaucracy. Tokyo is still seen as a source of funds, but hardly a strategic partner.

Distracted by the "rise" of China, Washington seems to have lost sight of the fact that there are today two aspiring powers in Asia. Rather than taking a patronizing and aloof approach, American policy toward Japan should seek to assure Tokyo that the United States is both committed to the alliance and is listening to the concerns of its ally. This means actively supporting Japanese diplomatic initiatives that serve broad U.S. strategic interests in East Asia. It means dropping the hollow rhetoric of "strategic partnership" with China. And it means encouraging a more "normal" security policy for Japan, albeit one premised on the current division of roles in which Japan assigns offensive and strategic missions to the United States. . . .

. . . Japan deserves to be taken more seriously as an American partner in Asia. The administration should have formulated a strategy with Japan toward the Asian financial crisis as it spread, instead of bickering over rhetorical differences in economic philosophy. After the Taepodong launch, senior U.S. officials should have planned a response together with Tokyo and Seoul before rushing to an agreement with North Korea (a trilateral coordination group has since been formed). Likewise, the administration would do well to sit down with Japanese officials to devise a joint strategy for permanent Japanese membership of the UN Security Council. And the administration should strengthen and expand its cooperation with Japan on global issues such as health and the environment, which are currently subsumed within the U.S.-Japan "Common Agenda"--a potentially important exercise that has been neglected in recent years.

Most important, the United States needs to pay far greater attention to its defense relationship with Japan. To begin with, the U.S. intelligence community should expand cooperation with the new Japan Defense Intelligence Headquarters, with the aim of strengthening mutual analytical capabilities. The administration should further aid Japan in the implementation of domestic crisis management rules, so that the bilateral defense guidelines are complemented by clear lines of authority inside Japan. U.S. forces in Asia should also begin integrating Japanese logistical and rear area support into their own contingency preparations and training. And we must welcome, not fear, Japan's debate about an expanded role in UN military operations.

The U.S. and Japanese governments agreed in the 1980s to a division of military roles and missions in and around Japan, whereby the United States would assume responsibility for all strategic, offensive and counteroffensive missions and Japan would retain responsibility for defensive tasks. That basic formula, expanded in the 1990s to incorporate Japanese participation in UN operations, need not change. Were Japan to acquire capabilities, or assume responsibility, for offensive operations, the alliance would be altered so fundamentally that Japan-China relations and Japan-South Korea relations would become unsustainable, thus undermining both U.S. and Japanese security aims. As Japan debates constitutional revision and the related question of whether to recognize the right of "collective self-defense", this division of roles and missions must remain clear. Within that formula, however, there is much more that Japan can do to enhance its own security and launch diplomatic initiatives as a global power, albeit one in support of and supported by the United States.

The rest of Asia may prove more difficult to convince. Japan will need to move promptly to reassure its neighbors that constitutional revision and other modifications to its defense policy will bolster, rather than diminish, the security of the region. The demise of old taboos will not make this any easier. Revisionism about the Second World War has become a leitmotif of popular media and politics in Japan. The 1997 film Pride glorifies Japan's wartime leader, Hideki Tojo. Millions went to see the film and the producers are currently at work on sequels about the kamikaze pilots and Japan's noble effort to "liberate" Indonesia. Not surprisingly, Japan's neighbors view these developments with considerable unease.

In Japan, the problems of the past have become entangled with visions of the future. Most Japanese do not deny the darker side of their national history. They do, however, intend to transcend it. Japan may have found a formula for doing so in its relations with South Korea. When Obuchi offered South Korean President Kim Dae Jung "heartfelt remorse" and a "deep apology" for Japan's transgressions against Korea, Kim accepted the gesture and promised to work toward building a stronger partnership with Japan in Asia. By contrast, China's Jiang Zemin refused to accept a similar apology and, more significant, to embrace a larger regional role for Japan. That impasse, as much as anything, accounts for recent tensions in Japan-China relations. China's transparent preference for a weak and passive Japan has not been lost on Tokyo.

The Japanese elite is today thinking more seriously about Japan's own security interests than at any other point in the postwar period. The United States should welcome this awakening and assure Japan that it will not weaken bilateral ties. From here on, America will have to consult with Japan earlier, more frequently and at higher levels. We will have to consider joint management of U.S. bases in Japan, endorse Japanese candidates to lead international organizations, and support Japanese diplomatic initiatives in Southeast Asia and at the United Nations.

In exchange, we should raise the bar of expectations. We should insist on active Japanese participation in peacekeeping operations, on a clearer Japanese stand against rogue regimes like Iraq, and on improved consultation prior to Japanese diplomatic initiatives. In all of this, we should appreciate that the opportunity to build a stronger relationship is at hand and that the consequences of alliance mismanagement are serious.

Before the dark days of the 1930s, the Japanese diplomat, scholar and student of Woodrow Wilson, Inazo Nitobe, wrote that the true internationalist in Japan must first look down at his own feet to see where he stands before raising his head to see where the world is going. As Japan raises its head, the first thing it should always see is the United States.