CIAO DATE: 02/05/08
The National Interest
A Broken Engagement
Barbara Slavin
Abstract
IT MAY seem counterintuitive, but September 11 produced an opening for improved U.S.-Iran relations that could have enhanced the U.S. ability to marginalize the number one threat to U.S. and Western interests: fundamentalist, suicidal Sunni terrorism. However, continued U.S. antipathy pushed Iran to become more of a strategic competitor, leading it to retain tactical links to Al-Qaeda as well as to bolster radical Shi‘a Muslim groups and other proxies. Instead of dividing our enemies, the Bush Administration united them against us.
Among the worst consequences of the Bush Administration’s post-9/11 strategic choices is the unabated rise of Iran. The U.S. decision to reject Iranian overtures for comprehensive negotiations in 2003 and to topple Saddam Hussein without a prior regional consensus about what would replace him has strengthened the most hard-line elements of Iran’s Islamic government, spurred its nuclear program, revived its expansionist ambitions and undermined pro-U.S. political factions throughout the Middle East. The question now is whether it is still possible to reach an understanding with Iran that will temper its motivation to play the spoiler and strengthen forces within the country that seek an end to extremism and isolation.
Immediately after 9/11, Iranians distinguished themselves by spontaneously demonstrating in sympathy with the victims of the attacks. At a multinational meeting on Afghanistan at the UN, then–Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi passed then–Secretary of State Colin Powell a note that read: “The United States should know that the Iranian people and the Iranian government stand with the United States in its time of need and absolutely condemn these vicious terrorist attacks”, according to a U.S. diplomat who saw the document.