CIAO DATE: 09/07
The National Interest
End the Crusade
Dimitri K. Simes
Full Text
Here they go again. After spending more than three years, the lives of nearly 3,000 American soldiers, and well over $300 billion in Iraq, the coalition of neoconservatives and liberal interventionists who brought America into the quagmire now tell us that the problem was not with having the wrong war at the wrong time for the wrong reasons, but rather with poor implementation for which they unsurprisingly deny responsibility.
And just as the Crusaders a millennium ago blamed their defeats in the Middle East on a lack of faith, we are told today that it is the realists—those heretics with an insufficient faith in the ability of American values and power to rapidly transform the world—who are poised to sabotage the entire project for spreading freedom throughout the region; that the realists and their false gods of stability and national interest will seduce Americans away from their true calling of spreading liberty throughout the world, even at the barrel of a gun.
But the debacle that is Iraq reaffirms the lesson that there is no such thing as a good crusade. This was true a thousand years ago when those European Christian knights tried to impose their faith and way of life on the Holy Land—pillaging the region in the process—and it is equally true today. As Senator Chuck Hagel (R-NE) has observed, “America cannot impose a democracy on any nation—regardless of our noble purpose.” He also noted, “You cannot have a foreign policy based on divine mission. We tried that in the Middle Ages, that’s what the Crusades were about.” Divine missions and sensible foreign policy just don’t go together.
And the crusaders of the last millennium and this one as well have had little qualms about using ignoble means to advance their noble purpose. The modern-day domestic requirements in launching a crusade, such as building public support and obtaining funding in a democratic system, force a degree of dishonesty that inherently undermine its nobility.
Consider the invasion of Iraq. The Bush Administration told the United Nations, U.S. allies and—most importantly—the Congress and the American people, that we had to remove Saddam Hussein because he had Weapons of Mass Destruction, active links to terrorist groups (often implying a close relationship with Al-Qaeda and the 9/11 plotters) and was aggressively developing a nuclear weapons program. No other explanation would have allowed President George W. Bush to win congressional support or to assemble a coalition of the willing with participation much beyond subsidized allies in “New Europe.”
Did the Bush Administration in its entirety intentionally mislead the American public and the world alike? Certainly not! Then-Secretary of State Colin Powell by all accounts believed that there was strong and sufficient evidence that demonstrated Iraq’s WMD capabilities. Indeed, his credibility did much to legitimize the administration’s case. For many others, Saddam Hussein deserved the presumption of guilt—and his duplicitous and underhanded dealings provided sufficient cause for concluding he was engaged in a clandestine weapons program. Still, it is equally apparent that the administration did not address the serious questions raised by many in the intelligence community about the quality of evidence regarding Iraqi WMD capabilities.
At the same time, quite a few of the most enthusiastic proponents for an invasion of Iraq both within and outside the administration—what we might term the “war faction”—were less interested in deliberately assessing the threat posed by Iraq’s WMD programs. Their main rationale in invading Iraq was to depose an Iraqi regime hostile to the United States and Israel—and to demonstrate to Arabs and others in the so-called Greater Middle East who was the real master of the region. From that perspective, the villainous Saddam was a convenient tyrant whose combination of provocation and weakness made him an ideal demonstration target of American power and determination. His forcible removal and the installation of a new regime would not only show American power but also encourage other governments in the area to be more accommodating to U.S. preferences.
Yet, for obvious reasons, the “war faction” never shared this goal with the American public. Only after it could not find WMD in Iraq did the administration shift the description of the intervention from finding WMD to a crusade for democracy in the Middle East. Thus, the administration pursued democracy in the Arab world via a considerable detour from democracy in the United States itself: after all, what can be more undemocratic than taking the nation to war under false premises?
And if the United States went to war to eliminate Iraq’s WMD, could not the administration have settled for removing Saddam in favor of a regime that would allow full and unobstructed inspections? After all, it agreed to normalize relations with Muammar Qaddafi in return for Libya surrendering a nuclear program.
But George W. Bush and his advisors did not seem to consider this as an option for Iraq, even with Saddam gone. Groupthink took hold, and shaky propositions left unchallenged—such as, despite Iraq’s ethno-sectarian makeup, democracy could easily take root; that Iraq could simultaneously be a democracy and move to recognize Israel and continue to contain Iran; that only a small number of forces would be needed to get the job done. That Iraq’s neighbors—who in 2003 were often and quite publicly warned that they were next in line for forcible regime change—were somehow expected to accept American-style stabilization of Iraq defies belief.
Still, the fact that the war in Iraq was an error does not mean that “cut and run” under whatever disguise is an acceptable solution. Abrupt withdrawal would only compound the mistake with unpredictable consequences for the United States in the Middle East and in the world in general. While there are clearly no good solutions in Iraq at this point, a strong case can be made that we should try everything possible to avoid defeat—and that we have not tried everything yet.
On the other hand, the need to avoid defeat should also be measured against burdening the next administration with Iraq as a defining issue in American foreign policy. The war in Iraq comes at a terrible cost to the federal budget, the morale and readiness of our armed forces, America’s ability to conduct operations elsewhere, and its broader diplomatic and military maneuvering room in dealing with other current and emerging threats and the international prestige and effectiveness of the United States. This is not an argument in favor of announcing any kind of schedule for withdrawal or starting a withdrawal during the next six or even twelve months. Rather, it is an argument for the president to recognize that since sending significantly more troops to Iraq over an extended period of time is not an option, and the current strategy is not working, he must make a clear choice to seek a political solution to avoid leaving a massive military involvement in Iraq to his successor.
Many—most prominently the Iraq Study Group—have already proposed a range of ideas for redefining the American military and political mission in Iraq—including in the pages of this magazine’s preceding issue—such as “Iraqization” of the war focusing on the anti-terrorist effort rather than nation-building and encouraging the Iraqis to move to a loose confederation with considerable autonomy for the Shi‘a, the Sunnis and the Kurds while helping the Iraqi government to cut the militias down to size.
Realistically speaking, however, we cannot adjust our course in Iraq without adjusting the administration’s approach to the Middle East and to international affairs in general.
To begin with, stability in Iraq on terms acceptable to the United States is unlikely without at least tacit cooperation from Iran and Syria. Accordingly, to disengage from Iraq without defeat, America needs either to compel Damascus and Tehran to cooperate or to make a deal with them. The United States does have the resources to force Tehran and Damascus to stop interfering in Iraq. In fact, we have the capability to obliterate their capitals or countries with nuclear weapons. However, the U.S. political process would not allow the administration to use these capabilities, and neither the United Nations nor even NATO allies would support that. In the Muslim world, it could trigger a real war between civilizations. Seeing this, neither Iran nor Syria seems to believe that the United States is willing and able to do what it would take to bring them to their knees.
Absent such will in the United States, there is no credible alternative to dialogue with the two regimes, now described as rogue states by the Bush Administration. The Iraq Study Group was right to recommend including Iran and Syria in a search for a political solution “without preconditions.” Of course, talking to them is not a panacea. Those who assume that simply by engaging in negotiations the United States will be able to obtain major concessions from Damascus and Tehran do not understand their true objectives. Each has its own concerns, starting with non-interference in its domestic affairs, and neither is likely to offer any favors to America. It would be an exercise in futility to tell them that they should stop meddling in Iraq; allow the United States, France and Israel to play a decisive role in Lebanon; end support for Hamas and other radical Palestinian factions; and in the case of Iran, abandon its nuclear enrichment program, without both offering something important in return and subjecting them to strong international pressure.
This brings us to the Palestinian problem. The reason to address the Palestinian problem is not that it would put an end to Shi‘a and Sunnis killing each other in Iraq, make Bashir al-Asad an altruist in Lebanon, or persuade the mullahs in Tehran to abandon their nuclear ambitions. Rather, as every moderate Arab leader in the region has told the United States, the perceived American double-standard on the Israeli-Palestinian dispute makes it much more difficult for them to support U.S. positions or to do essential heavy lifting on America’s behalf on other issues. It also makes it harder for Supreme Leader Khamenei and President Asad to accommodate American concerns in Iraq and elsewhere without losing face in their own countries.
The other side of the coin is putting intense pressure on Iran and Syria to demonstrate to them that the United States is indeed in a position to form a meaningful coalition against them with appropriate international legitimacy, including through United Nations Security Council resolutions. Already, leading European and Asian allies have indicated to Washington that without the cover of legitimacy the UN provides, they would be very reluctant to join any U.S. effort. That inevitably brings Russia and its veto into the picture.
Much is said, and sometimes with considerable justification, about Russia’s departure from democracy at home and its propensity toward applying heavy-handed pressure to its new neighbors. But publicizing Russia’s misdeeds, real and imagined alike, is not a substitute for achieving what is needed. The United States must either be prepared to bargain with a resurgent Moscow who cannot be intimidated or bribed as was done with Yeltsin’s Russia during the 1990s, or be prepared to pay the much higher costs for taking action without Russian cooperation.
This is why realists have a different perspective on the question of NATO’s further expansion east. For the crusaders of moralpolitik, the alliance is a near-mystical union of “democracies”, and must be broadened to bring in all states that desire membership, even at the cost of ratcheting tensions up with other major powers.
But common sense suggests one other major criterion: does expansion of the alliance enhance its capabilities and ultimately U.S. security? Would, for instance, the number of troops potentially committed to NATO missions by states like Ukraine and Georgia compensate for turning Russia into America’s adversary?
The idea that foreign policy decisions require hard-headed analysis and difficult choices is apparently offensive to those who believe that international affairs is a morality play and the United States is a global hegemon entitled, and indeed obliged, to right what they see as global wrongs. But being realistic about American options and dilemmas is not an obstacle to morality—on the contrary, it is an essential requirement in pursuing a high-minded policy that produces not only warm feelings in our hearts but results that matter and endure.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was a period when the United States could act on the world stage without much opposition from other major states. Today, however, existing and emerging centers of power seem much less willing to delegate de facto world government to the United States—no matter who is in charge, whether Democrats or Republicans.
Both Russia and China today accept that they need the United States more than they need each other—and this is especially true given China’s economic orientation. But if Moscow and Beijing believe that they are both being quietly encircled by the United States—either by NATO expansion further east or by some sort of global “democracy alliance”, they may change their calculations. They already appear to be hedging their bets in the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. A Chinese-Russian axis would likely be tactical, taking into account their divergent interests and mutual distrust. But even temporary rapprochement could deliver a severe blow to U.S. global leadership. Throw in disaffected continental European powers and India, and a considerable dent could be placed in America’s ability to isolate rogue states, put effective pressure on nuclear proliferators and deprive non-state terrorist organizations of their indispensable protectors. Witness Iran’s faith in the “powers of the east” to circumvent any American-initiated economic sanctions and to provide some counter-balance to the United States.
Henry Kissinger has offered the wise observation that “so long as Iran views itself as a crusade rather than a nation, a common interest will not emerge from negotiations.” But this observation is equally applicable to the United States. Many nations can embrace American world leadership, though obviously with different degrees of enthusiasm—if such leadership reinforces a global system based on free trade, secure lines of communication and a commitment to stability. Others might acquiesce more reluctantly—so long as they do not feel that America is engaged in a global crusade directed against them or at the expense of their vital interests.
The stakes could not be higher. In his ground-breaking new book, Annihilation from Within, Reagan Administration defense official and Washington wise-man Fred Iklé warns that “the dark side of progress”—revolutionary new technologies of human destruction, whether nuclear, biological or even in artificial intelligence—has exceeded the development of the international system and the states within it. Iklé is concerned that “Living comfortably on borrowed time, most democratic societies lack the will and foresight needed to defend against” the grave dangers that may come. September 11 may look trivial to what the United States and others may experience unless we focus on these apocalyptic threats, even at the occasional expense of desirable but optional pursuits. Moreover, notwithstanding “the appealing vision of a new ‘flat world’”, he writes, today’s globe is still dominated by states pursuing their individual interests. History will not judge kindly those who neglect a real and present danger to the survival of democracy in the United States and Europe in the name of promoting democracy on a global scale. And, Iklé makes a powerful case that the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction by non-state actors can create precisely such a disastrous outcome.
The bottom line is that notwithstanding often disingenuous references to the “international community”, our dangerous world is still dominated by states and, yes, their governments. Under these circumstances, America cannot lead if it disregards the interests and priorities of others. Telling those others what we think their interests are does not work; sovereign nations like to make such decisions themselves. And when President George W. Bush is viewed as a greater threat to world peace than either Kim Jong-il or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (less a threat than Osama bin Laden alone), in major international polls, few abroad are inclined to accept that Washington knows best. It is not cynical defeatism but patriotic desire to strengthen U.S. global leadership that should persuade us to end the crusade. Now.
Dimitri K. Simes is president of The Nixon Center and publisher of The National Interest.