

# MERIA

## TURKISH PUBLIC OPINION TOWARD THE UNITED STATES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE IRAQ QUESTION

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*Turkey is a traditional ally of the United States, however, certain events, notably Washington's 2003 military intervention in Iraq and the Turkish response to this, have soured Turkish-American relations. Based on opinion polls, this article analyzes and explains the Turkish people's perceptions of the United States during the period between December 2002 and September 2003. The Turkish were displeased by what they saw as an American attitude of pursuing unilateral policies aimed solely at protecting American interests. The Turkish people believed that the U.S. decision on Iraq was taken without regard for Turkey's national interests or bilateral relations. In their eyes, the American intervention, and Turkey's possible participation in it, would be harmful for Turkey, especially in the context of the Kurdish question. Therefore, it was not surprising that the Turkish nation opposed supporting the Americans in Iraq.*

After World War II, Turkey's main goal was to establish an alliance and to cooperate with the West, the United States in particular, in every regard. Until 1964, maintaining close relations with the United States was the central theme of Turkish foreign policy and was backed by public opinion. The Turkish people considered the United States the sole guarantor of Turkey's security and the sole source of the development of the Turkish economy. The clashes in Cyprus began at the end of 1963, and the United States took a neutral stance between Turkey and Greece. This demonstrated that pursuing policies based solely on the United States was insufficient to protect Turkey's interests.

Consequently, the United States experienced a major loss of prestige in the eyes of Turkish rulers, and anti-Americanism soared among the Turkish people. Problems such as

Washington's use of Turkish military bases, Turkish opium exacerbating drug addiction among American youth, the 1974 Turkish military intervention in Cyprus, and the American arms embargo on Turkey cooled Turkish-American ties until 1980.

While relations between the two countries were generally cordial during the 1980s, despite some significant problems, the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s once again forced Turkey to make a choice in its foreign relations. Turkish leaders decisively chose to stay in the Western camp and to act with the United States in world politics. In fact, in the new era, the Turkish ruling elite feared that Washington would leave Turkey due to the decrease in its strategic importance. Therefore, considerable efforts were made to prove Turkey's strategic value for the West and the United States. As part of the new Turkish attitude, Turkey lent full support to

Washington's policies during the 1991 Iraq crisis, in order to use every opportunity to increase Turkey's value in the eyes of American leaders. Turkish leaders approached the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States in the same way, emphasizing Turkey's alliance with the United States in its war against new threats.

However, the U.S. decision to intervene in Iraq militarily and the subsequent demand for Turkish assistance brought a new turning point in Turkish-American relations. Turkey's full support for Washington's 1991 war with Iraq did not further Turkish interests as was expected. In fact, as a result of the economic embargo on Iraq, Turkey lost a huge amount of revenue due to lost trade and investment opportunities.

The new conflict with Iraq was seen the Turkish people and leaders as harmful to its vital national interests, especially with regards to the Kurdish question. Although the Turkish government felt compelled to support the American action and launched some initiatives in this direction, the Turkish nation was overwhelmingly opposed to lending any kind of support to the Americans. In this new atmosphere, the Turkish parliament rejected the proposal to allow U.S. forces to use Turkish territory for the war.

This article analyzes and explains Turkish public opinion concerning the United States during the critical period of December 2002 through September 2003. These analyses are based on the opinion polls conducted by two Turkish public surveying companies: Anar and Pollmark. The Turkish nation's perception of the United States is an important factor in the future of Turkish-American relations. Moreover, the Turkish people's opinion of Washington's war against Iraq is an important indicator as to the perceived

legitimacy of U.S. actions, a problem it has faced elsewhere in the world.

### **THE TURKISH PEOPLE'S OPINIONS ON AMERICAN MILITARY INTERVENTION IN IRAQ**

The Turkish government of the Islamic-oriented AKP party did not take a hard line against cooperation. It signed an agreement to modernize military bases for this purpose and persuaded the Turkish parliament to ratify the governmental decree, which authorized the government to take necessary measures on this program. It did not object to the arrival of American weapons and soldiers in Turkish ports for future deployment in Iraq. Furthermore, it proposed a resolution in parliament to allow U.S. forces to operate from Turkish territory during the attack. The government may not have pushed this initiative with all its power, but it certainly did not incite public opinion against the idea.

In addition, reports that the United States would provide Turkey with significant financial aid in return for its participation in the war might have been expected to mobilize public support. But this exchange was seen as an insult to Turkey's national honor, as if it were a puppet or mercenary of the world's superpower. Therefore, 59.2 percent of the Turks expressed negative opinions on the bilateral negotiations regarding Turkey's contribution to the war.<sup>1</sup> In December 2002, 86.7 percent of Turkish people opposed the intervention.<sup>2</sup> A month later this figure rose to more than 90 percent. This was an extremely high rate given the alliance relationship between the two countries.<sup>3</sup> It was also striking that 74.9 percent of the Turkish people thought Iraq to be right in the conflict, compared to only 7.2 percent who supported the U.S. side.<sup>4</sup>

Turkish public opinion continued to oppose U.S. intervention after the war began. (80.6 percent opposed the intervention in May 2003).<sup>5</sup> The fact that

the United States won the war easily did not change the Turkish people's negative view. In August 2003, the American intervention in Iraq was still at the top of the agenda for the Turkish nation because of the serious problems it incurred for Turkey.<sup>6</sup>

According to polls, the Turkish people did not believe the reasons for launching a war against Iraq that were put forth by the American administration were the true motives behind the war. The Turkish population did not believe in the sincerity of the Americans, even though they were their political allies. In their opinion, American leaders had other, evil intentions for military intervention in Iraq.<sup>7</sup> Ironically, though, 45.6 percent believed that Iraq had chemical and biological weapons. However, this seemed to cause people to oppose the war since they worried Turkey might suffer if such weapons were used in an armed conflict.<sup>8</sup>

According to the majority of the people (74.4 percent), the real purpose of the United States was to gain control over oil resources in order to remain a superpower and to strengthen its hegemony over the world. Few thought the United States' was simply flaunting its power by the operation (6.9 percent) or seeking colonies to exploit (only 5.1 percent). Remarkably, only 2.3 percent of Turks believed that overthrowing the Saddam Hussein regime was the real reason for the attack, and just 0.6 percent believed the war was in retaliation for the September 11, 2001, attacks. On the other hand, only 5 percent thought that the United States was seeking to conquer the entire Middle East. In short, the main view was that America sought control of the oil rather than territorial conquest, to fight terrorism, or to eliminate a dangerous regime.

Given the fact that Iraq was among the major enemies of Israel and that blaming the war on Zionism was a major theme in the Arab world, one might have thought that the Turkish people would embrace that theme. But just 3.6 percent held that view. It was also striking that only 0.8 percent of the Turkish people saw the U.S.-Iraq war as one of religion.

### **REASONS FOR THE TURKISH PEOPLE'S NEGATIVE APPROACH TO THE AMERICAN INTERVENTION**

Aside from U.S. motives, Turkey's people were also critical of the way the policy had been conducted. Some 72 percent held the opinion that the American action would render the U.N. useless in world politics.<sup>9</sup> Generally, the Turkish people believed that the United States violated international law, weakened international institutions, and harmed world peace.

The Turkish people also opposed U.S. intervention in Iraq because of its possible negative ramifications for the Kurdish question. Over half (53.6 percent) believed that a U.S. intervention without a Turkish military occupation of northern Iraq would result in the establishment of a Kurdish state.<sup>10</sup> To make matters worse, the majority of the Turkish people (60.5 percent) believed that the United States favored the establishment of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq.<sup>11</sup> In fact, one of the most important reasons for the Turkish nation's opposition to the U.S. intervention was this belief. The close relations between the United States and Kurdish groups, including U.S. protection for a northern Iraq enclave outside Iraq's central authority, were taken as evidence of such a goal.

In contrast, 33.1 percent did not believe the United States would establish a Kurdish state.<sup>12</sup> And very few (0.08 percent) thought that creating such a state was the primary reason for the U.S. intervention. Still, some of those rejecting the idea of an American-backed Kurdish state might also have viewed the American presence in Iraq as encouraging Kurdish problems for neighboring countries, including Turkey.<sup>13</sup> The perceived high likelihood of American intervention resulting in the establishment of a Kurdish state caused the Turkish people to adopt extremely anti-American views.

Another reason for Turkish attitudes was certain reverberations from Turkey's own history. For example, 74.3 percent of those polled opposed the appointment of an American general as the highest authority of the new Iraqi rule.<sup>14</sup> The situation was too reminiscent of the occupation of Turkey under a military governor after World War I, which eventually sparked a nationwide resistance under Kemal Ataturk. Also in this context, 73.3 percent were disappointed by Iraq's quick surrender without more fighting.<sup>15</sup> Such memories also gave rise to the concern by 83.7 percent that the United States would have too much power in the region by permanently stationing its armed forces there.<sup>16</sup> Another issue, which worried the majority (69.5 percent) of the Turkish nation, was the possibility that the American administration might not limit its intervention to Iraq and might intervene in other regional countries.<sup>17</sup>

In addition to factors cited for this tendency to reject any connection with the Iraq war, was the fear of losing international prestige, since other countries opposed the operation; the fear that Turkish participation in the Iraq war would be a violation of the Turkish principle to avoid conflict with neighboring states; and the lack of perceived gain for Turkish interests. This view was held despite the fact that

Turks thought their country's refusal to cooperate would not stop the war. Only 5.4 percent believed that their parliament's refusal to cooperate would persuade the Americans not to launch a war.

### **THE NEGATIVE APPROACH OF THE TURKISH NATION TO HELPING THE UNITED STATES IN IRAQ AND ITS REASONS**

For American leaders, their allies' decision on whether or not to help them in Iraq would test the sincerity of their friendship and partnership with the United States. One of the countries from which the Americans expected the greatest help was Turkey. If a second front would be opened in the north of Iraq, with the participation of Turkey in military operations and the use of military bases on the Turkish territory, this would provide a great contribution to the American war effort. Turkish assistance would, in a sense, be reciprocation for the political, diplomatic, economic, and military aid which the United States had granted to Turkey since the Second World War.

However, the great majority of the Turkish people (77.8 percent) were of the opinion that Turkey should be opposed to the war and not help the United States in any way, including by offering its military forces and allowing the use of its military bases.<sup>18</sup> The Turkish people's opposition could have been more easily understood if there had not been potential benefits from the war. However, U.S. policymakers thought Turkey would gain a great deal by participating, and lose much-- including having a say in post-war arrangements-- if it did not participate. Turks may have also been expected to think they would lose more influence over the future of Iraq's Kurds and in bilateral relations with the United States if they did not participate.

But the Turkish people viewed the situation differently. Only a small portion

(7.7 percent) were ready to let the U.S. forces use the country's land and air space for the war, even without the participation of the Turkish armed forces. Those who supported this view believed that important gains could be obtained without any serious cost. However, more people did not take this stance because the Turkish people remembered the unfulfilled promises from the 1991 Gulf war and the great losses the country suffered as a result of that conflict. Only a very small number (2.6 percent) supported full involvement alongside the United States, which would include the use of Turkish military forces.<sup>19</sup>

Fear of losing U.S. support for Turkey or suffering some punishment at the hands of the United States simply had no effect on public opinion. An overwhelming majority (77.9 percent) of the Turkish people opposed the deployment of American military armed forces on Turkish territory.<sup>20</sup> By March 2003, the majority of the Turks (61.3 percent) wanted parliament to reject the government proposal to cooperate in the war.<sup>21</sup> The rate of those who opposed the use of Turkish territory as a second front in Northern Iraq also increased to 75 percent.<sup>22</sup> In March 2003, 69.7 percent of the Turkish people even opposed opening Turkish airspace to American warplanes, a low level of cooperation, but one which might have been seen by Washington as a sufficient level of cooperation to merit reward.<sup>23</sup>

Nor were Turks deterred by concern that, as 24 percent thought, Turkish-American relations would be negatively affected by a refusal to cooperate. Given Turkey's heavy military and economic dependence on Washington, this would be a grave cost from the Turkish point of view. A substantial number of the people, 20.7

percent, believed that a Kurdish state would be more likely to be established in Northern Iraq if Turkey did not cooperate with the United States.<sup>24</sup> In spite of these factors, Washington could not persuade the Turkish people to support the war effort.

Indeed, despite Turkey's economic hardships at the time, 72.3 percent opposed allowing the American forces to open a second front by using Turkish territory, even if that would result in significant amounts of financial aid.<sup>25</sup> Some 34.7 percent of the Turkish people believed that the Turkish economy would be negatively affected if their government refused to cooperate in the war, resulting in greater inflation and higher taxes.<sup>26</sup> In March 2003, 58.2 percent thought that there was a connection between the introduction of new taxes and the Turkish parliament's refusal to allow American troops to use Turkish territory for the war.<sup>27</sup>

By April 2003, the percentage of Turks who supported the decision not to extend help to the Americans during the Iraq crisis had decreased to 57.8 percent, although it remained a majority.<sup>28</sup> However, a month later, the number who believed that Turkey acted correctly during the Iraq war by not supporting the American war effort climbed back up to 71.7 percent.<sup>29</sup> Almost half, 46.8 percent, of the Turkish people even opposed the use of the Turkish ports and airports by the Americans for humanitarian purposes in June 2003. In contrast, 42.3 percent supported this restricted type of activity.<sup>30</sup>

So intense was the overall opposition to the war, that the Turkish people criticized their own government, led by an Islamic-oriented party, as being too soft on the issue. The majority of the Turks (55.9 percent) did not approve of government

policies, because they viewed them as hesitant or ambiguous rather than just firmly rejecting the American demands from the beginning.<sup>31</sup> The level of approval for the AKP government's policies on the Iraq crisis decreased further with the course of time (33.1 percent in March and 25.9 percent in July 2003).<sup>32</sup> In August 2003, the mark the government obtained even from its supporters was considerably low. (64 percent).<sup>33</sup>

#### *Reactions toward U.S. Actions*

Aside from the U.S. decision to go to war, Turkish public opinion also responded to American statements and actions in Iraq after the war. For example, the majority of the Turkish people (59.1 percent) disapproved of U.S. Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz's statement criticizing the Turkish Parliament's failure to pass the government plan to let U.S. forces use Turkish military bases.<sup>34</sup> He was perceived as suggesting that the Turkish authorities should apologize to the United States for this failure. But a considerable percentage of people (31.3 percent) stated that they did not have any opinion on the issue. This was a sign that Turkish public opinion's anger at the United States was largely focused on the war itself and there was not much desire for a wider confrontation.

Another emotional issue was an incident in which Turkish soldiers were detained in northern Iraq by the U.S. forces. The United States suggested that they were engaged in activities which might subvert the status quo in the Kurdish-populated areas, but Turks saw this as mistreatment that amounted to an insult. There was also concern that the United States might use Kurdish groups to punish Turkey for its decision not to support the war. A huge majority of Turks, 88.3 percent, did not accept U.S. explanations for the incident.<sup>35</sup> Almost the same amount of criticism (79.9

percent) was leveled against the findings of a U.S.-Turkish joint commission that investigated what had happened.<sup>36</sup> Again, 70.2 percent felt that their own government--which was acting cautiously so as not to worsen further bilateral relations--had not taken a tough enough stand on the incident.<sup>37</sup> Still, this was a temporary problem. Only 0.8 percent of the Turks saw the detainment as the most important incident of August 2003.<sup>38</sup>

#### *Providing Military Forces for the Iraqi Mission*

After the war ended, the idea of Turkey sending its own forces into post-Saddam Iraq was raised. This arguably had certain advantages for Turkey in securing its interests in Iraq, while also helping to relieve the pressure on U.S. forces and to show international support for the American peacekeeping effort. Still, so strong was the opposition to direct involvement that in February 2003 the Turkish people were almost evenly split on the issue.<sup>39</sup> The key issue was whether people thought stationing military forces in northern Iraq could be effective in preventing a Kurdish state or the use of Kurdish-populated areas as a base to attack Turkey's national interests. But the majority of the Turks still believed that Turkey would not be able to direct the problem as it wished even if it had military forces in Northern Iraq. In March 2003, the majority (54.3 percent) were in favor of sending military forces to northern Iraq, but the rate of those who did not approve the proposal was still considerably high (40.5 percent).<sup>40</sup>

It seemed that the Turkish people were confused on this issue. They favored the presence of the Turkish forces in the region in order to affect developments, but they also believed that intervention in northern Iraq, in the chaotic atmosphere created by the American operation, could not bring expected benefits. In September 2003, the

percentage of Turkish people who suggested that Turkey should have sent military forces to Iraq before the war started decreased to 32.9 percent. On the other hand, the rate of those, who believed that Turkey had acted correctly by not sending military forces to Iraq became 61.2 percent.<sup>41</sup> The opinion that the Turkish presence in Iraq would be risky seemed to gain more credibility.

In July 2003, a considerable number of Turkish people (68 percent) were opposed to the deployment of military forces in Iraq.<sup>42</sup> In September 2003, 64 percent were opposed to sending military forces to Iraq, while 31.1 percent were in favor.<sup>43</sup> Thus, people did not approve of a proposal which could normalize relations with the United States, compensate for the damages caused by the act of not supporting the American war effort, and ensure the reinstatement of American sympathy.

The Turkish political and military elite favored sending military forces to Iraq. However, at the same time, the general population complained about the lack of Turkish influence in Iraq, while opposing the sending of forces. This was partially because this was considered the sacrifice Turkish soldiers to save American soldiers. Turkey also did not want to be isolated internationally and antagonize such countries as France and Germany at a time when it was seeking full membership in the European Union.<sup>44</sup>

#### *Cooperation with the United States in Iraq*

The great majority of the Turkish people (73.5 percent) believed that the United States would not be able to establish a stable regime in Iraq.<sup>45</sup> By the same token, 64 percent of Turks did not have a positive view of the interim Iraqi government.<sup>46</sup> One

of their greatest concerns was that the new Iraqi state would be a federation-- to which 50 percent were opposed-- which could lead to national disintegration and Kurdish separatism. Another 36 percent of Turks did not oppose a federation, partly due to the view that this was up to the Iraqis themselves.<sup>47</sup> Thereafter, the proportion approving a federal regime in Iraq gradually increased until Turks were close to an even split on the issue.<sup>48</sup>

Yet despite the Turks' deep antagonism toward U.S. policy to attack Iraq, opinions began to change in the summer of 2003. The United States had won the war and Saddam Hussein's overthrow was an established fact. If Turkey were going to have influence in the new Iraq, prevent the creation of a Kurdish state, prevent Iraq from becoming a base for the anti-Turkish PKK Kurdish group, and preserve good relations with the United States, a new approach was needed. Thus, in July 2003, an increased number of Turks, 41.5 percent, supported the idea of cooperating with Washington in Iraq, though 45.9 percent were still against it.<sup>49</sup>

There was also an increasing interest in the idea of Turkey benefiting from Iraqi reconstruction. Some 42 percent thought Turkish businessmen could play an active role in the reconstruction of Iraq, whereas 45.8 percent held the opposite view.<sup>50</sup> Those doubting Iraq provided an economic opportunity thought the Americans would not welcome a Turkish role, though this seemed rather unlikely.

#### **PERCEPTION OF THE OTHER ACTORS**

##### *Iraq*

None of the above should be interpreted as meaning Turks sympathized with the

Saddam Hussein regime. Only 66 percent favored siding with Iraq in its war against the United States and its allies.<sup>51</sup> The majority (58.4 percent) did not approve of Saddam's policies.<sup>52</sup> Moreover, 52.8 percent of Turks believed that Iraq constituted a threat to its neighbors, though 37.3 percent held it was not.<sup>53</sup> A large majority (73 percent) had negative opinions of Saddam.<sup>54</sup>

Nevertheless, there was a great deal of sympathy for what Turks perceived as the Iraqi people. Thus, 74.2 percent of Turks thought the Iraqi cause-- which they interpreted as contradicting an American attack-- was right, as compared to only 7.2 percent who believed the Americans were right.<sup>55</sup> This meant most Turks rejected the policy of the United States, their ally since 1947, who had provided them with substantial aid in the past. On the other hand, they held more positive views regarding Iraq, with whom Turkey did not have normal relations and with whom they even had major problems in the recent period.

There were a number of factors involved here, including the identification of Iraqis as Muslims, the relative loyalty of Iraqis during the period Ottoman Empire, the view of the United States as an alien force in the region, and the idea that Iraqis were the underdogs. Perhaps most important of all, Turks preferred neutrality, the country's historic policy as in World War II and in the 1991 Gulf war. The fact that the United States was trying to push Turkey into a war brought about this preference for neutrality and encouraged opposition to American policy.

#### *Iran*

Turks do not have positive views of Iran. They may see it as too religious a country or as a Shi'a Muslim dominated country-- different from the largely Sunni Muslim Turks. Some also view it as revolutionary,

expansionist, and interfering in Turkey's internal affairs, and also a source of terrorism. They tend to dislike the current Iranian regime and hope that Iran will become a democracy.

When Iranian students demonstrated against the regime, however, Turkish public opinion was not overwhelmingly supportive. While 39.3 percent had favorable views of the demonstrations, 32.1 percent did not, and 28.7 percent had no opinion.<sup>56</sup> Perhaps a relatively large number of people did not approve of the demonstrations, because they were concerned these might lead to regional instability. In addition, 49.6 percent of Turks disapproved of the American support for the demonstrations, while only 23.2 percent approved.<sup>57</sup> Moreover, 80.2 percent of the Turkish people were opposed to an American military intervention in Iran on the grounds that the country supported terrorism.<sup>58</sup>

Regarding a possible Iran-America confrontation, 55 percent of Turks preferred neutrality, while 23.8 percent favored siding with Iran, compared to just 16.85 percent who wanted to be on the U.S. side.<sup>59</sup> This is remarkable given the long alliance between Turkey and the United States, on the one hand, and the Turkish authorities' perception of Iran as a threat since the Islamist revolution there in 1979 on the other. These attitudes could be related to public opinion on Iraq, including the concern regarding American power and the concern that this could serve as a precedent for foreign intervention which in turn could lead to later intervention against Turkey.

#### *Other Regional Countries*

Turkish people generally held more positive opinions of the regional countries than of the United States. A clear majority (75.2 percent) approved the visit of Turkish Prime Minister Abdullah Gul to the



countries of the region, with the purpose being to find a solution for the Iraqi question.<sup>60</sup> While U.S. intervention in regional problems was not desired, acting in cooperation with other states in the area during the Iraq crisis, even those not generally popular in Turkey-- namely Syria and Iran-- was preferred by 51.1 percent. At the same time, though, 36.9 percent opposed Turkey acting together with Syria and Iran, indicating distrust of those states.

#### *European Union*

Comparing the attitudes of the Turkish people toward the United States with their opinions on the E.U. is useful in understanding the perception of the Turks regarding the United States. While 69.5 percent of the Turkish people were in favor of Turkey's accession into the E.U., only 23.4 percent were opposed to that membership.<sup>61</sup> In September 2003, the rate of those who desired the E.U. membership, increased to 73.3 percent, whereas the rate of those who did not want it fell to 19.3 percent.<sup>62</sup> In the past, the Turks had considered the Western European states to be hostile outside forces and had held negative views of them. In 2003, the European Union still did not seem to pursue favorable policies regarding Turkey, and the prospects of Turkey's membership in the E.U. were unfavorable. Meanwhile, some influential political and military circles in Turkey argued that Turkey's E.U. membership would bring great harm to the Turkish nation. In spite of these factors, the Turkish people greatly favored the E.U. Public opinion analysis seems to indicate that during this period, the E.U. replaced the United States as the close friend and ally of Turkey.

#### **DIRECT PERCEPTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES**

The Turkish people's perception of the United States and its president, George W. Bush, was extremely negative in 2003, especially affected by the Iraq war issue. In March 2003, 85 percent of the Turkish people held negative opinions of the United States,<sup>63</sup> while 92 percent of them held a negative attitude toward Bush.<sup>64</sup> The negative perception of the United States dropped in August 2003 to 71 percent, which was still a high rate.<sup>65</sup>

Certainly, the extent of this attitude is surprising. In the first place, there could have been more acceptance of the U.S. claims that it was combating a dangerous dictatorship as well as for the other reasons it gave to explain its actions. Second, the two countries had long been allies and Turks had seen U.S. aid and support as an important asset. Moreover, at the time the opinion polls were conducted, there was no serious crisis between Turkey and the United States. The two countries were still trying to work together on the Iraq issue. In addition, the Turkish government was publicly favoring cooperation and did not attempt to incite anti-American attitudes.

The main problem, then, was the perception of the United States and its behavior. On the one hand, there was no country or institution in the world which could compete with, or restrain, U.S. power. On the other hand, the United States was seen as acting in its own interests, without consideration for other states. Thus, both the situation of a war next door and of an all-powerful United States seemed dangerous to many Turks. Some 69.5 percent of Turks believed that the United States, like other states which had world

hegemony in the past, did not hesitate to intervene in the affairs of weaker countries because it knew that no one could stop it from doing so.<sup>66</sup> Two-thirds of those polled in February 2003 also felt that the United States would intervene militarily in Iraq regardless of whether Turkey opposed this action.<sup>67</sup> This conception was a recipe for considering U.S. policy to be against Turkish interests on several levels. In holding this view, public opinion rejected Turkish government policy that the country should cooperate to some extent in order to reduce any damage from the U.S. action.

To a large extent, Turkish public opinion viewed the friction in bilateral relations to be a short-term problem, though 49.5 percent in the March 2003 poll were still pessimistic about the long-term future of the relationship.<sup>68</sup> In holding this view, they were aware that the refusal to help the U.S. war by helping the Americans open up a "second front" in northern Iraq was an act that could harm relations. Still, 37 percent were optimistic about the future of the relationship as well.

By May 2003, concerns had eased somewhat, with more people saying relations would improve. Only 21 percent thought they would deteriorate further.<sup>69</sup> Turks were thus not pleased with the existing situation, but thought that the problems were only temporary ones related to the Iraq crisis.

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**TABLES**

**ABBREVIATIONS**

PARTY	WORLD VIEW
AKP: JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY	CONSERVATIVE
CHP: REPUBLICAN PEOPLE'S PARTY	DEMOCRAT
DYP: TRUE PATH PARTY	SOCIAL DEMOCRAT
	CONSERVATIVE
	DEMOCRAT
MHP: NATIONALIST ACTION PARTY	NATIONALIST
GP: YOUNG PARTY	NATIONALIST, LIBERAL
DEHAP: DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE PARTY	KURDISH SOCIAL
	DEMOCRAT
ANAP: MOTHERLAND PARTY	LIBERAL
SP: HAPPINESS PARTY	RELIGIOUS,
	CONSERVATIVE
TGNA: TURKISH GRAND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY	

**Appendix I: The Attitudes of Turkish People on the Reasons and Legitimacy of the Iraq War**

**Table 1** (D1, December 2002). What do you think about the U.S. military intervention in Iraq?

	Positive	Negative	No opinion	Total
AKP	6.6	87.8	5.5	100
CHP	8.8	87.4	3.8	100
DYP	15.4	76.3	8.3	100
MHP	6.6	91.2	2.2	100
GP	9.4	88.0	2.6	100
DEHAP	3.9	85.3	10.8	100
TOTAL AVERAGE	8.0	86.7	5.3	100
Pearson Chi-Square	79.711	40	.000	2127

**Table 2** (D1, January 2003). What do you think about the U.S. military intervention in Iraq?

	Positive	Negative	No opinion	Total
AKP	3.4	94.4	2.3	100

CHP	3.3	95.7	1.0	100
DYP	5.4	91.9	2.7	100
MHP	6.2	91.5	2.3	100
GP	1.8	98.2		100
DEHAP	5.2	92.7	2.1	100
TOTAL AVERAGE	4.0	93.9	2.0	100
Pearson Chi-Square	34.061	40	.734	2004

**Table 3** (C7, March 2003). Do you think that there are chemical and biological weapons in Iraq?

	Yes	No	No opinion	Total
AKP	40.0	36.8	23.2	100.0
CHP	55.2	27.1	17.7	100.0
DYP	44.4	29.6	26.1	100.0
MHP	41.5	34.1	24.4	100.0
GP	45.8	38.3	15.9	100.0
DEHAP	47.3	28.6	24.2	100.0
TOTAL AVERAGE	45.6	33.4	20.9	100.0
Pearson Chi-Square	41.8	16.0	.000	1950

**Table 4** (C8, March 2003). Do you think that Iraq under the leadership of Saddam generates a threat for its neighboring countries?

	Yes	No	No opinion	Total
AKP	35.7	50.3	14.0	100.0
CHP	39.9	50.3	9.7	100.0
DYP	44.1	51.0	4.9	100.0
MHP	32.0	54.9	13.1	100.0
GP	38.3	53.3	8.4	100.0
DEHAP	33.0	60.4	6.6	100.0
TOTAL AVERAGE	37.3	52.8	9.9	100.0
Pearson Chi-Square	29.6	16.0	.000	1948

**Table 5** (C5, March 2003). Do you think that U.N. becomes ineffective in practice after the U.S. intervention without the approval of the U.N. Security Council?

	Yes	No	No opinion	Total
AKP	66.5	15.2	18.3	100.0
CHP	80.5	12.5	7.0	100.0
DYP	73.9	14.8	11.3	100.0
MHP	69.1	17.9	13.0	100.0
GP	65.1	29.2	5.7	100.0
DEHAP	72.8	21.7	5.4	100.0
TOTAL AVERAGE	72.0	16.4	11.7	100.0
Pearson Chi-Square	60.2	16.0	.000	1947

Turkish Public Opinion Toward the United States

**Table 6** (D1, February 2003). Do you think that anti-war demonstrations in Turkey and around the world will prevent the Iraq war?

	Yes	No	No opinion	Total
AKP	30.1	64.2	5.7	100
CHP	26.6	69.7	3.7	100
DYP	28.3	63.4	8.3	100
MHP	17.1	75.2	7.8	100
GP	38.7	55.0	6.3	100
DEHAP	31.6	65.3	3.2	100
TOTAL AVERAGE	27.5	66.6	5.9	100
Pearson Chi-Square	30.176	16	.017	2017

**Table 7** (D7, February 2003). Do you think that the U.S. will strike Iraq even without the consent of Turkey?

	Yes	No	No opinion	Total
AKP	62.1	30.3	7.6	100
CHP	71.8	22.8	5.4	100
DYP	64.4	29.5	6.2	100
MHP	78.3	18.6	3.1	100
GP	60.4	33.3	6.3	100
DEHAP	66.7	29.2	4.2	100
TOTAL AVERAGE	66.3	27.2	6.5	100
Pearson Chi-Square	27.007	16	.041	2020

**Table 8** (C6, March 2003). Which side is right in this conflict according to you?

	U.S. and Its Allies	Iraq	No opinion	Total
AKP	6.3	80.1	13.6	100.0
CHP	8.0	69.3	22.6	100.0
DYP	13.3	62.2	24.5	100.0
MHP	6.6	73.8	19.7	100.0
GP	11.2	74.8	14.0	100.0
DEHAP	2.2	79.1	18.7	100.0
TOTAL AVERAGE	7.2	74.9	18.0	100.0
Pearson Chi-Square	63.6	16.0	.000	1949

**Table 9** (B1, May 2003). Do you approve of the U.S. intervention in Iraq when considering the current circumstances?

	Yes	No	No opinion	Total
AKP	12.4	79.2	8.5	100.0
CHP	12.6	83.7	3.7	100.0
DYP	11.3	73.9	14.8	100.0

MHP	16.0	64.8	19.2	100.0
GP	15.3	82.0	2.7	100.0
DEHAP	7.4	89.4	3.2	100.0
TOTAL AVERAGE	12.2	80.6	7.2	100.0
Pearson Chi-Square	77.9	18.0	.000	1988

**Appendix II: Attitudes toward U.S.**

**Table 10** (D13, February 2003). What is your general opinion about U.S. President George W. Bush?

	Positive	Negative	No opinion	Total
AKP	5.9	88.4	5.7	100
CHP	2.7	94.3	3.0	100
DYP	7.6	88.3	4.1	100
MHP	1.6	95.3	3.1	100
GP	8.1	88.3	3.6	100
DEHAP	3.2	95.8	1.1	100
TOTAL AVERAGE	4.9	90.5	4.6	100
Pearson Chi-Square	31.532	16	.012	2017

**Table 11** (C2, March 2003). What is your general opinion about U.S. President George W. Bush?

	Positive	Negative	No opinion	Total
AKP	5.9	90.1	3.9	100.0
CHP	3.1	94.4	2.4	100.0
DYP	9.9	88.7	1.4	100.0
MHP	3.3	94.3	2.4	100.0
GP	8.4	89.7	1.9	100.0
DEHAP	4.3	94.6	1.1	100.0
TOTAL AVERAGE	5.3	92.1	2.6	100.0
Pearson Chi-Square	31.1	16.0	.000	1949

**Table 12** (C1, March 2003). What is your general opinion about the U.S.A.?

	Positive	Negative	No opinion	Total
AKP	12.6	81.7	5.7	100.0
CHP	8.7	88.9	2.4	100.0
DYP	13.3	81.8	4.9	100.0
MHP	8.9	87.8	3.3	100.0
GP	13.2	82.1	4.7	100.0
DEHAP	3.3	94.6	2.2	100.0
ANAP	27.6	68.4	3.9	100.0
SP	2.7	97.3		100.0
TOTAL AVERAGE	10.9	85.0	4.1	100.0
Pearson Chi-Square	58.5	16.0	.000	1948

Turkish Public Opinion Toward the United States

**Table 13** (C9, March 2003). Have the justifications for the U.S. intervention convinced you?

	Yes	No	No opinion	Total
AKP	8.3	89.2	2.6	100.0
CHP	3.8	94.8	1.4	100.0
DYP	8.4	88.1	3.5	100.0
MHP	8.9	88.6	2.4	100.0
GP	7.5	91.6	0.9	100.0
DEHAP	5.4	93.5	1.1	100.0
TOTAL AVERAGE	6.6	91.5	1.9	100.0
Pearson Chi-Square	18.9	16.0	0.3	1949

(Attention! The next question will be asked to the subjects who responded "no" to the above question)

**Table 14** (C9.a., March 2003). What is the real rationale behind the U.S. military intervention in Iraq?

	Petroleum	The U.S. wants to show its power to the world.	The U.S. seeks a new colony	Remove Saddam from power	To dominate Middle East	Retaliation for twin towers	Chemical and biological weapons in Iraq	Because of Zionist powers	Religion war	To establish Kurdish state	Total
AKP	78.7	5.4	2.8	2.4	3.3	0.9	0.2	4.6	1.1	0.7	100.0
CHP	76.6	7.0	4.4	2.2	7.3		1.1	0.7		0.7	100.0
DYP	73.0	5.7	5.7	4.1	1.6	4.1	1.6	4.1			100.0
MHP	82.1	6.3	2.7	0.9	4.5	0.9		2.7			100.0
GP	81.1	5.3	6.3	1.1	4.2	1.1	1.1				100.0
DEHAP	66.3	5.8	9.3	2.3	12.8			1.2		2.3	100.0
TOTAL AVERAGE	74.4	6.9	5.1	2.3	5.0	0.6	0.7	3.6	0.8	0.8	100.0
Pearson Chi-Square	249.6	72.0	0.0								1793

**Table 15** (C10, March 2003). Do you think the U.S. will leave or stay in the region after overthrowing the Ba'th regime?

	Leave the region	Continue to stay	No opinion	Total
AKP	12.4	78.9	8.7	100.0
CHP	6.6	89.6	3.8	100.0

DYP	9.8	85.3	4.9	100.0
MHP	9.8	84.6	5.7	100.0
GP	13.2	81.1	5.7	100.0
DEHAP	5.5	89.0	5.5	100.0
TOTAL	9.9	83.7	6.4	100.0
AVERAGE				
Pearson Chi-Square	Chi-34.8	16.0	.000	1949

**Table 16** (C11, March 2003). Do you think the U.S. will also intervene in other countries in the region?

	Yes	No	No opinion	Total
AKP	62.7	21.9	15.4	100.0
CHP	72.1	20.2	7.7	100.0
DYP	67.6	21.1	11.3	100.0
MHP	67.7	17.7	14.5	100.0
GP	70.4	22.2	7.4	100.0
DEHAP	81.3	12.1	6.6	100.0
ANAP	65.8	27.6	6.6	100.0
TOTAL AVERAGE	69.5	19.5	11.0	100.0
Pearson Chi-Square	35.1	16.0	.000	1950

**Table 17** (B5, April 2003). What do you think about the appointment by the U.S. of a military general as the governor of Iraq?

	Positive	Negative	No opinion	Total
AKP	16.5	73.7	9.8	100.0
CHP	15.9	78.3	5.8	100.0
DYP	25.0	66.7	8.3	100.0
MHP	10.2	80.5	9.4	100.0
GP	18.0	67.6	14.4	100.0
DEHAP	12.8	80.9	6.4	100.0
TOTAL AVERAGE	15.9	74.3	9.9	100.0
Pearson Chi-Square	47.1	18.0	.000	2004

**Table 18** (J4, May 2003). How would you react if the U.S. attacked Iran with the reason that it supports terrorism?

	Positive	Negative	No opinion	Total
AKP	8.1	80.3	11.6	100.0
CHP	18.4	76.9	4.8	100.0
DYP	9.9	80.3	9.9	100.0
MHP	11.1	77.8	11.1	100.0
GP	21.8	70.0	8.2	100.0
DEHAP	4.3	86.2	9.6	100.0
TOTAL AVERAGE	11.1	80.2	8.7	100.0
Pearson Chi-Square	55.4	18.0	.000	1987



Turkish Public Opinion Toward the United States

**Table 19** (H2, June 2003). What is your general opinion about the student demonstrations in Iran?

	Positive	Negative	No opinion	Total
AKP	31.6	40.9	27.5	100.0
CHP	50.4	26.8	22.9	100.0
DYP	39.7	22.8	37.5	100.0
MHP	36.4	33.1	30.6	100.0
GP	41.0	25.7	33.3	100.0
DEHAP	61.1	15.6	23.3	100.0
TOTAL AVERAGE	39.3	32.1	28.7	100.0
Pearson Chi-Square	86.2	18.0	.000	1900

**Table 20** (H3, June 2003). What do you think about the support of the U.S. government for student demonstrations in Iran?

	Positive	Negative	No opinion	Total
AKP	22.5	54.3	23.3	100.0
CHP	28.9	50.7	20.4	100.0
DYP	33.3	35.5	31.2	100.0
MHP	24.0	40.5	35.5	100.0
GP	28.8	39.4	31.7	100.0
DEHAP	8.9	63.3	27.8	100.0
TOTAL AVERAGE	23.2	49.6	27.1	100.0
Pearson Chi-Square	67.8	18.0	.000	1902

**Table 21** (A8, July 2003). Are you satisfied with the explanations of the U.S. officials about the reasons for the arrest of some Turkish soldiers in Iraq?

	Yes	No	No opinion	Total
AKP	4.2	84.5	11.3	100.0
CHP	1.7	93.4	5.0	100.0
DYP	5.4	90.5	4.1	100.0
MHP	2.3	93.1	4.6	100.0
GP	3.5	90.3	6.2	100.0
DEHAP	11.5	80.2	8.3	100.0
TOTAL AVERAGE	4.3	88.3	7.4	100.0
Pearson Chi-Square	47.5	18.0	.000	2034

**Table 22** (A13, July 2003). Do you think the U.S. will be able to form a stable order in Iraq?

	Yes	No	No opinion	Total
AKP	10.4	73.0	16.6	100.0
CHP	11.3	75.5	13.2	100.0
DYP	12.2	73.5	14.3	100.0
MHP	12.3	73.8	13.8	100.0

GP	17.9	60.7	21.4	100.0
DEHAP	14.4	74.2	11.3	100.0
TOTAL AVERAGE	12.5	73.5	14.1	100.0
Pearson Chi-Square	30.9	18.0	.000	2035

### **Appendix III: Attitudes toward Iraq**

**Table 23** (D11, February 2003). What do you think about Saddam Hussein's policies as they relate to the quarrel between Iraq and the U.S.?

	Positive	Negative	No opinion	Total
AKP	23.4	66.1	10.5	100
CHP	28.2	67.1	4.7	100
DYP	13.7	82.2	4.1	100
MHP	45.0	48.8	6.2	100
GP	32.4	61.3	6.3	100
DEHAP	25.3	60.0	14.7	100
TOTAL AVERAGE	26.3	64.2	9.5	100
Pearson Chi-Square	99.826	16	.000	2017

**Table 24** (D12, February 2003). What is your general opinion about Iraqi president Saddam Hussein?

	Positive	Negative	No opinion	Total
AKP	17.5	71.4	11.0	100
CHP	16.2	78.8	5.1	100
DYP	12.4	81.4	6.2	100
MHP	24.8	69.0	6.2	100
GP	21.6	73.9	4.5	100
DEHAP	15.6	76.0	8.3	100
TOTAL AVERAGE	17.6	73.0	9.4	100
Pearson Chi-Square	40.177	16	.001	2018

**Table 25** (C4, March 2003). What is your general opinion about Iraqi president Saddam Hussein?

	Positive	Negative	No opinion	Total
AKP	28.3	65.4	6.3	100.0
CHP	20.6	74.6	4.9	100.0
DYP	14.8	78.9	6.3	100.0
MHP	38.5	51.6	9.8	100.0
GP	27.1	63.6	9.3	100.0
DEHAP	32.6	62.0	5.4	100.0
TOTAL AVERAGE	25.8	67.5	6.7	100.0
Pearson Chi-Square	73.3	16.0	.000	1948

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**Table 26** (J1, May 2003). What do you think about Paul Wolfowitz's explanation regarding Turkey?

	Positive	Negative	No opinion	Total
AKP	9.5	58.3	32.2	100.0
CHP	10.8	63.1	26.1	100.0
DYP	4.9	65.5	29.6	100.0
MHP	12.0	59.2	28.8	100.0
GP	10.0	58.2	31.8	100.0
DEHAP	18.1	45.7	36.2	100.0
TOTAL AVERAGE	9.5	59.1	31.3	100.0
Pearson Chi-Square	39.8	18.0	.000	1990

**Table 27** (B1, April 2003). The government of Saddam Hussein did not do enough to defend Baghdad as was expected. What do you think about this statement?

	Positive	Negative	No opinion	Total
AKP	20.9	74.5	4.6	100.0
CHP	24.3	67.9	7.8	100.0
DYP	18.8	66.7	14.6	100.0
MHP	10.2	84.4	5.5	100.0
GP	15.3	76.6	8.1	100.0
DEHAP	23.2	70.5	6.3	100.0
TOTAL AVERAGE	19.4	73.2	7.4	100.0
Pearson Chi-Square	49.2	18.0	.000	2007

**Appendix IV: Attitudes toward Policies of Turkish Government on the Iraq war.**

**Table 28** (D2, January 2003). If the U.S. intervenes in Iraq, what policy should Turkey follow in this situation?

	Turkey should be neutral.	Turkey should take the side of Iraq against the U.S.A. and her Allies	troops to the region, but it may open its air and land spaces to the U.S. military	Turkey should take the side of the U.S.A. and its Allies	Other	No opinion	TOTAL
AKP	81.5	7.2	5.3	2.1	2.5	1.5	100
CHP	77.3	3.0	13.0	1.7	4.7	0.3	100
DYP	71.1	8.1	11.4	5.4		4.0	100

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MHP	72.1	7.0	9.3	2.3	7.8	1.6	100
GP	72.6	18.6	4.4	1.8	0.9	1.8	100
DEHAP	90.6	4.2	2.1	1.0	2.1		100
TOTAL	77.8	6.6	7.7	2.6	3.7	1.5	100
AVERAGE							
Pearson	Chi-265.29	100	.000				2006
Square	8						

**Table 29** (D3, January 2003). What do you think about the diplomatic visits of Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul to the countries of the region to find a peaceful solution for the Iraqi problem?

	Positive	Negative	No opinion	TOTAL
AKP	88.9	5.5	5.6	100
CHP	72.6	23.4	4.0	100
DYP	65.1	23.5	11.4	100
MHP	69.0	25.6	5.4	100
GP	63.4	32.1	4.5	100
DEHAP	71.9	25.0	3.1	100
TOTAL AVERAGE	75.2	18.3	6.5	100
Pearson Chi-Square	191.071	40	.000	2005

**Table 30** (D4, January 2003). Do you think that the Istanbul summit of foreign ministers of the countries of the region will be effective in solving the Iraqi problem?

	Yes	No	No opinion	Total
AKP	49.7	34.8	15.4	100
CHP	27.7	65.0	7.3	100
DYP	40.5	43.9	15.5	100
MHP	30.2	63.6	6.2	100
GP	37.5	53.6	8.9	100
DEHAP	29.2	62.5	8.3	100
TOTAL AVERAGE	37.8	50.0	12.2	100
Pearson Chi-Square	137.214	40	.000	2004

**Table 31** (D2, February 2003). What do you think about the policies of AKP government regarding the Iraq problem?

	Positive	Negative	No opinion	Total
AKP	58.2	33.4	8.4	100
CHP	15.2	80.1	4.7	100
DYP	24.0	61.0	15.1	100
MHP	40.0	53.1	6.9	100
GP	19.8	70.3	9.9	100
DEHAP	15.6	79.2	5.2	100
TOTAL AVERAGE	34.1	55.9	10.0	100
Pearson Chi-Square	266.884	16	.000	2019

**Table 32** (D1, March 2003). What do you think about the policies of the AKP government regarding the Iraq problem?

	Successful	Unsuccessfu l	No opinion	Total
AKP	62.3	27.0	10.7	100.0
CHP	13.6	81.2	5.2	100.0
DYP	29.6	59.2	11.3	100.0
MHP	34.1	56.1	9.8	100.0
GP	17.8	72.9	9.3	100.0
DEHAP	13.2	81.3	5.5	100.0
TOTAL AVERAGE	33.1	58.1	8.8	100.0
Pearson Chi-Square	354.7	16.0	.000	1947

**Table 33** (A5, July 2003). Do you think that the AKP government's policy regarding the Iraq problem is successful?

	Yes	No	No opinion	Total
AKP	49.0	38.9	12.1	100.0
CHP	11.6	78.7	9.6	100.0
DYP	23.3	67.8	8.9	100.0
MHP	26.2	67.7	6.2	100.0
GP	17.0	72.3	10.7	100.0
DEHAP	7.3	89.6	3.1	100.0
TOTAL AVERAGE	25.9	64.1	10.0	100.0
Pearson Chi-Square	255.2	18.0	.000	2033

**Table 34** (A11, July 2003). Are you satisfied with the U.S.-Turkish Commission's explanation for the arrest of Turkish soldiers by the U.S. soldiers in Iraq?

	Yes	No	No opinion	Total
AKP	9.1	70.9	20.0	100.0
CHP	2.0	85.8	12.3	100.0
DYP	10.2	85.7	4.1	100.0
MHP		90.7	9.3	100.0
GP	6.2	79.6	14.2	100.0
DEHAP	5.3	81.1	13.7	100.0
TOTAL AVERAGE	5.7	79.9	14.4	100.0
Pearson Chi-Square	77.6	18.0	.000	2032

**Table 35** (D6, February 2003). What do you think about the permission issued by the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) for the U.S. military settlement in Turkey?

	Positive	Negative	No opinion	Total
AKP	19.1	71.6	9.4	100

CHP	10.4	85.9	3.7	100
DYP	12.4	83.4	4.1	100
MHP	20.2	76.0	3.9	100
GP	16.1	81.3	2.7	100
DEHAP	4.2	92.7	3.1	100
TOTAL AVERAGE	16.1	77.9	5.9	100
Pearson Chi-Square	52.100	16	.000	2019

**Table 36** (D8, February 2003). Do you think it would be beneficial for Turkey to send its troops to Northern Iraq in the case of U.S. military intervention in Iraq?

	Yes	No	No opinion	Total
AKP	42.7	47.3	9.9	100
CHP	39.1	57.6	3.4	100
DYP	40.7	48.3	11.0	100
MHP	52.7	41.9	5.4	100
GP	44.6	47.3	8.0	100
DEHAP	11.5	86.5	2.1	100
TOTAL	40.0	52.1	7.9	100
AVERAGE				
Pearson Chi-Square	80.408	16	.000	2018

**Table 37** (D2, March 2003). When you reconsider it today, what do you think about the TGNA's rejection of AKP government's decision to send Turkish troops to Iraq?

	Positive	Negative	No opinion	Total
AKP	66.9	24.8	8.3	100.0
CHP	60.6	33.8	5.6	100.0
DYP	57.3	34.3	8.4	100.0
MHP	51.6	37.7	10.7	100.0
GP	53.8	42.5	3.8	100.0
DEHAP	70.7	23.9	5.4	100.0
TOTAL AVERAGE	62.4	30.2	7.4	100.0
Pearson Chi-Square	44.8	16.0	.000	1949

**Table 38** (FM1, February/March 2003). What do you think about the TGNA's rejection of the AKP government's decision to send Turkish troops to Iraq and the settlement of the U.S. troops in Turkey?

	Positive	Negative	No opinion	Total
AKP	64.4	33.9	1.7	100
CHP	74.6	21.6	3.7	100
DYP	50.0	50.0		100
MHP	58.6	41.4		100
GP	68.0	26.0	6.0	100
DEHAP	90.9	9.1		100
TOTAL AVERAGE	66.9	29.7	3.4	100

Turkish Public Opinion Toward the United States

Pearson Chi-Square	66.3	16.0	.000	915
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**Table 39** (FM2, February/March 2003). What would be the possible result of this rejection?

The U.S. government would give up attacking Iraq	5.4
Turkish-U.S. relations would be negatively affected.	24.0
The Turkish economy would be negatively affected. The AKP government would raise taxes and prices.	34.7
If the war would break out, a Kurdish state would be established in the Northern Iraq after the war.	20.7
Other	15.1
Total	100.0

**Table 40** (D3, March 2003). What do you think about the Turkish government's decision to open the Turkish air space to the U.S. air force?

	Positive	Negative	No opinion	Total
AKP	25.6	63.3	11.0	100.0
CHP	18.4	79.2	2.4	100.0
DYP	42.7	52.4	4.9	100.0
MHP	25.2	62.6	12.2	100.0
GP	23.4	67.3	9.3	100.0
DEHAP	9.9	85.7	4.4	100.0
TOTAL AVERAGE	23.4	69.7	6.9	100.0
Pearson Chi-Square	97.4	16.0	.000	1949

**Table 41** (E1, March 2003). Do you think that the TGNA's rejection of the Turkish government's decision about the settlement of the U.S. troops in Turkey would damage Turkish-U.S. relations in the long term?

	Yes	No	No opinion	Total
AKP	45.5	37.0	17.5	100.0
CHP	54.4	37.3	8.4	100.0
DYP	39.4	44.4	16.2	100.0
MHP	54.1	35.2	10.7	100.0
GP	51.4	38.3	10.3	100.0
DEHAP	48.4	37.4	14.3	100.0
TOTAL AVERAGE	49.5	37.1	13.4	100.0
Pearson Chi-Square	37.2	16.0	.000	1947

**Table 42** (E2, March 2003). Do you think that Turkey should have given permission to the U.S. troops to settle in Turkey in order to get financial support from U.S.?

	Yes	No	No opinion	Total
AKP	22.1	67.5	10.5	100.0

CHP	16.4	78.0	5.6	100.0
DYP	26.1	57.7	16.2	100.0
MHP	19.7	69.7	10.7	100.0
GP	23.4	72.9	3.7	100.0
DEHAP	7.6	88.0	4.3	100.0
TOTAL AVERAGE	19.8	72.3	7.9	100.0
Pearson Chi-Square	62.2	16.0	.000	1947

**Table 43** (E3, March 2003). If the U.S. wants to settle its troops in Turkey again should Turkey accept this demand?

	Yes	No	No opinion	Total
AKP	17.6	70.0	12.4	100.0
CHP	14.6	82.3	3.1	100.0
DYP	31.0	59.2	9.9	100.0
MHP	21.1	66.7	12.2	100.0
GP	20.4	72.2	7.4	100.0
DEHAP	7.6	87.0	5.4	100.0
TOTAL AVERAGE	16.4	75.0	8.7	100.0
Pearson Chi-Square	85.2	16.0	.000	1950

**Table 44** (E4, March 2003). In recent days Turkish troops have entered Iraq by crossing the border. What do you think about this?

	Positive	Negative	No opinion	Total
AKP	60.4	33.7	5.9	100.0
CHP	51.9	42.5	5.6	100.0
DYP	57.3	37.8	4.9	100.0
MHP	76.2	19.7	4.1	100.0
GP	55.7	41.5	2.8	100.0
DEHAP	11.0	83.5	5.5	100.0
TOTAL AVERAGE	54.3	40.5	5.2	100.0
Pearson Chi-Square	126.9	16.0	.000	1947

**Table 45** (F1, March 2003). Do you think that AKP government's negotiation with the U.S. government was successful in the process of issuing the permission of sending Turkish troops to Iraq?

	Successful	Unsuccessful	No opinion	Total
AKP	51.5	34.7	13.8	100.0
CHP	15.0	79.4	5.6	100.0
DYP	30.8	55.9	13.3	100.0
MHP	34.1	56.9	8.9	100.0
GP	26.2	64.5	9.3	100.0
DEHAP	12.0	78.3	9.8	100.0
TOTAL AVERAGE	31.0	59.2	9.8	100.0
Pearson Chi-Square	247.1	16.0	.000	1949



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**Table 46** (F3, March 2003). Do you see any relation between the failure of AKP government's proposal to get permission from TGNA and the newly issued taxes?

	Yes	No	No opinion	Total
AKP	59.4	26.6	14.0	100.0
CHP	65.2	25.4	9.4	100.0
DYP	52.4	29.4	18.2	100.0
MHP	60.2	22.0	17.9	100.0
GP	57.4	32.4	10.2	100.0
DEHAP	64.1	27.2	8.7	100.0
TOTAL AVERAGE	58.2	28.9	12.9	100.0
Pearson Chi-Square	60.5	16.0	.000	1951

**Table 47** (B2, April 2003). When you reconsider it today, what do you think about the relatively low support of Turkey to the U.S. at the beginning of the Iraq war?

	Positive	Negative	No opinion	Total
AKP	61.5	29.3	9.2	100.0
CHP	58.6	36.3	5.1	100.0
DYP	60.4	27.1	12.5	100.0
MHP	58.6	35.2	6.3	100.0
GP	51.4	35.1	13.5	100.0
DEHAP	67.4	22.1	10.5	100.0
TOTAL AVERAGE	57.8	33.3	8.9	100.0
Pearson Chi-Square	39.0	18.0	.000	2006

**Table 48** (B6, April 2003). Do you think that Turkish businessmen will take an active role in the reconstruction of Iraq?

	Yes	No	No opinion	Total
AKP	46.9	40.0	13.0	100.0
CHP	41.9	50.3	7.8	100.0
DYP	31.3	58.3	10.4	100.0
MHP	39.1	47.7	13.3	100.0
GP	34.5	52.7	12.7	100.0
DEHAP	34.7	46.3	18.9	100.0
TOTAL AVERAGE	42.0	45.8	12.3	100.0
Pearson Chi-Square	38.6	18.0	.000	2007

**Table 49** (B7, April 2003). What do you think of Turkey, Syria, and Iran's common policy regarding Iraq?

	Positive	Negative	No opinion	Total
AKP	56.5	33.1	10.3	100.0
CHP	44.4	43.7	11.9	100.0
DYP	50.0	37.5	12.5	100.0

MHP	32.8	59.4	7.8	100.0
GP	47.3	33.6	19.1	100.0
DEHAP	53.7	34.7	11.6	100.0
TOTAL AVERAGE	51.1	36.9	12.0	100.0
Pearson Chi-Square	71.5	18.0	.000	2006

**Table 50** (J2, May 2003). Do you think that Turkey should have given more support to the U.S. in the beginning of the Iraq war?

	Yes	No	No opinion	Total
AKP	14.6	69.7	15.6	100.0
CHP	22.8	69.4	7.8	100.0
DYP	18.2	63.6	18.2	100.0
MHP	15.9	73.0	11.1	100.0
GP	25.5	62.7	11.8	100.0
DEHAP	10.6	78.7	10.6	100.0
TOTAL AVERAGE	16.4	71.7	11.9	100.0
Pearson Chi-Square	59.8	18.0	.000	1990

**Table 51** (J3, May 2003). Which direction do you expect Turkish-U.S. relations to take in the near future?

	Will be the same	Will be better	Will be worse	No opinion	Total
AKP	30.3	38.8	13.7	17.2	100.0
CHP	36.4	31.3	24.5	7.8	100.0
DYP	36.2	36.2	16.3	11.3	100.0
MHP	34.9	25.4	28.6	11.1	100.0
GP	31.8	40.0	16.4	11.8	100.0
DEHAP	31.2	18.3	25.8	24.7	100.0
TOTAL	33.3	31.4	21.0	14.4	100.0
AVERAGE					
Pearson Chi-Square	107.8	27.0	.000		1986

**Table 52** (B2, May 2003). When you reconsider it today, what do you think about the policy on Iraq pursued by the Turkish government at the beginning of the war?

	Positive	Negative	No opinion	Total
AKP	56.8	34.0	9.3	100.0
CHP	27.1	69.8	3.1	100.0
DYP	24.6	59.2	16.2	100.0
MHP	19.2	64.0	16.8	100.0
GP	23.6	70.0	6.4	100.0
DEHAP	18.3	75.3	6.5	100.0
TOTAL AVERAGE	35.5	55.8	8.7	100.0
Pearson Chi-Square	208.1	18.0	.000	1986

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**Table 53** (H1, June 2003). Which side should Turkey take in the tension between the U.S.A. and Iran?

	the U.S.A.	Iran	Stay neutral	No opinion	Total
AKP	17.2	26.5	52.0	4.3	100.0
CHP	20.0	11.1	65.0	3.9	100.0
DYP	19.1	19.9	51.5	9.6	100.0
MHP	23.8	21.3	52.5	2.5	100.0
GP	13.5	22.1	63.5	1.0	100.0
DEHAP	11.1	33.3	52.2	3.3	100.0
TOTAL	16.8	23.8	55.1	4.4	100.0
AVERAGE					
Pearson Chi-Square	93.1	27.0	.000		1901

**Table 54** (C1, June 2003). What do you think about the decision of the Turkish government to open its seaports and airports to the U.S.A. for humanitarian purposes?

	Positive	Negative	No opinion	Total
AKP	49.2	41.3	9.5	100.0
CHP	41.3	50.2	8.5	100.0
DYP	49.6	28.5	21.9	100.0
MHP	51.2	42.1	6.6	100.0
GP	41.3	52.9	5.8	100.0
DEHAP	20.9	71.4	7.7	100.0
TOTAL AVERAGE	42.3	46.8	10.8	100.0
Pearson Chi-Square	100.6	18.0	.000	1902

**Table 55** (A6, July 2003). Should Turkey increase its cooperation with the U.S.A. on the Iraq issue?

	Yes	No	No opinion	Total
AKP	49.8	33.2	17.0	100.0
CHP	37.7	48.7	13.7	100.0
DYP	40.8	51.0	8.2	100.0
MHP	39.2	49.2	11.5	100.0
GP	38.4	42.0	19.6	100.0
DEHAP	19.8	72.9	7.3	100.0
TOTAL AVERAGE	41.5	45.9	12.5	100.0
Pearson Chi-Square	88.0	18.0	.000	2032

**Table 56** (A7, July 2003). Should Turkey send troops to Iraq?

	Yes	No	No opinion	Total
AKP	30.2	61.5	8.3	100.0

CHP	20.9	76.8	2.3	100.0
DYP	34.2	58.9	6.8	100.0
MHP	29.5	58.9	11.6	100.0
GP	25.9	69.6	4.5	100.0
DEHAP	7.3	89.6	3.1	100.0
TOTAL AVERAGE	25.9	68.0	6.1	100.0
Pearson Chi-Square	82.5	18.0	.000	2032

**Table 57** (A9, July 2003). Do you find the policy pursued by the Turkish government in regards to the arrest of the Turkish soldiers in Iraq successful?

	Yes	No	No opinion	Total
AKP	36.3	48.8	14.9	100.0
CHP	6.6	85.4	8.0	100.0
DYP	22.3	70.9	6.8	100.0
MHP	10.9	85.3	3.9	100.0
GP	11.6	75.9	12.5	100.0
DEHAP	3.1	81.4	15.5	100.0
TOTAL AVERAGE	18.9	70.2	11.0	100.0
Pearson Chi-Square	223.2	18.0	.000	2034

#### **Appendix V: The Impact of Iraqi Ethnic Structure on the Attitudes of Turkish People**

**Table 58** (D9, February 2003). If the U.S. intervened in Iraq with military forces and Turkish troops did not enter Iraq, do you think Iraq would be divided ethnically?

	Yes	No	No opinion	Total
AKP	51.1	30.7	18.1	100
CHP	54.9	33.3	11.8	100
DYP	40.7	43.4	15.9	100
MHP	65.9	20.2	14.0	100
GP	59.5	28.8	11.7	100
DEHAP	34.4	53.1	12.5	100
TOTAL AVERAGE	52.6	31.6	15.8	100
Pearson Chi-Square	55.729	16	.000	2017

**Table 59** (C12, March 2003). If Iraq after Saddam becomes a federation consisting of Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmens, what would be your reaction?

	Positive	Negative	No opinion	Total
AKP	36.0	49.2	14.8	100.0
CHP	34.8	51.9	13.2	100.0
DYP	42.7	37.8	19.6	100.0
MHP	36.1	50.8	13.1	100.0
GP	26.2	58.9	15.0	100.0
DEHAP	62.6	27.5	9.9	100.0
TOTAL AVERAGE	35.8	50.0	14.2	100.0

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Pearson Chi-Square	55.9	16.0	.000	1949
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**Table 60** (B3, April 2003). If Iraq after Saddam were to become a federation consisting of Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmens, what would be your reaction?

	Positive	Negative	No opinion	Total
AKP	37.4	53.0	9.6	100.0
CHP	45.1	45.1	9.8	100.0
DYP	27.1	62.5	10.4	100.0
MHP	29.9	63.8	6.3	100.0
GP	31.5	55.0	13.5	100.0
DEHAP	66.3	25.3	8.4	100.0
TOTAL AVERAGE	41.2	48.7	10.1	100.0
Pearson Chi-Square	81.6	18.0	.000	2005

**Table 61** (B4, April 2003). Do you think that the U.S.A. wants a Kurdish state in Iraq?

	Yes	No	No opinion	Total
AKP	60.5	31.0	8.4	100.0
CHP	66.1	26.8	7.1	100.0
DYP	39.6	50.0	10.4	100.0
MHP	51.6	40.6	7.8	100.0
GP	46.8	37.8	15.3	100.0
DEHAP	38.9	46.3	14.7	100.0
TOTAL AVERAGE	56.3	33.1	10.6	100.0
Pearson Chi-Square	86.1	18.0	.000	2006

**Table 62** (A12, July 2003). What do you think about the newly established Iraqi Administration Council?

	Positive	Negative	No opinion	Total
AKP	9.4	59.2	31.3	100.0
CHP	5.6	65.1	29.2	100.0
DYP	8.9	71.2	19.9	100.0
MHP	3.8	71.5	24.6	100.0
GP	11.6	55.4	33.0	100.0
DEHAP	28.1	45.8	26.0	100.0
TOTAL AVERAGE	8.3	64.0	27.7	100.0
Pearson Chi-Square	103.5	18.0	.000	2031

**Table 63** (C6, May 2003). If the Turkish Government were to issue a law to pardon terrorist prisoners. how would you react?

	Positive	Negative	No opinion	Total
AKP	25.0	62.2	12.7	100.0
CHP	29.6	60.5	9.9	100.0

DYP	13.3	78.3	8.4	100.0
MHP	12.0	72.0	16.0	100.0
GP	13.6	75.5	10.9	100.0
DEHAP	61.7	26.6	11.7	100.0
TOTAL AVERAGE	26.1	62.3	11.6	100.0
Pearson Chi-Square	119.5	18.0	000	1990

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Table 45 (F1, March 2003).

<sup>2</sup> Turkey's new right, traditional left, and radical right (Turkish nationalists) were opposed to the intervention of the American armed forces in Iraq at similar high rates. The traditional right was, to some extent, left behind in this regard (its rate of opposition to the intervention was 76.3 percent. Table 1 (D1, December 2002)).

<sup>3</sup> Table 2 (D1, January 2003).

<sup>4</sup> Table 13 (C6, March 2003).

<sup>5</sup> Table 9 (B1, May 2003). The Turkish nationalists opposed the U.S. military intervention in Iraq at a lower rate (64.8 percent) compared with the others. They may have feared that not acting with the U.S.A. would harm vital national interests. The group which opposed the intervention at the highest rate (89.4 percent), was the Kurdish nationalists. They should have been felt positively about the operation since it would bring more benefits for the Iraqi Kurds. The Turkish Kurds might have been affected by previous American support for Turkey on the Kurdish question.

<sup>6</sup> Pollmark, *Türkiye Gündemi*, August 2003, p. 22.

<sup>7</sup> Table 14 (C9a, March 2003). The traditional left and the Kurdish nationalists were more convinced than others by the explanations given by the Americans (94.8 percent and 93.5 percent). But the rates of the others polled

were also high. The group whose rate was lowest on this issue was the traditional right (88.1 percent). The Kurdish nationalists had the lowest rate (66.3 percent) of belief that the competition for oil resources was the real cause of the American war against Iraq. They put more of an emphasis on obtaining colonies and establishing control over the Middle East as the motives behind the war. It seemed that the others believed gaining control over oil reserves was the only motive for the war.

<sup>8</sup> Table 3 (C7, March 2003).

<sup>9</sup> Table 5 (C5, March 2003). The Turkish left had a stronger feeling that the U.N. would become non-functional (80.5 percent believed this). The left put more of an emphasis on the question of legitimacy.

<sup>10</sup> Table 58 (D9, February 2003). The Turkish nationalists feared the possibility of the division of Iraq at a higher rate (65.9 percent) than the others did. The Kurdish nationalists least believed (34.4 percent) that Iraq would be disintegrated. It was interesting that the Turkish left was anxious about this issue at a rate similar to that of the Turkish nationalists. They, too, were concerned about the integrity of the Turkish territory.

<sup>11</sup> Table 61 (B4, April 2003). The Turkish left had the highest rate (66.1 percent) of belief that the United States would establish a Kurdish state. The group that least believed such an occurrence was

possible (38.9 percent) was the Kurdish nationalists. According to them, the United States would not hold an anti-Turkish stance on this issue. The traditional right least believed that the United States wanted to establish a Kurdish state.

<sup>12</sup> Table 61 (B4, April 2003).

<sup>13</sup> Table 14 (C9a, March 2003).

<sup>14</sup> Table 17 (B5, April 2003). The traditional right approved the appointment of an American general as the highest authority in Iraq at a higher rate (25.0 percent). It was interesting that the Kurdish and Turkish nationalists disapproved of this most (80.9 percent and 80.5 percent). Nationalistic feelings led them to oppose the action, as they considered it to be belittling the nation.

<sup>15</sup> Table 27 (B1, April 2003).

<sup>16</sup> Table 15 (C10, March 2003). The Turkish left and the Kurdish nationalists believed at the highest rate (about 89 percent) that the United States would establish its presence in the region and would be in the pursuit of hegemony over the region. The new right, which was in the power, believed at the highest rate (12.4 percent) that the U.S.A. would leave the region.

<sup>17</sup> Table 16 (C11, March 2003). The Kurdish nationalists, who did not want to see the United States in the region as a colonial power, believed at the highest rate (81.3 percent) that Washington would launch attacks against the other regional countries. The new right, which was affected by being in the power and which did not want to have to face any difficulties, believed at the lowest rate

(62.7 percent) that the United States would intervene in other states.

<sup>18</sup> Table 28 (D2, January 2003).

<sup>19</sup> Table 28 (D2, January 2003). The group which was most opposed to taking a side in the war (90.6 percent), was the Kurdish nationalists. They may have believed that their situation would be negatively affected by the Turkish-American cooperation. The lowest rate (71.1 percent) on this issue was that of the traditional Turkish right which was more pro-American. It was interesting that the anti-American Turkish left showed the highest rate (13 percent) of support for the use of the Turkish airspace and land by the Americans. On the other hand, the left least believed that Turkey should be on the side of the United States in the war (1.7 percent).

<sup>20</sup> Table 35 (D6, February 2003). All of these groups had a negative view of the government decree. The leading group in this regard was the Kurdish nationalists, who were against Turkey's intervention in Iraq because they did not want Turkey's influential presence in the Kurdish region. It was interesting that the traditional Turkish right was more opposed to the decree than was new right. The Turkish nationalists approved of the decree at a higher rate than the followers of the governmental party did. They feared the decree could negatively affect Turkey's national interests.

<sup>21</sup> Table 37 (D2, March 2003). The Kurdish nationalists approved of the rejection of the governmental decree at the highest rate. The left lagged behind on this issue. The traditional right and the Turkish

nationalists disapproved of the rejection at the highest rate.

<sup>22</sup> Table 43 (E3, March 2003).

<sup>23</sup> Table 40 (D3, March 2003). The traditional right had a much higher rate of approval of the opening of the airspace than did the others. They wanted to normalize relations with the United States, as the United States was annoyed by Turkey's actions.

<sup>24</sup> Table 39 (FM2, February/March 2003).

<sup>25</sup> Table 42 (E2, March 2003).

<sup>26</sup> Table 39 (FM2, February/March 2003).

<sup>27</sup> Table 46 (F3, March 2003).

<sup>28</sup> Table 47 (B2, April 2003).

<sup>29</sup> Table 50 (J2, May 2003).

<sup>30</sup> Table 54 (C1, June 2003).

<sup>31</sup> Table 31 (D2, February 2003).

<sup>32</sup> Table 32 (D1, March 2003); Table 33 (A5, July 2003).

<sup>33</sup> Pollmark, *Türkiye Gündemi*, August 2003, p. 14.

<sup>34</sup> Table 26 (J1, May 2003).

<sup>35</sup> Table 21 (A8, July 2003).

<sup>36</sup> Table 34 (A11, July 2003).

<sup>37</sup> Table 57 (A9, July 2003).

<sup>38</sup> Pollmark, *Türkiye Gündemi*, August 2003, p. 22.

<sup>39</sup> Table 36 (D8, February 2003).

<sup>40</sup> Table 44 (E4, March 2003). The Turkish nationalists favored the deployment of Turkish military forces in Northern Iraq at the highest rate, which exceeded the rate of the others considerably. Their major concern was the possibility that the Kurdish issue could get out of control. The Kurdish nationalists were decisively opposed to the deployment of Turkish forces in the region. They believed the presence of Turkish forces would be harmful to their interests.

<sup>41</sup> Pollmark, *Türkiye Gündemi*, September 2003, p. 52.

<sup>42</sup> Table 56 (A7, July 2003).

<sup>43</sup> Pollmark, *Türkiye Gündemi*, September 2003, p. 53. Governmental party (AKP) supporters approved the deployment of military forces at the highest rate (41.2 percent), which was twice as high as the rate of the others. The government seemed to be determined to protect Turkey's interests.

<sup>44</sup> Pollmark, *Türkiye Gündemi*, August 2003, p. 22.

<sup>45</sup> Table 22 (A13, July 2003).

<sup>46</sup> Table 62 (A12, July 2003).

<sup>47</sup> Table 59 (C12, March 2003).

<sup>48</sup> Table 60 (B3, April 2003).

<sup>49</sup> Table 55 (A6, July 2003).

<sup>50</sup> Table 48 (B6, April 2003).

<sup>51</sup> Table 28 (D2, January 2003).

<sup>52</sup> Table 23 (D11, February 2003). The Turkish nationalists were ahead of the others in approving the policies pursued by Saddam Hussein. The possibility of the establishment of a Kurdish state, as a result of Saddam's overthrow by the Americans, affected the opinions of the nationalists on this issue. The traditional right, friends of the United States, showed the highest rate of disapproval of Saddam Hussein's policies.

<sup>53</sup> Table 4 (C8, March 2003).

<sup>54</sup> Table 24 (D12, February 2003).

<sup>55</sup> Table 8 (C6, March 2003). The new Turkish right (followers of the governmental party) felt the Iraqis to be right at the highest rate (80.1 percent). They had more sympathy toward the Iraqis because of their shared Islamic backgrounds. The traditional right and left found the Iraqis to be right at lower rates. Their opinion was influenced by their traditional hostility toward the Arabs.

<sup>56</sup> Table 19 (H2, June 2003). The groups which approved of the student demonstrations in Iran at the highest rate



were the Kurdish nationalists (61.1 percent) and the Turkish left (50.4 percent), who did not like the Iranian regime at all. The new right showed the highest rate (31.6 percent) of disapproval of the demonstrations. This could be explained by their fear of the destabilization of Iran, which could be harmful to Turkish interests.

<sup>57</sup> Table 20 (H3, June 2003).

<sup>58</sup> Table 18 (J4, May 2003). A possible American attack against Iran was supported at the highest rate (18.4 percent) by the Turkish left, who did not like the Iranian regime. Those who were most opposed to the American intervention (86.2 percent) were the Kurdish nationalists, who feared that the American intervention would be harmful to their situation.

<sup>59</sup> Table 53 (H1, June 2003).

<sup>60</sup> Table 29 (D3, January 2003).

<sup>61</sup> Pollmark, *Türkiye Gündemi*, August 2003, p. 31. The followers of the governmental party and the opposition party in the Parliament favored E.U. membership at higher rates (about 80 percent) in comparison to other opposition parties, which were not represented in the Parliament (their rate was 60 percent).

<sup>62</sup> Pollmark, *Türkiye Gündemi*, September 2003, p. 50.

<sup>63</sup> Table 12 (C1, March 2003).

<sup>64</sup> Table 11 (C2, March 2003); Table 10 (D13, February 2003).

<sup>65</sup> Pollmark, *Türkiye Gündemi*, August 2003, p. 33.

<sup>66</sup> Table 16 (C11, March 2003).

<sup>67</sup> Table 7 (D7, February 2003).

<sup>68</sup> Table 41 (E1, March 2003). Leftists and Turkish nationalists believed at higher rates that Turkish-American relations would be soured. Followers of the governmental party also believed that relations would be negatively affected. The traditional right was more optimistic as to the future of the relations.

<sup>69</sup> Table 51 (J3, May 2003). The groups had not made up their minds regarding the future of Turkish-American relations. The followers of the governmental party were more optimistic, believing there would be an improvement of relations. The same group showed the lowest rate of a belief that the relations would deteriorate.