Middle East Review of International Affairs

Volume 9, Number 2, June 2005

 

Nasser and His Enemies: Foreign Policy Decision Making in Egypt on the Eve of the Six Day War
by Laura James ^*

 

Abstract

This article argues that Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser neither blundered into the Six-day War, nor did he make deliberate plans to provoke conflict. Instead, in early 1967, he took actions aimed at reaping political gains, which he knew carried a high risk of precipitating military hostilities. It is suggested that Nasser's willingness to take such risks was based on his fundamental underestimation of Israel's capacity for independent and effective military action. This was largely founded on his image of America as an all-powerful adversary, although intelligence failures caused by domestic factors, including Nasser's lack of control over the Egyptian military, also played a role.

Full Text (PDF, 22 pages, 106.6 KB)

Note *: Laura James is a College Lecturer at St Edmund Hall, Oxford University. She is currently completing her doctoral thesis in International Relations, entitled, "Images of the Enemy: Conflict Decision Making in Nasser's Egypt." She also worked as a consultant at the International Fund for Agricultural Development.