From the CIAO Atlas Map of Middle East 

MERIA

Middle East Review of International Affairs

Volume 8, Number 2, June 2004

 

Tactical Deception and Strategic Surprise in al-Qai'da's Operations
by Richard H. Shultz, Jr. and Ruth Margolies Beitler *

 

Abstract

How do Middle East terrorist organizations build deception tactics into their training to exploit the vulnerabilities of militarily superior opponents? This paper argues that al-Qa'ida has developed into the non-state equivalent of the counterintelligence (CI) state, using CI principles and practices in its strategy. The article examines how al-Qa'ida employs counterintelligence tools to organize, deploy, and fight.

Full Text (PDF, 24 pages, 125.6 KB)

Note *: Professor Richard H. Shultz is a professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, and is director of the school's International Security Studies Program. His recent publications include The Secret War Against Hanoi: Kennedy and Johnson's Use of Spies, Saboteurs, and Covert Warriors in North Vietnam (1999); Security Studies for the 21st Century (co-editor and author) (1997); and War in the Information Age: New Challenges for U.S. Security Policy (co-editor and author) (1997). He is currently writing a book on Ethnic, Tribal and Religious Warriors: How Non-State Armed Groups Fight (Columbia University Press).

Professor Ruth Margolies Beitler is an Associate Professor of International Relations and Comparative Politics at the U.S. Military Academy. Her books include The Path to Mass Rebellion: An Analysis of Two Intifadas (Lexington Press, 2004) and a monograph (co-authored with Cindy Jebb), Egypt as a Failing State: Implications for U.S. National Security, (Institute for National Security Studies, July 2003). Back