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THE FIRST DECADE OF THE JORDANIAN-ISRAELI PEACE-BUILDING EXPERIENCE: A STORY OF JORDANIAN CHALLENGES (1994-2003)

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This paper explores the structural obstacles to a warm peace on the Jordanian side following the July 25, 1994 Washington Declaration signed by Jordan and Israel and the signing of a full-fledged peace treaty three months later. The paper argues that obstacles existed at the political and economic levels, which hindered such a peace from growing. It contradicts the mainstream argument that Jordan reaped the peace dividend and was able to improve the quality of life of its citizens during the era of peace. Furthermore, it discusses the role of the anti-normalization movement in hindering further normalization.

On July 25, 1994, Jordan and Israel signed the Washington Declaration, which ended the official state of belligerence between them that had existed since the foundation of the State of Israel in 1948. Three months later, a full-fledged peace treaty was signed between representatives of Jordan and Israel in the Arava Valley in southern Jordan. The ceremony was attended by world leaders and key figures whose hopes for peace in the region were high and, at the time, seemed well-founded. Though the treaty was the second between an Arab state and Israel, it was unique for a number of reasons. That is, the treaty was the first to be physically signed in the region and was negotiated directly between the two parties concerned, without the need for serious third-party mediation. Moreover, it promised complete normalization of relations at all levels and in all spheres. Yet despite initially high expectations at the most senior levels of leadership in both states, "warm" peace (understood as full normalization of relations at the political, economic, and social levels to a degree that would enable the easy transfer and flow of people, goods, and ideas) did not materialize. This paper explores the structural obstacles to a warm peace on the Jordanian side, thereby supplementing the modest body of academic literature existing on the Jordanian-Israeli peace-building process and shedding light on the party least studied. The main argument put forward is that obstacles existed at the political and economic levels, which hindered such a peace from growing. It contradicts the mainstream argument that Jordan reaped the peace dividend and was able to provide a better quality of life to its citizens during the era of peace. Furthermore, it discusses the role of the anti-normalization movement in hindering further normalization.

The theoretical paradigm adopted in the course of data gathering and analysis has been one that has permitted a constitutive role between agency and structure. As such, constructivism clarified the ontological assumptions of the research while focusing at the same time on the epistemology of agent and structure.

THE SOCIO-POLITICAL DIMENSION

The Jordanian political setting during the first decade of peace underwent serious

setbacks, which had negative impacts on the domestic scene and on bilateral relations. On the Jordanian-Israeli front, there was a continuous cooling in relations as a result of what the Jordanian authorities perceived as Israeli attempts to undermine not only the foundations for peace but Jordan's very state sovereignty—whether directly or otherwise.

Continuous Cooling in Jordanian-Israeli Relations

At the interstate level, relations grew cold after the death of Rabin and began to deteriorate rapidly when Netanyahu came to power. Two particular incidents marred relations between both states: the opening of the Hasmonean Tunnel under the Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem and the botched Mashal Affair. The Hasmonean Tunnel in Jerusalem opened at the end of September 1996, with the timing of the event suggesting Jordanian knowledge and consent of the Israeli project. That is, the tunnel was opened soon after a visit by Dore Gold, an advisor to the Israeli prime minister (to Jordan), where he met with King Hussein in Amman. The new gate was a symbolic and psychological affront to the Palestinians and a blatant violation of the pledge to resolve the issue of Jerusalem through negotiations. A year later, Netanyahu ordered the killing of Khalid Mashal, the head of Hamas' political bureau in Amman. The attempt against Mashal's life involved injecting a slow-acting poison into his ear. The plan was carried out, but Mashal was not killed. However, the incident took place the same day a senior civil-military Israeli delegation held a meeting with King Hussein in Amman, again putting the King in a very awkward position and shaking the peace's foundations to the core. The deterioration in relations in the political sphere continued with the commencement of the second intifada during Barak's term as prime minister, and the subsequent building of the separation barrier by the Likud-led government of Ariel Sharon. This revived Jordanian fears that the substitute homeland project for the Palestinians might, in reality, not be buried after all, especially with its once most enthusiastic proponent at the helm of Israeli leadership.

In addition, Jordan's status as host to the largest number of Palestinian refugees made it difficult to insulate Jordanian-Israeli relations from the numerous crises and continuous deadlock in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, in which the refugee issue was a major stumbling block. From a Palestinian perspective, Oslo itself came to be known as the process by which the Palestinians gave up the right to resist Israel's occupation for an illusive Israeli promise to end it. With regards to withdrawals, many Palestinians believed that Israelis had the upper hand, deciding when, where, how, and if it wished to withdraw from territories under its control. Absence of an international monitoring body to ensure compliance with signed agreements gave Israel the right to continue acting as an occupation force. From a Palestinian point of view, Israel was not seriously committed to peace. In addition to the controversial policies of settlement building and expansion, the closure of Palestinian enclaves resulted in a serious drop in living standards, plunging the population into economic despair, notwithstanding the signed accords' emphasis on the need for economic cooperation and development to ameliorate the living conditions in the occupied territories. The end of 2003 marked the passing of more than a decade since the Oslo process, yet there was still no

Palestinian state on the ground, nor the prospect of one looming on the horizon. By then, Israel had started to implement a unilateral withdrawal plan, which many believed would ensure that the maximum number of Palestinians would live on the minimum amount of land.

From an Israeli point of view, however, Oslo ensured territorial concessions which, once seized by the Palestinians, became safe havens from which militant extremists could launch their attacks against Israelis. Suicide attacks were, perhaps, the key factor in robbing the peace camp in Israel of its initial enthusiasm and future support. Formal peace, apparently, did not bring with it the long-sought and promised security. Furthermore, the offers made by Barak in 2000 and Clinton's subsequent "parameters," considered extremely generous, were inexplicably rejected by the Palestinian leadership, shedding doubts on the latter's genuine commitment to peace and a two-state scenario. The Palestinian rejection of the propositions and failure to produce a counter-offer strengthened lingering suspicions that the second step on the Palestinian agenda after independence would be the liquidation of the Israeli state. The Israeli point of view even supported an argument to the effect that Hamas acted with the consent of the PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization)—against whom the PLO never mounted anything beyond a verbal attack—to balance the power asymmetries. Israeli leadership, in particular, was so convinced of the deliberate lenient treatment towards Hamas and Islamic Jihad by the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) that in 1998, the Wye River Memorandum offered 13 percent of the West Bank to the Palestinian National Authority as an incentive to step up Palestinian police repression of violent attacks against Israel. The Palestinian anti-terrorism plan was to be monitored by the CIA.[1] In the end, Israeli and American leaders bluntly stated their wish for Arafat to step down in favor of someone else, making the end of violence a precondition to resuming peace talks. Israel declared Arafat an unsuitable partner for negotiations and confined him to his headquarters in Ramallah. He only left his headquarters to medical treatment in Paris. He died in Paris and his body was returned for burial in Ramallah in November 2004.

Of particular interest was the sympathy escalating violence in the occupied territories aroused among the Jordanian public. It rigidified popular anti-Israeli frames in Jordan, which validated distrustful interpretive schemes and made it impossible to speak of normalization. Initially, the Jordanian government and (to an extent) the public sympathized with the Israelis, feeling outrage at the bombers who were threatening the entire peace process in the region.[2] However, sympathy later shifted to the Palestinians under occupation as a result of continued Israeli closures of Palestinian areas and the disproportionate level of retaliation by the Israeli Defense Forces (especially Operation Grapes of Wrath).[3] Such measures were largely perceived as collective punishment for the acts of a few, reflecting a callous disregard for Arab lives. By the time the second intifada started, the popular Jordanian attitude was that the peace process had reached a deadlock and was, more or less, doomed.[4] As a result, Jordan did not consider it appropriate to replace its outgoing ambassador, who had resigned in the wake of the eruption of the second intifada, and he was only replaced in early in 2005. Indeed, Egypt, too, had withdrawn its ambassador from Tel Aviv and only sent one back around the same time as Jordan.

Regression in the Democratic Process

Political regression, however, was not limited to the inter-state level, but was actually experienced at the popular level as well. This was the result of the adoption of a number of laws that tightened the government's hold on the domestic scene at the expense of personal freedoms and further democratization. To the government, these measures were crucial to maintaining a pro-peace foreign policy and to controlling the domestic scene among challenging regional events on both the eastern and western sides of the border.

The regression started before formal peace materialized. Observers and the opposition hold that in order to avoid a serious opposition to peace with Israel, the government enacted a new electoral law on the eve of the 1993 elections, known as the "one-person-one-vote" law. The law basically allowed voters to cast one vote for a representative of their choice, as opposed to as many votes as the number of seats allocated to their electoral base (as was the case under the previous law). Given Jordanian society's particularities, this law meant weak chances for casting votes based on ideological or political convictions instead of on family-based ties. The enactment of the law and accompanying measures adopted by the government at the time produced an assembly that ratified Jordan's peace treaty with Israel a year later. However, on May 17, 1997, Majali's government introduced temporary emergency amendments to the 1993 Press and Publications Law, enforcing a sweeping regime of censorship. That same year, Jordan published about 20 weeklies, and although they had limited circulation, they acted as opposition papers. The newly introduced Press and Publications Law curbed the opposition through broad restrictions and the imposition of substantial fines on journalists and editors in the event of an offense.[5] Majali's government defended the changes as necessary in light of misuse of freedom of expression by the yellow press and the continuous blurring of the lines between slander and professional journalism. These amendments were later annulled on January 26, 1998, by the High Court of Justice, which found them unconstitutional. However, the government reintroduced the law through the parliament, which approved it.

The law was then ratified by a royal decree on September 1, 1998, amidst mounting protests. The new law banned the media from publishing material that touched on any of 14 subjects, including: the king; the royal family; the armed forces; security agencies; the economy; the judiciary; the heads of Arab and Islamic or friendly states and their diplomatic missions in Jordan; and any crime at any stage of execution, investigation, or trial. This had a negative impact on press rights, especially because the passing of a lawsuit against a publication meant court authority to order the suspension of its publication pending trial, a process which could take years.[6] Heavy international criticism of the 1998 Press and Publication Law (especially following the publication of the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network Report on the matter entitled "Black Year for Democracy in Jordan") prompted the government to produce a new draft law promulgated on September 22, 1999, some elements of which were more liberal. For example, the capitalization requirement for weekly publications was halved, the power to revoke a publication was transferred from the minister of information to the court system, fines were reduced, and some taboos were cancelled. However, critics and

relevant civil society representatives were not satisfied, as the law maintained censorship and government interference—making it in letter and spirit almost the same as the one it came to replace. In particular, they objected to the fact that it did not provide the assurances the press needed in order to guarantee basic freedoms; it introduced no obligation on the government to sell its shares in dailies; it contained no provision against pre-trial detention of journalists; and it maintained the unpopular right of the government to license publications and censor them.

The regression continued with the postponement of the 2001 parliamentary elections. This was most likely the result of fears that the second intifada and an anticipated U.S. attack on Iraq provided a climate conducive to yielding an opposition-led assembly. Such an assembly would challenge the state's pragmatic foreign policy orientations, especially when parliament members, two months prior to dissolving parliament, were heavily petitioning the government to stop the prosecution of the anti-normalization committee members imprisoned at the time. With the anticipated attack on Iraq, the anti-normalization movement also became an anti-Western influence and policy movement. This forecasted a definite sweep in the polls by the nationalist and Islamist dissidents if elections were to take place in an atmosphere of heightened popular discontent over regional tensions. Consequently, in addition to dissolving parliament and postponing elections, the government also replaced elected municipal councils (mostly Islamists who won the 1999 kingdom-wide municipal elections) with state-appointed local committees. Both electoral laws—parliamentary and municipal—were amended in what the opposition viewed as a clear attempt to produce non-threatening assemblies.

In absence of a parliament, over 200 temporary measures were passed by royal decree between 2001 and 2003. Some of these decrees were very controversial. For example, one decree passed in 2001 amended Article 150 of the Penal Code, establishing stiff penalties for the publication of news that could damage national unity, incite crimes, spread hatred, undermine people's reputations, or spread rumors and false information. The prime minister became legally eligible to present cases directly to the state security court—a right exercised by some prime ministers in their dealings with the press, leading to the imprisonment (and later the prosecution) of editors and journalists before the State Security Court.

Peace did not foster an ambiance conducive to further democratization as would have been the normal expectation. The regime was far more realistic and pragmatic than the population at large and rationalizing that support at the policy level was crucial to safeguarding state interests during turbulent times, a decision with negative implications on the democratic process. However, one area where both the government and the public harbored inflated expectations was the economic sphere.

THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC DIMENSION: THE UNRIPE "FRUITS OF PEACE"

From the beginning, the government's raised expectations for the peace dividend were not well-founded. The World Bank's report of 1994 on the impact of peace on the Jordanian economy stressed that while Jordan could slowly emerge out its debt, the country's economic expansion would fall

short of providing the rapid and sustained growth needed to reinforce peace with Israel.[7]

Overall, economic growth in the second half of the 1990s was lower than in the first half of that decade, with the annual growth rate of GDP dropping from ten percent during the period of 1992-1994, to 5.6 percent in 1995, and then falling to 1.5 percent during 1996-1998. The GDP experienced a slower growth rate than the population between 1996-1999, meaning there was a decline in the per capita income during that period.[8] By the end of 1997, some 26 percent of the Jordanian population suffered from absolute poverty, while 45 percent of all families lived on a monthly salary of at most 150 Jordan Dinars (JOD) (almost $180 US). Unemployment stood at high rates, estimated at 20 to 30 percent.[9] For most of the decade, real wages continued to fall, and a 1999 World Bank study showed that poverty had only been marginally alleviated, with the absolute number of poor people remaining constant in comparison to 1992.[10] It is important to note that while the drop in the standard of living was a result of a combination of factors—not only those related to the peace process—the association was nonetheless made between both since the Jordanian economy was, in fact, worse off in the era following the peace treaty with Israel.[11] While Jordan's good relations with the United States secured it increased economic and military aid, aid remained below what was needed to rid the country of its crippling debt burden, despite the progress it was making at some economic levels. The key issue was that to the average person in the street, "there was no noticeable improvement in the standard of living."[12] In fact, with the elimination of subsidies on irrigation water, municipal water, and electricity in 1996, many people were worse off.[13] This was the case despite the available figures of increased Jordanian exports to the United States, which are usually sited to indicate an improved economy at the macro-level.[14]

On the bilateral front, cooperation did not rise to initial expectations. Jordanians realized that the Israeli market remained a closed economy and one highly protected against outside competition—especially in the newly captured markets in the West Bank and Gaza, which formed the second largest export market for Israeli products with a volume of more than $2.5 billion US a year. Apart from the years 1997-1999—when trade was in Jordan's favor—Jordanian-Israeli trade relations have been almost equal in terms of input and output. For example, for the year 2002, total Jordanian exports to Israel amounted to 86.3 million Jordan Dinars with 57.7 million JOD (almost $81 million US) in clothing. The 57.7 million JOD of exports came from 47 million JOD in imports of Israeli textiles. Raw material was returned to Israel without a substantive benefit to the Jordanian market as was hoped, which was not the case in the years from 1997-1999. Until the end of 2003, Jordanian imports from Israel were greater than its exports to the country. [15]

Even the story of the Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZ) merits careful attention. More than 80 percent of the firms located in Jordan's 12 zones are South Asian textile and luggage manufacturers. Nearly half of the 20,000 workers are not Jordanian, and Jordanian workers complain of very low wages ($3.50 US per day) that hardly suffice to cover transport, which is not necessarily available or provided (though workers tend to commute from remote areas). Dire economic conditions, it seems, prompt workers to accept minimum wages, most of which are spent on transport. On a

cultural note, communities are becoming resentful of the clashing traditions and cultural practices of the foreign QIZ workers whose social habits appear jarring in comparison to local customs.[16] Moreover, families are not particularly happy about their daughters being stranded on remote streets waiting for buses that run on no fixed schedules. Given Israeli closures of the West Bank, QIZ exports do not as of the writing of this article include Palestinian components, and manufacturers struggle to ensure the Israeli minimum contribution of seven percent (mostly zippers, packaging, or labels added during export at Haifa port). Since most of the cloth is imported and wages are extraordinarily low, QIZ firms find it difficult to meet the 11.7 percent domestic content requirement, and thus calls for a lower threshold are gaining strength. It would seem that QIZ investors—who are mostly foreign—reap considerable gains by exploiting resident resources of cheap labor, minimal labor standards, and easy access to U.S. markets.

Notwithstanding the Qualified Industrial Zones experience, the effort to link trade and peace in Jordan has not been a genuine success.[17] If anything, it shows that investors may reap generous returns, but as a result of what could be described as exploitation (low wages and minimal satisfactory working conditions).

Nonetheless, the belief that economic development is the way to secure peace and to fight radicalism prevails. Hence, the government's public relations campaign, "Jordan First," which made official the intention of putting economic reform first. However, the various initiatives remained mostly hostage to a number of structural constraints (legal, administrative, and social), which translated into modest success in attracting the required investment or, if attracted, sustaining and maintaining it. Though at the macro-level of the economy Jordan was doing better due to a revised economic policy and tighter control on expenditures, at the micro-level, the life of the average person in the street was becoming harder.

THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF ANTI-NORMALIZATION

Structures exist at all levels of social interaction and constitute the environments in which agents operate. They define the parameters of action, enabling some and hindering others, even to the detriment of personal attitudes. This makes the prominence of an anti-normalization culture in Jordan after formal peace a key structural obstacle to warm peace between both states. Anti-normalization activists have institutionalized their opposition to peace and further normalization through the imposition of laws, rules, and regulations upon groups under their influence; they have prohibited them from any form of interaction with Israel or Israelis, lest the psychological enmity towards both be reduced. The anti-normalization culture has acted as a melting pot for parties traditionally and ideologically opposed but that now found themselves sharing an opposition to peace and/or normalization with Israel, specifically the Islamists and the leftists.

From the outset of the peace process, the Islamists and leftists[18] were vocal in their opposition to peace with Israel.[19] Islamists opposed it on ideological religious doctrine, while the leftists refused it on the basis of their ideologies, which tended to oppose Israel's existence.[20] Even though the majority of Leftist elements had agreed to the concept of peace with Israel, there was a unanimous opposition to the post-Madrid

agreements on the grounds of their bias in Israel's favor. According to the leftists, the agreements were negotiated out of Arab weakness. This resulted in concessions at the expense of Palestinian national rights,[21] giving rise to fears of further Israeli penetration of the Arab nation through political and economic domination, which could extend to the cultural realm as well.[22] Therefore, the anti-normalization movement became a non-violent action that in essence was a technique of struggle.[23]

The opposition group of Islamists and leftists became popularly known in Jordan as the "anti-normalization movement" and they focused their efforts on robbing the treaty of any social significance by using the influence at their disposal: their civic political bodies, especially the professional associations. The movement's activities took various forms: boycotts,[24] blacklists, public conferences, demonstrations, and disbarment of syndicate members for "normalizing relations with the enemy." This normalization was understood in such basic terms as attending an international conference also attended by Israeli participants[25] or visiting Israel for personal reasons. In particular, the movement is proud of its largest demonstration, which took place in January 1997, protesting the opening of the first Israeli trade fair in Amman. Such an act was considered the "mother of all anti-normalisation achievements to date." However, expulsion of the professional members from their respective syndicates and associations was the strongest weapon the movement had and used, given that the law in Jordan requires professionals to be members of their associations in order to practice their profession. Therefore, by blacklisting and then expelling members, there would not only be social pressures with which to contend, but economic ones as well. Such blacklisting, was a real threat to one's livelihood; the blacklists were also made available to neighboring Arab countries and displayed on the screens of satellite channels (for example, al-Jazira satellite TV), resulting in a wider Arab boycott of the Jordanian normalizers. Even though the majority of the expulsions were overruled by the country's Higher Court of Justice, the fact remained that the incrimination of professionals curbed the extent to which Jordanians supported normalization, given the direct risk it posed to their livelihoods and social standing in their communities and the society at large.

The official and publicized government crackdown, however, took place in November 2002. At that time, a Higher Court's Special Bureau for the Interpretation of the Law was requested to interpret the by-laws of the professionals' associations in order to determine the legality of the anti-normalization committees[26] and that of the Council of Association Presidents, which had issued the boycott and disbarment directives. However, this is another case whereby policy paves the way for normalization whereas the reality on the ground does not.

The story of building peace with Israel reveals various structural obstacles, the key among them discussed in this article. It is apparent that the elites' drive and push for a warm peace stood in stark contrast with the reality on the ground. Indeed, maintaining a pro-peace foreign policy and standing up to its local critics was increasingly difficult. Mounting regional tensions only added to an already faulty Palestinian-Israeli peace track. However, the fact remains that notwithstanding the first turbulent decade of formal peace, Jordan honored its treaty of peace, and the treaty has endured. Structural obstacles were key in robbing the peace of its envisaged warmth. This

confirms the fact that warm peace is the product of positive and active popular engagement, without which no peace-building process is possible or complete. Many in the region grew up believing that peace with Israel was impossible, a stroke of madness, and political suicide. These same people, however, have lived to see it become a reality. The question now concerns the type of peace and its degree of warmth. This paper has been a humble effort at exposing some of the challenges that Jordan faces on its road to building an illusive warm peace.

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NOTES

[1] In his book, *The Missing Peace*, Dennis Ross holds that Arafat condoned the violence erupting with the second intifada to boost his negotiating position over the Haram. See Dennis Ross, *The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004).

[2] For example, following the bombing of two buses in Jerusalem, the *Jordan Times* issue of March 4, 1996, opened with "the bombs are aimed at peace."

[3] Doubts regarding peace and further normalization were revived and publicly expressed. For example, the *Jordan Times* editorial of April 18, 1996 said, "peace is being shattered in Lebanon;" while the Lower House of Parliament proclaimed the massive Israeli retaliations as an act that "exposes to the world the true face of the Jewish state." Following the bombing of the shelter, columnist Musa Kilani wrote: "Israel should not wonder anymore why its efforts at normalisation of relations at the popular level are sagging. If anything, its bloodbath in Lebanon has already moved many Jordanians from the centre of the road to openly opposing ties with the Jewish state." See Musa Kilani, *Jordan Times*, April 20, 1996.

[4] Paul L. Scham and Russell E. Lucas, "'Normalisation' and 'Anti-Normalisation' in Jordan: The Public Debate," *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 5, No. 3, (September 2001), http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2001/issue3/jv5n3a5.html.

[5] While the maximum for an offense was 1,000 JOD ($1,408 US) under the 1993 law, it went up to 50,000 Dinars ($70,422 US) under the new legislation. Furthermore, requirements for a start-up of a weekly newspaper went up from a minimum of 15,000 JOD ($21,126 US) to 300,000 JOD ($422,535 US). The same law also reintroduced the government's right to suspend and shut down newspapers for a variety of broadly defined infringements.

[6] George Joffe' (ed.), *Jordan in Transition* (London]: Hurst & Company, 2002), p. 57.

[7] See World Bank, "Peace and the Jordanian Economy," (The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1994).

[8] Adiba Mango, unpublished doctoral thesis, (Oxford: St. Antony's College, 2000), p. 237.

[9] See Markus Bouillon, "Walking the Tightrope: Jordanian Foreign Policy from the Gulf Crisis to the Peace Process and Beyond,"in Joffe' (ed.), *Jordan in Transition*.

[10] Mango, unpublished doctoral thesis.

[11] *Ibid*, p. 237.

[12] *Ibid*, p. 264.

[13] Towards the end of 1999, UN World Food Program Monitor in Jordan Nabih Kayed, said that the population in the south was mainly living on tea and bread, which the government was no longer subsidizing (as cited in *Middle East International*, December 10, 1999), while people were selling their livestock due to their inability to buy fodder (UNDP Jordan Development Report, 2004).

[14] According to Michael Herzog, Jordanian exports to the United States increased from $16 million US in 1998 to $670 million in 2003. Given Jordan's gross domestic product of approximately $9.8 billion and less than $3 billion in annual exports, this is a major boon to the country's economy. See Michael Herzog, "A Decade of Israeli-Jordanian Peace: An untold Economic Success Story," *PeaceWatch Report*, No. 478 (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 29, 2004), Jordanian exports to the United States increased from $16 million in 1998 to $670 million in 2003. Given Jordan's gross domestic product of approximately $9.8 billion and less than $3 billion in annual exports, this is a major boon to the country's economy.

[15] Per official statistics of the Ministry of Trade and Industry, Jordanian exports into Israel for 2001 totaled 72.9 million JOD, while Jordanian imports from Israel in 2001 amounted to 78.1 million JOD. Jordanian exports into Israel in 2002 were 86.3 million JOD, while Jordanian imports from Israel in 2002 were 89.1 million JOD. As for 2003, Jordanian exports to Israel for the year were 60.2 million JOD and its imports 80.8 million JOD.

[16] Confirmed in the author's various discussions with former workers of the QIZs in 2004 and confirmed by the UNDP-Ministry of Planning's Jordan Human Development Report for 2004.

[17] Pete W. Moore, "The Newest Jordan: Free Trade, Peace and an Ace in the Hole," *Middle East Report Online*, June 26, 2003.

[18] The term describes the secular left, which, in Jordan, comprises parties as well as movements with nationalist and socialist ideological orientations.

[19] In May 1994, that is, prior to the signing of the peace treaty, eight Islamists and leftist political parties, including the Islamic Action Front, Communists and Ba'thists, formed the "Popular Arab and Jordanian Committee for Resisting Submission and Normalization."

[20] Notwithstanding the pan-Arabist and Marxist branches continued opposition to Israel's existence on ideological grounds. It must be noted that the majority of leftists have shown more pragmatism than the Islamists, with many mainstream leftist elements accepting the concept of peace with Israel through their acceptance of the 1982 Fez peace plan, which espoused the establishment of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. For more on this matter, see Sami al-Khazendar, *Jordan and the Palestine Question: The Role of Islamic and Left Forces in Foreign Policy Making* (Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 1997).

[21] For example, by recognizing Gaza and the West Bank as "disputed territories," both sides claimed equal rights to them. This indirectly legitimized Israel's occupation, which decades of occupation

has failed to do despite the number of UN resolutions opposed.

[22] In his speech following the assassination of Rabin and upon forming his government, Peres spoke of "The New Middle East," which, in his vision, would be "dominated by banks, not tanks, ballots, not bullets, and where the only generals would be General Motors and General Electric." Cited in Avi Shalim, *The Iron Wall*, (NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999), p. 552. In the Arab world, the words bore a threat, understood as meaning a reconstruction of the Middle East with Israel at its center, with the prospect of a cultural domination constituting a threat to Arab identity and heritage.

[23] For an explanation of the concept and role of non-violent action as a technique of struggle, see, for example, Ho-Won Jeong, (ed.), *The New Agenda for Peace Research* (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 1999), pp. 33-35.

[24] These were a revival of the Arab states' policy adopted after 1950 to first boycott shippers carrying passengers or cargo to Israel and later extended to any corporations dealing with Israel.

[25] For example, attending the Copenhagen peace conference was one reason, in 2001, for blacklisting such key Jordanian personalities as Adnan Abu Odeh, former political advisor to the King, and former Prime Minister and Chief of Royal Court Fayaz Tarawneh.

[26] While one generic anti-normalization committee served all the associations, the engineering association had its own internal anti-normalization committee, making it necessary to study the engineers' association by-laws in particular.