MERIA

Middle East Review of International Affairs
Vol. 3 No. 3/September 1999

 

Radical Islam in Egypt: A Comparison of Two Groups
By David Zeidan *

 

Editor’s Summary

The author compares two key Egyptian radical Islamic groups, the Society of Muslims (Takfir wal-Hijra) and the Society of Struggle (Jama'at al-Jihad) and analyzes their differences in doctrine and strategy. This study is presented in the context of a broader examination of the history of militant Islamic groups in Egypt. The author argues that the two societies furnish examples of basic types of radical Islamic movements. In addition, Jama'at al-Jihad remains important in contemporary Egyptian politics and in that country’s internal struggle.

 

The Egyptian radical groups under study here, the Society of Muslims (Takfir wal-Hijra) and the Society of Struggle (Jama'at al-Jihad), espoused drastically different ideologies and strategies for gaining power. The Society of Muslims (Takfir) had a passive separatist and messianic ideology, delaying active confrontation with the state to an indefinite point in the future when it could reach a certain degree of strength. In comparison, the Society of Struggle (al-Jihad) followed an activist, militant ideology that committed it to immediate and violent action against the regime.

 

Islamic Resurgence

History reveals cyclical patterns of Islamic revival in times of crisis. Charismatic leaders arose attempting to renew the fervor and identity of Muslims, purify the faith from accretions and corrupt religious practices, and reinstate the pristine Islam of the Prophet Muhammad’s day. Leaders of revivals tended to appear either as renewers of the faith promised at the start of each century (mujaddids), or as the deliverer sent by God in the end of times to establish the final kingdom of justice and peace (mahdi). 1

In modern times, a new wave of revival was initiated by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the main grassroots movement that emerged in response to the modern crisis in the Arab world. At a time when Egypt faced the challenges of colonialism, economic and cultural dependence, rapid industrialization and urbanization, and a massive population explosion, 2 the Muslim Brotherhood called for a return to the original fundamentals of Islam. Suppressed by Nasser in the mid-1950s — after Egypt’s revolution evoked nationalism rather than Islam as Egypt’s main identity marker—the Muslim Brotherhood reemerged during the Sadat era (1970-1981) as a movement committed to non-violent participation in the political process. 3

Radical Islamic societies (jama'at) emerged out of the Muslim Brotherhood drawing on the thought of its main ideologue, Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), who endorsed a violent takeover of power. 4 While he himself belonged to the Brotherhood, Qutb’s radical reinterpretation of several key Islamic concepts inspired some to split off from the Brotherhood and use his writings to legitimize violence against the regime. For example, he argued that the existing society and government were not Muslim but rather dominated by “pagan ignorance” (jahiliyya). The duty of righteous Muslims was to bring about God’s sovereignty (hakimmiyya) over society, denounce the unbelief (Takfir) of the current national leaders, and carry out a holy struggle (jihad) against them. 5

There were a number of factors which led to the proliferation of radical groups since the 1970s in Egypt and across the Muslim world. One reason was, as had been true of the earlier Brotherhood, a response to the impact of modernity, Western encroachment, misrule by the national elite, and a whole series of massive economic and social dislocations. The result was a crisis of identity and a search for authenticity. Heavy-handed repression by military-backed regimes—armed with their own powerful Arab nationalist ideology—left no avenues for protest except through the religious idiom. 6

Equally, the oil boom enhanced the power of Islamic Saudi Arabia and channeled much financial aid to militant groups, encouraging their growth. The 1973 war against Israel and accompanying oil embargo against the West—which seemed to demonstrate Arab-Islamic power—as well as the 1979 Iranian revolution further fuelled radical zeal.

Yet, ironically, the state apparatus in Egypt was also an element in this trend. President Anwar Sadat encouraged the development of Islamicist societies (jama'at Islamiyya) as a counterweight to the Nasserist-dominated professional associations and student unions. These societies extended their influence through a network of educational and social services at a time when government services had collapsed in the face of economic crisis and rapid increases in the number of students and the overall population. The Islamic societies, offering identity and community as well as social welfare, became a recruiting field for the revolutionary radicals. 7 Another phenomenon that emerged during the 1970s was a dramatic rise in the number of independent private (ahli) mosques, not controlled by the government, that provided a safe meeting point for militants and recruits. 8

 

The Society of Muslims (Jama'at Al-Muslimin)

One of the new radical Islamic groups was generally called Takfir wal-Hijra (hereafter, Takfir) by the media and by government security agencies. Takfir is the legal ascription of unbelief (excommunication) to an individual or group, while hijra signifies Muhammad’s original flight or migration from Mecca to Medina, serving as a model for contemporary disentanglement from the corrupt society and regime in Egypt. Takfir was led by Shukri Mustafa, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood in Asyut who was imprisoned in 1965 and joined the radical disciples of Qutb while in prison. On his release in 1971 he started building up Takfir. Following the kidnapping and murder of an ex-government minister in 1978, Mustafa was arrested and executed by the authorities.

Mustafa was an autocratic leader who expected total obedience from his followers. His control was strengthened by the belief that he was the predicted savior (mahdi) 9 . Given this prestige, he was able to run Takfir as a highly disciplined organization, divided into action cells, recruiting groups, and logistic units. As contemporary society was infidel, he argued, Takfir would set up its own alternative community that would work, study and pray together. There were gradations of membership: full members devoted themselves totally to the community, leaving their jobs and family. Errant members were excommunicated and punished. 10

 

Society of Struggle (Jama'at Al-Jihad)

The main ideologue of this group (henceforth called al-Jihad for short) was Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj, a former Muslim Brotherhood member who was disillusioned by its passivity. 11 After belonging to a series of radical groups, he founded al-Jihad in 1979. To explain his views, Faraj wrote a short book called “The Neglected Obligation” (al-farida al-gha'ibah). But al-Jihad did not restrict itself to theory alone. It quickly became involved in sectarian conflicts and disturbances in Upper Egypt and Cairo. In October 1981, it assassinated Sadat at a military parade.Faced with an all-out campaign to shut it down, al-Jihad supporters fought a three-day revolt in Asyut seeking to spark a revolution before being defeated.

In contrast to Takfir, al-Jihad was not led by one charismatic leader but by a collective leadership. 12 It built up a sophisticated organization run by a leadership apparatus in charge of overall strategy, as well as a ten-member consultation committee (majlis al-shura) headed by Sheikh Umar 'Abd al-Rahman. Everyday operations were run by a three-department supervisory apparatus. 13 Members were organized in small semi-autonomous groups and cells. 14 There were two distinct branches, one in Cairo and the other in Upper Egypt. The Cairo group was composed of five or six cells headed by amirs who met weekly to plan their strategy. 15

In recruiting, both Takfir and al-Jihad relied heavily on kinship and friendship ties. Both recruited predominantly students from rural areas and from lower-middle-class backgrounds who had recently migrated to the big cities and were alienated and disoriented in their new environment. Most members were well-educated, particularly in technology and the sciences. 16 Takfir recruited mainly in Upper Egypt and was the only society to actively recruit women. Faraj recruited for al-Jihad in private mosques in poor neighborhoods where he delivered Friday sermons. 17 Al-Jihad succeeded in recruiting members from the presidential guard, civil bureaucracy, military intelligence, media, and academia.

 

Comparison of Ideologies

Especially interesting are the differences between these two radical groups, which represent many streams of radical Islamic thought today, and the traditional, still far more widely accepted Muslim theology and world view. Both groups agreed that authentic Islam had existed only in the “golden age” of the Prophet’s original state in Medina and under the “rightly guided” first four Caliphs (622-661). Muslims must rediscover its principles, free them from innovations, and actively implement them in present society. This was in line with revivalist (salafi) 18 views, and contradicted the traditionalist view of Islam as the total of the sacred source texts of Quran and the Prophet’s example and traditions (Sunna), plus all scholarly interpretation and consensus over the ages. It also differed from the reformist view in stressing active political, rather than mere educational, activity.

The ultimate goal for both groups was the establishment of a renewed universal Islamic nation (umma) under a true Caliph, 19 fully implementing Islamic sacred law (shari'a) as God’s ideal form of Islamic government. 20 Until the establishment of this Caliphate (khilafa), the Islamic societies would form the embryo and vanguard of the true Islamic nation in its struggle against internal and external enemies. The takeover of power in individual Muslim states would be a necessary first step toward the ultimate goal.

Takfir’s ambitions did not extend to the Middle East or Islamic world alone. It claimed that the Prophet’s mandate was to fight all people in the world until they all would convert, pray, and pay the Islamic charitable tax (zakat). The fact that this had never before been achieved did not change the fact that this was Islam’s true goal. The group also emphasized the importance of a charismatic leader—its own—for Islam’s triumph. After establishing its rule over one state, Takfir would call on all humanity to join Islam and submit to its shari'a. The Islamic state would become the third superpower and extend its dominion over the whole world. 21

The views of al-Jihad were roughly parallel, though it put less emphasis on a single leader. But it agreed that true Muslims must wage war against the infidel rulers of all states, including Muslim states. 22 In contrast to the traditional religious scholars, who proclaimed the necessity of submission to any ruler claiming to be a Muslim, they insisted that acceptance of a government was only possible when the Islamic legal system is fully implemented. 23 Implementation of shari'a becomes the sole criterion of the legitimacy of regimes. 24 Traditional scholars viewed the concept of the “age of ignorance” or paganism (jahiliyya) as an historic condition in pre-Islamic Arabia.

In contrast, for both groups, “ignorance” (jahiliyya) is a present condition of a society which is not properly Islamic because it does not implement the full shari'a and hence is rebelling against God’s sovereignty. All the regimes currently in power in Muslim countries are thus not acceptably Islamic and it is both right and necessary to rebel against them. 25

On some points, Takfir and al-Jihad differed in a way that made clear why al-Jihad was the more successful organization. Takfir claimed that both the regime and all of society were pagan and true Muslims must separate from them. Takfir included in this condemnation all four traditional schools of Islam (madhabs) and all traditional commentators. It labeled these schools as puppets of rulers who used them to monopolize Quranic interpretation to their own advantage. They had closed the door of creative interpretation (ijtihad) and set themselves up as idols (tawaghit), serving as mediators between God and believers. 26

Al-Jihad, in contrast, selected certain commentators it favored, including the famous Hanbali medieval scholar, Ibn Taymiyya. His writings were interpreted as showing that societies were partly Muslim even when the rulers are all pagans who legislate according to their own whims. 27 Al-Jihad accepted the four traditional schools of Islam (madhabs), much of scholarly consensus, and some later commentators. Consequently, it would be much easier for a Muslim to join al-Jihad or find some truth in its teachings. While traditional scholars and the Muslim Brotherhood would not denounce a Muslim as an infidel—accepting his claim to be Muslim at face value and leaving the judgement of his intention to God—both radical groups were ready to denounce Muslims as infidels, which could imply a willingness to attack or kill them. Since Egypt’s failure to implement shari'a made it an infidel pagan state placed under excommunication (Takfir), all true Muslims were duty-bound to wage holy struggle (jihad) against the regime, an idea alien to traditional Islam.

Both Takfir and al-Jihad also agreed that the prime emphasis should be put on a national revolution first. Only when the infidel regimes of Muslim countries were overthrown and replaced by true Islamic states could the Caliphate be restored, occupied Muslim territories liberated, and shari'a rule established throughout the world.

But in determining the targets and enemies of its revolution, Takfir declared that not only the regime but the society itself was infidel and under excommunication. This entailed two strategic decisions that ensured that Takfir would remain more of a cult than a revolutionary organization. First, it entailed a personal withdrawal from society, which required a choice few people would make and a burden beyond what its infrastructure could sustain. Second, it meant a delay in action, which indefinitely postponed active militancy. 28

While rejecting the state, Takfir also provoked it. Denouncing all symbols of the regime’s legitimacy—the religious establishment, the army, and all government services—members ignored its laws, including conscription into the army and the legal or educational system. The group forbade members from working as state employees, a real economic sacrifice given the Egyptian system. 29

Traditional scholars view Muhammad’s migration (hijra) from Mecca to Medina as an historical event that has spiritual, but not programmatic, relevance for Muslims today. Takfir, however, interpreted hijra as meaning that all true Muslims in every generation must re-enact and emulate Muhammad’s model of flight as a physical separation from infidel society. By departing to a safe place, they could establish a new society and prepare for the stage of return and victory. Total separation (mufassala kamila) is a must in the temporary stage of weakness, ending only when the alternative community becomes strong enough to challenge the regime. 30 , 31

This plan was aborted, however, by Takfir itself. Its use of violence against “apostate” members brought police intervention which in turn led to a confrontation that destroyed the organization. Given its program, Takfir posed no immediate danger to the government since in practice the strategy it pursued was one of passivity for an extended period.

In contrast, al-Jihad was a self-proclaimed revolutionary group employing armed struggle. Al-Jihad rejected Mustafa’s insistence on total separation from society, neither would it postpone jihad until the phase of strength was achieved. While Takfir wanted to boycott state institutions, al-Jihad worked to infiltrate the military, security services and other government institutions so as to successfully wage immediate jihad. 32 Al-Jihad was just as determined in rejecting the regime, but much more flexible in dealing with Egyptian society. Certainly, it declared armed jihad as a fundamental requirement (a sixth pillar, in its own words) of Islam. Many traditional scholars, the group asserted, had suppressed this fact. Indeed, jihad against unbelievers—including “Muslims” who did not observe the religion’s requirements properly—must be the top priority of all true Muslims. 33 The regime and its employees were infidels, al-Jihad claimed. As historical justification, it cited Ibn-Taymiyya’s criticism of the Mongol rulers of his day, who mixed shari'a with customary law.

In contrast to Takfir, al-Jihad advocated immediate revolt as both legitimate and imperative. 34 Such a revolution would be able to seize power and establish an Islamic state. 35 In tactical terms, Faraj argued that the assassination of Egypt’s president (whom it called the “evil prince” and “the Pharaoh”) would be an effective first step. 36 While Takfir rejected traditional mainstream Islam as it had been practiced and defined, al-Jihad claimed that its principles and goals were the proper embodiment of that faith. Faraj insisted that most historically respected scholars agreed with al-Jihad’s positions of waging jihad and establishing the Islamic state. 37

Like many historic European revolutionary groups—but unlike Marxist doctrine—the view of al-Jihad was that political assassination and violent acts would mobilize the masses. A necessary assumption here, for this strategy to work, was that the people were already on the side of al-Jihad and were just waiting to be shown the proper example and leadership. Indeed, this was al-Jihad’s claim. Since God would grant success and the infidel regime’s fall would miraculously cure all social ills, there was no need to prepare the ground and establish one’s strength beforehand. 38

Yet such a strategy was not so easy to implement. For example, Islamic doctrine was critical of the killing of fellow Muslims and, as noted above, viewed a government professing Islam as an acceptable ruler. Al-Jihad had to argue, using specific incidents and some commentators from Islamic history, that killing Muslims and overthrowing a Muslim-led government was the correct interpretation of Islam. 39 While al-Jihad enthusiastically endorsed this position, its leaders knew that theirs was a distinctly minority view. Faraj criticized other groups—most importantly, the Muslim Brotherhood—for their gradualist strategy and involvement in the political system. Such behavior, he insisted, only strengthened the regime. He also rejected widely accepted arguments that jihad should be postponed (as Takfir claimed) or that this concept required only defensive or non-violent struggle (a widely held Muslim position.) In response, Faraj insisted they were all wrong and that active, immediate jihad would be the only strategy for achieving an Islamic state. 40 Al-Jihad immediately implemented its goals in the late 1970s by involvement in sectarian conflicts, riots, and acts of terrorism, culminating in the Sadat assassination.

Another characteristic of these two groups somewhat at odds with the traditionalist Muslim view was their strong antagonism to Christians and Jews, though even here Takfir and al-Jihad had contrasting views. Instead of seeing Jews and Christians as protected communities (dhimmis) and “People of the Book”, the two groups viewed them as infidels both because they had deliberately rejected the truth and because of their connections to colonialism and Zionism. 41 They were accused of serving as a “fifth column” for external enemies, 42 a Trojan Horse of the West within Muslim societies. 43 Takfir stressed an international Jewish conspiracy and the need to fight it, whilst Zuhdi’s group in al-Jihad viewed Christians as the first enemy to confront and was heavily involved in anti-Coptic activities. Sheikh 'Abd al-Rahman issued a religious legal edict (fatwa) legitimizing the killing and robbing of Christians who were said to be anti-Muslim. Both groups accepted the prevalent conspiracy theories that saw the Christian West, Jewish Zionism, and atheist Communism as planning to corrupt, divide and destroy Islam. Rulers in Muslim states were puppets of these forces, leading their countries into dependence and secularization. This battle had started right at the inception of Islam, and the Jews and Christians of the 7th century were identical with the Jews and Christians of today. 44 Takfir accused the Jews of seducing humanity to idol-worship and of spreading corruption and immorality all over the world, while al-Jihad accused Muslim rulers of obeying Jews and Christians and opening up Muslim countries to exploitation. 45

Finally, both groups saw themselves as messianic (mahdist, in Islamic terminology). Takfir believed that the world was nearing its end and Mustafa, Takfir’s leader, was the Mahdi. Among proofs of the world’s coming end was the prevalent state of disbelief, oppression, immorality, famine, wars, earthquakes, and typhoons. 46 Mustafa would be the Caliph who would found a new Muslim community, conquer the world, and usher in God’s final reign on earth.

Al-Jihad, while not mahdist, accepted the tradition of the mahdi who will reveal himself at the end of time to establish justice in the whole world. In the meantime, the West was in decline, and would soon be replaced by true Islam. 47 Lack of messianic leadership however was no excuse for postponing the struggle, and leadership should be given to the best Muslim in the community, presumably al-Jihad’s leadership.

 

Response to Suppression

After its suppression by the government and the execution of Mustafa, Takfir seemed to disintegrate and its members joined other underground groups such as al-Jihad. However there are persistent rumors that a nucleus remains active underground and their ideas have affected many other radical groups. 48

In contrast, though, al-Jihad survived repression. Despite the imprisonment and execution of al-Jihad’s leaders following Sadat’s assassination, offshoots managed to regroup, declaring jihad against Mubarak’s regime. Al-Jihad has continued to be linked to terrorist incidents and outbreaks of communal violence ever since. 49 It seems to have a narrow base of support mainly in the urban centers of northern Egypt, and many of its leaders live in exile in Western countries. One wing seems to be loyal to Abbud al-Zammur, one of the original founders, now imprisoned in Egypt. Another wing is called Vanguards of the Conquest or The New Jihad Group and appears to be led by an Afghan war veteran Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri. 50

In July 1986, following riots started by mutinous Central Security Forces, 75 members of an offshoot were arrested. 51 In September 1989, members of Salvation from Hell, another offshoot, were sentenced for the attempted assassination of two ex-cabinet ministers and a journalist. The society seemed to specialize in attacking high-level government officials and high-profile secularists: In 1990 five members of al-Jihad were arrested for the killing of the speaker of the National Assembly. 52 In 1993, al-Jihad members attempted unsuccessfully to assassinate Interior Minister Hassan al-Alfi and Prime Minister Atef Sidky. Al-Jihad maintains links with other international radical Islamic groups and figures such as Osama ben-Laden, the presumed mastermind of the bombing of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. 53 Sheikh Abd al-Rahman was exiled to the United States in 1985, where he was later implicated in the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York, put on trial, and sentenced to imprisonment. He had kept his influence on al-Jihad as well as on the other radical movement, al-Jama'at al-Islamiyya, operating both in Egypt and abroad. In the 1980s members of these societies, like other radical groups in the Arab world, fought alongside the mujahidin in Afghanistan against the Soviets, gaining valuable experience in warfare and often specialist training from U.S. agents. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, many returned to their home countries reinvigorating the violent struggle against the regimes in power.

 

Conclusion

Studying these two groups reveals the impact of the new political ideologization of Islam in recent decades. Yet it should be clear that these groups’ theology is no simple revivalist return to sacred origins but a reinterpretation of historically dominant views andfa sectarian-type innovation on the model of the early kharijis. 55 Even when they can claim historic precedents—Ibn-Taymiyya, for example—they use innovative approaches, lying outside the framework of mainstream Islam.

Even though these groups have a large circle of sympathizers who agree with their goals and accept their methods, they remain a minority within Egypt. Examining their ideologies gives important clues to why their support has remained limited. First, as noted above, many of their views either revise or contradict traditionally accepted interpretations of Islam held by most Muslims. Thus, joining or supporting the group requires a change in one’s original belief system.

Second, these groups are naive in their strategic conceptions. One could argue that on a strategic level, both Takfir and al-Jihad were unconsciously pursuing a suicidal approach. Takfir’s isolation and al-Jihad’s launching of a revolution without preparation and wide support could only lead to defeat. Dependence on divine intervention was not a blueprint for success.

Third, many Egyptians will not accept their claim that a mere takeover of political power in a coup and the establishment of shari'a will miraculously solve all the country’s problems. The Iranian model shows that the capture of the state does not automatically yield rapid progress or a just society. Even popular support can be difficult to maintain, while Islamist leaders may well disagree on goals, ideology, and methods. Their utopian presentation of the projected golden age of the re-instituted Caliphate fully implementing shari'a inevitably raises high expectations that can never be fulfilled. Should they take power, it would mean dealing with the frustrations of unfulfilled expectations by totalitarian means. As in most revolutions, large numbers of people would have to be sacrificed on the altar of ideology. And even then, the original ideology itself might have to be sacrificed to pragmatic considerations.

 


Endnotes

*: David Zeidan is working on a PhD on comparative religious fundamentalism at London University. Back.

Note 1: Hrair R. Dekmejian, 1985. Islam In Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World,  New York: Syracuse University Press,  pp. 9-12,19-20;  See also John L. Esposito, 1988. Islam: The Straight Path, New York: Oxford University Press,  pp. 117-118 Back.

Note 2: Dekmejian, 1985. Islam In Revolution, pp. 3-7, 9-12. Back.

Note 3: During the pre-revolution days, the Muslim Brotherhood had been equivocal on the issue of violence: while advocating participation in the parliamentary process, it had also founded a secret armed wing which was involved in some violent activities. Back.

Note 4: Dekmejian, 1985. Islam In Revolution, pp. 912, 19-20. Back.

Note 5: John L. Esposito. 1992. The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? New York: Oxford University Press,  pp. 133-135 Back.

Note 6: Dekmejian, 1985. Islam In Revolution, pp. 8, 31; See also John O. Voll.  “The Revivalist Heritage”, in Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad et al. eds.,  1991. The Contemporary Islamic Revival: A Critical Survey and Bibliography,  New York: Greenwood Press, p. 23, and also Esposito, 1988. Islam The Straight Path, pp. 162-164. Back.

Note 7: Esposito, 1992. The Islamic Threat, pp. 138-139. Back.

Note 8: Hamid Ansari. 1984. “The Islamic Militants In Egyptian Politics”, IJMES Vol. 16, No. 3, 1984.  p. 129. Back.

Note 9: Dekmejian, 1985. Islam In Revolution, p. 95.  Mustafa’s title was “prince of the princes” (amir al-'umara' ), rather than the more common amir used by most leaders of Islamic societies. Back.

Note 10: Esposito, 1988. Islam, The Straight Path, pp. 136-137; See also Farzana Shaikh, ed., 1992. Islam & Islamic Groups: A Worldwide Reference Guide,  Harlow: Longman,   p. 70 Back.

Note 11: Nabeel Jabbour. 1993. The Rumbling Volcano,  Pasadena: William Carey Library,    pp. 194-212 Back.

Note 12: Dekmejian, 1985. op.cit. p. 97. Back.

Note 13: Dekmejian, 1985. op.cit. pp. 97-98. Sheikh Abd al-Rahman became spiritual guide for both al-Jihad and the other extremist groups known as “Islamic societies” (al-jama'at al-Islamiyya) well into the 1990s issuing the religious legal decisions (fatwas) needed to legitimate their various activities.  He is now serving a prison term in the United States for his involvement in the World Trade Center bombing in New York. Back.

Note 14: Ibid. Back.

Note 15: Gilles Kepel, 1985. Muslim Extremism In Egypt: The Prophet and the Pharaoh, London: Al-Saqi Books,  p. 206. Back.

Note 16: Dekmejian, 1985. op. cit. pp. 95-96. Back.

Note 17: Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot.  “Religion Or Opposition: Urban Protest Movements In Egypt”, IJMES, Vol. 16, 1984,  pp. 549 ; see also Kepel, 1985. op.cit. p. 206 Back.

Note 18: The salafiyya movement was launched by Rashid Rida (1865-1935, disciple of the great Egyptian Muslim reformer Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905). Its goal was the revival of Islam not so much by harmonizing it with modern times as advocated by the reformers, but by a return to the pristine Islam of the pious forbears (salaf). Salafism was to some extent an amalgamation of reformist with fundamentalist Wahabi trends. Back.

Note 19: Ever since Ataturk dissolved the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924 in his drive for secularization, Islamists have viewed the revival of the Caliphate - the divinely appointed succession to the Prophet and the ideal form of state leadership - as essential to the revival and political resurgence of Islam. Back.

Note 20: Ansari, 1984. op. cit. pp 136; see also Walid Mahmoud Abdelnasser. 1994. The Islamic Movement in Egypt : Perceptions of International Relations, 1967-81. London: Kegan Paul,  p. 111; See also Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj, “The Neglected Duty”, in Johannes J.G. Jansen. 1986. The Neglected Duty: The Creed of Sadat’s Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in the Middle East,  New York: Macmillan,  pp. 162-165. Back.

Note 21: Abdelnasser, 1994. op.cit. pp. 234-235. Back.

Note 22: Ibid, p. 235. Back.

Note 23: Ansari, 1984. op.cit. pp. 136-137. Back.

Note 24: Abdelnasser, 1994. op.cit. pp. 258- 259; see also Faraj, 1986. op.cit. p. 166. Back.

Note 25: Abdelnasser, 1994. op.cit. p. 197. Back.

Note 26: Ibid Back.

Note 27: Ibid; see also Faraj, 1986. op.cit. pp. 166-167,170,173-175. Back.

Note 28: Abdelnasser, 1994. op.cit. pp. 204-205. Back.

Note 29: Jabbour, 1993. op. cit. p. 150; see also Kepel, 1985. op. cit. p. 150, and Abdelnasser, 1994. op. cit. pp 205-206. Back.

Note 30: Jabbour, 1993. op. cit. pp 143-157. See also Kepel, 1985. op.cit. pp. 95-96, and Dekmejian, 1985. op.cit. pp. 92-96. Back.

Note 31: Dekmejian, 1985. op.cit. pp 92-96, 101; Faraj, 1986. op.cit. 200-1. Back.

Note 32: Abdelnasser, 1994. op.cit. p. 111. Back.

Note 33: Ansari, 1984. op. cit. pp 137 ; see also Dekmejian, 1985. op.cit. p. 101. Back.

Note 34: Ansari, 1984. op.cit. pp. 123-144; see also Kepel, 1985. op.cit. pp. 191-122, and Faraj, 1986. op.cit. pp. 170,173-5. Back.

Note 35: Ibid. Back.

Note 36: Esposito, 1988. Islam the Straight Path, pp. 134-135. See also Kepel, 1985. op. cit. pp. 195, and Ansari, 1984. op.cit. pp. 136-7. Also Abdelnasser, 1994. op.cit. pp. 205-207. Back.

Note 37: Johannes J.G. Jansen.  “Tafsir, Ijma' and Modern Muslim Extremism”, ORIENT, Vol. 27, No. 4, 1986,  p. 648; See also see Faraj, 1986. op.cit. p. 172. Back.

Note 38: Jansen, 1986. op.cit. p. 648. See also Faraj, 1986. op.cit. pp. 202-203. Back.

Note 39: Faraj, 1986. op.cit. pp. 207-208, 210-213 Back.

Note 40: Faraj, 1986. op.cit. pp. 186-189. Back.

Note 41: Esposito, Islam, 1988. The Straight Path, pp. 171. Back.

Note 42: Abdelnasser, 1994. op.cit. pp. 242-243. Back.

Note 43: Ibid, p. 239. Back.

Note 44: Ibid, pp. 226,240-241,244, 254. Back.

Note 45: Ibid, p. 226. Back.

Note 46: Abdelnasser, 1994. op.cit. p. 216. See also Derek Hopwood, 1991. Egypt: Politics and Society 1945-1990,  London: Harper Collins Academic,  p. 118. Back.

Note 47: Abdelnasser, 1994. op.cit. pp. 234-235. See also Faraj, 1986. op.cit. pp. 163-164. Back.

Note 48: Dekmejian, 1985. op.cit. pp. 96- 97. Back.

Note 49: Shaikh, 1992. op.cit. p. 69. Back.

Note 50: Terrorist Group Profiles, Dudley Knox Libraries, Naval Postgraduate School, published on the internet at: http://web.nps.navy.mil/~library/tgp/jihad.htm.   Back.

Note 51: Springborg, R. 1989. Mubarak’s Egypt, Boulder: Westview,  pp. 217. Back.

Note 52: Esposito, 1988. Islam: The Straight Path, pp. 134-135. Back.

Note 53: Hopwood, 1991. op.cit. p. 188. Back.

Note 54: Darwish, Adel. “On the Threshold of the 7th Millenium”, The Middle East, June 1999.

Note 55: The khariji movement was a legalistic puritan group that arose in the early years of Islam during the rule of Muhammad’s son-in-law 'Ali as fourth Caliph ( d.661). It was the first Muslim sect. The kharijis rejected all Muslims who did not accept their interpretation of Islam as infidels worthy of death. They developed an ideology of continuous jihad and rebelled against all rulers until finally suppressed after some two hundred years of bloodshed. Remnants of the original khariji movement survive today in the ibadis of Oman and in the mzabis of Algeria. Back.