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Middle East Review of International Affairs
Vol. 3 No. 2/June 1999
Greece and Middle East
By Spiros Ch. Kaminaris
*
This article examines Greece’s policy in the Middle East. The focus is on how its own problems, especially with Turkey, have shaped Greece’s foreign policy. Of special interest is the Greek handling of international terrorism originating from the Middle East and how different governments in Athens have followed varying approaches on these issues.
International terrorism in this article is represented by incidents in which terrorists of foreign nationality have gone to Greece seeking victims or symbolic targets there that represent a foreign state. Historically, these groups have included Arab, usually Palestinian, organizations selecting American and Israeli targets; and Kurdish or Armenian groups, choosing Turkish targets. In the past these included the Kurdish PKK as well as the Palestinian May 15 Organization, Abu Nidal group, Popular Struggle Front, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), PLO, and Black September, and also Lebanese Shiite groups.
The operational preferences by such groups for Greece can be explained by several factors: Local Support Base: Greece has large numbers of ethnic Kurds and Arabs some of whom can provide a logistical infrastructure to support their operations. Geographic Location: Greece’s geographical proximity to the Middle East, north Africa, and Eastern Europe make it a useful transit point or for international terrorist groups. The fact that Greece is an EU member and has participated in the reduction of travel barriers in Europe makes cross-border movements relatively open. Presence of Targets: The primary targeted countries, (the United States, Israel, and Turkey, for example) have a presence in Greece including embassies and other offices, Jewish institutions, companies, and other facilities. Good Prospects for Publicity: Greece’s location in Europe and the presence of a free press are two factors facilitating prominent coverage of incidents which is, after all, a primary consideration of international terrorist groups. Permissive Atmosphere: At times, Greece’s security services have been ineffective against groups and the political leadership less eager to prevent or punish operations compared to other countries. Let us consider this last point during five periods in modern Greek history:
1. George Papadopoulos’s Military Junta (1967-74)
During this era, Middle East and Arab international terrorist groups imported their activities into Greece at the end of the 1960s. They sought to use hijackings and hostage-taking to achieve international publicity and strike against their enemies, and then as a bargaining chip to release captured comrades from Greek jails.
While the Greek military junta took a hard line toward local opposition, it followed a soft line toward international terrorism on Greek soil. The most important incident took place in August 1973. Two members of the PLO’s Black September organization pulled out machine guns and grenades at Athens airport, killing 3 people and wounding 55 passengers. The duo then seized 35 hostages, but soon surrendered to Athens police. After a one-day trial, a Greek court sentenced them to death.
In February 1974, three gunmen hijacked the Greek freighter Vory at the west dock of Karachi port in Pakistan, threatening to blow up the ship and kill two hostages if the Greek government did not free the two Arab terrorists of the previous attack. As part of a deal, which emerged in April 1974, the convicted terrorists’ death sentences were commuted to life imprisonment. Later the Greek government pardoned them and, in May 1974, they were deported to Libya at the request of Tripoli.
International terrorism and hostage situations were something new for the whole international community. The junta was inexperienced and hesitant in trying to free the hostages, since a failure might have damaged its image. Making a compromise was intended to save the hostages, preserve relations with radical regimes and groups, and get the government out of a crisis. Concessions were also intended to avoid future attacks against Greece, though arguably appeasement had the opposite result.
2. Konstantinos Karamanlis’s New Democracy Government (1974-1981)
The dramatic rise in oil prices—making some Arab states important potential markets and patrons—along with the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, led Greek policy to tilt in a way which made Greece look soft and sympathetic toward international terrorism and its sponsors.
During this period, sporadic Palestinian terrorist acts continued to take place. The most publicized incident was the June 1976 hijacking of an Air France airbus by seven PFLP commandos shortly after it left Athens airport. The plane was diverted to Entebbe airport in Uganda. The episode received international publicity focusing on Athens airport’s lax security measures, followed by the spectacular rescue operation by Israeli forces.
Arguably, Greek security measures were not alone in their inability to deal with terrorism during that period. Dramatic episodes took place in other European countries, too. For example, in December 1975 OPEC ministers were seized as hostages in Vienna by “Carlos.” In October 1977 came the hijack of a Lufthansa plane departing from Spain and taken to Somalia, in which the German Special Forces in a daring rescue operation freed the hostages. 1
Still, the situation in Greece did reflect specific local conditions, too. The reputation of the Greek civil security forces was severely damaged by their participation in the junta. The Karamanlis’ government limited the police’s role and stripped the military of its internal security functions. Old habits of brutality had to be abandoned and several policemen were tried for using torture and other human rights’ violations. While necessary, such steps might have affected the police’s performance and efficiency as an institution.
3. Andreas Papandreou’s PASOK Government (1981-1989)
A sympathy for radical Arab regimes and causes was encouraged and, to some extent, exploited by Papandreou’s ambition to promote Greek leadership of Third World states, as a third force between the capitalist West and the Communist East, which of course was viewed with distaste by the United States, Great Britain, Israel and Turkey.
During this era, terrorist activities in Greece increased partly as a result of Papandreou’s 1981 policy of “anoigma,” opening to the Arab world. In this context, Greece granted official recognition to the PLO at the end of 1981, and adopted a stronger stand than any other EC government against Israel.
This tactic was the result of ideological, political and economic considerations. Ideologically, a powerful faction within Papandreou’s political party advocated the reorientation of Greek foreign policy toward nonalignment. This policy was called “Tritokosmikos” (Thirdworldism). Politically, Papandreou hoped to win the support of Arab nations on the Cyprus and Aegean issues. A strong pro-Palestinian stand as well as pro-Armenian and later pro-Kurdish support was intended to move the Arabs, Armenians and Kurds closer to Greek positions vis-a-vis Turkey. Finally, there was an expectation that the pro-Arab policy would bring Arab investments into the country.
Terrorist incidents with international implications appeared especially in 1984 and afterwards. They began with the case of Jordanian Abdallah Fuad Shara, a member of the May 15 terrorist organization. He was arrested in April 1984 by British and American agents in a raid in his apartment in Athens. The Greek authorities released him and provided safe passage to Algeria, claiming that the evidence was not strong and that the foreign agents “violated international law and Greek sovereignty,” acting or their own and without a proper authorization. 2
More tension came in February 1985 with a bomb explosion, claimed by the Greek Cypriot right-wing National Front group. The bomb exploded at a popular hangout for U.S. servicemen from the American air base in Glyfada, near Athens. Seventy-eight people (including 55 Americans) were injured but there were no fatalities. The Americans blamed Papandreou’s anti-American “damaging comments.” 3
Further trouble erupted in June 1985 when Lebanese gunmen hijacked a TWA jetliner carrying 153 passengers, after it had taken off from Athens airport. This led to an intense crisis at Beirut airport and the death of one American sailor. 4 As a result, the U.S. State Department warned its citizens in July of the high risk of terrorism at Athens airport, which elicited a strong Greek protest. Additional incidents affected not only Greece’s reputation and relations with the United States but also damaged the economy by affecting the tourism industry. The Greek Tourist Organization estimated that Reagan’s travel advisory in 1985 alone cost Greece $400 million. 5
The unhappiness of President Ronald Reagan’s administration with Papandreou’s thirdworldism intensified U.S.-Greek friction, especially given the Greek government’s frequent criticisms of U.S. policy, and Greece’s direct links with the PLO and Qaddafi’s Libya. There was also concern over the future of U.S. bases in Greece.
At the time, the U.S. government was pressing European states to take a more forceful line against international terrorism. Greece got its reputation for being soft on the issue by disagreeing. Among other points, the Greek government’s refusal was based on an argument that Greece’s coastline and hundred of islands made it hard to keep out determined terrorists. In reality, though, this stance was a result of other issues, including an effort to protect Greek business interests in the Arab world.
For example, the Hellenic Arms Industry (EBO) was established in 1977 with the task of manufacturing light infantry weapons for the Greek armed forces. The company, however, developed the capability to produce a broad range of weapons not only for domestic consumption but also for export. As a result, Greek weapons production by 1985 had expanded beyond its original purpose of domestic production of systems to support national defense and was making a positive impact on the national economy through its earnings in hard currencies. In December 1984, EBO concluded an agreement with Libya to sell it $500 million in military equipment over the next four years. Under the terms of the economic agreement with Libya, Greece agreed to sell equipment that was Greek designed and Greek made. Greece was a net exporter of arms, in which the economic impact of the developing defence industry has been significant. In 1983 sales amounted to over $120 million, 3.6 percent of Greece’s total exports. In late 1985, Libya signed an agreement with Greece covering the sale of $500 million in equipment, including the Artemis-30 antiaircraft gun and the Steyr armored personnel carrier, manufactured in Greece under license from Austria. 6
Greece was also soft with the Arabs as a result of Turkey’s Cyprus invasion in 1974 which created a psychological complex in Greek politics and military circles of a continuing threat from the Turks. When Papandreou assumed power, for instance, he was briefed and re-briefed by the General staff the possibility of a surprise attack from the East. Paying attention to Papandreou’s rhetoric, one could come to a conclusion that Papandreou was paranoid and suspicious of “dark forces”, such as Turkey, CIA, KGB, domestic revolutionaries (17N and ELA) with the desire to bring his government down. 7
To counter that potential danger, Papandreou and his political party tried to improve Greece’s intelligence capabilities by exploiting “the connection factor,” with the leaders of Syria, Iraq, Libya and PLO. The Arabs did not have intelligence capabilities in Turkey, but pretended they did. They provided false information, often believed, creating many alerts and even partial mobilizations. Such cooperation with the socialist and revolutionary Arabs, in turn, affected Greece’s relations with conservative Arabs, and Israelis who openly accused the Greek government of tolerating terrorism. 8
4. Constantine Mitsotakis’s New Democracy Government (1990-93)
In 1991, and after a series of weak coalition governments, Mitsotakis tried to normalize Greco-American relations by following a pro-American, pro-Israeli foreign policy. That was achieved by signing first an agreement maintaining the U.S. bases on Greek soil and second with de Jure recognition of Israel. Greece was the only community member without full ties with Israel. Relations under Papandreou (1981 to 1989) were maintained only at the consular level and the atmosphere in Athens had been chilly toward Israel since Greece was supporting the Palestinian cause. 9 In contrast, Mitsotakis pursued tough policies towards terrorism.
Following Greece’s support of the Desert Storm operation against Iraq’s aggression to Kuwait, in January 1991 the Greek police arrested and deported suspected terrorists. During the evening of January 19, 1991, four Iraqis were deported. Thirteen other Arabs, including Iraqis, Libyans, Jordanians, Algerians, and six Palestinians (the latter holding Iraqi or Jordanian passports) being held in Attiki prison, were scheduled to be deported and eight others were being held in jail. 10
The major incident of international terrorism during this period occurred in April 1991 when members of the Islamic Holy War Movement triggered prematurely a bomb aimed at the British consulate in Patras. Instead, it wrecked the offices of Air Courier Service, a Greek company, killing seven people including the Palestinian carrying the bomb. 11
Once the identity of the bomb carrier was established, three days after the explosion, the former PLO representative in Athens, Mansur Gadur was expelled from Greece, together with five other “diplomats” and twenty more Palestinians. 12 An Athens court used the anti-terrorist law to sentence to life the two captured Palestinians responsible for the explosion. Four other terrorists connected with this incident were convicted and jailed. As a result, the Patras incident marked the first time the Greek authorities were able to break a terrorist network of any kind and apply the new anti-terrorist law. 13
5. Papandreou’s Return to Power and Replacement by Constantine Simitis (1993-1997)
Early elections in 1993 brought Andreas Papandreou and his party back to power. During this period incidents of Arab terrorism dropped dramatically as a result of the signing of the historic peace accord at the White House between PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin on September 13, 1993. This facilitated the extradition or release of convicted and captured terrorists.
Such was the extradition of Abd al-Rahim Khalid to Italy and Muhammad Rashid’s release from prison. Khalid, one of the four-member Palestinian squad which seized the Achille Lauro cruise ship off Egypt and killed an elderly Jewish-American, was flown from Athens to Genoa, where he had been sentenced in absentia to life in prison in 1987. He had been in jail in Greece since 1991 on charges of illegal possession of drugs and weapons. 14
Rashid Muhammad was the Palestinian responsible for planting a bomb on a Pan American airline plane in Brazil in 1982 killing a teenager, and of a mid-air bomb blast on a TWA airliner approaching Athens in 1986 which killed four U.S. citizens. He was arrested by Greek police, after a tip-off from U.S. officials, trying to enter Greece with false passport. A Greek court in 1992 sentenced him to 18 years in prison. His sentence was reduced to 15 years in 1993. In 1996 according to judicial sources and press reports, Rashid was given five days leave from a maximum security prison over Greece’s Orthodox Easter for good behavior. Rashid’s pass made some Greek officials, furious because it preceded a bomb attack on a Greek supreme court prosecutor, and angered the United States, because another convicted Palestinian Majid al-Mulqi, had just escaped in Italy during a similar prison leave for good behavior. Finally, in 1996 Rashid was freed after only 8 and a half years in prison and deported to Tunisia. The Greek government claimed that it took that course after being warned by Palestinian groups that they would hit Greek targets if Rashid was to be extradited to the United States. 15
While Arab terrorist incidents declined, activities against Greece’s neighbors increased. During the Greek-Macedonian (FYROM) talks to normalize relations between the two Balkan states, the negotiations were undermined by terrorist incidents, such as a bomb attack in an attempt to assassinate Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov and a bomb threat on a plane carrying Greek Foreign Minister Karolos Papoulias. Nevertheless, Greece did succeed in achieving favorable diplomatic concessions and developed good relations and economic opportunities in the Balkan States. 16
In April 1994, Albania accused Greece of creating border incidents when gunmen shot dead two Albanian border-guards and shouted slogans supporting the ethnic Greek minority in Albania. Although Greek security forces managed to arrest the terrorist group one year later, incidents such as this, led to diplomatic expulsions and retaliations. 17
Regarding Greece’s “eastern front”, Greek-Turkish relations came under further strain with two assassinations of Turkish diplomats on July 1994. These incidents were followed by retaliatory hits on Greek islands injuring tourists. It has been suggested that it was an act of revenge for the assassination of the Turkish diplomats, with the intention to harm the Greek tourist industry and to break Greek-Turkish negotiations over EU and Cyprus.
This incident had come at a time, however, when Greece was working to improve relations with Turkey. For the six months after January 1994 when Greece had held the EU presidency, however, Papandreou did not want to annoy the other members by blocking Turkey’s entry into the European Union. He had been carrying out secret negotiations with Turkey proposing to accept Turkey’s customs union with the EU in return for firm timetable for making Cyprus a full EU member and finding a solution to the Cyprus problem. 18
More tension was created in 1997 between Greece and Turkey after an article published in the British newspaper Sunday Observer revealed links among leaders of the leftist Greek terrorist organization November 17, the Greek secret service and the PKK, claiming that Athens sheltered and trained PKK rebels who planned attacks in Turkey. 19
Analysts at that time characterized this story as a Turkish attempt to damage the image of Greece for a number reasons, such as to prevent the shipment and installation on Cyprus of the Russian S-300 anti-aircraft missiles, to weaken Greek positions during negotiations over disputed issues in Cyprus and the Aegean Sea, and to block the Greek veto of Turkish admission to EU. 20
Turkish fears, however, that the Greek government was helping the PKK seemed vindicated in the events around the capture of the PKK’s leader, Abdallah Ocalan, by the Turks. Greek attempts to help Ocalan find a safe haven provided evidence of direct involvement by the Greek government with terrorism.
The Kurdish guerrilla leader, Ocalan, had been expelled by Syria under Turkish pressure in late 1998. He had sought political asylum in Italy. But while Italy would not extradite him to Turkey—since Italian law forbade extraditing someone to a country where he might face capital punishment—it was also reluctant to give safe haven to a man branded publicly a “terrorist” by Prime Minister Massimo D’Alema. The Italian media in mid-January 1999 said Ocalan, had gone to Moscow. The hunt for Ocalan ended in February 1999, when he was found enjoying the hospitality of the Greek ambassador to Kenya. 21
Apparently, pro=Kurdish Greeks had been helping him in his travels around Europe, even furnishing him with a private plane. When he turned up in Athens on January 29, Ocalan apparently stayed for the weekend in a safe house provided by Greeks who had campaigned for the Kurdish cause. After failing to find a safe haven in Belarus, he reportedly returned to Greece on February 2. He was then flown to stay at the Greek ambassador’s residence in Nairobi, Kenya, with the understanding that Greece would try to persuade an African country or perhaps the Netherlands to accept him. 22
It is now believed that Prime Minister Simitis ordered the Greek secret service to remove Ocalan from Greece and Greek protection, out of concern that Turkey would become aware of his presence and close ties with Greece, triggering a crisis that could even lead to war. Sending Ocalan to Kenya was thus a way to get Greece out of a problem which had been created by private individuals within the country. For example, disciples of Papandreou were portraying Ocalan and the PKK as noble guerrillas fighting for independence from Turkey, just as Greeks did in the last century. 23
At any rate, this incident became a fiasco for Greek foreign policy. Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos, along with other Greek politicians from various political affiliations, were trying to weaken Turkey by supporting the terrorist group PKK. 24 These revelations contradicted Greece’s apparent political trend away from supporting radical Middle East regimes and groups. After all, by 1986, Papandreou’s policy of support of “national liberation struggles” started to face serious problems in both international and domestic credibility.
The killing of Greek citizens by terrorists at home and abroad threw into question the concept that appeasement would buy Greece immunity from attack. Three Greeks were also among those killed in the simultaneous Arab terrorist attacks on El Al service counters at the Rome and Vienna airports. Afterwards, the opposition and foreign press criticized Papandreou policies towards PLO. 25
Furthermore, incidents such as the Kristallis fiasco, and corruption among the anti-terrorist squad shown in the Koskotas scandal, damaged Papandreou and the credibility of Greece’s Central Intelligence Agency. Daniel Kristallis, an agent of the KYP (Greece’s Central Intelligence Agency), was arrested as a suspected terrorist. He claimed that he worked for four other intelligence services. Apparently, he had placed bombs and then took money for providing false information on the explosions. Opposition parties pressed for reorganizing the KYP and gaining better parliamentary control. 26 George Koskotas, former chairman of the Bank of Crete and a close associate of high-level PASOK officials, was accused of misusing more than $209 million in bank funds. While he was under around-the-clock surveillance by anti-terrorist squad and about to be arrested, he managed flee the country. 27
Greek policies also went through a reappraisal as Papandreou became incapacitated with illness in 1995 and when he died in 1996. Greece faced serious problems since it was at the bottom of the European Union, with little prospect of joining the single currency in the first wave. The new prime minister, Simitis, tried to bring Greece’s politico-economic strategies into line with the EU’s economic criteria while improving Greece’s diplomatic image with the other European states and the United States.
As a result, in August 1996 Greece reduced backing for the Kurdish PKK and began negotiations with Turkey. 28 In 1997, when the United States criticized Greece for failing to join other European states which recalled ambassadors from Tehran after a German court found Iran had ordered political murders in Germany, the Greek government complied. 29 Moreover, the Greek Government also extradited a number of captured terrorists wanted in Europe.
While Papandreou’s and Pasok’s views and the hope of profitable trade were factors affecting the Greek attitude toward international terrorist issues, the most single important factor was the relationship with Turkey and the Cyprus issue. In the past, Greek counter-terrorism forces were less enthusiastic to capture international terrorists (Arabs and Kurds) mainly because the Greek governments did not want to alienate Arab and Kurdish support over Cyprus or damage Greek investments and business in Middle East.
Greek foreign policy is influenced by the Great Idea strategy which sets Greece’s mission as protecting ethnic Greeks and Greek heritage everywhere in the world. Thus, Greek interests and policy regarding Cyprus are both of great importance and are different from those of other countries. A permissive attitude toward international terrorism (assisting terrorists or wanting good relations with terrorism-sponsoring countries) could be seen as a strategy for continuing war with Turkey by other means. The purpose is to compel Ankara to submit to territorial and national claims over Cyprus and Aegean disputes. In that sense assisting international terrorist could be seen as a bargaining chip to gain concessions in negotiations, as a way of equalizing the power balance between Greece and its neighbor. 30 The Turkish invasion of Cyprus heightened both Greek hatred and fear of Turkey’s power. The economic and security policies of the 1980s to build relations with the Arabs and other Third World countries (the “anoigma” and “allagi” strategies) was part of the effort to counterbalance Turkey. Greek foreign policy also sought to befriend other enemies of Turkey including Armenians and the PKK. 31
In 1998, Turkey threatened to attack Cyprus when Russia was about to deliver $400 million worth of advanced surface-to-air missiles, SAM-300s, to Greek Cyprus in late November, 1998. Deployment of the Russian missiles was seen by Greece and Greek Cypriots as a powerful weapon to balance Turkish air superiority over the island.
Greece was motivated not only by the Cyprus issue but also by Greek-Turkish differences in Aegean Sea and the Turkish-Israeli alliance which undoubtedly pushes Greece to become even more directly involved in Middle East politics. Greece took steps to solidify its ties not only with Russia but with Syria, Armenia, Iraq and Iran.
During the threats of a preemptive air strike, the Turkish foreign minister had asked Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel for help in preventing the missiles from reaching Greek Cyprus. Although the Israelis explicitly denied any intention of becoming involved, the Greek Cypriot government urged the Russians to exert counter-pressure on Israel to stay out. 32
This situation, one could argue, has contributed toward forming two military blocs in the region, with an active Greek political presence. At the center of one block stand Turkey and Israel, both non-Arab, democratic, and Western- oriented countries. Each maintains a large military and both have problems with Syria, Iran, and Iraq. Turkey and Israel also developed friendly relations with Jordan. Jordanian and Turkish military pilots train in each other’s countries. Their chiefs of staff meet regularly and their governments have created a high-level formal group to discuss the menace posed to each of them by Iraq.
Opposed to this arrangement are Syria and Iran. Greece occupies a position of importance analogous to that of Jordan on the other side. This view of its Middle Eastern and European neighborhoods also has larger implications for Greek interests. In the Caucasus, Azerbaijan and Georgia line up with Turkey, whereas Armenia is closer with Iran. Russia is favorable toward Greece. In the Balkans, Macedonia, Bosnia, Slovenia, and Croatia tend toward Turkey’s side; Yugoslavia has been closer to Greece. In Central Asia, Kazakstan, Kirgizia, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan side with Turkey, while Tajikistan has had good relations with Iran.
In practice, then, both alliances and attitudes toward terrorism unfold from a state’s or specific government’s view of its vital interests. This applies both to the sponsorship of terrorism and the degree to which a country makes an effort to deter, punish, or even to define terrorism. 33
Among the prime determinants of Greek policy toward the Middle East and toward international terrorism will be the degree of stability in its relationship with Turkey and the security—or lack of security—Athens feels in both the European and Middle East regions. Such issues as Greece’s relationship with the EU, alliance with the United States, and role in the troubled Balkans all become inputs in setting its Middle East policy. 34
In general, Greece’s most immediate and important policy goal is growing integration with Europe, seeking investment to fuel economic growth. Greece continues to rely heavily on EU aid, which currently amounts to about 4 percent of GDP. Thus, friction with Turkey, an arms race, increased defense spending, involvement in Middle East rivalries, and such diplomatic embarrassments as the Ocalan fiasco undermine Greece’s urgent developmental goals. This does not mean that Greece will necessarily avoid these traps, but doing so is at least the country’s current preferences.
Endnotes
*: Spiros Ch. Kaminaris. Spiros Ch. Kaminaris is completing his doctorate at the Centre for Byzantine, Ottoman and Modern Greek Studies at the University of Birmingham, UK. His dissertation is on terrorist acts in Greece and governmental responses. Kaminaris was an organizer of the conference “Greece and the European Union: 16 years after its accession,” in May 1997. The proceedings are available in Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, Vol. 22, 1998. Back.
Note 1: See incidents 2527 and 3207 in Edward F. Mickolus, Terrorism, 1988-1991: A Chronology of Events and a Selectively Annotated Bibliography. (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Westport, 1993),pp 570-573 and 734-740. Back.
Note 2: As a result to this incident, one CIA agent involved in the case was thrown out of Greece. Wall Street Journal, 10 July, 1984. See also Daily Telegraph, 9 July,1984. New York Times, 9 July, 1984. Back.
Note 3: Washington Post, January 6, 1985. Back.
Note 4: This incident is well known as the world watched in horror since television cameras tracked TWA Flight pilot, Capt. John Testrake, a gun held to his head by Middle Eastern Terrorist. Haitham Haddadi, “Major Hijackings in Last 20 years”, Reuters, 19 September, 1995. See also David Field, “TWA Has Maintained Respected Safety Record but Terrorists Have Targeted Airline in Past”, USA Today, 18 July, 1996. Back.
Note 5: See Christos Ioannides, “Greece Turkey, the United States and the Politics of Middle Eastern Terrorism” in Greece on the Road to Democracy from the Junta to Pasok 1974-1986, ed. Speros Vryonis (New York: Caratzas, Jan Press, 1991), pp. 152 and 245. Back.
Note 6: See http://www.elibrary.com Greece: Chapter 5C. Foreign Military Relations, Countries of the World; Embassy of Greece, Washington DC; 01-01-1991. EBO consisted of two factories-one in Aiyion and the other in Lavrion. The Aiyion plant employed more than 800 people and produced GA3 and GA4 assault rifles; the MP5 submachine gun; MG3, HK11, and HK21 machine guns; the Rheinmetall 20mm cannon; the Mauser 30mm model F cannon; 81mm mortars; and other small arms equipment. The Lavrion plant employed over 400 in the production of ammunition and explosives. EBO has also developed weapons systems for domestic use; the ARTEMIS-30, a small antiaircraft system, was developed for use by the Greek army in the Aegean. This system found an international market. Back.
Note 7: See George J. Tsoumis, “Defense Policies of Pasok,” in Greece under Socialism ed. N. Stavrou (New York: Caratzas-Orheus Press, 1988), p. 101. Back.
Note 9: “The New Greece,” Economist, 315 (June 9,1990): p. 58. Gil Sedan, “Greek Leader Arrives In Israel, Solidifying New Warm Relations,” Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 19 May, 1992, pp PG. Back.
Note 10: Mickolus, op. cit., p. 646. Back.
Note 11: Ibid., pp. 728-730. Myra MacDonald, “Greek Court Cuts Prison Terms for Palestinians,” Reuters, 12-22-1995. Back.
Note 12: Jean Cohen, “Greek Court Gives Palestinians Stiff Sentences For 1991 Bombing”, Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 07-20-1992, pp PG. Back.
Note 14: See Tracey Ober, “Greece extradites Achille Lauro convict to Italy”, Reuters, May 24, 1996. Back.
Note 15: See Stephen Weeks, “Freed Pan Am bomber leaves Greece amid US anger”, Reuters, 12 May, 1996, pp PG.. Vicki Allen, “U.S. blasts release of convicted bomber”, Reuters, 12 May, 1996. Stephen Weeks, “Convicted Palestinian Gets Easter Break in Greece”, Reuters, April 17, 1996. Jean Cohen, “Greek High Court Reduces Prison Time of Arab who Placed Fatal Plane”, Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 21 June, 1993. Back.
Note 16: The bomb killed Gligorov’s driver and wounded three bystanders in the center of the Macedonian capital. If Gligorov had been killed, it would have left Macedonia without a skilled leader. Greece could put the screws back on by keeping trade sanctions. Bulgaria could stir animosity among Macedonia’s pro-Bulgarian Slavs. The large ethnic Albanian minority in the west of the country could sharpen demands for more autonomy. Bloodshed between Serbs and Albanians in Serbia’ s Kosovo province could trickle dangerously into Macedonia. And it was also feared that Serbia might try to gobble up Macedonia—south Serbia, as some Serbs call it—as well. However Macedonia’s own extreme nationalists, were the most likely perpetrators of the bomb attack since they accused Gligorov for being too soft. See “A Blow Against Macedonia. (Attempted Assassination of President Kiro Gligorov Shows how Fragile the Republic Is)”, The Economist, 337 (October 7, 1995): p. 57. See also Kurt Schork, “Peace Efforts in ex-Yugoslavia Jolted by Violence”, Reuters, October 3, 1995. Regarding the bomb threat against Papoulias, the Greek Foreign Ministry gave no details of who had made the bomb threat. Papoulias however signed a highly controversial accord earlier this month with Macedonia (Fyrom). The deal involved the lifting of Greek sanctions against FYROM and the removal of a symbol from FYROM’s flag which Greece considered implied a claim to Greek territory. He was due to meet the foreign minister of Turkey in New York during the UN session. Buchizya Mseteka, “Bomb Threat Forces Greek Minister’s Plane to Land,” Reuters; September 24, 1995. Back.
Note 17: MAVI group was active in Greece as early as June 1983, when the group claimed responsibility for a bomb planted in the Albanian ambassador’s car, parked in front of the Albanian embassy in Athens causing material damages but no injuries. See Mickolus, op. cit., Vol. 1 1980-83 (Iowa State University Press, 1989), p 409. Back.
Note 18: Reuters, May 17, 1997. Bruce Hoffman and Dona Kim Hoffman, The Rant-St. Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism 1994. Reprinted from Terrorism and Political Violence, p. 191. U.S. Department of State 1995: Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1994, Office of the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism Appendix A: Chronology of Significant Terrorist Incidents, 1994. Back.
Note 19: The Sunday Observer, September 28, 1997. See also “Greece to React to UK Paper on Kurdish Terrorist Camps,” Xinhua News Agency, 03 October, 1997. Back.
Note 20: “Greece Will Call For Demilitarization of Bosphorus”, Itar-Tass, September 9, 1997. Back.
Note 21: Reuters, 16/01/1999. See also Marjorie Miller, Maura Reynolds, Paul Watson, Carol J. Williams John J. Goldman Maria Petrakisin. “Kurd Response Is Disruptive—and Disciplined”, Los Angeles Times, Home Edition Part A, Page 1 February 17, 1999 Back.
Note 22: “The Ocalan crisis,” The Economist, Vol. 350, February 20, 1999. See also Ilene R. Prusher, “How Kurd’s arrest rattles,” Christian Science Monitor, February 2, 1999. Back.
Note 24: Michael Theodoulou and Andrew Finkel, “Ankara force storms into northern Iraq,” Times February 18, 1999. Back.
Note 25: New York Times, December 27, 1985. Back.
Note 26: See Alex P. Schmid, Albert Jongman et al. Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature, (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Company, 1988) p. 560. Back.
Note 27: Robert Ajemian, “Scandals The Looting of Greece for the First Time, A Fallen Tycoon Tells how he Embezzled Millions”, Time, March 13, 1989, p. 32. Michael S. Serrill. Reported by Mirka Gondicas/Athens, Europe: “In Classical Greece, The Elected Magistrates of Athens, Called”, Time International, September 25, 1989, p. 22. See also Time International, “Hanging it out in Public Papandreou’s Peccadilloes May Bring his Downfall,” December 19,1988. Back.
Note 28: Greek government spokesman, Dimitris Reppas said that the PKK would not be allowed to open an office in Greece because it operates against state governments by using violence and terrorism. ”Mr. Reppas Commented on the Opening of PKK Offices in Greece Athens”, Macedonia Press Agency, May 4, 1998. Back.
Note 29: The Greek Government claimed that it opposed terrorism and the use of violence but isolating a country was not the best way to bring it into the international community. “EU Ambassadors to Return to Iran Soon”, Xinhua News Agency, April 29, 1997. The State Department was at the end very pleased to see the Greek ambassador leaving Iran. U.S. Dept Of State: Daily press briefing, M2 Press Wire, April 18, 1997. Back.
Note 30: Bargaining during negotiations tends to be more effective when participants have equal rather than unequal power. J. Z. Rubin and B. R. Brown, The Social Psychology of Bargaining and Negotiation, Academic Press (London 1975), p. 228. Back.
Note 31: In September 1998, the Greek foreign minister met in Tehran with his Armenian and Iranian counterparts. Following their meeting, the Iranian media called for a regional defense alliance against Turkey and Israel. Daniel Pipes, “The real ‘New Middle East,” Commentary, November 11, 1998, p. 25. Back.
Note 33: John Collins, “Definitional Aspects” in Y. Alexander and C. Edinger, Political Terrorism and Energy: The Threat and Response (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981),p.6. Back.
Note 34: See, for example, on the Turkish issue’s role in U.S.-Greek relations, Andrew Gimson “Clinton backs Turkey’s fight to join EU,” Daily Telegraph, May 14, 1998. Back.