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Israel's Lebanon Policy
Laura Zittrain Eisenberg
Middle East Review of International Affairs
Issue #3/September 1997
"In late August 1997, Hizbullah rockets rained down on the inhabitants of the upper Galilee and residents of south Lebanon came under punishing fire from Israel and its South Lebanese Army (SLA) ally." The escalating burst of mutually retaliatory strikes showed south Lebanon remained as volatile as ever. 1
In April 1996, Israel's "Operation Grapes of Wrath" had failed to crush Hizballah, Lebanon's anti-Israel Shi'a Muslim militia. It led, however, to an agreement among the combatants which put each other's civilians off limits and confined confrontation between armed forces to Israel's self-declared south Lebanese "security zone." A five-nation committee composed of Syria, Lebanon, Israel, the United States and France was established to monitor the agreement and defuse flash points. But August's conflagration and the committee's impotence raised the question: Had the Grapes of Wrath agreement already withered on the vine?
Even during the 16 months after the Grapes accord, daily confrontations with Hizballah continued to claim a steady rate of Israel Defense Forces (IDF) casualties. A fatal February 1997 collision of two Israeli military helicopters ferrying troops to southern Lebanon cost the lives of 73 soldiers and finally thrust the issue of Israel's unsatisfactory Lebanon policy into the spotlight. The flare-up in August 1997 added fuel to the vigorous public debate. From an Israeli view point, the questions are: Should the IDF continue to control a buffer in south Lebanon, pending the far-off negotiation of security arrangements there with the Lebanese or Syrian authorities? Or, in the absence of agreements with the Lebanese government or its Syrian overseer, is unilateral withdrawal a viable alternative?
Evolution of the South Lebanon "Security Zone"
Although the conflict with Hizballah now dominates Israel's Lebanon problem, it was originally the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) which drew Israeli attention northward in the late 1960s. Unhampered by Beirut's weak central government, the PLO established a "state within a state" in south Lebanon and the border region was quickly racked by deadly Palestinian raids into Israel and harsh Israeli retaliatory strikes.
The 1978 "Litani Operation" and 1982 "Operation Peace for Galilee" were Israeli invasions designed to drive the PLO out of southern Lebanon (1978) and destroy the PLO entirely (1982). Three months after the first invasion and under U.S. pressure, Israel reluctantly acquiesced in the formation of a south Lebanese buffer zone in which IDF troops were mostly replaced by a United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).
Israel has not been without Lebanese allies in its battles against the PLO. In 1976 the Rabin government offered quiet support to south Lebanon's "Free Lebanon Militia" (FLM), commanded by a rebel Greek Catholic Lebanese army officer, Sa'd Haddad. Israel trained and supplied the FLM, which was supposed to keep the PLO away from the border with Israel. Israel withdrew from south Lebanon after the Litani invasion but left behind several hundred men to support Haddad's forces which often came into conflict with UNIFIL. Although crossborder infiltration and attacks against Israeli civilians in the north significantly decreased, the PLO soon returned to its south Lebanon camps where it continued to train guerrillas and stockpile weapons. That, along with the extension of Syrian influence there, reflected the unsatisfactory outcomes of the Litani, UNIFIL, and Haddad operations."
After Litani, the government of Menachem Begin stepped up Israeli commitments to anti-PLO forces in Lebanon, embracing the stronger Maronite Catholic militias in the north. Israel undertook the 1982 invasion in conjunction with the Maronite Phalange organization. The primary goal was to destroy the PLO; subsidiary goals were to diminish Syrian influence in Lebanon, facilitate the consolidation of a pro-Israel Lebanese government under Phalange leader Bashir Gemayel, and win Israel its second peace treaty with an Arab state. Every aspect of the campaign failed, as did the Israeli-Phalange alliance.
Moreover, Lebanon proved easier to enter than exit. The U.S.-mediated May 1983 agreement between the Lebanese and Israeli governments called for an IDF withdrawal while allowing continued Israeli access to south Lebanon. Syrian pressure and internal Lebanese opposition led to Beirut's quick abrogation of the accord. Prime Minister Shimon Peres ordered a unilateral withdrawal in 1985. One comprehensive overview of Israel's woes in Lebanon asserts that the January 1985 decision to withdraw marks the last formal governmental decision regarding Israel's Lebanon policy: the ensuing twelve years of Israeli involvement in Lebanon reflect ad hoc responses to events in the field. 2
After the withdrawal, a small number of IDF soldiers remained behind in Israel's self-declared "security zone," a ten-mile wide swath of Lebanese territory running the length of the Israel-Lebanon border. As in 1978, the plan was to equip and support the indigenous South Lebanese Army (SLA), the reconstituted FLM led by General Antoine Lahad since Haddad's death in 1984, to act as a buffer between northern Israel and anti-Israel forces in south Lebanon.
Dr. Frankenstein in the Lebanese Laboratory, 1985-1997
By 1985, however, Israel had a new enemy in south Lebanon, fiercer and more effective than the PLO had ever been and, ironically, in part a reaction to Israel's actions. Lebanese Shi'a from the border region had constituted 60 percent of Haddad's militia. Although some Shi'a supported the Palestinians and the PLO, others--angered at oppressive PLO domination and PLO crossborder attacks that invited Israeli retaliatory strikes against their villages--responded to Israel's anti-PLO invasion of 1982 with relief and support. But as hostilities dragged on after 1982, Israeli forces settled into the south, building new roads, posting road signs in Hebrew, commandeering facilities, and establishing bases, headquarters, and detention camps. These heavy-handed steps caused Israel to change in many Shi'a eyes from liberator to occupier. Further, Israeli strategists had focused on PLO and Syrian activities in Lebanon, not properly weighing the Lebanese Shi'a politicization in the early 1970s, marked by the rise to prominence of Shi'a leader Musa al-Sadr, and the formation of Shi'a organizations such as Amal and the Islamic fundamentalist Hizballah. Despite Shi'a-PLO antagonism, Israel had neither recognized nor rewarded the Shi'a as potential allies, taking continued Shi'a quiescence for granted."
Funded by Iran and encouraged by Syria, Hizballah sought to drive the Israelis back across the border. The contest with Hizbullah has become, since 1985, the primary focus of Israel's Lebanon policy. Ironically, the PLO, target of the 1982 invasion, became Israel's ostensible peace partner in 1993, while many of the previously friendly Shi'a of south Lebanon joined Israel's new, active Hizballah enemy. Hizballah's suicide attacks, roadside bombs, and ambushes take a steady toll on the IDF and its SLA ally, sparking debate within Israel over its Lebanon policy.
Lebanon's sectarian politics cause many observers to fall into the trap of using religious or confessional shorthand in characterizing actors: the SLA-Hizballah strife is often mistakenly described as Christian versus Shi'a; the SLA-IDF alliance as a Christian-Jewish partnership. The concept of a "minority alliance" with Lebanese Christians against a common Muslim enemy had tempted Zionist policymakers in the pre-1948 era and some observers continue to see this as Israel's strategy. But other Lebanese have also cooperated with the IDF, pro-Israel Christians are a small minority overall, and Israel's alliances with Lebanese from different camps can all be explained by "standard strategic-political thinking," namely, the common denominator of an anti-PLO (now anti-Hizballah) stance. 3
Although the SLA leadership is predominantly Maronite, there are Druze commanders who exercise considerable autonomy in the mainly Druze region of Hasbaya and often deal directly with the IDF instead of going through Lahad. The rank-and-file is composed of Christians (mainly Maronites, Greek Catholics and Greek Orthodox), Druze, and Shi'a. Shi'a slightly outnumber Christians among the foot soldiers, meaning that SLA-Hizballah run-ins often pit Shi'a against Shi'a, evidence of intra-Shi'a differences as to whom can better help them achieve their regional and national aspirations: Israel or Syria. Some SLA members join from ideological conviction, many more because of pragmatic politics; others are conscripted from villages falling in the zone of SLA control.
Israeli hopes that the SLA could thwart Hizballah have been disappointed; instead, the SLA has repeatedly required Israeli air cover and ground support. Israel has lost some 2030 soldiers a year in south Lebanon since 1985; the number of Israeli troops there has recently increased from 1,000 to 2,000. Iran's providing more sophisticated technology to Hizballah and Hizballah's own increasing effectiveness apparently countered the 1995 creation of an IDF special forces unit ("Egoz") assigned to Lebanon. In fact, since 1995 the ratio of Hizballah to IDF/SLA casualties has decreased to less than 2:1 from a past ratio of 5:1. 4
Diplomatic efforts to defuse the border region.
1991 saw hopes rise that Syria could be persuaded to cooperate in security arrangements that would allow an orderly Israeli evacuation from Lebanese territory. In the Gulf War that year, Syria sided with the U.S.-led coalition against Iraq, technically putting Syria and Israel in the same camp. Syria also participated in the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference which inaugurated direct, bilateral Israeli-Syrian negotiations. Observers speculated that the same American carrots and sticks used for these two efforts could also bring Syria to rein in Hizballah.
Israeli-Lebanese talks, also launched at Madrid, focused on the south Lebanon problem. Israel put forth the "Jezzine First" proposal, referring to a town north of the security zone and beyond Israel's direct occupation but held by an SLA brigade answerable to Israel's ally Lahad and outfitted with Israeli supplies. Talks between SLA commander Lahad and Lebanon's then Ambassador to the United States, Simon Karam, complemented the bilateral talks and seemed to augur an SLA withdrawal from Jezzine as a test case for future SLA and IDF withdrawals. The rapid progress of the Lebanese negotiations apparently unnerved the Syrians, who wanted to retain control of the south Lebanon pressure point as a bargaining chip in their own lagging negotiations with Israel. Syrian pressure on the Lebanese government scuttled the Jezzine plan.
Hopes that Syria would allow Israel a graceful exit from Lebanon, and that Israel would seize the chance to withdraw, rose again in 1993. This time the catalysts were the surprise Israeli-PLO Declaration of Principles and productive Syrian Israeli negotiations under U.S. mediation. The Israeli-PLO agreement and the rapid movement on the Jordanian-Israeli track which immediately followed suggested, for a moment, that peace was finally at hand in the Middle East and that Syria and Lebanon would soon follow suit in reconciling with Israel.
An apparently successful peace process and anticipated structural changes in the Arab-Israel conflict system bode well for a new Israeli policy toward Lebanon. By 1994 Israel was at peace with Egypt and Jordan, deeply into negotiations with the PLO, and at various stages of reconciliation with other Arab states. Emerging from the overwhelming sense of isolation which had characterized its regional standing since birth, Israel's impetus for casting its lot with non-state actors (such as independent militias) greatly diminished. Uri Lubrani, Israel's longtime coordinator for policy in Lebanon, emphasized that since the Madrid conference of 1991, Israel had an open line of communication to the legitimate Lebanese government, "the only Lebanese actor with whom we can strike a deal." 5
Arab and Israeli opponents of the peace process succeeded in disrupting these rosy expectations, however. Hamas suicide bus attacks within Israel in the spring of 1995, Prime Minister Rabin's assassination in November 1995, and another spate of deadly suicide bus explosions in the spring of 1996 effectively put all further negotiations on hold and threw Israelis into a crisis of doubt concerning the benefits of this peace process. The Israeli-Lebanese diplomatic track went cold with the outbreak of hostilities along the border, leading to the April 1996 Grapes of Wrath campaign, discussed below.
Syrian Ambassador to the United States Walid al-Moualem has implicitly suggested that had Rabin lived, Israel and Syria would have concluded an agreement over the Golan Heights and by extension, over South Lebanon. 6 Itamar Rabinovich, then Israel's ambassador to Washington and lead negotiator with the Syrians, agreed that significant progress had been made while Rabin was alive, but recalled persistent sticking points and cautioned against the retrospective pronouncement that an accord had been imminent. 7 Suspended after the bus bombings, Israeli Syrian negotiations broke off indefinitely after the election of Benjamin Netanyahu, who quickly announced a firm position that Israel would not withdraw from the Golan under any circumstances. All subsequent Israeli diplomatic overtures to Beirut for help in resolving the situation in south Lebanon have since foundered because of that government's utter dependence on Syria. Periodic talks between the SLA and the Lebanese government over reviving the 1991 "Jezzine First" plan continue even today, but a positive outcome is unlikely without approval from Syria, which has no interest in seeing Israel's Lebanon problem resolved until its own claims against Israel are settled.
Israeli military campaigns
Following sustained Hizballah rocket attacks into northern Israel, Israel has twice resorted to full military campaigns. Both operations ("Accountability" in July 1993 and "Grapes of Wrath" in April 1996) aimed to break Hizballah's ability to undertake military attacks within southern Lebanon and into northern Israel by destroying Hizballah camps, supply lines, arms depots and fighters. In addition, the attacks forced Lebanese civilians in the border region to flee north, which the Rabin (1993) and Peres (1996) governments hoped would pressure Beirut to pressure Damascus to pressure Hizbullah to stop its activities. Jerusalem also hoped suffering civilians in the south would blame Hizballah elements in their midst for provoking Israel's wrath. Both hopes failed. Lebanese across the sectarian spectrum, even those with little sympathy for Hizballah's wider aspirations (such as creating an Islamic state), rallied behind the refugees and their Hizballah defenders and against Israel. Hizballah emerged from the battles bloodied but unbowed, with its prestige heightened.
The cease-fires ending the two Israeli operations both stipulated that neither Hizballah nor Israel would target the other's civilians. These terms, however, implicitly permit continued warfare in the security zone, where Hizballah hit and run strikes each time promptly resumed. Carnage in the security zone prompts one observer to pronounce the buffer an "(in)security zone." 8
"Lebanon First."
In August 1996, soon after assuming office, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu proposed a "Lebanon First" plan whereby Israeli troops would withdraw entirely from Lebanon in exchange for Syrian guarantees to disarm Hizballah, facilitate the deployment of the Lebanese army southward to the border with Israel, and protect Israel's SLA allies. This diplomatic initiative aimed simultaneously to divest the new government of its draining Lebanese inheritance and to advance security arrangements with Syria. But Syria's President Hafiz al-Asad rejected the proposal. With no promise of a reward for Syria's services (such as an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights), he has no interest in confronting his Hizballah client, protecting his Israeli opponent, or promoting the Lebanese Army's authority at the expense of Syrian influence. When Damascus rejected his offer, Netanyahu marveled at the "Kafkaesque" situation in which "the prime minister of Israel announces he wants to get out of the territory of an Arab state Lebanon. And the Syrian government, together with the Lebanese, are opposing this withdrawal." 9 Former foreign minister Abba Eban rightly observed, however, that the situation is equally "Golanesque." 10
With its interests long subordinated to Syria's, one might think that Lebanon would have jumped at Netanyahu's offer to resolve the problems in "Lebanon first." Unfortunately for both Israel and Lebanon, the order to jump can come only from Syria; Lebanon can only ask how high. Publicly, Syria and Lebanon rebuffed Netanyahu's offer as a publicity stunt or ploy to divide and conquer. Privately, Lebanon recognized that it could not take control of the south without Syrian pressure on Hizballah; Syria worried that a Lebanese-Israeli deal would isolate Syria and further consolidate Israeli control of the Golan Heights.
The general outline of a solution along the Israeli-Lebanese border is clear: Lebanese army units replace IDF and SLA troops, Hizballah disarms, the SLA disbands, joint Lebanese-Israel teams patrol the border region, the Hizballah and SLA rank-and-file are integrated into the Lebanese army (as have been members of other disbanded militias), and SLA commanders win amnesty or safe passage abroad, most likely to France, although there are indications that some may seek asylum in Israel. Syria's refusal to countenance a cooperative withdrawal plan, however, and Beirut's inability to coordinate policy with Israel on its own, force Jerusalem to seek alternatives.
Unilateral Withdrawal: Risk or Relief?
That search became more intense after the February 4, 1997 collision between two air force helicopters transporting Israeli soldiers to bases within the security zone. Helicopter shuttles had been instituted to reduce IDF vulnerability to Hizballah roadside bombs. The resulting military casualties, the largest in a single day since the 1973 war, shattered any remaining restraints on an open debate about the most controversial of proposals, unilateral withdrawal.
Support and opposition for unilateral withdrawal is unusual in that it does not cut along standard party or ideological lines. The "Kochav Yair" group, a bipartisan association of parliamentarians and former intelligence chiefs supporting unilateral withdrawal, includes Yossi Beilin, a prominent Labor party leader; Michael Eitan, the Likud party whip; Avigdor Kahalani, minister of interior and head of the Third Way Party; and Gideon Ezra, former deputy head of the Shin Bet.
The equally bipartisan opposition to unilateral withdrawal is led by Netanyahu, backed by the unlikely coalition of Army Intelligence chief Moshe Ya'alon, Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai, Lebanon coordinator Uri Lubrani, Meretz dove Yossi Sarid and Labor MK Ephraim Sneh. In the wake of the katyusha barrages of August 1997, hardliners Ariel Sharon and Rafael Eitan called for massive Israeli retaliation and the enlargement of the security zone. Labor party leader Ehud Barak, who had opposed a "unilateral withdrawal," called in August 1997 for a gradual, staged troop withdrawal beginning at the far edges of the security zone, as a test of Hizballah's intentions.
Some observers suggest that the unilateral withdrawal debate reflects less about Israeli attitudes toward Lebanon and more about perceptions of the prospect for a deal with Syria. 11 The proposition is that those who see a potential Syrian deal want to hold off on any bold Lebanon moves and resolve the security zone problem in the context of a Syrian solution, using an Israeli withdrawal as a bargaining chip; those who see little hope of an accord with Syria suggest Israel take the initiative in Lebanon, thereby liberating itself from a military and political burden and simultaneously denying Syria leverage over Israel in Lebanon. Although intuitively reasonable, this argument fails to account, for instance, for Netanyahu's stance against withdrawal (even though he does not expect a deal with Syria) and Beilin's support for withdrawal (despite his position that an accord with Syria is possible). Opinion polls indicate that the Israeli public is united in its grief over IDF losses in south Lebanon but undecided on the proper remedy, with support and opposition for a unilateral withdrawal fluctuating with the day's headlines. When it comes to Lebanon, Israelis' positions seem to be individualistic, idiosyncratic, and subject to periodic revision.
The argument for unilateral withdrawal:
The logic is simple: the Hizballah enemy arose in response to Israel's lingering presence in southern Lebanon. Were Israel to withdraw, Hizballah's raison d'etre would be fulfilled, and its call to arms obsolete. If it continued attacks across the border, Hizballah would find itself rejected by a south Lebanese population unwilling to countenance activities that provoke Israeli retaliation. Unilateral withdrawal thus immediately removes Israeli troops from daily contact with Hizballah while drastically diminishing Hizballah's will and capacity to fight. Withdrawal proponents see Hizballah's increasing activity in Lebanon's political arena as evidence that, after an Israeli pullback, it will turn its energies away from Israel and focus on Shi'a issues within the Lebanese political system. Hizballah won seven parliamentary seats in the 1996 elections and one veteran Hizballah-watcher predicts that "while Hizballah's future as an armed element may be somewhat uncertain, its survival as a viable political player is not." 12 Another agreed that Hizballah's political metamorphosis is designed to preserve the group's influence even after an Israeli withdrawal, noting that "Hizballah may undertake suicidal attacks, but it does not have, as an organization, a suicidal policy." 13
Supporters of a unilateral withdrawal emphasize that "unilateral" does not mean "unconditional," but rather "without Syrian agreement." Their plan calls for a clear declaration that an Israeli redeployment back across the border is contingent upon strict adherence to a full cease-fire, and a clear warning that any attack against persons or sites within Israel would provoke a massive Israeli military response, including the seizure and full pacification of Lebanese territory. Other possible components of the withdrawal scenario include foreign buffer troops to replace the IDF and SLA (possibly U.S. and French, or Egyptian and Jordanian) and a fully fortified, patrolled border with minefields, high electrified fences, and electronic warning systems.
Withdrawal proponents point out that neither the iron fist (Peace for Galilee, Accountability, Grapes of Wrath) nor the extended hand (Madrid, Oslo) have calmed the border region; 14 a dramatic new policy is necessary. They argue that Hizballah's ability to fire missiles over the security zone and into Israel has diminished the usefulness of the security zone as a buffer; the best way to stop the attacks is to remove the catalyst, namely, the IDF occupation of Lebanese territory. Pacification of the Hizballah resistance would also diminish Hizballah-SLA confrontations, reducing the vulnerability of IDF troops called upon to backup the SLA and relieving Israel of responsibility for autonomous SLA decisions. The August 1997 attack against Sidon's civilians by the SLA brigade in Jezzine embarrassed Israel and dragged it into an escalating conflict with Hizballah.
The alternative is the status quo: an indefinite war of attrition in the security zone punctuated by periodic, intensive military flare-ups, and the guaranteed deaths of many dozens of Israeli soldiers, at least, pending a far-off peace with Syria. In unilaterally initiating a withdrawal from Lebanon, Israel both liberates itself from a military and political burden and simultaneously denies Syria leverage over Israel in Lebanon. This camp holds that Israel is powerful enough, and its deterrence well enough established, to test the proposition that Hizballah is dedicated to fighting Israel in Lebanon, not in Israel.
Unilateral withdrawal: the argument against
Skeptics cite four factors against unilateral withdrawal: Syria's intention not to let Israel off the hook so easily, the weakness of the Lebanese government and army, calls for vengeance from some Lebanese quarters, and Hizballah's fundamentalist doctrine, which prescribes an ongoing jihad (sacred war) against Israel. Hizballah statements often refer to the Israeli Galilee as "North Occupied Palestine."
Opponents of unilateral withdrawal argue that as long as Asad sees Hizballah attacks as a valuable pressure point against Israel, he will encourage those Lebanese who want to punish Israel even after a unilateral Israeli withdrawal, which he opposes for the same reasons he opposed the "Lebanon First" plan. Although Hizballah's original purpose was to eliminate Israel's presence on Lebanese soil, encouragement from fundamentalist Iran over the years has provoked calls for the elimination of Israel. Syria and Iran would likely support extremists intent upon carrying the fight into Israel.
There is also the possibility Hizbullah might not itself attack across the border while facilitating similar attacks by Syrian based Palestinian factions determined to scuttle the peace process. Arafat's standing among Palestinians in Lebanon has declined, especially among the 1948 refugees from the Galilee for whom Oslo's focus on the West Bank and Gaza holds little appeal. In one of many roadside bombings in the security zone during August 1997, there was already some confusion as to whether the perpetrators were Shi'a or Palestinians.
However promising the logic of unilateral withdrawal, its potential drawbacks are severe. Most mayors of northern Israeli towns have petitioned the government against a unilateral withdrawal, citing an unacceptable threat to their constituents, some living within automatic rifle range of the Lebanese border. Ironically, Israel adopted the SLA so it could protect northern Israel. Now Israel's need to protect its SLA ally, whose casualty rate exceeds that of the IDF, is one of the primary factors mitigating against a unilateral withdrawal.
The SLA and Lebanese Christian nationalists sympathetic to Israel vigorously oppose a unilateral withdrawal for fear of a wholesale massacre of SLA members and their families by Hizballah, a horror that Lebanese history in no way rules out. They are unpersuaded by a recent "amnesty" offered by Hizballah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah to all SLA members who lay down their arms prior to an Israeli pullback, and Nasrallah's promise of protection for south Lebanon's Christians afterwards. 15
An ultranationalist minority of the Lebanese Maronite population clings to an old concept of a Christian-Jewish alliance against common Muslim enemies of Iran, Syria, and Hizballah. Pending Lebanon's liberation, it calls on Israel to support the creation of a Christian Free Lebanon, with an independent army, in the south. 16 But most Lebanese Christians believe their future lies in national reconciliation with Lebanese Muslims (now a majority), and the FLM and SLA experiences cast doubt on the likelihood that a strong south Lebanese military force independent of Israeli backup could emerge.
Clearly Israel would welcome the friendship of a truly free Lebanese state. But Israel has learned the hard way that the liberation of Lebanon from Syrian control and the consolidation of pro-Israel power there is a monumental task beyond the scope of its abilities. Israel must do all it can to see that its SLA partners are not thrown to the wolves, but the focus of Israel's policy must be its own narrow security needs. Hizballah's intentions.
Hizballah's intentions stand at the heart of the Israeli debate. If allowed to reach the border, would Hizballah simply strike deeper into Israel? If so, Israelis would prefer to fight Hizballah in Lebanon. In a concise and expert analysis of the unilateral withdrawal dilemma, Mark Heller of the Jaffee Center at Tel Aviv University argues that the popular Israeli assessment of the Hizballah threat falsely identifies Hizballah as the chronological and ideological heir to the pre-Oslo PLO, arguing that the two organizations emerged in different eras, and with different agendas. He acknowledges, however, that the faulty association does not necessarily mean that the conclusion that Hizballah intends to pursue the fight into Israelis invalid. 17 Sheikh Nasrallah has been purposefully vague in defining Hizballah's post withdrawal plans, expressing a tactical preference for "keeping the enemy off-balance" rather than "reassuring the enemy," 18 even though the latter would be useful ammunition for those Israelis favoring a pullback. And Hizballah's public "jubilation" 19 at the fatal helicopter crash in February 1997 offered ammunition of a decidedly different sort.
After the helicopter tragedy, Netanyahu tried to stem the vociferous public debate over Israel's Lebanon policy with the warning that it injured the morale of soldiers still serving in the Lebanese combat zone and encouraged Hizballah in the belief that a devastating body count will force an Israeli retreat; he also reminded Israelis of the unwritten national code not to question a military operation while the troops were still in the field. The Lebanon war of 1982 had already challenged that last premise, however, with its unprecedented antiwar demonstrations and scattered incidents of conscientious objection. More recently (April 1997), some mothers of sons serving in Lebanon have banded together to demand that the IDF leave the security zone. 20 Buffeted by public opinion, successive Israeli governments have learned that picturesque southern Lebanon is a dangerous place which poses hard questions, suggests no easy answers, and offers no respite for baffled Israeli policymakers.
The Word from Lebanon
Lebanon's official position is that it endorses UN resolutions 425 (1978) and 509 (1982), both of which call for an unconditional Israeli withdrawal to the international border as established by the armistice. The government of President Elias Hrawi and Prime Minister Rafik Hariri has announced that it will tolerate Hizballah operations as long as the Israeli occupation of the south continues, and voiced its intention to send the Lebanese Army to take over any areas from which the IDF or SLA withdraws, although it is uncertain if the army is up to the task. As long as the IDF remains on Lebanese territory, Beirut is loathe to set off the confrontation which an attempt to restrain or disarm Hizballah would necessarily cause, constrained by the weakness of the Lebanese Army and by the popular perception of Hizballah as the heroes leading the struggle against Israeli occupation. The government may entreat Hizballah not to provoke Israeli retaliations in which Lebanese civilians suffer, but will neither encroach on Hizballah's turf nor strongly criticize the organization. Lebanese Foreign Minister Faris Bouez, referring to growing pressures within Israel to withdraw the IDF from Lebanon, recently said that his country owed Hizballah a debt of gratitude for making Israel's presence in the south untenable. 21
In August's flare-up, the Lebanese Army actually joined with Hizballah in firing upon the SLA brigade in Jezzine after the latter shelled Sidon. In another move sure to win approval from both Hizballah and Syria, the government in Beirut had the courts convict, in absentia, over eighty SLA members of treason for consorting with Israel. General Lahad received the death penalty and the others prison sentences, symbolic gestures as long as the men remain in the south beyond the government's reach, but ones which call into question plans for a post withdrawal amnesty for former SLA members.
For Lebanon, the government's entire program of national reconciliation, unification and demilitarization hinges upon an Israeli withdrawal from the south and the concomitant disarming of the SLA and Hizballah. For Israel, a withdrawal agreement and security regime on the border with Lebanon would pacify Israel's last active battlefront and leave the government (and armed forces) free to concentrate on the Palestinian front. Syrian opposition and Lebanon's inability to act independently of Syria bring us back to the unilateral withdrawal option.
It is self-evident to Israelis and to scholars attuned to Israeli sensibilities that Israel stakes no claim to Lebanese territory and would readily withdraw if only someone-Hizballah, the SLA, the Lebanese government, Asad-would guarantee an end to anti-Israeli activity in south Lebanon, and demonstrate the necessary influence to deliver on that promise.
Israelis may be surprised to know that although the Lebanese are aware of the rising public clamor within Israel to evacuate the security zone, most harbor dark suspicions about Israel's true intentions regarding their country. Many subscribe to a view of an expansionist Israel, anxious to enlarge itself by holding onto south Lebanon. Another prevalent charge is that Israel covets the Litani river and will maintain the security zone so as to have access to its water. Israel's military operations in Lebanon have embittered those Lebanese who have suffered as a result. The outspoken pro-Israeli position of that small group of Lebanese Christian nationalists also sustains the widespread suspicion that Israel is anxious to make peace with a friendly Christian government in Lebanon, and meddles in intra-Lebanese affairs with the purpose of seeing such a government take power. Relieving these Lebanese fears is a Herculean task, which only an actual Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory, if anything, can effect.
Conclusion
Israel's buffer zone in south Lebanon and support for the SLA focus narrowly on the border region's security. Israel's 1982 debacle ruled out more ambitious aims. That experience weighs heavily on both nations. During the August 1997 fighting, Foreign Minister Bouez cautioned Israel against a major military campaign, saying "I would like to remind those Israeli leaders who still have a spirit of adventure of the fate that befell their predecessors from previous adventures in Lebanon. We all know what Israel reaped from the 1982 invasion of Lebanon. And we equally know that Israel cannot guarantee its peace and security through the occupation of Lebanon." 22
Any Israeli schemes for restructuring Lebanon or hope that Lebanon will be the next state to make peace with Israel are long gone. Israelis recognize that Lebanon will be the last neighbor to sue for peace, following a Syrian-Israeli agreement. Israel's sorry Lebanese legacy spurs the government to find a way to withdraw, with or without Syria's blessing.
The bloodshed in August 1997 and failure of Grapes of Wrath, like operations Accountability, Peace for Galilee and Litani before it illustrates that, compelling names aside, military campaigns alone cannot satisfy Israeli needs for security and peace along the border with Lebanon. The real "Operation All Quiet on the Northern Front" will entail a package solution that includes Israel's total withdrawal from the security zone, the disarming of Hizballah, protective arrangements for pro-Israeli Lebanese left behind, and stringent security arrangements along the border. Until then, thoroughly disabused of any idyllic visions and anxious to be out of Lebanon, Israel will have to weigh all options including unilateral withdrawal seriously and soberly.
Note 1: This article draws on the author's "Israel's South Lebanon Imbroglio," Middle East Quarterly, 4:2 (June 1997) 6069. Back.
Note 2: Ariela ReingalHoffman and Galit Yamini, "Zahal will not sit in Lebanon," Yediot Achronot, July 18, 1997, pp. 46. This article appears in an outstanding multi-part series, "The Lebanese Snare" (milkud Levanon) published in Yediot Achronot on July 18 and 25, August 8 and 15 and 22, 1997. Back.
Note 3: Avner Yaniv, Dilemmas of Security: Politics, Strategy, and the Israeli Experience in Lebanon (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 64; Yair Evron, Lebanon: The Israeli Syrian Deterrence Dialogue (London: Croom Helm, 1987), p. 28. For treatment of pre 1948 Zionist policy towards Lebanon and the minority alliance debate see Laura Zittrain Eisenberg, My Enemy's Enemy: Lebanon in the Early Zionist Imagination, 19001948 (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1994). Back.
Note 4: Augustus Richard Norton, "The Impasse in the South," Daily Star (Beirut), July 21, 1997. Back.
Note 5: Author's interview with Uri Lubrani, October 18, 1993, Tel Aviv. Back.
Note 6: "Fresh Light on the SyrianIsraeli Peace Negotiations" (An Interview with Ambassador Walid alMoualem), Journal of Palestine Studies, 26:2 (Winter 1997), pp. 8194. Back.
Note 7: Author's interview with Itamar Rabinovich, April 9, 1997, New York. Back.
Note 8: Augustus Richard Norton with the assistance of Jillian Schwedler, "(In)security Zones in South Lebanon," Journal of Palestine Studies, 23:89 (Autumn 1993) pp. 6179. Back.
Note 9: The Jerusalem Post, International Edition, August 17, 1996. Back.
Note 10: Abba Eban, "A 'Golanesque' Situation," Jerusalem Post, August 16, 1996. Back.
Note 11: "The Lebanon Debate" (editorial), Jerusalem Post, International Edition, week ending 22 February 1997. Back.
Note 12: Augustus Richard Norton, "Hizballah in Transition," Daily Star (Beirut), August 9, 1997. Back.
Note 13: Electronic correspondence with Lebanese journalist Antoine Bassil, August 18, 1997. Back.
Note 14: Herb Keinon, "Taking a new look at Lebanon," Jerusalem Post, International Edition, week ending February 22, 1997. Back.
Note 15: Mona Ziade, "Nasrallah to SLA: Leave now and we will help you" (interview with Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah), Daily Star (Beirut), March 14, 1997. Back.
Note 16: "For a detailed presentation of this argument, see Walid Phares, "Liberating Lebanon," Middle East Quarterly, 3:4 (December 1996), pp. 2130. Back.
Note 17: Mark Heller, "Weighing Israel's Options Now," in Rosemary Hollis and Nadim Shehadi, eds., Lebanon on Hold: Implications for Middle East Peace (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs and the Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1996), pp. 5255. For a Lebanese take on unilateral withdrawal and a quiet border region see Fida Nasrallah, "The Way Ahead: Restoring the Lebanese State," in Hollis and Shehadi, pp. 8285. Back.
Note 18: Ziade, "Nasrallah to SLA.". Back.
Note 19: Benjamin Netanyahu's characterization, quoted in Joel Greenberg, "Israel, Shaken by Air Crash, Ponders Cost of Buffer Zone," New York Times, February 6, 1997; David Rudge, "Hizballah celebrates crash," Jerusalem Post, International Edition, week ending February 15, 1997. Back.
Note 20: David Rudge, "Mothers of soldiers in Lebanon repeat call for an Israeli pullout," Jerusalem Post, International Edition, week ending June 28, 1997. Back.
Note 21: Quoted in Douglas Jehl, "With Iran's Aid, Guerrillas Gain against Israel," New York Times, February 26, 1997, A4. Back.
Note 22: Radio Orient interview, quoted in Nicholas Blanford, "SLA man killed as truce talks remain deadlocked," Daily Star (Beirut), August 23, 1997. Back.