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Middle East Review of International Affairs
Vol. 2 No. 4/December 1998
Turkey’s Energy Politics in the Post-Cold War Era
By Brent Sasley *
This article’s purpose is to highlight why Turkey’s energy needs are becoming such an important aspect of its foreign policy, how this is leading to friction with allies or neighbors, and the manner in which Turkey is handling these problems.
Turkey is at the crossroads of several volatile, strategically and economically important regions, including the awkward triangle of the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. As Simon Mayall put it, “Bosnia, the Middle East Peace Process, Iraqi sanctions, Operation Provide Comfort, Trans-Caucasus separatism, Russian activities in the ‘Near Abroad,’ CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty] flank issues, NATO enlargement, Cyprus, Central Asia, and energy pipelines [cannot] be discussed without reference to Turkey.”(1)
With its economy now the world’s 17th largest and 65 million people, Turkey’s energy needs are increasing quickly. Turkey’s gas demands during the 1990s have been growing at 10 percent per year, and by the year 2005 these demands are expected to quadruple to 45 billion cubic meters. Oil needs are similarly urgent, with predictions that 22 million tons will have to be imported annually by 2010.(2) Consequently, in recent years Ankara has made it an important policy goal to find and retain reliable energy supplies.
Virtually all these sources are found in the Caspian Sea basin’s five states—Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Turkmenistan, and Kazakstan. The U.S. government previously estimated Caspian crude oil reserves at around 100–200 billion barrels, surpassed only by Persian Gulf reserves (estimated at about 670 billion barrels of crude oil). However, recent appraisals, based on actual drilling operations and other sources, suggest there are only 15–29 billion barrels, comparable to North Sea oil reserves. Some believe that an additional 163 billion barrels remain to be discovered, but oil companies conducting operations in the region are more skeptical. Despite these results, though, $75 billion worth of private capital has been committed to the Caspian region, and Turkey is geographically close enough to warrant a considerable share in these energy resources.
Most of the crude reserves belong to Azerbaijan and, to a lesser extent, Kazakstan. Kazakstan, however, also has large natural gas deposits, mainly in the huge Tengiz field. In addition, Turkmenistan’s western desert is believed to hold the world’s second-largest natural gas stocks, estimated at about 21 trillion cubic meters.
These resources have drawn great interest by Iran, Russia, and the United States, all of whom are searching for economic and strategic opportunities.(3) But each of these countries already has sufficient domestic energy sources and import systems in place able to meet its requirements. In contrast, Turkey has no significant internal resources and must build expensive pipelines to fulfill its needs. This situation has required Ankara to take some decisions contrary to these other powers’ policies and interests.
Striking Out On Its Own
While Turkey remains very friendly to the United States, Ankara has had to cast a wider net in its search for means to supply its energy needs than Washington has preferred, especially regarding business dealings with Iran. These circumvent the 1996 Iran–Libya Sanctions Act, which punishes companies investing more than $20 million in either country.
To sustain its current economic growth, Turkey in 1996 signed a deal with Iran to purchase $23 billion worth of gas over the next 23 years, making that country Turkey’s second-largest gas supplier.(4) A pipeline is scheduled to begin operating in mid-1999. This is in conflict with U.S. policy to avoid bringing Iran into any of the region’s emerging commodity and economic web of agreements.
To supplement this arrangement, Turkey in December 1997 completed an agreement with Turkmenistan and Iran to build a pipeline through the former to connect with the Turkey–Iran pipeline. Construction began on November 9 1998, and the line is scheduled to begin piping gas in 2001. The signatories to this accord also hope that eventually Turkmen gas can be routed through this conduit to Europe, which would of course increase the transit fees collected by these states.
In addition, Turkey’s preference for an oil pipeline crossing Turkey rather than Russia has annoyed Moscow. Russia has traditionally been Turkey’s largest gas supplier. Given its need to meet growing internal consumption, Ankara has sought to increase these quantities significantly. Moscow promised to augment its supplies fivefold by 2010 and to build a gas pipeline reaching under the Caspian Sea to Turkey. However, it is unlikely that cash-strapped Russia will be able to meet these demands or keep these promises. With its primary supplier unable to meet its needs, Turkey has been forced to look elsewhere for sources.
Since achieving independence from the USSR in late 1991, Azerbaijan has been the focal point of intense governmental and corporate interest in its oil reserves. Unable to develop its offshore oil fields with only Russian technology, Azerbaijan welcomed Western oil companies to drill for oil and help export it, and Western governments to provide protection from Russian domination. Drilling and extracting the oil is relatively easy compared to arranging for its export. This also involves highly political decisions about transport routes, which most of those involved view as a zero-sum game.
The issues of oil transport pipelines have been in negotiation since 1993. In 1994, the Azerbaijani government signed what was called the “contract of the century” with the Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC), a business consortium of oil companies from the United States, Britain, Norway, Turkey, Russia, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and Azerbaijan itself. The accord allows these companies to drill in three major fields (the Azeri, Chiraq, and Guneshli) and involves some $7.4 billion. These firms, a mixture of private and public ventures, are to pay for whatever pipeline is eventually built to transport Azeri oil to outside markets.
Although the final decision rests with Baku (or, perhaps more appropriately, with President Heidar Aliyev, the strongman who rules Azerbaijan with a mantle of democracy), the AIOC is to recommend to the Azeri government which pipeline route it deems most economically sound. Since the consortium is paying for the pipeline’s cost, it is expected that its proposals will be treated quite seriously. The AIOC’s report has been postponed several times, the most recent being from October 29, to mid-November, and finally to early December, 1998. In fact, it is unlikely the AIOC will make suggestions at any time soon.
The consortium had originally planned to use an older Soviet-made pipeline stretching from Baku, through Chechnya, to the Russian port of Novorossiisk on the Black Sea. The oil would then, it was expected, be shipped through the Turkish Straits and into the Mediterranean Sea. However, Ankara has from the start strenuously objected to this proposal: aside from its desire not to miss out on any lucrative transit fees that would come with having an oil pipeline traverse its territory, Turkish policymakers have pointed out that the Turkish Straits, the Bosphorus channel in particular, is simply unable to handle any more oil traffic.
Therefore, another route would be more feasible. Although the United States supports Turkey’s claim to the Main Export Pipeline, as it is called, Ankara has risked the displeasure of both Russia and Iran by calling for the Baku–Ceyhan line to be constructed as the primary export vehicle of Azerbaijani oil. In doing so, Turkey has challenged Russia in what Moscow prefers would remain its own backyard, the “Near Abroad,” namely Central Asia and the Caucasus. Although the challenge is primarily economic, Moscow must take into account the development of a Turkish sphere of influence displacing Russia on security and political matters.
Whose Oil; Whose Pipeline?
A further complication is the disagreement by the locals states as to how to divide ownership of Caspian Sea energy reserves. The five littoral states are not unanimous in their views, with some preferring the Caspian’s legal status to be titled a “lake,” and others favoring a “sea” approach. The division of the oil spoils would vary accordingly.
If the Caspian is defined as a sea, under the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, littoral states can claim rights of sovereign waters up to twelve miles from shore and an exclusive economic zone within 200 miles from the coast.(5) If the Caspian is granted lake status, tradition and precedent sanction that surrounding countries divide the water’s resources equally between them.
Azerbaijan and Kazakstan say the Caspian is a sea, which would allow both countries to retain their resource-rich areas without having to share them with the other states. Russia, whose offshore reserves are far less than those of Azerbaijan and Kazakstan, claims the Caspian is a lake so that it can gain a larger share of the resources. Iran is somewhat supportive of Moscow’s position, arguing that no economic exploitation should take place until all five states agree on a proper division of the Caspian’s munificence. Turkmenistan, for its part, has taken both stands at times without a clear indication of any particularly strongly held viewpoint.
Turkey’s support for Azerbaijan derives from their common interests on this issue, as well as cultural, linguistic, ethnic, and historical ties that exist between the two Turkic peoples. However, the more immediate motivation is the fact that Aliyev has shown himself determined to throw off Russian domination and even influence, and steer his country toward the West, particularly the United States. Turkey is Washington’s nearest regional ally and a counterbalance to Russia. Aliyev has, therefore, intensified Azerbaijan’s relationship with Turkey to an extent unexpected when he first came to power. Azerbaijan has reciprocated by supporting Ankara’s preferred pipeline route.
Turkey objected to the AIOC’s initial indications that it preferred a Baku–Novorossiisk pipeline route. Given that a Turkish company does own a small stake in the AIOC (Turkish Petroleum, at 6.75%), and Azerbaijan’s support for Turkey’s case, the AIOC agreed to consider other options. The two most prominent choices are a refurbished line running from Baku to the Georgian Black Sea port of Supsa (oil running along this route would also have to be shipped through the Bosphorus), and a 1,081 kilometer connective line from Baku to the Turkish Mediterranean terminal at Ceyhan.
Turkey has actively, even aggressively, campaigned for the Baku–Ceyhan pipeline. It has fostered better relations with Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Georgia, and the oil companies making the decision on the route. Toward the end of 1997, the first Azerbaijani oil was piped through to Novorossiisk, and since then Turkey has increased the pitch of its lobbying. The main components of Turkey’s argument include: Ceyhan’s ability to handle large amounts of oil, the fact that due to environmental and ecological reasons the Bosphorus cannot manage more oil traffic, and playing on the U.S. desire to keep Russia and Iran from any significant control or benefit from oil transport routes.
The Ceyhan terminal, near the Syrian border, was once part of the pipeline network bringing Iraqi oil to the Mediterranean Sea. It is in good working condition and, as Turkish politicians are quick to mention, can handle many times the capacity of Novorossiisk. In addition, and perhaps even more important, Ceyhan is on the warm waters of the Mediterranean, whose mild climate allows year-round operation. Novorossiisk, on the other hand, is located on the Black Sea, where winter weather conditions force its closure for part of the year.(6)
In addition to the benefits of using Ceyhan, Turkey has also pointed out the disadvantages of continuing to use the Bosphorus channel as a primary oil-shipping route. In fact, in recent months Turkey has intensified its negative picture on this point as a way to undermine the arguments of those who want oil piped to Black Sea ports and then through the Turkish Straits.
The Bosphorus flows through the heart of Turkey’s main city, Istanbul, with its population of over 10 million people, presenting a potential ecological nightmare in the case of spills or collisions. As Turkey’s Environment Minister, Imren Aykut, stated, “No country has the right to endanger the lives of 10 million people just because it wants to sell oil.”(8)
The Bosphorus is one of the most difficult channels to navigate: its twists include four separate bends requiring vessels to turn at more than a 45 degree angle, and 12 times ships must change course as they wend their way through the passage. Moreover, the channel is already clogged with ships of all shapes and sizes, including ferries connecting the two parts of the city. An estimated 50,000 vessels passed through the Bosphorus last year, 4500 of which were tankers, and this number is increasing at a rate of 15 to 20 percent each year.(7) The number of foreign ships in the passage has increased since 1960 by 150%, and their tonnage by over 400%.
A few examples illustrate the hazards posed by the Bosphorus:
Between 1983 and 1993, 167 large-scale accidents occurred in the Straits. A 1979 collision between a Greek and Romanian tanker spilled over 95,500 tons of oil into the water; in 1991, a Lebanese vessel struck a bridge and sank with 20,000 live sheep. In late August 1998 a Greek tanker ran aground, and on October 23, 1998 a Turkish oil tanker collided with a water tanker, although no oil was spilled. These problems demonstrate the dangers posed by over-use of the Bosphorus by larger vessels carrying hazardous cargo.
Frustrated by a lack of understanding from those states using the Bosphorus, Turkey has unilaterally adjusted the shipping rules there, which Russia claims violates the 1936 Montreux Convention.(9) This document has governed the conditions and use of the Turkish Straits and has not been revised to make allowance for changes since then. It grants free passage through the Straits to any ships of any state, regardless of what cargo is carried. In 1994, Turkey enacted regulations that let it limit traffic through the Bosphorus to prevent environmental disasters, arguing that it has the right to issue safety and environmental ordinances for maritime traffic.
Ankara has resorted to veiled threats as well. Using the excuse of the dangerous over-crowding of the Bosphorus to force changes to the rules governing its use, Turkey has attempted to provide such unfavorable circumstances for those ships plying the Straits that the AIOC might consider it too much trouble and opt instead for the Ceyhan terminus. Foreign Minister Ismail Cem was most unequivocal in an October 1998 speech on transporting oil through the Turkish Straits:
“We warn those who are contemplating such a calculation that they will face serious difficulties in transporting not only existing oil shipments but also future ones through the Turkish Straits starting in the year 1999. To this end, Turkey will start implementing all possible means afforded by international law as well as its own legislation....I would suggest that companies who are in a position to transport their Caspian oil either via the Baku–Ceyhan pipeline or through the Black Sea and the Turkish Straits to take the above-mentioned facts into consideration. Turkey has both a right and the determination to take all necessary measures to protect the ecological system as well as the historic and cultural environment of the Turkish Straits.”(10)
Some of these measures include: regulating the intensity and flow of tanker traffic through the Bosphorus in light of potential threats to the population and environment of Istanbul; curtailing increases in tanker traffic; refusal to give priority to oil tankers over other vessels and cargoes; international legislation which raises insurance liability of ships to maximum levels; declaration of hazardous cargoes (previously voluntary); and, beginning in 2000, authorization given only to double-hulled tankers.
In the last few months of 1998, reports circulated to the effect that oil companies were losing interest in Baku–Ceyhan, and that a Baku–Supsa line was more likely to be recommended by the AIOC to Azerbaijan. Upon hearing this, Ankara spoke out forcefully about the impossibility of the Bosphorus being jammed with more oil tankers, and that the recommendation from the AIOC was just that: a recommendation. As President Suleyman Demirel put it, in reference to a Baku–Ceyhan route: “Azerbaijan is determined, Georgia and Turkey are determined, and the United States is backing the project.”(11) President Aliyev has similarly brushed off concerns that Baku–Ceyhan is unrealistic. Azerbaijan is meant to have the final say in choosing the Main Export Pipeline, but since the consortium will be shouldering the project’s costs, one wonders how independent Aliyev can really be.
Notwithstanding the fact that the AIOC has a preference for a Baku–Supsa line, Turkey has been successful in bringing other countries around to its point of view. As early as December 1997, Aliyev stated he fully backed plans to use Turkey as a transit route for Caspian oil.(12) In April 1998, the presidents of Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan confirmed their support for the Baku–Ceyhan pipeline, and a month later Aliyev again endorsed this particular route to Turkey’s President Demirel. And on October 19, 1998, on the seventy-fifth anniversary of the founding of the Republic of Turkey, the presidents of Azerbaijan, Kazakstan, Turkmenistan, Georgia, and Turkey signed a declaration of support for the pipeline. At the same time, Ankara announced new incentives for firms building Baku–Ceyhan, including tax initiatives (a “tax holiday”) and guarantees that transit fees would only cover costs.
In addition to state governments, Turkey has also been keen on dealing directly with the oil companies considering the Main Export Pipeline. When, toward the end of 1998, industry sources indicated that Baku–Ceyhan was not a viable option, Turkey’s energy ministry officials met, on November 5, with oil firm officials (and Azeri and Georgian decisionmakers) in another attempt to convince the firms that its own choice was not only more viable, but economically practical as well.
Finally, Turkey has been able to count on the U.S. policy of bypassing Iran in the hunt for territories through which to build oil and gas pipelines, and on Washington’s desire to lessen the role Russia plays in the region. U.S. interests in the area center on the economic potential of both commodities and markets, and the strategic consequences of secure sources for industrialized countries and the regional states’ development and economic growth. Washington has committed itself to Baku–Ceyhan, using Turkey to help protect the pipeline and influence the Turkic states to emulate the Turkish model of a free-market economy, democratic polity, and ability to sustain a healthy secular society in a Muslim nation.
Strobe Talbott, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, was very clear on Washington’s outlook on Caspian energy politics:
“This administration remains committed to the Caspian Basin Initiative and to the strategic imperative of developing multiple transportation routes for bringing oil and gas to world markets. Let me emphasize in the strongest terms that our plans and our policy continue to feature the prospect for a pipeline running through Baku to Ceyhan. We will continue to make the case for that pipeline as commercial negotiations among companies and transit states move forward in the weeks and months ahead.”(13)
Former Energy Secretary Federico Pena was even more blunt when he stated that the U.S. wanted “to foster viable and reliable alternatives for export of the region’s resources, particularly avoiding transit routes through Iran.”(14) With the Islamic Republic not being considered a serious host country, and Washington intent on limiting Russia’s involvement, Turkey is the only viable choice.
In May 1998, Turkey hosted the “Crossroads of the World” Conference, which brought several American agencies together. The U.S. Export–Import Bank, Trade and Development Agency, and Overseas Private Investment Corporation all agreed to help contribute to making Baku–Ceyhan a reality, although no agency committed direct funds to the cost of building it. Although it has not usually been mentioned, some also believe that American support for Baku–Ceyhan, aside from dovetailing with U.S. strategic interests, is a way of repaying Turkey for the economic hardships it has endured since 1990 and the Gulf War, including the loss of lucrative transit fees from the Iraqi oil pipeline and the disruption of cross-border trade.
Furthermore, Turkey has been against Section 907 of the American Congress’ Freedom Support Act of 1991, which was intended to help develop former Soviet Union countries. Section 907, passed at the behest of a strong Armenian lobby, effectively prohibits any U.S. aid to Azerbaijan so long as the latter maintains its blockade of Nagorno–Karabakh. In fact, Azerbaijan is the only country in the world to which the United States cannot legally send humanitarian aid. This legislation hinders Washington’s regional energy diplomacy, and impedes Azerbaijan’s recovery from the war. Turkey would prefer a repeal, which would help strengthen its allies in Baku.
At the same time that Turkey is gaining support among regional countries for its preferred pipeline choice, it has also been quietly increasing its security ties to certain states. Turkey has replaced Russia as Georgia’s primary trading partner. Given Tbilisi’s desire to wean itself from dependence on Russia, it can be expected that the two will enhance their cooperation even further in future. Despite the fact that Ankara did not give unconditional support to Azerbaijan during its war with Nagorno–Karabakh, Turkey and Azerbaijan have much in common and it is not unlikely that both countries will grow closer as economic opportunities increase and Baku’s need for Western support and protection grows as well.
Conclusions
Unfortunately for Turkey, the costs of constructing a Baku–Ceyhan pipeline are enormous: the Turkish government puts the price at $2 billion, while the AIOC’s estimates range far higher, at $3.5 billion. This expense in itself is a significant deterrent. In addition, the fact that in March 1998, world oil prices fell to their lowest levels in almost a decade means even more production on the world market would make very little economic sense for those paying the costs of the pipeline.
Perhaps just as disturbing for those supporting the Baku–Ceyhan route is the slow realization that Washington dramatically over-estimated the potential reserves hidden beneath the Caspian Sea—although as previously mentioned some do believe that a considerably higher amount of reserves does in fact exist. AIOC officials have stated in the past that were the volume of oil to be piped from Azerbaijan to increase significantly, the costs of building Baku–Ceyhan would be bearable and economically feasible. Until the price of crude rises, however, and enough oil can be routed in Turkey’s preferred direction, the costs of this particular pipeline cannot be justified for those firms participating in the energy boom.
Turkey’s energy requirements are sufficiently large enough that Ankara has risked the displeasure of other regional or external states in its quest for energy resources. And, in fact, its careful policies appear to have paid off: Despite using Iran as a conduit for natural gas, the United States still supports Turkey as the terminal for Azerbaijani and even Kazak oil(15); despite its desire to have the Baku–Ceyhan pipeline become a reality, and thus avoid having Iran participate in a lucrative arrangement, Turkey has managed to maintain solid and even friendly economic dealings with Tehran.
Only with Russia has Turkey not been able to assuage fears of exclusion and extensive Turkish penetration. Ankara has on occasion not invited Russia to international conferences on Caspian energy, even though many of these conventions include Central Asian and Caucasian states. In addition, Turkey has engaged in a relatively active effort to tie the newly independent Turkic republics to it, at least in cultural, educational, and business matters.
Of course, this is not to say that Russia and Turkey are on a collision course over Caspian Sea energy resources; rather, it is to say that of the other three powers heavily involved in the area, Turkey has not been able to entangle Russia as sufficiently as the U.S. and Iran in strategic or economic cooperation, and thus the potential for future strong disagreements over these issues remain.
The most probable recommendation from the AIOC is a non-recommendation. Given the powerful American and Turkish support for the Baku–Ceyhan line, it is unlikely the consortium would openly declare that route unfeasible; rather, most analysts believe that the AIOC will put off a decision on Baku–Ceyhan and concentrate instead on the Baku–Supsa and Baku–Novorossiisk routes, with the possibility of expanding one of these to link up to the Ceyhan terminal at a later date when the volume and price of oil makes such a course more economically practical. Ankara has not been pleased with these developments, but it seems as though the AIOC will not be convinced of the workability of the Baku–Ceyhan line until such time as world oil prices rise and more positive drilling successes, translating into greater volumes of oil to be piped, are extracted from the Caspian Sea.
Despite the fact that Turkey has been described as an awakening regional power in many writings, one must also remember that Ankara has a long history of caution, and perhaps even timidity, in its foreign policy. As some have noted, Turkish policymakers have failed to take advantage of several historic opportunities due to both the Kemalist legacy and the fact that Turkey has always been surrounded by, if not outright enemies, at least hostile or unfriendly states.(16)
However, if one is to judge by the foreign energy policies Turkey has pursued in the last seven years, one may conclude that Ankara has decided that, at least on this matter, it must actively search out and defend its own interests and not allow certain opportunities to pass it by. Turkey has aggressively promoted the Baku–Ceyhan pipeline, going so far as to begin modifying its policies over the use of the Bosphorus by oil tankers. It has risked Washington’s adverse reaction by engaging in gas agreements with Iran and gambled on being able to retain a prominent role in regional energy politics without alienating to any great degree the other two regional powers also actively involved in the same pursuit, Russia and Iran.
Turkey’s plans for acquiring adequate supplies of energy may seem too grandiose at times. Ankara’s desire to build a subterranean pipeline under the Caspian Sea stretching from Turkmenistan, through Azerbaijan and Georgia and finally into Turkey is one example. However, such a route would be feasible were the financial inducements commensurate with the building costs and the need for such a project to be called for. A pipeline from Turkmenistan to Turkey would also serve American interests by bypassing Iran and Russia altogether.
As further proof of Turkey’s willingness to do what it must to ensure its economic and security needs, Ankara claimed in May 1998 that if the Baku–Ceyhan route is not selected by the AIOC, it might consider hiring a private company to develop its portion of the Baku–Ceyhan line.(17) Whether or not this was intended as a threat or motivation to the AIOC remains to be seen.
Turkey’s geopolitical locale made possible an important role in regional politics, while domestic energy needs required it to do so. Whether Russia will be able to re-dominate the region remains to be seen, but it can be assumed that Turkey will not accept that fact and intends to continue playing a major role in Central Asia and the Caucasus.
Endnotes
*: Brent Sasley works at the Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba. His master’s thesis was, “A Structural Reinterpretation of Power in the Middle East: Explanations and Implications of the Evolving Military Relationship between Turkey and Israel.” He is director of the Editorial Board of the Research Institute of International and European Studies (RIIES). Back.
Note 1: Simon Mayall, McNair Paper 56, Turkey: Thwarted Ambition (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1997). Back.
Note 2: Bulent Aras and George Foster, Research Paper No.43: Turkey and the Azerbaijani Oil Controversies: Looking for a Light at the End of the Pipeline (Athens: Research Institute for International and European Studies, 1998), 2. Back.
Note 3: For a comprehensive survey of these countries’ convergence on the Caspian, see Aras and Foster, Turkey and the Azerbaijani Oil Controversies. Back.
Note 4: As this agreement was signed under the prime ministership of Islamist Necmettin Erbakan, who had campaigned for severing ties with the West and strengthening links to the Muslim world, many feared it was a harbinger of things to come. However, it should be pointed out that this agreement had been in negotiation for some time before Erbakan came to power, and was a reflection of Turkey’s energy needs rather than a sharp turn in foreign policy. Back.
Note 5: Aras and Foster, Turkey and the Azerbaijani Oil Controversies, 4. Back.
Note 7: Stephen Kinzer, “Fearless Turks’ Big Fear? Tanker,” New York Times 24 October 1998. Back.
Note 9: The bulk of oil tanker traffic that passes from the Black Sea through the Bosphorus is Russian. Back.
Note 10: Ismail Cem, press release of unofficial translation, Turkish Embassy, Washington, D.C., 24 October 1998; received from http://www.turkey.org/turkey/f_politics.htm. Back.
Note 11: Reuters, 12 October 1998. Received from Armenian News Network/Groong, 12 October 1998. Back.
Note 12: Agence France-Presse, via Clarinet, 28 December 1997. Received 29 December 1997. Back.
Note 13: Strobe Talbott, at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy’s Turgut Ozal Memorial Lecture, 14 October 1998. Received from Armenian News Network/Groong, 16 October 1998. Back.
Note 14: Testimony of Energy Secretary Federico Pena Before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on International Relations, 30 April 1998. Received from Armenian News Network/Groong, 30 April 1998. Back.
Note 15: Although there should be no illusions about the fact that the United States has its own motivations and designs in mind when it supports Turkey’s calls for the Baku–Ceyhan route—including avoiding allowing Russia and Iran to play a large role in determining the economic and strategic future of Central Asia and the Caucasus. Back.
Note 16: See, for instance, Malik Mufti, “Daring and Caution in Turkish Foreign Policy,” The Middle East Journal 52, no.1 (Winter 1998), especially p.45. Back.
Note 17: Saadet Oruc, “Turkey Considers Bypassing the AIOC,” Turkish Daily News 9 May 1998. Received from Armenian News Network/Groong, 9 May 1998. Back.