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Middle East Review of International Affairs
Turkey's November 2002 Elections: A New Beginning?
by Ali Carkoglu
*
Abstract
Turkey's November 2002 elections ended with a stunning victory for the new Justice and Development Party. Since only one other party reached the 10 percent minimum necessary to hold seats in parliament, the victorious group was left with close to a two-thirds' majority. This article analyzes the meaning of the election, the fate of the different parties, and the attitudes of the electorate
Turkey's November 3, 2002, general elections ended with a predicted but still impressive victory for the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi-AKP), the first party since 1987 to secure a clear majority in Parliament. The rapid rise of AKP support marks another step in the electoral collapse of centrist politics in the country. The left-leaning Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-CHP) is the only other party passing the 10% nationwide electoral support threshold to gain seats in the Parliament. AKP got about 34 % of the votes compared to 20% for CHP. The remaining 46% of votes did not elect anyone since all other parties did not gain the minimum 10% needed. (See Table 1 below).
The incumbent government's coalition members suffered the heaviest losses. Compared to the 1999 election, the largest incumbent coalition partner, the Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti-DSP), shrunk down to about 1.2%. It may have set a world record for being the largest party in one election and losing almost all its support in the next one. Among the other coalition partners, the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyet Hareket Partisi-MHP) lost 9.6 percentage points, while the junior partner the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi-ANAP) lost 12.9 percentage points. Hence, the coalition partners together lost about 39 percentage points of electoral support from the April 1999 elections.
The two major opposition parties did not perform much better. While the pro-Islamist Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi-SP) suffered a loss of 12.9 percentage points, the True Path Party (Dogru Yol Partisi-DYP) lost 2.5 percentage points. Besides CHP and AKP and to a lesser degree the Democratic People's Party (Demokratik Halk Partisi-DEHAP), all opposition parties incurred significant losses of electoral support. Consequently, all the leaders of those losing centrist parties, except the leader of the SP, were forced to step aside.
The leadership of the winners seems committed to integrating Turkey into Europe. However, their religiously conservative constituency is known to be skeptical toward EU membership. From the perspective of economic interests, AKP supporters seem to reflect resurgent conservative Anatolian capital against the secular establishment of Istanbul, the largest city of Turkey. The influence of upwardly mobile Anatolian firms may aim to shift the power balance in their favor through advocating irresponsible populist social and economic policies together with revitalized pro-Islamist actions and a push for private business gains through access to or effective control of the government.
If AKP does not keep a neutral stand in such a power struggle among the top economic players it would be politically self-destructive since the perception of honesty is one of its main attractions. The corruption associated with the previous liberalization period under the centrist ANAP and DYP was one of the main reasons for declining trust in the centrist parties among the electorate.
Besides the issue of EU membership--which the AKP leadership started to push as soon as their electoral victory became certain--a number of other issues present the new government with potentially explosive problems. Most obvious among those are the long-lasting Cyprus conflict and the impending military engagement in Iraq.
On the domestic front, AKP's consultative meetings with a wide variety of civil society organizations seem to have pleased public opinion as a first step in the direction of a more inclusive and open government. At the same time, though, the AKP's overwhelming power coupled with its Islamist politics could create serious internal conflicts. In short, the message of the election may either be the end of politics in Turkey as it has been practiced for decades, or a temporary deviation, which voters will reverse at the next opportunity.
This article provides a short overview of the main characteristics of the Turkish party system and electoral behavior. The November 2002 election is evaluated in light of these historical patterns. Next, the campaign period will be critically considered and linked to characteristic patterns of the Turkish party system. Finally, I will venture into a speculative appraisal of the near-term implications of the new AKP government.
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Endnotes
Note *: Ali Carkoglu is an associate professor of political science at Sabanci University and research director for TESEV. He is co-editor of Turkish Studies journal Vol. 4, Number 1 on Turkey and the European Union which will also be published as a book by Frank Cass.Back