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Middle East Review of International Affairs
Understanding Syrian Policy: An Analysis of Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shara’s Explanation
By Barry Rubin
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Editor’s Summary
In studying the contemporary Middle East, one of the most controversial and complex challenges is comprehending Syria’s regional strategy and policy toward the peace process. The author believes that Syria is stuck between its traditional hardline stance and attempts to develop a more flexible approach. This article provides a detailed analysis of Syrian foreign minister Faruq Al-Shara’s January 2000 speech before the Arab Writers’ Union conference in Damascus, which exemplifies the key issues regarding Syria today.
Understanding Syria’s national strategy is one of the most complex and controversial questions of contemporary Middle East politics. Many government officials, policy analysts, and journalists wrongly predicted that Syria was ready to make a peace agreement with Israel. Clearly, important factors were left out of the equation.
To examine Syrian thinking and policy, perhaps the single most interesting document is the January 2000 speech by Syrian foreign minister Faruq al-Shara to the Arab Writers’ Union in Damascus. This group’s members and publications had been the most outspoken domestic critics of any Syrian intention to make peace with Israel. Consequently, in contrast to speeches aimed at the West, on this occasion Shara had no incentive to exaggerate Syria’s willingness to be moderate.
At the same time, though, Shara was trying to explain why Syria had moved closer to making peace with Israel and had changed its policy on several other issues. He sought to prepare this tough audience—and by extension, Syrian public opinion—for big changes in Syria’s course of action, while reassuring them that Damascus would not abandon its traditional policies. In doing so, he also reviewed the leadership’s present view of the region’s modern history, an interpretation that reflected its own self-image, goals, and analysis. In some ways, the talk also gives a sense of much broader Arab thinking—and rethinking—about the Middle East’s major issues.
What emerges is a portrait of a country and its rulers positioned between two worldviews. The first, which generally prevailed in the Arab world during the second half of the twentieth century, stressed such ideas as Pan-Arab nationalism, Israel’s elimination, and a deep suspicion of Western powers. The new view envisions a region of nation-states pursuing their own interests more openly, making peace with Israel, and building closer relations with the United States and Europe.
Factors in Syria’s Diplomatic Policy
The repeated diplomatic failure to achieve a Syria-Israel agreement did not merely derive from disagreement over moving the border a few meters in one direction or the other. Much deeper forces were at work, and the outcome was a basic consequence of Syrian national interest, perception, and geopolitics as interpreted by the country’s leadership.
Israel’s government was clearly ready to return the entire Golan Heights to Syria up to the international border in exchange for full bilateral peace. Not only was this endorsed by Prime Minister Ehud Barak, but it was also secretly accepted by his predecessor, Benjamin Netanyahu. Other issues, smaller but vital, blocked an agreement. Yet these could have been resolved with a minimum of flexibility on Syria’s part.
The conventional wisdom about Syria-Israel negotiations was that there was a “window of opportunity,” a temporary chance to make progress that would soon disappear. But the situation might also be viewed as a gradual evolution of the Syrian position—as had happened with other Arab states—which may or may not have achieved ripeness but could do so over time.
The “window of opportunity” argument and Syria’s stance in recent years was usually attributed to three points, all of which have been seen as promoting Damascus’ willingness—even eagerness—to make a deal:
One could question each of these three points as reasons for Syria’s eagerness or even willingness to make an agreement. For example, Syria could have lowered the priority of getting back the Golan and raised the price it was willing to pay. The government have could assumed that it would mobilize more Arab support, and even make some gains in the West, by negotiating without reaching a successful conclusion. Or, for example, Asad might have concluded that a peace agreement might produce greater domestic stress and thus complicate matters for his son.
Indeed, there is evidence for all three of these counter-arguments in Shara’s speech. Even more compelling, perhaps, are 15 points that can be noted in Shara’s talk about Syria’s reluctance to sign an agreement and its lack of will to pay even the minimal price for successful negotiations.
Five Strategic Reasons
Five International Reasons
Five Domestic Reasons
Rabinovitch entitled the third chapter of his book “First Cracks in the Ice,” implying that tAnd, finally, five domestic reasons:
Consequently, Syria’s ideal strategy was to appear to negotiate seriously but to demand so much that Israel would not agree. This was a win/win situation for Syria, which could appear to be moderate in the West and steadfast in the Arab world. Either Damascus would get everything it wanted or would not have to take the risks involved in making actual peace.
Syria’s move cannot be seen as merely a cynical exercise. It was the result of the Syrian leadership’s oscillation. Equally, it should not indicate that nothing has changed in Syrian policy. The decision to send Shara to meet Barak in Shepherdstown during January 2000 was an important step forward. And there were some changes in the tone of Syrian rhetoric, again as shown by Shara’s speech to the Arab Writers’ Union (see below).
Issues in the Negotiations
Aside from the return of the Golan, there were four main issues involved in the Syria-Israel negotiations. The most significant was Syria’s demand for control of about 20 square miles of territory on Israel’s side of the international border, that Syria had conquered in 1948. This demand contradicted Syria’s own position that obtaining territory by force was unacceptable. The international border had also been accepted in the Egypt-Israel and Jordan-Israel agreements.
While the land involved was small in size, it was of vital strategic importance to Israel, but far less vital for Syria. Most seriously, holding this territory would have given Syria control over Israel’s main water sources, including an ability to claim a large part of the Sea of Galilee’s water supply.
There was no chance that any Israeli government would agree to such terms. Syria’s demand for such Israeli concessions, plus the Golan Heights, before it would agree to discuss any other issue doomed the negotiations to failure.
Other issues might have been resolved without great difficulty:
The picture then is of a Syria caught between the “old thinking” and the “new thinking”. Shara’s speech shows this mixture of thinking, analysis, and strategy. Perhaps Syria’s present condition is temporary. Syria must eventually move forward to adapt to the dramatic changes that have taken place in the region in recent years. This may be inevitable in the long-run but the timing or success of such an outcome should never be taken for granted.
It is not yet clear how Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000 will affect this picture, but it will probably make progress on the Syria-Israel front less likely for several reasons. Syria has lost one of its most treasured—though illusory—cards, using Hizballah to attack Israeli forces in southern Lebanon as leverage to try to get leverage for Israeli concessions in the Golan. There will also surely be increasing Lebanese resentment—significant even if relatively small—of Syria’s continued occupation. This would make Damascus more nervous about risking control over Lebanon in a post-peace environment. Last, Israel will strongly resent Syrian efforts to arm, fund, and encourage cross-border attacks by Hizballah or Palestinians in Lebanon. Syria must weigh whether it wishes to escalate tensions in Lebanon and risk confrontation with Israel at the most delicate moment of its transition to a new regime. Israel-Syria clashes in Lebanon are not out of the question.
Syria’s Sense of History
The difficulty of reversing Syria’s long and deeply entrenched policies regarding Israel or the Ba’th regime’s internal system should not be underestimated. The view of history presented in Shara’s talk is neither accurate nor especially pragmatic.
Part of this conception might be attributed to propaganda, a desire to sway the opinion of others by misrepresenting facts. This approach can get in the way of achieving diplomatic progress.
At the same time, Shara wants to show that he does not deviate too far from the accepted discourse, to prove that he is not betraying Syria, Arab nationalism, Ba’th ideals, or even Islam. The need to stay within such margins is a good illustration of the domestic constraints on Asad’s regime.
Certainly, Shara tries to twist this conception in subtle ways to create a rationale for making peace with Israel. But there are many elements that Syrian leaders really believe, which make it far more difficult for them to change policies and strategy.
In analyzing Shara’s presentation and other Syrian statements, several key arguments emerge as especially interesting and important. Shara’s speech contains many paradoxical points.
On Peace with Israel:
Argument A: Israel wants to dominate the Middle East and destroy the Arabs. The Arabs can defeat Israel if they continue the struggle. Consequently, no peace is possible and a diplomatic solution is against Arab interests.
Argument B: Peace can be made with Israel. In Shara’s rationale, conflict benefits Israel because it is stronger militarily and has more international support. Consequently, a diplomatic solution would benefit the Arabs, who can still engage in political and economic competition.
On Syria and the Arab world:
Argument A: Syria and the other Arab states are mutually supportive of each other. Syria should rely on Arab unity.
Argument B: Syria’s policy is better than that of the other Arab states. The others repeatedly betray Syria and also the Arab and Palestinian causes. Therefore, these states cannot be trusted and Syria must look after its own interests.
On the West:
Argument A: The West is Syria’s enemy and always supports and strengthens Israel, while trying to weaken the Arabs.
Argument B: Syria needs to win over the West, which it can do by showing that Israel does not really want peace.
On Syria’s policies:
Argument A: Syria’s policies are correct and embody the best of Arab nationalism and the needs of the people.
Argument B: Syria has fallen behind Israel and faces severe problems. Economic reform is badly needed.
The Meaning of History:
Argument A: The Arabs have suffered many defeats due to Israeli, Western, and even Arab treachery.
Argument B: Shara does not really articulate the idea that the Arabs have fallen behind due to the mistakes of their own ideology and actions—at least, if Syria is included—and need to re-evaluate their own conceptions and systems. This approach is, however, implicit in his arguments.
The following is the text of Shara’s speech and his response to questions. The speech is broken up and certain sections are followed by an analysis in italics. The speech is followed by a question and answer session.
Syrian Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shara,
Speech To The Arab Writers’ Union Conference
January 27, 2000
Damascus, Syria
“I thank ‘Ali ‘Uqlah ‘Irsan, president of the union, and thank you all for giving me this precious opportunity. I have wanted for a long time to meet with you. Unfortunately, however, due to circumstances beyond my control—and possibly also due to circumstances that were unsuitable to you—the meeting could not take place.
“Ladies and gentlemen, I am neither a speaker nor a preacher here, and I am certainly not a negotiator. I came here so we can be together, and so that we can present our concerns to you and you can present yours to us. The distance between us is not big, as I can see, and it will never be. We are proceeding from one position, and not two different positions. What will help us will not be the eloquence that may be used by some of us, albeit it is certainly beautiful. However, I would like to affirm right from the start that only prophets possess absolute truth. They possess it by faith. We aspire and hope to approach this truth and get closer to it. We also want our understanding of the truth to be as identical as possible, although full identity of views and conclusions might not exist even between brothers, or the person and his conscience from morning till night. Even in the case of the individual, there is the hungry and the comfortable. The view changes sometimes, and evens the conclusions in some cases.”
ANALYSIS: Shara certainly does not approach his audience as a leader of a dictatorial regime threatening them for their dissent. His approach signals that in Syria, at least, the dictatorship must pay some attention to public opinion, even though it largely shapes public opinion. Intellectuals often form one of the most reactionary groups in the Arab world, largely because they see themselves as guardians of the historic ideology.
“I only want to cast a cursory glance at history in order to get to Shepherdstown [West Virginia, the site of the ill-fated Syrian-Israel negotiations], as ‘Ali said, although the time may not be quite accurate in terms of history. We all recall that toward the end of the nineteenth century, a Zionist plan and an Arab national plan came about. The two plans followed their courses to implementation in one way or another. The difference between them was big. There was an aggressive Zionist plan that sought expansion and domination under a racist mentality, and there was an Arab national plan that sought the contrary aim. The Arab plan was to assert the existence of the nation and the unity of its soil, and to affirm the justice of its cause within a humanitarian perspective to a large degree. I say very briefly that the Zionist plan had succeeded in achieving most of its ambitions, but not all of them.
“On the other hand, the Arab national plan had, unfortunately, gone through bumps and tremors, as well as ups and downs. Still, there were great moments at the peak of the successes of this plan. The hopes pinned on this plan were big. But to some eyes, the lights were dimmed, the implementation was heavy, and the adherence was difficult. We have passed through setbacks since World War I. The results of that war were serious for the Arabs, although they fought alongside the so-called allies. The Arabs were grossly cheated in a heedless moment of history. Our countries were divided under secret agreements between the then big powers, Britain and France, in 1916. A year later, the Balfour Declaration appeared in 1917. Later on, Britain and France became mandatory powers over the Arab Mashraq. Of course, the Arab Maghreb had been under direct colonial control for decades.
“Then as a result of World War II, Palestine was divided under the Balfour Declaration. The Arab national plan did not know how to deal with this problem. It neither accepted partition, nor did it reject it in a positive manner. In other words it was not a rejection that could have thwarted the Declaration, or a rejection that could have increased our share of the territory. What happened was completely the opposite. The rejection increased the share of the territory that was allocated to the Jewish state. It got more territory than was allocated to it under the famous UN Resolution 181. What did the Arabs do? Quite simply, those who fought with regular and paramilitary units were unfairly called seven Arab armies. But they were armies that were commanded by the British rather than the Arabs themselves. Therefore, the defeat was inevitable and the outcome a foregone conclusion.
ANALYSIS: Shara brushes aside the Arabs’ 1948 defeat by calling it “inevitable” when this was by no means true. Of course, only Jordan’s Arab Legion was led by British officers. What is most important here, however, is the theme that Arab rejection gave Israel more territory and power. Later, he will imply that this basic argument also applies to today.
“In the early fifties, [Egyptian President Gamal] ‘Abd al-Nasser came, inflamed the feelings of the masses, and nationalized the Suez Canal [in 1956]. The enemies did not forgive him for doing that. Three countries attacked him, two of them were then still big powers, France and Britain. But the surprise was that Israel arrived at the Suez Canal even before the British and the French armies could reach it.
“The whole world was stunned by its power, with the exception of the Arabs, perhaps, who believed that Israel was no more than a misfit entity that was set up on a part of the land of Palestine.
“It was clear that many Arabs—including intellectuals and simpletons—did not change their mind about this entity and its power, even after its military forces arrived at the Suez Canal in 1956 before the arrival of the British and the French armies. Israel would not have withdrawn, were it not for the Egyptian people’s steadfastness in Port Said, Ismailia, and other cities, the world pressure, and Syria’s stand alongside Egypt with all its weight and the solidarity of its people.
ANALYSIS: Here is another significant rewriting of history since the Israeli withdrawal was brought about by U.S. pressure, which in turn was partly due to Soviet threats. Again, though, the main point is that Israel’s power should not be underestimated. This contributes to Shara’s basic point about a strong Israel that “benefits” from the conflict.
In short, by appearing to affirm traditional Arab positions, Shara also prepares the ground for a different interpretation. At the same time, by explaining why the Arab states—and Syria in particular—did not succeed in defeating and destroying Israel, he clears Arab governments of blame. Militants and ideologies still argue that with a proper pan-Arab or Islamic ideology and strategy, the Arab states could have won. The implication is that they could still win today by continuing the struggle against Israel.
“The Syrian people felt that they were in one trench with Egypt against the tripartite aggression [in 1956]. Unfortunately, however, these great feelings, which created a real coup among the Arabs and inflamed the imaginations of young men and women then, did not last long despite their embodiment in a unity experiment [i.e., the 1958-1961 United Arab Republic joining Syria with Egypt]. Neither did they crystallize in practice into a national ideology that builds the present and deepens its roots for the sake of resistance in the future. Later on, the enemies dealt a serious blow to the pan-Arab aspirations, which were brought by ‘Abd-al-Nassar, the Arab Socialist Ba’th Party, and the progressive trend in the Arab Mashraq in general, through the 1967 aggression. We are now reaping the fruits of that aggression and trying to remove its effects. Therefore, I am not exaggerating when I say that the Corrective Movement, which took place in 1970 under the leadership of President Hafiz al-Asad [i.e., Syria’s current government], has crystallized for the first time in modern Arab history a mature and realistic pan-Arab ideology. This ideology sees the present from the viewpoint of strugglers, not that of defeatists or adventurers. It also builds the present in order to deepen its roots for the sake of insuring steadfastness in the future.
“In fact, since the 1967 aggression, our predicament in the Arab arena, whether as officials, intellectuals, writers, analysts, or politicians, is that we are really cornered and faced with one of two choices. Either we have to accept a peace that is akin to capitulation and surrender, which can never be the peace we want, or we have to reject peace without a solid ground on which to base this rejection. I say that on the basis of all the experiences that our nation has gone through capitulation and negative rejection is easy. But this cannot be real struggle. Now, this is the substance of the ideology that is presented by the Corrective Movement, if I may say so.
ANALYSIS: According to Shara, the 1967 War left the Arabs with only two choices: a peace of surrender or futile rejectionism. Although he does not say so, Syria chose the latter option, which he admits did not work very well.
We tried to negotiate, Israel rejected our terms.
But if a rejection without “solid ground” did not work, perhaps a rejection on “solid ground” would be the best option. The implication here is that the preferred alternative is to reject peace with a basis: by offering terms that Israel cannot accept and thus claim that one has tried to achieve peace but that Israel is unwilling to do so, as we will see below.
There are several problems with this strategy. First, Egypt, Jordan, and the Palestinians have already gone beyond this point. Second, such a strategy brings no real benefits. The West generally would not accept that Syria had done its best only to be refused by Israel; the Arab world would take Syria’s side verbally but either would not or could not solve any of its fundamental problems.
“Unfortunately, however, those Arab rulers who made peace with Israel did not pursue this course. Had they pursued the al-Asad course, the separate solutions would never have been necessary, and Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem would not have been essential. Egypt was the biggest Arab country, Arab solidarity then was in good shape, and the international balance of power was better. But Sadat was defeated from within and he behaved accordingly. Yet, the brave Egyptian army was not defeated, and the Egyptian people, who came out in millions to force ‘Abd al-Nasser to go back on his resignation, were not defeated either. The Egyptian army, which carried out the crossing, was brave and courageous just as the Syrian army, which reached the shores of Tiberias in the first days of the war. Then it had to face the stabs of the brother even before the enemy.
“It was not long after the signing of the Camp David accords in 1979 that the Islamic Republic of Iran was suddenly attacked for no reason. The attack came immediately after the success of its revolution, after it closed the Israeli embassy in Tehran and gave it to Palestine, and after it adopted Arabic as an official language in the country. It was very strange indeed for Muslim Iran to be attacked by an Arab capital that sponsored the Arab National Charter and the Arab summit, which came as a reply to the visit to Jerusalem and the Camp David accords.
“The unjustifiable visit to Jerusalem and the attack on Iran were the two biggest historical mistakes in the second half of the twentieth century, as far as the Arabs and Muslim arenas were concerned. And, before the Arab citizen had time to recover from this shock and regain his breath, Kuwait was invaded without any reason or justification. Iraq could have gotten—and I am saying this not only to the Iraqi regime, but to the whole of Iraq, regime, government, and people— whatever it wanted from Kuwait without war, because it was in fact in full control of Kuwait on the security, political, and information levels. So, why the invasion? And what were the reasons for it? Besides, Iraq is one of the richest Arab states.
“Nevertheless, we continue to tell our brethren in the Gulf that we must not pause at that moment forever. We, as Arabs and an Arab League, must try to overcome that tribulation. We must place it behind our backs, because the freeze at that point could result in a catastrophe for everyone.
“This background has resulted in setbacks, and I am using here a diplomatic term and not the real harsh terms. We have faced setback after setback, stab after stab on the Arab body, and crack after crack in the Arab national plan. On the other hand, the Zionist plan kept advancing, thanks to the mistakes in the Arab plan. Of course, the Zionist plan was not free of cracks, but it did not face any real setbacks or successive stabs as the Arab national plan had. I am not exaggerating when I say that it was thanks to Syria under Hafiz al-Asad’s leadership that the Arab national plan was rectified after every setback.
ANALYSIS: The key point here once again is that the Arab side is in a weak position. This stands in sharp contrast to historic statements that the Arabs were strong, that time was on their side, and that continued struggle would eliminate Israel.
“Despite the successive retreats and setbacks on the Arab and international levels, including the catastrophe of the Second Gulf War, which opened the region to the United States, the West, and Israel, Syria did not submit to others or to their double standards. It emphasized that the Security Council resolutions must be applied against both Iraq and Israel. When he addressed the U.S. Congress on March 6, 1991, George Bush was fully aware that Syria in particular, and the Arabs in general, would not agree to the implementation of the Security Council resolutions against Iraq, while ignoring those relating to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The U.S. president responded because there was public and government pressure, especially from the Damascus Declaration states, which said that the UN resolutions must also be applied to Israel, and that Israel must face sanctions if it did not implement these resolutions. This was an important point, which we managed to emphasize, especially in Syria. The president also continued to reaffirm it in his meetings, whether with President Bush in Geneva when the subject was broached, or with congressmen and European leaders. The emphasis had continued until the convocation of the Madrid Conference.
ANALYSIS: Of course, Shara does not mention that Iraq accused the world of having a double standard because it did not protest Syria’s occupation of Lebanon as well as Israel’s policies. But the most important theme of this discussion is a changing view of the United States. The Syrian regime’s historic view was that U.S. policy was inevitably anti-Arab and pro-Israel. Shara now suggests that the United States has switched its policy, and the credit for this development belongs to Syria. This suggests that Damascus can work with Washington as a mediator in negotiations with Israel.
“Did the others understand matters as we did? I regrettably must say that they were only enthusiastic about implementing the UN resolutions against Iraq, rather than Israel. Yet, Israel was more powerful than all the Arab states combined. The United States, which is its biggest strategic ally, supplies Israel with all types of weapons, from rifles to rockets and planes, not to mention the gigantic computers, which even Europeans have not seen. The United States has also included Israel in its Star Wars program. Israel, with the help of the United States, has also become an arms exporter. It exports arms and some components even to China, which is a superpower. It also exports pilotless reconnaissance aircraft to Latin American countries and even to some European states. Four or five weeks ago, Germany presented Israel with a gift of three up-to-date submarines, which are appropriate for use by Israel in the Mediterranean Sea. These subs could, after being equipped with nuclear warheads, be used throughout the Mediterranean to threaten the countries of the region. Let me tell you about the direct and indirect financial aid received by Israel. Israel’s budget is 20 times that of Syria. And if we consider the armament budget, we will find that Syria’s budget is barely 7 percent of the Israeli budget. Now, the prices of weapons worldwide are the same. There are no longer any cheap arms, which Syria can buy, and expensive arms, which Israel and the other countries can buy. They are all expensive, and so are the spare parts, everywhere in the world, in Moscow, Washington, and London.
ANALYSIS: According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Israel’s 1998 defense budget was $8.5 billion while Syria’s was $3.1 billion. So Syria’s military budget is about 35 percent of Israel’s—seven times bigger than Shara’s claim. The CIA Fact Book reports Israel’s 1998 budget at $58 billion and Syria’s 1997 budget at $4.2 billion. Of course, a large part of military budgets are wages and benefits to soldiers, where Syrian costs are far below those of Israel. Also, in proportion to the Gross Domestic Product, the two countries have a similar level of military spending: 9.5 percent for Israel compared to about 8 percent for Syria.
Still, while Shara’s claim is exaggerated, his basic principle is accurate and politically important. Israel is strong and getting stronger. If Syria is relatively weak, military confrontation is not a sensible policy. This accords with Shara’s point that a continuation of the conflict does not serve Arab interests.
“Therefore, we insisted on the implementation of the UN Security Council and opposed the double standard. Then came the [1991] Madrid Conference, which was discussed for more than eight months. You must wonder why. Shamir, then Israeli prime minister, had in mind only a regional conference for multilateral talks to discuss economic and environmental issues and cooperation on disarmament, i.e. the disarmament of the Arabs. He also had in mind cooperation in resolving the refugee problem at the expense of the Arabs. He was not thinking of repatriating them to their homeland, Palestine. He also wanted to discuss the subject of water so Israel could take all it wants from the Golan and other places.
“Yes, Israel wanted a regional conference and it did not want the agenda to include anything concerning the land. Shamir claimed at that time that he had to be rewarded for exercising self-restraint and not responding to Saddam’s missiles. The reward to him means that Israel must keep the occupied territory. He claimed that the area of Israel was 28,000 square kilometers. That included the Golan, South Lebanon, and the whole of Palestine. When he went to Madrid against his will, Shamir wanted the talks to continue for 10 years without making any progress. He did not go to the Madrid Peace Conference willingly. He went against his will. Therefore, he wanted to sabotage the Madrid Conference right from the start. It was we who upheld the Madrid Conference, the Madrid mandate, and the land-for-peace formula. It was Israel, which wanted and still wants the peace-for-peace formula and the disruption of the peace process.”
ANALYSIS: Instead of viewing the Madrid conference as a victory for Israel—the first time the Arab states had to meet it face to face after rejecting this option for many years—Shara wants to portray the meeting as an Arab victory. This is not accurate history. Indeed, Syria tried to walk out of the meeting but relented when it saw that other states would not join it. Still, the importance of this view is that it serves as a rationale for direct negotiations with Israel. Contrary to Syria’s policy from 1948 to 1991 (and even beyond), direct talks and making agreements is presented as an Arab victory over Israel. Incidentally, Shara’s statement that Shamir claimed south Lebanon as part of Israel is flatly wrong.
“For almost half a century Israel has been claiming that it wants peace with the Arabs, but it cannot get it. It has also been claiming that the Arabs are warmongers. Israel has succeeded in deceiving the world public, especially the Americans. Even when Sadat made his visit to Jerusalem, Israel portrayed it as a defeat so that the records will not show that Arabs are seekers of peace. The question posed to us all—and I am now speaking about the real peace as understood by Asad’s Syria—is as follows: Would such peace help Israel expand to set up Greater Israel, the aim of the Zionist plan? I say that is possible.
“But, if the peace helps it to establish Greater Israel, war can help it even more by achieving this aim quickly, very quickly. There is no balance of power between the Arabs and Israel when it comes to military confrontation.
“But what if we turned this military confrontation into political, economic, commercial, and cultural competition with all its dimensions? What if we disarmed Israel and neutralized it—since the arms will continue in the backstage and, therefore, must be taken into consideration—would not the outcome be better and would not the catastrophes be avoided? Israel would then be made to use other than military means, whereby the United States and others insist that it must be superior over all the Arabs combined. We could succeed. At any rate, we have tried 50 years of armed struggle and we are now alone with Lebanon. Now, this does not mean that we will lay down our arms in a state of peace.
“Let us not make a mistake. There is war and peace, and there is no war, and no peace. We spent more years in a state of no war, no peace. We now want to try peace, but nothing has happened so far. We are still in a state of war. The establishment of a state of peace in the future means turning this struggle into a political, intellectual, economic, and commercial struggle. We could, perhaps, be in a better situation. So let us give the peace struggle a chance, just as we gave military struggle a chance, but without making any mistakes. Now, is this a struggle over borders or existence? And do we need to enter into an endless Byzantine argument on the subject?”
ANALYSIS: Here is the heart of Shara’s argument. Conflict is in Israel’s favor. Peace would help the Arabs. “We have tried 50 years of armed struggle and we are now alone with Lebanon.” This approach is similar to past speeches of Egyptian presidents Sadat and Husni Mubarak.
Shara quickly hedges this by adding that this would not mean an Arab surrender nor an end to competition. But he concludes that this is a new era of “peace struggle” and says, let’s give peace a chance.
Finally, he asks: “Is this a struggle over borders or existence?” Do the Arabs still want to destroy Israel or merely to push it back to the 1967 borders? Shara does not want to argue about this subject, preferring ambiguity. But clearly his proposal means accepting the latter alternative.
“But, let me repeat my statement in Washington, which some people have understood differently, possibly due to poor translation. Others then read it in the papers and built their own judgments on it without returning to the original text. I said that if the Israelis were not ready to return all the occupied Arab territories to their rightful owners, they would be sending a message to the Arabs that the conflict in such a case would be over existence, and not of borders. I placed the responsibility on Israel before the international community when I said that if Israel wanted to keep and continue its occupation of the Arab territories, it would be sending a message to the Arabs that they had no other choice but a struggle over existence, in other words, it would be either us or them. At any rate, they are the ones behind the idea of the struggle over existence through their Zionist plan, which views the Arabs as Red Indians who must be exterminated.”
ANALYSIS: Peace is only possible if Israel returns all “occupied Arab territories,” says Shara. Nevertheless, Syria was ready to sign an agreement—if Israel had met all its conditions—that would have brought full peace regardless of and not premised on an Israel-Palestinian agreement.
Most important, he puts in Israel’s hands the choice between occupation with a “struggle over existence” or peace. Rather than proudly insisting on the Arab readiness to struggle against Israel’s existence, he insists that Israel is the one responsible for the struggle over resistance. There is an element of propaganda here, especially if this talk was being given to a Western audience. But in the context of talking to those opposed to making peace with Israel, Shara is saying he does not demand Israel’s elimination.
“The Madrid Conference was a battle in every sense of the word under the land-for-peace principle, implementation of the Security Council resolutions, and the Madrid mandate. The other battle was Arab coordination. The others wanted the Arabs to go as separate Jordanian, Palestinian, Syrian, and Lebanese delegations. We could not go as a unified Arab delegation. The reason was that our brothers in Jordan were with Saddam, and so was Arafat. We, on the other hand, were against the occupation of Kuwait. We are now speaking about the Arab parties to the peace process.
“Syria had an idea how we could turn the tables on the Israelis and the Americans, who insisted on separate delegations that could not coordinate with one another. We insisted that we should be at the same place and time during the talks, so that when a delegation—Palestinian, Jordanian, Lebanon, or Syrian—came out of a bilateral meeting [with Israel] it would be able to meet and talk about what Israel proposed to it to stop any maneuverings, tactics, procrastination, or misinterpretation of UN resolutions. We said that the best thing was coordination among the Arabs, i.e. the parties to the peace process. I began my contacts after the opening of the conference on the consideration that Syria must be the one to tackle any loopholes and achieve the best form of Arab coordination.
“Unfortunately, it became clear from the first day of the Madrid peace talks that the Arab parties, with the exception of Lebanon, were not interested in coordination. Lebanese Foreign Minister Faris Buwayz was enthusiastic about coordination. The Jordanian foreign minister was also interested in the subject of coordination. But it then appeared that the head of the Jordanian negotiating delegation was not [Foreign Minister] Kamil Abu-Jabir, but another person who, regrettably, did not show any interest in the subject of coordination.
“I said, let us talk with the Palestinian brethren. We learned that the approval had to come from Arafat in Tunis. We waited, but the approval did not come. I met with Dr. Hanan Ashrawi and told her that the subject was serious and sensitive. She said that she was for coordination. But, the directives from Arafat said that there would be no coordination. She declined to make any statement on the request by Arafat. A cable then came from Tunis saying that neither Dr. Haydar Abd al-Shafi nor Hanan Ashrawi were authorized to discuss this subject. I tried to ignore what I learned about Arafat’s position on the coordination. I spoke to James Baker and told him: All the Arab parties want the peace talks to be at the same place and time. I also told him: Our Palestinian and Jordanian brethren agreed on coordination. He said: No, I will not take that until I hear from them personally. I said: Mr. Baker, we came to Madrid after a great effort. Do not lose this chance, which could be a personal accomplishment for you and the United States. We, the Syrians, will not go tomorrow to the talks unless they are held in the same place and time. He told me rather angrily: You are threatening the United States. I told him: I am not threatening the United States. Can anyone believe that the Syrian foreign minister is threatening the United States? Why threaten it? Besides, Syria cannot pose a threat to the United States. It was a long, heated argument and we did not reach any solution.
“But, the Spanish prime minister found a solution. Baker said: There is no other place, and King Juan Carlos wants this place for his visitors. There is no other place in Madrid, which can take all these delegations. I told him: I will discuss the matter with our Spanish friends. I went to the Spanish foreign minister who was most considerate. He took me to Spanish Prime Minister Gonzales, who agreed and found a very good place. The Americans were annoyed. The Spanish foreign minister told me: These Americans want to occupy Madrid. They do not want to give the Spaniards a chance to organize the residence of the delegations. At any rate, the story did not end there. As to Arab coordination, it ended right then. They agreed on the first day, but then went their own way.”
ANALYSIS: How accurately this represents what happened in Madrid is another matter. Shara seeks to show that Syria was the champion of Arab unity that was let down by the other Arabs. But if the other Arabs are always going to let down Syria, how can Syria depend on their support in a continuing battle with Israel?
Somewhat disconcerting is Shara’s open—probably unwitting—admission of having lied to Baker. He admits that the other delegations would not follow Syria’s lead, then says he went to Baker and told him the precise opposite was happening. Unsurprisingly, Baker angrily rejected Syria’s assertion.
“The messages from Tunis went directly to the Palestinian delegation, and we did not know anything about them. Since then, only Syria and Lebanon remained together. Coordination ended in November 1991 in Madrid. When the delegations went to Washington, they continued to hold meetings, but they were formal meetings. Until the signing of the Oslo Agreement in September 1993, our delegation continued to brief the other Arab delegations about what went on with it. However, the Palestinian and Jordanian delegations did not brief the Syrian delegation about what went on with them. The fact is, Arab coordination ended when the Arab parties agreed to enter the multilateral talks. In other words regional cooperation, was supposed to come after the accomplishment of peace and not before that.
“I recall that Arafat visited Syria before the multilateral talks. We were in Latakia. He told the president: I will not go to the multilateral talks. I am with Syria. Besides, I do not have a state so as to normalize with Israel. I am the one who must thank Syria for being against the multilateral talks. We were very pleased and said that this stand turned a new leaf with Arafat. But we were surprised to find out that after his visit to Amman, he immediately left for India and China. We then heard his news conference in which he called on China and India to join the multilateral talks. Just imagine that. He was so committed to his pledge and then he turned around. Had he stood by Syria and Lebanon, I believe that no one would have dared attend the multilateral talks.
“In another visit, Arafat proposed suspending the peace process to the president. This was in April 1993. The president told him: This is a big and serious decision. We must first study it together and then adopt it, as it might turn the whole world against us. But if there was an Arab consensus on it, we would be right and the world would not be able to stand against us, especially since Israel did not offer anything. When Arafat felt that the president was actually serious about studying the subject, he switched the conversation to talking about Palestinian students in Nablus, Gaza, etc. He was no longer interested in following up on this subject or the idea over which he was so enthusiastic. We learned then that he was negotiating secretly in Oslo.
“We absolutely had no knowledge about the negotiations, which Arafat and his team were conducting secretly in Oslo. We only read about them in the press like everybody else. He continued negotiating for nine months, from late 1992 to September 1993. I am surprised sometimes when our Palestinian brethren say, where is the coordination, and claim that Syria refuses to coordinate. Coordination on what? Where is the common basis on which to coordinate? Can Arafat make a commitment? Many were the times when there was coordination, but it barely lasted a week. They only wanted the coordination so they could brief the Israelis on what went on in these coordination meetings. If anyone thinks that Arafat can hold a secret even to himself or between himself and his colleagues, he is mistaken. So, how can he sincerely coordinate with four or five other Arab states? Unfortunately, this is the bitter reality. I really feel pained when I see Palestinians and Syrians facing one another on the [satellite television] channels. I tell myself: This is a certainly a plot to turn the Syrians against the Palestinians, and the Palestinians against the Syrians and the Arabs. This is very serious and it must stop. It is as if we do not belong to one nation. This is inconceivable.”
ANALYSIS: Again, the accuracy of the details can be debated. But the basic theme is true: Syria and the PLO have not coordinated policy, acting more as competitors than as partners in dealing with Israel. “It is,” he remarks, “as if we do not belong to one nation. This is inconceivable.” Yet this has been how Arab politics have generally functioned over decades. Shara does not openly here think the unthinkable. The cause is not a “plot” but simply divergent interests and priorities.
“You all heard about the so-called Rabin pledge. Since the Madrid Conference, we decided that we would not discuss any element of peace before settling the subject of full withdrawal. For withdrawal to be complete it must be to the June 4 line. No Israeli civilians, militarists, or semi-civilians or semi-militarists should remain on the Golan. No ground station and no civilian in a ground station should remain. This was, and still is, the meaning of full withdrawal. We will not go back on it under any circumstances. We told them: Even if we get hungry, we will not give up demand for full withdrawal to the June 4 line. As to their bid on Syria’s weakness, they are mistaken. Syria is strong through its leader, people, resources, capabilities, people, parties, and organizations. It will not stop demanding the restoration of its entire territory.
“Syria will not sign an agreement that has any kinds of dictates or conditions that are unacceptable to it or that prejudice its sovereignty. Hafiz al-Asad will not sign such an agreement. No matter what leaks you may have heard here and there, they are absolutely baseless. The reports that were published in Al-Hayat when we were in Shepherdstown, claimed that Syria was asked to review the structure of its army and the number of its weapons. All that talk is nonsense and baseless. It was never discussed in the first place. It was also reported that Syria agreed to revise its school curricula. This is also baseless. The Israelis will not dare discuss this subject with us. It was also reported that Syria would expel the Palestinians and the ten [opposition] organizations. This is baseless. We will not force any Palestinian to leave except to his homeland, Palestine.”
ANALYSIS: Here, Shara lays down Syria’s negotiating position. Syria’s “weakness” will not lead to concessions though, of course, he is inaccurate when he refers to demands for areas across the international border as “demanding the restoration of its entire territory.”
“Thus, we say that Syria, headed by President Hafiz al-Asad, will not accept any agreement unless it is an honorable one. We will not agree to anything that could prejudice our history, civilization, culture, customs, and traditions and our nation. If the Israelis do not accept that, they will lose. And if we succeed in regaining our full rights and land it will be a major success for one, two, or three generations. If we fail, God forbid, we will not lose, because we would have won Arab and international public. The Arabs will stand by us whether they like it or not because we will tell them: We have made every effort. We decided, we went, we spoke, and we opened our minds and hearts, but these racist expansionists want to impose their conditions on us and on the Arabs. We must never accept these conditions. Any Arab who believes in his Arabism, nationalism, history, heritage, and religion will not accept them. The Arabs will stand by us even at most extreme end of the Arabian Peninsula or in Mauritania, which presented its ambassador to [Israeli President Ezer] Weizman yesterday.”
ANALYSIS: But after everything Shara has said, how can he assert that all the Arabs “will stand by us”? His proposed explanation is because he can tell them, “We have made every effort...but these racist expansionists want to impose their conditions on us and on the Arabs.” Will, however, the Egyptians, Jordanians, Palestinians and others accept this argument?
“So, in either case, we will not lose. I find it strange when some people say that we will lose in either case. This is unrealistic talk, which expresses feelings that do not reflect the reality, or what the people think everywhere. You have seen the people—the worker, peasant, merchant, officer, engineer, and soldier—everywhere toiling and hoping for a respectable livelihood. Watch them, and you will find that it is absolutely impossible to act against the spirit of the masses and the pulse of the street. You must know that Hafiz al-Asad will not take any one step before studying it and feeling the pulse of the street.”
ANALYSIS: Again, Shara suggests the formula that negotiating without compromising will be a win/win situation for Syria. His radical critics, of course, view negotiating at all as a shameful surrender, while moderate Arabs are not impressed by Syria’s failure to reach an agreement.
“The Israelis tried to leave the subject of withdrawal to the very end of the talks so as to extort the Syrian delegation and use withdrawal as a pressure card to obtain concessions on the other elements of peace. We said: Never, we will never agree. We formed four committees, headed by the committee on the demarcation of the borders. We said that the committee must demarcate the 4 June 1967 line. Without that there will be no resumption of talks. We still hold the initiative and we must try not to lose it. Rest assured, we are in a stronger position despite their weapons.”
ANALYSIS: In contrast to his earlier statements, Shara now asserts that Syria is still “in a stronger position.” But on what basis is this true? Incidentally, Israel did not demand that the subject of withdrawal be left “to the very end of the talks” but to discuss all the issues simultaneously.
“Do not think that the Arabs who followed the new method of talks are praising us for nothing. They saw the difference. Some people said, the Syrians are just like all the others. They obviously were trying to justify what the others did for years through an erroneous method of making concessions. But, they discovered in the end that this was not the case. They saw the Israeli press itself reporting and U.S. officials in particular making statements confirming that the Syrian delegation in the peace talks was really smart and concerned about its country’s interests. It adhered to its national rights and sovereignty and faithfully defended the honor of its homeland and people. And it will continue to do so.
ANALYSIS: Here, Shara is defensive. Remarkably, his proof of Syria’s steadfastness is to cite Israel and U.S. sources, which in itself is a sign of change—that Syria need justify itself by the views of those “enemies.” The Arabs supposedly praising Syria remain anonymous.
“Sorry, for taking up your time. I just wanted to put you in the full picture and to relieve you of some of the questions that might cross your minds. Still, this does not mean that I cannot respond to any questions you might want to ask.”
Question and Answers Session
Question: “How do you distinguish between “settlement” and “peace” as a concept?”
Al‑Shara: “Actually, I find it unusual when we sometimes get bogged down in endless Byzantine arguments which are not of much benefit. It is like the case when one makes a mistake in Arabic grammar and uses it as the subject of the discussion, rather than the real issue. ‘Settlement’ is not a wrong word. It comes from the root ‘to settle,’ which means straightening things, or settling differences on a sound basis. No doubt, peace has a deeper meaning, compared to settlement. Peace could mean anything. But, in the case of Israel, the word means nothing. For example, Israel made peace with Egypt. But, I do not see any peace between Egypt and Israel. Israel does not respect the word peace. Its concept of peace is simply handshakes, embassies, flags, and such things.
“But does Israel respect Arab culture and civilization? Does it understand the feelings of the Arabs? Would it reassess the serious mistakes it has committed against Palestinians, Lebanese, Syrians, Egyptians, and the Arabs in general? How many people did it kill and how many massacres did it commit, from Dayr Yasin to the Hebron Mosque? The new Israeli, who wants real peace with the Arabs, must first condemn all the mistakes he has committed against the Arabs. Are the Israelis serious about the settlement process? Some are serious and others are ready to kill their own leaders to avoid a settlement. The Israeli negotiation team had Labor Party and Likud members. Barak wanted to buttress himself with himself with the opposition, the diehards, and the demonstration that said that Israelis were against peace with Syria and the return of the Golan. This is obvious extortion. You must also know that when it comes to Israeli interests, even Netanyahu stands by Barak. Netanyahu, Barak’s arch-rival in the elections, stands by Barak at certain sensitive junctures because he places Israel’s higher interests above anything else.”
ANALYSIS: Shara says he doesn’t want to get into a semantic argument about what he means by peace with Israel, though he is drawn into this debate to some extent. He does not want to admit directly that he is talking about peace with Israel, especially before an audience that opposes it. His suggestion is that there can be a settlement of the military conflict and an absence of war between the Arabs and Israel. But he tries to please the rejectionists by saying that this would not be a warm peace or could involve a real social rapprochement. This reiterates his view of a continued cultural and economic competition.
While attacking Israel, he also modifies the historic view that all Israelis are alike. He loads a heavy burden of evil on Israel. But he also asserts that there are good and bad Israelis, those favoring peace and those opposing peace.
Question: “Are you enthusiastic about what you said? And are you convinced about peace with Israel?”
ANALYSIS: To use the colloquial, one might rephrase the question as: Do you really believe this stuff you are saying? Presumably, the questioner is referring to Shara’s view that peace is possible.
Al‑Shara: “I am in harmony with everything that I say. I do not say anything that I am not convinced of. This is the history of my life. I say with full pride that I represent the real thoughts and policy of President Al‑Asad. This is how I understand President Al‑Asad. He does not lie to people, or even to himself.
“He is sincere and far‑sighted. He believes in peace. But he utterly rejects capitulation. Furthermore, he does not accept any slackening when it comes to the nation’s basic issues. He does not accept any retreat or slackening. I consider myself a faithful executor of this policy.”
ANALYSIS: The foreign minister insists his view is official policy in line with Asad’s view. The bad news for the critics in the audience is that the government does envision the possibility of peace. The consolation for them is that it will bargain very toughly, so toughly that no agreement might take place.
Question: “What is the truth about the agreement that Americans, French, and others would man the Mount Hermon monitoring post alongside the Israelis?”
Al‑Shara: “We have categorically rejected the existence of any Israeli ground stations on the Golan, Mount Hermon, or any part of Syrian territory. They still insist on an Israeli presence on Mount Hermon. We have rejected that. We will not agree to it. At any rate, the rejection is categorical and not subject to compromise. They think that we might accept that within a week or two, or even a month or two. We will not accept that under any pressure, because the existence of any Israeli ground station will symbolize occupation. In such a case, we would have kept a symbol of occupation and it would be as if the Golan had not been returned and liberated. It must be liberated completely and there must not be a single Israeli soldier or civilian in it.”
ANALYSIS: Shara takes advantage of the question’s wording. On no conditions would Israelis be allowed to man a monitoring station. But he does not explicitly rule out a stationed staffed by others, pointing to a possible compromise on this issue.
Question: “Is it not unfair to consider the Zionist plan alone responsible for the defeat of the Arab national plan?”
Al‑Shara: “Actually, I did not say that. I was objective in my view of the matter. I said that there were ups and downs. But, there were also years of great victories, the nationalization of the Suez Canal, Port Said, Ismailia, and the resistance against the tripartite aggression. We must not forget these victories. We must not forget the October War, either. So the national plan had successes and failures. The Zionist plan also had successes and failures. However, thanks to foreign aid, Israel is in a better position to continue with its plan. The United States is behind them, and so is the West in one way or another. But they, too, had setbacks. In my opinion, the October War created a big schism in the Israeli body and shook up Israel deeply. They were also defeated politically in their invasion of Lebanon. Begin died from frustration, since he could not keep the lands, which he had occupied to get to Beirut. He was forced to withdraw gradually by the resistance, Syria’s steadfastness, and the thousands of Syrians who fell in Lebanon. Whoever of you reads what is written by Western writers will know the extent of Syrian steadfastness, especially near the Damascus‑Beirut highway, in Al‑Sultan Ya’qub battle, and during the siege of Beirut.
“The entire Lebanese resistance with its Islamist, national and even Marxist groups fought bravely during the first years and they continue fighting to this day. You have heard about the big losses that are inflicted on Israel and that it wants to withdraw from Lebanon today, before tomorrow.”
“I tell you that if we do not get our land through the peace process, we will win the world and Arab public. For Israel has continued to claim that it is always with peace and that the Arabs are against it. True, the media are directed against us and are in favor of the enemy to a large extent, but it is possible to penetrate these mighty, hostile media. Here is a simple example. When I made a statement in Washington in front of the White House, press articles appeared criticizing what I allegedly had said. Two or three days later, when they went back to the original statements and verified what I actually said, they were forced to review their positions. They said: ‘The Syrian foreign minister was indeed right. We did not know that half a million people were evicted from the Golan. We also did not know that Moshe Dayan admitted that it was the Israelis who provoked the Syrians before 1967.’
“True, we do not have such massive media as Israel does, but our strong, solid, and persistent position and the reaffirmation of our constants in a convincing way are bound to have an effect. A strong argument is important in the media. We only want our land and rights. They are the ones who are exposed now because they want to keep the land. This process of exposure is, in my opinion, very important. We must expose them because they do not want peace. If a referendum on peace is actually held in Israel and fails, Israel will not find a listening ear even in Washington, New York, or Paris. The failure of the referendum will be catastrophic for the future of Israel.”
ANALYSIS: Noticeably, Shara does not threaten war if Syria does not get what it wants but rather an international public relations campaign. In this context, he repeats the view that Syria can reject a negotiated solution but then put the blame on Israel. He brags about alleged minor successes in Western press coverage. It is doubtful that Syria made any such gains by its strategy but, again, this is a very different approach from the historic Syrian stand insisting on the need for militant struggle and rejection of the West as imperialist and hostile to the Arabs.
Question: “Israeli news media cite Barak as saying that the talks between the Israeli and Syrian delegations will begin within a few weeks. What is Syria’s position? And is there a secret diplomacy?”
Al‑Shara: “There is no secret diplomacy. We have rejected such diplomacy right from the start. We have said and continue to say that we have nothing to hide from our people. We do not say in secret what we do not say in the open. And now you see that the talks are openly discussed in the media.”
ANALYSIS: There were, of course, secret contacts through the United States or other countries at various points but they did not result in any breakthroughs.
Question: “What is the fate of Palestinian refugees?”
Al‑Shara: “UN Resolution 194 issued in 1949 guarantees the right to repatriation for Palestinian refugees and compensation for those who do not want to return. This is Syria’s position. And this is how the Arab position should be. Unfortunately, however, the subject of the refugees is on the agenda of the multilateral talks, without being based on Resolution 194. This is a big mistake, which will require a big effort to rectify.”
ANALYSIS: There is a subtle criticism here of the PLO, implying that only Syria cares about the refugees. The PLO also, of course, maintains UN Resolution 194 as its official position. In the long-term, one can only wonder what would happen to the Palestinians in Syria if Yasir Arafat were to offer them repatriation to an independent Palestinian state, especially in the absence of a Syria-Israel agreement. Note also that Syria claims to have agreed in principle to sign a full, bilateral peace treaty with Israel that would not be conditioned on or even mention any resolution of the Palestinian refugee issue.
Question: “Some people say that Al‑Shara shook hands. We know that he did not shake hands. So what is the reply?”
Al‑Shara: “He did not shake hands.”
ANALYSIS: Syria is more militant than Egypt, Jordan, and the PLO, rejecting any symbolic signs of peace. So far, he asserts, Syria has not crossed any red lines that should antagonize domestic hardliners. Of course, if and when Syria and Israel ever did make an agreement, there would presumably be a handshake.
Question: “You spoke about competition between civilizations and cultures instead of the military conflict. Would not this concept give the Zionists a right in Palestine, which conflicts with the concepts held by the Arab Socialist Ba’th Party?”
ANALYSIS: Here is the tough question. Does the government really mean to abandon the effort to destroy Israel and accept Israel, substituting a wimpy “competition” for militant struggle? Shara backs down at this point.
Al‑Shara: “In my opinion, this question is important nationally and ideologically. Even the Ba’th Party—and I am honored to be a member in it—understands that the restoration of the whole of Palestine is a long‑term strategy, which cannot be achieved in one phase. I am talking about the party and not about the negotiations or the other ideologies. Even the Ba’th Party’s ideology views the liberation in phases. This talk about viewing the liberation in phases is 30 years old. The first phase is regaining the occupied Arab territories and guaranteeing the Palestinian Arab people’s inalienable national rights.
Another view. What do the Arabs hate in Israel? Do they hate Jews simply because they are Jews? Never. Proof is that during the 1967 aggression, not a single Syrian Jew was hurt, although four or five guys from Al‑Hamidiyah Bazaar could go into the Jewish quarter and kill as many Jews as they wanted, and neither the authorities nor the security forces could have stopped them. But, this did not happen. There are Jewish synagogues in Damascus, Aleppo, and Al‑Qamishli. They are all in very good condition. Any Syrian Arab citizen even at the peak of the Israeli attacks did not touch them. Why? Because the Syrian citizen is civilized. The Armenian who lives in Syria is Syrian. Many Armenians decided not to go back to Armenia after its independence, as they felt deeply Syrian. The Kurds, too, are proud of their Syrian affiliation. This country is the cradle of civilizations. Everyone can live peacefully in it once he belongs to this land, this homeland, and this nation.”
ANALYSIS: This is the most explicit hardline example of “old thinking” in Shara’s presentation. It is neither what he “really” believes nor an apology that should be ignored. Such views of a “two-stage” final solution is still part of the Syrian leadership’s thinking. It has been pushed down in their overall conception but they have a very hard time abandoning such notions. In turn, these ideas constrain them from moving toward a political settlement.
Still, the main focus of Shara’s argument is that Israel is to disappear through a competition of civilizations and cultures rather than through military means. Does Shara believe that this kind of campaign will eliminate Israel? His hardline critics are skeptical, and for good reason.
Shara escapes from this uncomfortable topic by a long discussion of Syrian pluralism and the mistaken concept of Jewish nationalism. He does not mention that almost all Jews left Syria at the first opportunity, nor the anti-Jewish material produced by the Syrian government.
Yes, his standpoint is not fully hypocritical. After all, the current regime does relatively favor ethnic pluralism in the country. It is dominated by an Alawite minority and supported (from fear of an Islamic revolution) by the Christian minority. Perhaps he is sending a message here to the Sunni Muslim majority: do not turn Syria into a dictatorship that oppresses the minorities.
Question: “Would the politicians force the intellectuals to accept the pledges and treaties, or would culture keep its viewpoint?”
Al‑Shara: “No, there is no enforcement. For if there is enforcement, this would mean that we submitted to Israel in the peace agreement. It must not occur to anyone that we will force the intellectuals or the ignorant to do anything against their will.
“There will be no provision for speaking about this subject. There will not even be discussion within closed chambers on this. This is a red line.”
ANALYSIS: While freedom of speech and other human rights in Syria are limited, there would be freedom to reject normalization with Israel and to criticize that country. This issue would continue to serve as a safety valve for those who would not be allowed to criticize their own country’s system and regime, or indeed those of Arab states with which Syria is on good terms.
Here, Shara is assuring the writers that they should not oppose peace with Israel because they fear it would affect their own rights. They have an incentive to accept the government line on this basis. Incidentally, of course, what Shara describes is exactly what has happened in Egypt, Jordan, and among the Palestinians.
Question: “Why do we not seek peace between us, the Arabs?”
ANALYSIS: In colloquial English, this question asks: Why waste time making peace with Israel when you should devote yourself to struggling for Arab unity?
Al‑Shara: “We are trying, we have tried, and we will continue to try. I already said that peace makes it incumbent upon us to be more unified politically, economically, socially, and culturally.”
ANALYSIS: Of course, the foreign minister wants to stress that Syria advocated Arab unity. This is nothing new. But his talk also implies three other important points.
First, making peace with Israel—a step urged on Syria by Egypt and other Arab countries—no longer runs counter to maintaining Arab unity. On the contrary, taking such a step would bring Syria into line with an emerging Arab consensus.
Second, Syria’s version of a new Middle East—which it shares with a number of other Arab states—is quite different from former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres’ view of regional cooperation. Still, the Arab alternative is one of peaceful competition, with each Arab state being able to choose the level of cooperation it wants to have with Israel. Syria recommends a cold peace. Notice that Shara mentions political, economic, social, and cultural solidarity among Arabs but does not mention military alliance.
Finally, Syria, like other Arab states, wants Arab unity to be on its own terms. For example, Syria has not helped the Palestinian Authority or sought to restore Lebanon’s full sovereignty. If unity conflicts with Syrian interests, then unity is sacrificed on behalf of state goals.
Sources:
The speech itself was given on January 27, 2000 to the Arab Writers Union Conference in Damascus. The text is from Al-Usbu’ al-Adabi, February 12, 2000, published weekly by the Arab Writers Union in Damascus. See <http://www.awu-dam.com>. Translation is from Foreign Broadcast Information Service, FBIS‑NES‑2000‑0216, February 12, 2000.
The question-and-answer session is from “Al‑Shar’ Answers Questions on Peace,” al-Safir (Beirut), February 12, 2000. Translation is from FBIS‑NES‑2000‑0216, February 12, 2000.
We have changed only transliterations for a few names and corrected a few obvious spelling errors.
Endnote
*: Barry Rubin is editor of MERIA and deputy director of the BESA Center for Strategic Studies, Israel. He is also co-editor of the new sixth edition of “The Israel-Arab Reader” (Viking-Penguin, 2000) His latest book is “The Transformation of Palestinian Politics: From Revolution to State-Building,” (Harvard University Press, 1999). Back.