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Middle East Review of International Affairs
Strategic Choices in the Mediterranean: Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East
By Kenneth B. Moss
*
Abstract
U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East can be seen as part of a broader strategy in the Mediterranean region. The article discusses the relationship between U.S. decisionmaking in this theater and the inter-relationship between Middle Eastern issues and those in neighboring areas. Of particular interest is the degree of coordination or leadership that exists in relations between the United States and Europe.
In the Cold Warís aftermath, the United States holds a preeminent global position. Its strategic reach is not hindered by distance but rather by political, economic, and social factors over which it sometimes has little influence. Furthermore, there are regions where the United States has significant strategic interests but is not well-positioned to be the decisive actor.
The Mediterranean littoral is an example of this situation. Working from east to west, the United States enjoys its strongest influence in parts of the Middle East, but as one faces the Greek-Turkish rivalry in the Aegean or the complex politics of North Africa, the U.S. ability to craft a settlement diminishes. Its presence is very visible, its voice influential, but its impact is seldom final.
Therefore, how can the United States influence the policies and actions of key actors in the Mediterranean in such circumstances to assure that its interests are met? What are the options on hand for U.S. policy? Should institutions that the United States belongs to--such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)--continue to hold a decisive place in U.S. strategy, or should the United States coordinate more with other institutions, such as the European Union (EU), where it has less influence?
The fact is that U.S. efforts to maintain a political environment in the Mediterranean favorable to its interests require cooperation with European endeavors. This is due to the favorable European position in the region--thanks to proximity and history--as well as the fact that the most overarching question affecting the entire area is the impact of Europeís quest for identity. Many American policymakers prefer solutions that allow for use of military power--such as the U.S. Sixth Fleet or NATO--because these assure U.S. input and visibility, while acceptance of the part played by European institutions is given grudgingly. 1 Yet most regional problems require an integrated strategy of diplomacy, economic assistance, and trade, sectors where the Europeans hold a stronger hand. Fortunately, the basic compatibility of U.S. and European perspectives or objectives in the region is close enough to encourage cooperation.
Settlement of many problems in the Mediterranean particularly depends on Europeís definition of its identity in the post-Cold War era. Europe must not only decide how far ìeastî to expand but also how far ìsouth.î 2 This factor has often been absent in U.S. official thinking about the Mediterranean. 3
The U.S. Strategic Perspective
One reason the United States overlooked Europeís role in the Mediterranean area was a strategic perspective which saw the place mainly as a transit zone through which U.S. forces and commerce moved elsewhere. In the nineteenth century, profitable commerce and missionary activity were the focus of U.S. policy in the Mediterranean. Two centuries ago, the U.S. need to protect its commerce led it to deploy small naval forces there and to negotiate the use of port facilities in the Balearic Islands in 1815. Today, the Sixth Fleet continues this tradition and watches over one of the worldís most important routes for trade.
Religion has influenced U.S. policy in this region from its early history, when religious leaders hoped to bring the reintroduction of Christianity in the Holy Land and established a pattern of missionary work and American schools that has lasted to the present day. 4 Today, religion has reinforced a pro-Israeli stance in U.S. policy, whether because of the identification of American Jews with Israelís welfare or the interpretation by some evangelical groups that events in the region may presage the worldís end. However, while one can find anti-Islamic statements by American religious leaders, the characteristics of religion in the United States have insulated it some from the legacy of Islamic-Christian confrontation in Europe. 5
The Cold War, Israelís independence, declining British and French power in the region, and dependence on Middle Eastern oil reinforced the U.S. propensity to regard the Mediterranean as a route from West to East. The Truman and Eisenhower Doctrines declared U.S. responsibility in protecting the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East from Soviet expansion. To serve that mission--as well as to send troops and supplies through southern Europe to meet its NATO commitments--the United States negotiated a series of base agreements with countries on both the European and Mediterranean sides of the Mediterranean. The expansion of the U.S. relationship with Israel, especially after the 1967 and 1973 wars, reinforced the importance of these bases, even though the United States began to lose access or face restrictions on its use of some facilities. Enlargement of the U.S. role in the Middle East as a guarantor of stability added to the importance of the remaining bases. Since 1945, over 40 percent of U.S. deployments have gone through the Mediterranean. During the 1991, Gulf War approximately 90 percent of the forces and equipment deployed passed through the Mediterranean region. Today, troops and supplies destined to support U.S. and NATO missions in Bosnia and Kosovo follow these same routes. 6
European Security Perspectives
There is, of course, no single European strategic perspective. In fact, two contradictory perspectives have coexisted in much of Europeís strategic approach to the Mediterranean.
The first regards it as a distinct, but interlinked region. For example, one can argue that there is a shared heritage between the Roman concept of mare nostrum and the Italian governmentís 1991 initiative to establish a Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) modeled after the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Italian commerce from the Renaissance into modern times has traveled this sea, as has that of all European countries on its northern shores. The concept of community has guided European policy in other forms, most notably the EUís Euro-Mediterranean partnership launched in Barcelona in 1995 that seeks an eventual free trade area by 2010, but also through NATOís Mediterranean Initiative and others under the auspices of the Western European Union (WEU) and CSCE.
This sense of a Mediterranean-wide community has often caused the United States and Europe to view each otherís intentions in the region with suspicion. Not surprisingly, European governments resent U.S. attempts to stifle elements of trade in the Mediterranean through sanctions on U.S. and foreign companies doing business with Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. American policy is an intrusion into historical patterns of cultural and commercial exchange. At the same time, despite the fact that recent European initiatives in the Mediterranean aim to reduce tension region-wide, the United States has been uncomfortable with any inclusive framework that would challenge its role in the Middle East peace process--the one regional issue the United States has purposely chosen to dominate.
The other European strategic perspective holds the Mediterranean as the stage on which Western civilization fought back the incursion of non-Western cultures. This image of the Mediterranean world is traceable, at least, to the Greek-Persian Wars of the fifth century BCE, but etched more strongly by the legacies of the expansion of the Islamic faith into the Iberian peninsula, the impact of the Crusades, and the efforts of the Ottoman Turks to expand into central Europe. 7 The legacies of these struggles survive today through the anti-immigrant rhetoric of Europeís political right, debates in some European political circles over the ìChristianî nature of their societies, or even in motherís admonishment to children that they must behave or the ìTurkî will get them. 8
Since the EUís growth raises doubt about the preservation of the traditional nation-state and the national cultures of its member states, a mass flux of immigration into Europe from northern Africa has fueled European anxieties about future national identities. Nearly 10 percent of the population of the Maghreb countries has migrated to Europe; over three million of them are in France alone. Germany is the home of more than two million Turks, of whom at least 400,000 are ethnic Kurds. Violence by teenagers in France in poor immigrant neighborhoods and Kurdish violence in Germany after Turkeyís arrest of Abdullah Ocalan in February 1999 reinforced the arguments of German conservatives who tried to block significant changes in the countryís 1913 citizenship law. 9
Regional Threats to Stability and U.S. Interests
By the mid-1990s, the situation in the Mediterranean was so unstable to American eyes that one book title described the region as a ìmaelstrom.î 10 The principal danger seemed to be in northern Africa, where attacks and murders by Islamic extremists threatened the stability of Algeria and Egypt. The fate of the latter would likewise determine the fate of the Middle East peace process. Although the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981 by Islamic radicals and a pattern of terrorist attacks on secular academics, journalists, and tourists drew much attention to Egypt, the situation became worse in Algeria. There a bloody pattern of raids, murders, and countermeasures took more than 80,000 lives after January 1992.
Instability and concern over insecurity in North Africa were rooted in demographic and economic trends. The Algerian economy had suffered ever since oil prices started to drop in the mid-1980s, although there was a rise in the mid-1990s. The countryís situation was complicated by a population explosion where 70 percent of the population was under the age of thirty and unemployment for males between the ages of 18 and 24 rose to somewhere between 70 and 75 percent. 11 Such figures would spell trouble for any country, and in Algeria, where a military-controlled government repressed democratic processes and organized political opposition, it was no surprise that Islamic extremism held such a strong appeal to segments of an embittered and alienated population.
Following the victories by the Islamic Salvation Front in the 1992 elections, the army cancelled the second round and forced President Chadli Benjedid to resign. The nearly unimaginable horror of some of the attacks, combined with the rhetoric of extremist militants, fed the worst stereotypes of the Islamic world in the West. Terrorist attacks in France, where over 1.5 million people of Algerian descent live, fueled concerns about a spread of the violence to Europe. 12 Following the collapse of the Shah of Iranís government in 1979, a ìdomino theoryî developed in many Western minds that envisioned the toppling of moderate governments in Algeria, then Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and even Libya. A type of jihad against the West seemed to be at hand.
Connected to this situation was the disturbing prospect of the spread of weapons of mass destruction into the region. Libya obtained Scud-B missiles that could strike neighbors in northern Africa as well as Italian islands such as Lampedusa, and evidence suggested that Libya was trying to acquire better missile technology. Widespread concern grew about its chemical weapons program, and some thought Egypt also might possess chemical weapons. In addition, there was concern that if an extremist Islamic government came to power in these or other countries, it might be controlled or influenced by states such as Iran, which might supply such weapons or encourage militancy toward neighbors. 13 Such concerns became one of the arguments to support the development of ballistic missile defense capabilities that could shield Europe from attack from northern Africa or the Middle East.
The 1991 New Strategic Concept adopted by NATO reflected this growing alarm about developments to the south by stressing a need to safeguard Europeís southern flan and control the proliferation of weaponsí technologies in the region--concerns that the alliance reiterated in June 1994. 14 NATO began its Mediterranean Dialogue with six non-alliance members in early 1995 to provide for an exchange of information and discussion of subjects of common concern. 15
The maelstrom predicted for North Africa has not happened. The reasons include opposition to violence within most of the Islamic community, disillusionment among some of the extremists, irreconcilable factionalism in their ranks, and the increased effectiveness of government countermeasures against terrorism. 16
That said, one should not think the danger is over, though the situation in Algeria has improved. The armed wing of the Islamic Salvation Front announced an end to its support of violence in June 1999 and, a month later, newly elected President Abelaziz Bouteflika pardoned thousands imprisoned in connection with the terrorism as a step towards reconciliation. Nevertheless, the more militant Armed Islamic Group is still fighting, violence continues, and the countryís serious socio-economic problems remain.
Elsewhere in the Maghreb, the situation remains relatively quiet. Tunisia has repressed the extremists to the point where some fear there might be a reaction, but, so far, that has not happened. In Morocco, questions exist about the extent of stability in the wake of the the death of King Hassan II. 17 His son, King Muhammad VI, has said he regards King Juan Carlos of Spain as a model monarch. But will he address the serious problems of poverty and poor infrastructure that most Moroccans face? 18 In Libya, Muammar Qadhafi continues to be a source of regional problems, though his departure could also trigger internal instability as well.
Different issues mark the relationship between Europe and the Middle East peace process or Persian Gulf security. These include European dependency on Middle Eastern oil, the weapons of mass destruction there, and potential crises if diplomacy failed. Because of Europeís geographic proximity, historical ties, commercial relations, fears of Islamic extremism, and jealousy of a larger U.S. role, it sometimes disagrees with the United States on issues of Middle Eastern policy. 19
As Philip Gordon has observed, the United States concentrates on the process and is inclined to urge the parties to find a settlement while Europe focuses on its objectives and is not reluctant to support immediate Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories and an independent Palestinian state. 20 Arguably, the Oslo formula has drawn their positions closer, but differences remain. As to how to deal with the two pariah states in the region--Iran and Iraq--the United States has taken a tougher line than the Europeans, using both persuasion and threats of sanctions against European companies to secure begrudging compliance.
Two more issues affecting Europe directly and also U.S. interests are the Balkans crises and Turkeyís relationship with Europe. Both are thoroughly interwoven with the question of how Europe defines itself. The Balkans are ultimately more of a European problem but the potential widening of these problems could also damage U.S. interests.In short, aside from humanitarian concerns, it is not so much the Balkan crisis that attracts the concern of the United States but rather its potential impact on the larger neighborhood.
The two institutions in the European arena with the most bearing on the Balkan situation are NATO and the EU. NATOís mission of European defense has now expanded into being a peacekeeper in the Balkans. The EUís responsibility for the European community is also critical for determining that areaís future. In the wake of the Kosovo crisis, the European Commission proposed on October 13, 1999, that the EU accelerate negotiations to include the second tier of six countries it had designated in December 1997 as eligible candidates. Aside from Slovenia, in the first tier of candidates, this revision would affect the status of Bulgaria and Romania. 21 The commitments of aid by the EU and its member states to rebuilding Kosovo and, eventually, Serbia, made at the Sarajevo summit in July also indicated greater recognition of Europeís responsibilities in the Balkans. Clearly, the EU is ready to shoulder most of the cost of rebuilding Kosovo.
Some may yet question how sincere Europe is about including a region that in some ways has always been regarded as being ìon the other side of the tracks.î 22 But the Balkan crisis of the 1990s caused European leaders to look at their positive rhetoric about the EU with more conscience and, consequently, brought them to recognize that Europe must assist this long-troubled region. As British Prime Minister Tony Blair declared at the European summit in Cologne in June 1999: ìLet this mark the point at which these countries, so often scarred by ethnic conflict and racial divides, be brought properly into the true family of European nations.î Such words signal not only a renewed British commitment to Europeís development but a noticeable shift in European thinking. 23
The status of Turkey is both a European and U.S. problem. The strategic importance of Turkey for the United States is high. Turkey stands at the intersection of three areas of major U.S. strategic interest: the Balkans, the former Soviet republics, and the Middle East. Whatever course Europe chooses in defining its relationship with Turkey, its decision will have consequences inside Turkey and on that countryís role in the other regions.
Turkeyís relationship with Europe has been an ambiguous one. It belongs to the Trans-Atlantic security community as a member of NATO and an associate member of the WEU. Yet, it is not a member of the EU. Until 1999, the EU would not list Turkey as an official candidate for membership. There were a variety of reasons why this process took so long, but one key element was a doubt as to whether Turkey is ìEuropean.î 24 Other reasons for exclusion, however, were not insignificant. In the short-term, the cost of economic adjustment and support programs to bring Turkey closer to the economic levels of the EU would be prohibitively high. Eighteen years after admitting Greece, the EU is still paying assistance to that country. Also, the end of the Cold War had placed a series of unquestionably ìEuropeanî countries in the line for admission, and consideration of them was essential if the growth of an integrated Europe is to continue. With over two million Turks, Germany feared that Turkeyís membership in the EU would open its borders more easily and increase the ranks of Germanyís unemployed and add to the cost of its social programs. Some Europeans also feared the strengthening of the Mediterranean ìvoiceî in EU matters and worried that Turkeyís cheaper cost of labor, when combined with its strong work ethic, would draw jobs out of northern Europe. 25 Lastly, a consistent pattern of restrictions on free speech, arrests of journalists, and military operations against Kurdish elements inside Turkey as well as outside acted as obstacles for the EU. The EU also urged reform of Turkeyís courts, especially its state security courts, where until June 1999 a military representative sat on the panel.
The Turks understandably have thought double standards are used against them. Turkey has been a member of NATO since 1952, and even under three periods of military government, Turkeyís membership in NATO never came into question. But while NATO has obviously contributed to a higher sense of European identity, its mission is not the building of Europe. That job belongs to the EU. According to the Maastricht Treaty, ìEuropeanî states can become EU members, but ìEuropeanî is not defined. 26 This term was not difficult to set when Moroccoís application was rejected in 1986, but for Turkey--whose history is as interwoven with the development of the Christian states of Europe and the European state system as it is with the Islamic world--the answer is not easy. The United States has repeatedly urged Europe to accept religious and ethnic diversity in its midst, which some critics argue is an imposition of the American model of a pluralistic society onto a European setting. In May 1997 Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott cautioned against ìdefining the ìEuropean-nessî of a village on the basis of whether its landmarks are church spires or minarets.î 27
The tensions that Turkey has with Greece embody part of this cultural divide.The rivalry in the eastern Mediterranean long precedes modern-day Greece and Turkey and their Christian and Islamic traditions. Ancient Greece, as an ancestral home of Western civilization, fended off threats from the east--most notably the Persians, who crossed from Asia into Europe at the narrowest point of the Bosphorus. 28 Such historical digressions are only meant as a reminder that geopolitical disagreements between Turkey and Greece go beyond the current disputes over airspace, mineral rights on the continental shelf, the sea boundaries of Aegean islands, or even the issue of Cyprus. The challenge for NATO, the EU, and key member states is to help overcome both historical legacies and the highly complex recent disputes. Yet many Turks suspect that even if every issue with Greece were to be resolved, Turkey might still not become a member of the EU and Europe, thereby defeating the goal of Kemal Ataturk and his successors to identify Turkey with the secular model of Western societies.
Unexpectedly in late August and September 1999, a possible end to tension between Turkey and the EU appeared. The violent earthquake that devastated much of northwestern Turkey caused a fundamental reexamination by much of Europe towards the country. As one Turkish journalist wrote: ì[T]he earthquake has physically shifted Turkey two centimeters west towards Greece, geologists here have measured, [but] the disaster has politically brought two regional rivals even closer.î As the EU sought to prepare aid packages for the devastated country, Greece indicated it was considering lifting its veto on financial aid to Turkey. 29 After the EU foreign ministers met in Finland in early September, signs emerged of a willingness to reconsider the position on Turkeyís non-eligibility status. The Commission report on October 13 recommended formally listing Turkey as an eligible candidate but not starting negotiations with it. Finally, the December 1999 EU summit listed Turkey as an official candidate for membership. 30 Meanwhile, Greece and Turkey have begun negotiations on a series of bilateral agreements affecting tourism, economic and technological cooperation, maritime transportation, and fighting organized crime among other things. 31
Yet, any solution to Cyprus still seems distant, though the visit of Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit to Washington in September 1999 spurred new hope. President Clinton sent his special envoy, Alfred Moses, to Turkey after the summit to engage in a series of shuttle meetings between Greek Cypriot President Glafcos Clerides and Turkish Cypriot President Rauf Denktash. The initial challenge facing Moses is to get the two leaders to talk to one another in some mutually acceptable format. Denktash has rejected the notion of proximity talks in New York and insisted that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus be given equal treatment with the internationally recognized Greek Cypriot government. By October, the prospect of quadrilateral talks involving Greece and Turkey as well seemed a little brighter, partly because Denktash was being pressured by Turkish Cypriot unions to yield. 32
With Cyprus, though, there have been glimmers of hope before. Disputes remain over shaping governance of the island, the rights of the Turkish Cypriots, the payment of damages, and the destruction of religious and historical property. In addition, there is the basic question of whether or not Ecevitís government, with its dependence on a nationalistic coalition partner, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), can win adequate support at home for concessions on Cyprus. The EU decision in December 1997 to list Cyprus among those eligible for candidacy reinforced the rigidity of Turkish Cypriots and Turkey, who are determined not to let Europe link Turkeyís EU membership to Cyprus.
There is no doubt about the legitimacy of many of the EUís disagreements with Turkey over the division of Cyprus, but Brussels recklessly placed EU policy in the hands of a single member--Greece. The EUís calculation that its Cyprus policy would be a ìcatalystî that would require Turkey to modify its position backfired. 33
Similarly, Turkey is still a long way from becoming a full member of the EU. Turkey must satisfy the ìCopenhagen criteria,î which expressed the EUís expectation of democratic institutions, rule of law, human rights, and protection of minorities for all candidates. However, even if Greece drops many of its objections, other European countries are likely to retain theirs. Scandinavian members of the EU, for example, continue to be very critical of Turkeyís human rights record.
Challenges to the United States
Europeís own self-definition will have an important effect on the future of the Mediterranean and Middle East. The United States must continue to try through public and private statements to influence the European debate, with its success in mobilizing a strong reaction on Kosovo showed.
One contribution the United States can make regarding the Mediterranean is that it sees the region as a whole and can stress this framework with its allies when appropriate. The United States is not as captive to historically and culturally driven approaches to the region that see it as a boundary of confrontation between cultures and religions. No current issue poses immediate dangers, but if left unattended or mishandled, such as the Turkish-European relationship, could significantly threaten U.S. interests.
The NATO framework that the United States prefers in its relations with Europe carries an unintentional but implied exclusionist message because of its role to defend Europe. By redefining its strategic mission in order to expand the scope of its measures for Europeís defense, NATO policy may stir fears of European colonialism in North Africa and the Middle East. This could seriously taint relations throughout the region and make it difficult to pursue economic, commercial, and diplomatic initiatives so important for handling problems on the Mediterraneanís southern shores.
Many of the EU programs have tried to transcend the differences that exist on both Mediterranean shores, even if the European debate over self-identity has fueled exclusionist attitudes on the seaís northern coast. Nevertheless, the EUís mission is an economic one, making it committed to development progress in adjacent countries. U.S. interests are clearly best served by reinforcing those initiatives that treat the region as a whole and address the economic and demographic factors that contribute to instability on its shores.
The EUís European-Mediterranean Partnership presents the best framework for the region, especially through the provision of about $6 billion of assistance and the goal of a free trade zone. 34 These measures are especially important since U.S. assistance in the region mainly goes to Israel, Egypt, and Jordan to support the peace process. Meanwhile, NATO should focus on a variety of options that run from scientific and academic exchanges, through educational activities for both the civilian and military sectors, to endeavors to assist in verification measures and joint military exercises. 35 These actions would reinforce EU efforts to reduce the division in the Mediterranean world. A mechanism for coordinating NATO and EU policies and activities is needed, whether it be informal exchanges between them or a formal body that might have a representative from each of the organizations sponsoring a Mediterranean initiative to encourage coordination and reduce duplication. 36
The importance of U.S. actions to support or complement EUís initiatives is their reinforcement wherever possible of a more open, unbounded definition of European identity and responsibility. The United States has emphasized this repeatedly in its dialogue with the EU regarding Turkey. In doing so, the United States has observed that it shares many of the EUís concerns about Turkey but that the EU must not make the mistake of closing the door on Turkeyís membership. U.S. policy rests on the conviction that Turkey has made significant progress in its political and economic development. The prospect of actual EU membership and full participation in the Western traditions of modern Europe and the United States will be a lure for the countryís political leadership and a large majority of its society.
Of course, progress on the Middle East peace process must be an important priority for the United States. 37 Europeís role in the area will be related to the status of these efforts, while a lack of success will make Europeans believe that they have a better formula for a settlement, a belief that has contributed to intermittent tension in U.S.-European relations.
Finally, the United States needs to be prepared to devote the same amount of energy and time to try to resolve Greek-Turkish disagreements that it has given to the Middle East, Northern Ireland, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Given the strategic importance of this region to the United States and its allies--a fact that every administration has emphasized during the last five decades--it is puzzling that Republican and Democratic Presidents alike have chosen not do this. The lesson from all the examples of U.S. negotiation just listed shows that U.S. involvement has to be at the highest level and conducted in a consistent manner. This endeavor will probably require months if not years, and it will need sustained Presidential support.
President Clintonís decision to address the issue directly when in Turkey in November 1999 for the OSCE was an important step forward. Obviously, the fate of any settlement depends on the willingness of Greece, Turkey, and the representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities to participate in such meetings and ìshuttleî diplomacy. That is an issue that each of them must decide, but each of the previous examples given where U.S. diplomacy has mattered began with equally polarized parties.
In short, there is much work for the United States to do in the Mediterranean, even when it is not in a primary position. Through its influence in European discussions, its close ties with Turkey and Greece, and its persistence in the Middle East peace process, the United States has ample points for leverage. This region was among the very first that the United States understood to be of strategic importance to its interests, and there is absolutely nothing on even a distant horizon to suggest that its importance for the U.S. will diminish. The challenge is using good diplomacy to benefit from the initiatives of others also having strategic interests in and around this historic sea.
Endnotes
*: Kenneth B. Moss is a professor in the Department of Grand Strategy and Mobilization in the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, which is part of the National Defense University. Back.
Note 1: A recent example of this is in F. Stephen Larrabee, Jerrold Green, Ian O. Lesserm and Michele Zanin, NATOís Mediterranean Initiaitve: Policy Issues and Dilemmas, RAND Report MR-957-IMD, RAND; Santa Monica, California. Back.
Note 2: Iver B. Neumann, Uses of Other: ìThe Eastî in European Identity Formation, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999) pp. 39-63. Back.
Note 3: ìExtremismî will be used here in preference to the more widely used ìfundamentalism.î As others have pointed out, fundamentalism is borrowed from protestant Christianity, and its meaning emphasizes strict interpretation of the Scriptures. Many in the Islamic world may be regarded as fundamentalists in how they regard the Koran, but there is significant disagreement over whether or not their interpretations justify political activism and government rigorously based on religious teachings. The latter, who have pressed their views, especially through violence, throughout the region are treated here as ìextremists.î See John Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality, revised edition, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995) pp. 7-8. Esposito prefers ìIslamic revivalismî or ìactivism.î No word seems fully satisfactory. Back.
Note 4: James A. Field, Jr., America and the Mediterranean World, 1776-1882 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969). Back.
Note 5: Fouad Ajami claims ì[t]here is no anti-Islamic impulse in U.S. foreign policy.î See ìUnder Western Eyes: The Fate of Bosnia,î Survival Vol. 41, No. 2 (Summer 1999), p. 49. The statement is too sweeping, but it is fair to say that anti-Islam has not dominated U.S. thinking. For anti-Islamic themes and the influence of religious interpretations that have implications for U.S. foreign policy see William Martin, ìThe Christian Right and American Foreign Policy,î Foreign Policy, No. 114 (Spring 1999), pp. 66-80 and Paul Boyer, When Time Shall Be No More: Prophecy Belief in Modern American Culture (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1992) pp. 194-196, 200-203, 326-331. Back.
Note 6: Ian O. Lesser, Mediterranean Security: New Perspectives and Implications for U.S. Policy, RAND Report R-4178-AF, Rand: Santa Monica, California, 1992, p.8. Back.
Note 7: See Peter Green, The Greco-Persian Wars (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1996). Green introduces this theme on page 3. Back.
Note 8: For a discussion of the Turkish image in popular culture see Edmute Heller, ìMamma, I Turchi--Hilfe, die Tuerken,î Sueddeutsche Zeitung am Wochenende, April 12-13, 1997, p. 2. Back.
Note 9: The new German citizenship law, approved on May 22, 1999 allows for dual citizenship and shortens the required period for naturalization from eight years to fifteen. Back.
Note 10: See John W. Holmes, editor, Maelstrom: The United States, Southern Europe, and the Challenge of the Mediterranean (Cambridge, MA: The World Peace Foundation, 1995). Back.
Note 11: Yacoubian, pp. 27-33. Back.
Note 12: A good brief overview and analysis of the Algerian situation is Mona Yacoubian, Algeriaís Struggle for Democracy, Studies Department Occasional Paper Series No. 3 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1997). Back.
Note 13: See Sami G. Hajjar, Security Implications of the Proliferation of the Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1998) pp. 12-20 and Sumner Benson, ìMiddle Eastern Missiles, NATO Missile Defenses, and Mediterranean Security,î Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 7. No. 4 (Fall 1997), pp. 13-31. Back.
Note 14: Benson, pp. 19-20. Back.
Note 15: The six countries are Egypt, Israel, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, and Jordan. For the establishment of the initiative see Richard G. Whitman, ìCore, Periphery and Security in Europe,î a paper presented to the International Studies Association, March 18-21, 1998, available on Columbia International Affairs Online (CIAO), http://wwwc.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dic/ciao, p. 4. Back.
Note 16: See Fawaz A. Gerges, ìThe Decline of Revolutionary Islam in Algeria and Egypt,î Survival, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Spring 1999), pp. 113-125. Back.
Note 17: For brief surveys of the situation in both countries see the reports by Carol Migdalovitz, ìTunisia: Government, the Economy, and Relations with the United States,î CRS Report for Congress, 98-688 F, August 18, 1998 and ìMorocco: Political and Economic Changes and U.S Policy,î CRS Report for Congress, 98-663 F, August 10, 1998. Back.
Note 18: ìMoroccoís Humanitarian King,î The Economist, July 31, 1999, p. 35. Back.
Note 19: See Philip H. Gordon, The Transatlantic Allies and the Changing Middle East, Adelphi Paper No. 322 . International Institute for Strategic Studies (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) and Pedro Moya (Rapporteur) ìSecurity in the Greater Middle East,î Committee Report of the Mediterranean Special Group, North Atlantic Assembly, November 1998, http://www.naa.be/publications/comrep/1998, pp. 14-21. Back.
Note 20: Gordon, see especially pp. 24-25. Back.
Note 21: See Regular Report from the Commission on Progress to Accession by Each of the Candidate Countries, October 13, 1999, http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report-10-99 and The Economist, October 2, 1999, pp. 54-55. The countries in the first tier were the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia; those in the second tier were Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, and Slovakia. Back.
Note 22: The reference is taken from C.L. Sulzbergerís A Long Row of Candles as quoted in Robert Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History (New York: St. Martinís Press, 1993) p. xiv. Back.
Note 23: The Blair quote and judgment about Europeís costs in Kosovo come from Anne Swardson and Charles Truehart, ìEuropeans Assume the lead in the Balkans,î Washington Post, June 5, 1999, p. A17. Back.
Note 24: The specific reasons are discussed in Birol A. Yesilada, ìThe Worsening EU-Turkey Relations,î SAIS Review, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1999), p. 148. Back.
Note 25: The chairman of a major European subsidiary in Turkey made this observation about European motives in remarks to the author in Istanbul on May 6, 1998. Back.
Note 26: See Barry Buzan and Thomas Diez, ìThe European Union and Turkey,î Survival, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Spring 1999), pp. 49-50. The article specifically states ìany European state may apply to become a member of the Union.î Back.
Note 27: Talbott as quoted by Alan Makovsky, ìTurkeyís Faded European Dream,î in the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, Conference Report, The Parameters of Partnership: Germany, the U.S., and Turkey: Challenges for German and American Foreign Policy, October 24, 1997, Washington, D.C., 1998, p. 62. Back.
Note 28: See the discussion in David Gress, From Plato to NATO: The Idea of the West and Its Opponents (New York: The Free Press, 1998) pp. 120-128; although, Gress notes that the Roman legacy pushed the boundary of the West to the west of Greece. Back.
Note 29: Nadire Mater, ìQuake Pushes West Towards Turkey,î August 26, 1999, article provided by author from nadire@turk.net. Back.
Note 30: See Turkish Daily News, September 7, 1999, Electronic Version Headlines, TDN_Headlines-ownerr@onelist.com. See Regular Report from the Commission on Progress to Accession by Each of the Candidate Countries, October 13, 1999, http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report-10-99. Back.
Note 31: Turkish Daily News, October 21, 1999, Electronic Version Headlines, see above note. Back.
Note 32: See Turkish Daily News, October 4, 5, and 21 1999, Elecronic Version Headlines, TDN_Headlines-ownerr@onelist.com. The story referring to the trade unions comes from the issue of October 21, 1999. Back.
Note 33: F. Stephen Larrabee, ìThe EU Needs to Rethink Its Cyprus Policy,î Survival, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Autumn 1998) p. 25. In the same edition of this journal Elizabeth H. Prodomou, ìReintegrating Cyprus: The Need for a New Approach,î pp. 5-24; Kalypso, Nicolaidis, ìExploring Second-Best Solutions for Cyprus,î pp. 30-34, and Ergun Olgun, ìRecognizing Two States in Cyprus Would facilitate Co-existence and Stability,î pp. 35-42 represent other perspectives on this issue. Back.
Note 34: See Richard G. Whitman, Core, Periphery, and Security in Europe: Securing Europeís Southern Flank? A Comparison of NATO, EU and WEU Policies and Objectives, î paper delivered before the International Studies Association, March 18-21, 1998, pp. 11-15 for a discussion of some of the economic and commercial benefits, <http://wwwc.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dic/ciao/conf/whr01/whr01.html> Back.
Note 35: See NATOís Mediterranean Initiative: Policy Issues and Dilemmas, pp. 88-101. Back.
Note 36: Ibid., p. 87. Also see the report of the Mediterranean Special Group, North Atlantic Assembly, Security in the North African Region, March 30, 1999, pp. 14-17. < http://www.naa.be/oublications/comrep/1999/as139gsm-e.html> Back.
Note 37: The implications for Turkey include its boundary dispute with Syria, the status of disagreements concerning water rights and the status of Kurdish insurgents in Syria, and Turkeyís evolving security relationship with Israel. Back.