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Developing the Security Agenda: In the Long Run National Security Requires an Enlarged Development Agenda

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Abstract

The sources of many of the threats to the national security of developed countries today lie in fragile states. In such countries governments fail to properly deliver public services and goods (security in particular) to their citizens. In short they are unable to effectively manage or execute their core tasks. The resulting exclusion, uncertainty, poverty and insecurity fuel conflict. Global interconnection and interdependence cause such fragility and conflict to have serious negative regional and international spill-over effects in the form of migration, criminal networks, diseases, environmental degradation, terrorism, more conflict and human trafficking. Richer countries are often quick to label these effects as threats to their own national security. Such labeling is often used to 'securitize' the issue, which results in it being addressed only superficially. The international development agenda, however, aims at tackling the root causes of poverty and conflict. There is great potential across the international development community to address many of today's national security challenges. Sustainable development, however, is a long term, arduous and non-linear process. In the short run – and as a consequence -

national security may require occasional securitization of development. In the long run this is not an advisable strategy. From a development perspective, increased engagement of donor countries in fragile states has significant advantages for their national security interests.

Introduction

In fragile states, security is necessary to enable development in the short run. In the longer run, however, development is a prerequisite for sustainable security.¹ Politicians, policy makers and academics alike have recognized the security – development nexus on many occasions. Its explicit mention in a growing number of policy documents testifies hereof. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) for example states that: 'Security is fundamental to people's livelihoods, reducing poverty and achieving the Millennium Development Goals'.² Regrettably, deeper insights into the implications of this link are hard to find. What, for example, does this statement mean for the suitability of existing development policies and instruments, or for the level of risk donors ought to be prepared to take?

A powerful driver for translating political recognition of the link between development and security into real action, is the connection between the implications and relevance of (in)security in fragile states and the national security interests of developed countries. However, this link is usually only made for the short-term to justify measures and to devote resources that aim to defend presumed national security interests. For example by denoting fragile states as sources of criminal and terrorist networks against which enhanced border controls and restrictions of civil liberties are required. Such measures are often taken for good reason. The short-term focus on fragile states (as sources of threat to the national security of developed countries) might explain why a more elaborate and in-depth understanding of the longer-term link between security and development is unavailable. However, securitization of fragile states refocuses the development agenda on short-term donor interests. This ultimately prevents the international community from addressing the root causes of insecurity and conflict, which is detrimental for fragile states and for the West. Yet the strong overlap in fragile states between the self-interest and morality of the developed world as motives for action creates a win-win situation with positive pay-offs for the development *and* the security agenda.

This article argues that in the long run Western national security interests are well served by increased donor engagement in fragile states.³ Such

¹ An internationally agreed definition of a fragile state does not exist. Section 3 lists some of their characteristics.

² OECD-DAC, *Whole of government approaches to fragile states*, DAC guidelines and reference series, OECD publishing, Paris, 2006, p. 7

³ The usual case to increase engagement in fragile states is made from a development perspective. It is estimated that roughly 10% of the world's

engagement must take place from a development perspective. This requires more integrated policy responses and amalgamated working practices in the field. It also requires the development agenda to lead the security agenda (notwithstanding the occasional temporary necessity to let immediate stabilization needs override development considerations). In the long run the former will benefit the latter more than vice versa. In addition, such engagement will only be meaningful and stand some chance of success when it is based on rigid analysis and prioritization, when it is appropriately sequenced and executed under specific modalities. It is not business as usual.

The aim of the article is threefold. First, it calls for increased donor engagement in fragile states. Not for the usual moral or altruistic reasons, but in the interest of national security in the developed world. Second, as a consequence, it suggests that national security institutions in developed countries should devote more resources to such engagement. Third, it aims to encourage ministries for development cooperation and national security institutions to enter into and institutionalize an action focused dialogue to give effective shape to this engagement.

The originality of the article does not lie in the argument that over the last decade or so security threats to developed societies have become more diffuse and emanate partially from the developing world. This position is well established. It lies in the assertion that to deal with these threats, a stronger development agenda is required – also from a perspective of national security.

To make this case, section 2 argues that two particular post Cold War developments necessitate increased engagement for development in fragile states from the national security of developed countries. Section 3 explores what it means to speak of security and development in situations of fragility and in fragile states. Section 4 finally outlines likely conditions for successful donor engagement in fragile states.

How Fragile States Became More Relevant for Security in the Developed World

Publications on the consequences of the end of the Cold War for today's global security threats and conflict analysis are endless.⁴ This section does not intend to copy such work. Instead, it argues how two post Cold War developments in particular have increased the need to engage in fragile states from a development perspective to meet Western national security

population lives in fragile states and around 30% of the poorest. The Millennium Development Goals (MDG's) are unlikely to be reached without addressing the security - development nexus in fragile states.

⁴ For example: Buzan (B.), Waever (O.), De Wilde (J.), *Security - A New Framework for Analysis*, Lynne Rienner publishers, London, 1998; Smith (R.), *The Utility of Force, the Art of War in the Modern World*, Borzoi Books, New York, 2005.

interests. Subsequently, it outlines two developments that have enabled increased engagement to actually take place. Because it is beyond the scope of this paper to explore these issues in great depth, these developments are only covered superficially.

The first development that increases the relevance of fragile states from a Western security perspective is the disappearance of bi-polar superpower overlay after 1989. During the Cold War many conflicts were subsumed into the greater confrontation between the United States (US) and Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR). However, this did not mean that no conflicts took place. Conflicts continued, but were largely ignored, isolated, contained or used as proxies. However, two main changes became evident: First, Western attention to these conflicts increased. Second, the negative effects of the conflicts were no longer so restrained by the superimposed threat of more familiar interstate Western conflict. Local threats gained space with increased potential to generate global threats. Regretfully, a number of further changes are also said to have occurred as a result of the end of the Cold War. For example, conflict incidence is often said to have been lower throughout the Cold War than afterwards. In addition, it is occasionally advanced that most conflicts during the Cold War were fought by developed countries, as opposed to developing countries after it. Finally, intrastate conflict continues to be frequently regarded as a post Cold War phenomenon. However, none of these statements seems to be supported by data.⁵ The argument that more attention must be paid to the many low intensity intrastate conflicts in the developing world - because of their unending negative spiral and because important checks that used to be in place upon them have been removed - is well-established. Increased public, political and media attention has indeed catalyzed action. Sometimes this has been mainly driven by security interests (Iraq and Afghanistan could be advanced as examples), or sometimes by moral considerations (in Somalia and Haiti for example). However impressive such action may seem, the efforts of the international community in fields like conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction have been largely inadequate and in general not very successful.⁶ Yet conflicts today have greater potential to cause negative regional and global effects. It is remarkable that the majority of current conflicts take place in fragile states and that most fragile states are

⁵ For example, conflict incidence peaked in the period 1978-2002 - including a decade of the Cold War and a decade after it. In terms of who fights most conflicts, Western states indeed conduct most international conflicts. However, Asian and African states are generally the most conflict-prone. With respect to inter- and intrastate conflicts; the latter have always outnumbered the former by at least a factor of three to one: Human Security Center, *Human Security Report 2005 - War and Peace in the 21st Century*, University of British Columbia, OUP, Oxford, 2005, pp. 23-33; HIIK, *Conflictbarometer - Global Conflict Panorama*, Department for Political Science, University of Heidelberg, 1995, 1997-2006. For a contrary view: Smith, op.cit., pp. 269 et seq. (in particular)

⁶ Griffin (M.), 'A Stitch in Time - Making the Case for Conflict Prevention', in: *Security Dialogue*, vol. 32, no. 4, December 2001; Dobbins (J.), McGinn (J.) and Crane (K.) et al., *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq*, RAND Study, New York, 2003

developing countries.⁷ These states suffer from many, complex and interlinked sources of fragility, the mitigation of which requires sustained and comprehensive development. Therefore, Western national security interests require stronger engagement in such countries.

The second development that increases the relevance of fragile states from a Western security perspective is the increase in global and regional spill-over effects (even of low level conflicts) because of growing interconnectedness and interdependence. After the Cold War the process of globalization boosted interaction density and regularity more than ever.⁸ Interconnectedness has increasingly become complemented by interdependence.⁹ This necessitates analysis of the world as a single system. Interdependent states are vulnerable states when abuse of their interconnectedness has negative repercussions on their ability to generate prosperity and security for their citizens. From a conflict perspective this means that the channels through which entrepreneurs of violence can spread the possibilities and effects of conflicts have multiplied. This creates regional and global threats.¹⁰ Conflict and underdevelopment are strongly correlated as is demonstrated by the fact that most of today's conflicts take place in the developing world. For the period 1978 – 2004 Sub-Sahara Africa in particular seems a good illustration of how stagnant human development can combine with a high conflict incidence.¹¹ In the long run only effective and sustained development can prevent the adverse effects of conflict in the developing world to resonate as security threats through the developed world via vastly augmented global channels.

Fortunately, a more conducive environment is shaping up in donor countries to translate the appreciation of the implications of underdevelopment and conflict for national security interests into a larger

⁷ Compare for example the findings of the Human Security Center (op.cit., p. 27 in particular) and the Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy fragile state index: Fund for Peace, *Failed States Index Scores 2007*, <http://fundforpeace.org/web/content/fsi/fsiindex2007.php> (consulted July 2007). Most armed conflicts after the Cold War have been fought in Asia and, increasingly after 1987, in Sub-Sahara Africa (HSC, op.cit., pp. 24-25; HIIK, op.cit. 1996-2006)

⁸ For example: Keohane (K.) and Nye (J.S.), *Power and Interdependence*, 3rd edition, Longman, New York, 2001, pp. 7-8 and 233-235. The implosion of the Soviet block enabled a truly international society and global economy to emerge.

⁹ Interconnectedness refers to the degree and ease with which political entities can interact. Interdependence refers to the (perceived) cost of its disruption (Keohane & Nye, op.cit., 2001, p. 236).

¹⁰ For example: Chabal (P.) and Daloz (J-P.), *Africa Works - Disorder as Political Instrument*, African Issues, Indiana University Press, 1999, pp. 77-91; Adamson (F.), 'Globalisation, Transnational Political Mobilisation, and Networks of Violence', in: *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, vol. 18, number 1, April 2005

¹¹ UN Development Program, *Human Development Report 2005 - international cooperation at a crossroads, aid, trade and security in an unequal world*, UNDP, New York, 2005; HSC, op.cit., p. 24

development agenda. Two such enabling developments merit consideration.

First, the end of the Cold War created policy space and opportunities to bring Western development and security communities and their paradigms closer together. Security has traditionally been a state-centric concept that revolved around the use of threat and warfare as tools of statecraft in order to ensure continuation, enlargement and survival of the state.¹² The Cold War drove this militaristic, state-centered perspective of security to the extreme with its focus on superpower conflict and the nuclear balance. In turn, this subordinated development interests to security interests, at least insofar as the US and the USSR were concerned. This has been amply demonstrated by their use of military and development aid to 'gain' clients in the developing world.¹³ Other countries kept the security and development paradigms largely apart because of fear that the quest for poverty alleviation would become tainted by the strong Cold War focus on militarization. The end of the Cold War has created policy space and opportunities to align these paradigms and their epistemic communities, in particular where they meet most visibly: in situations of fragility characterized by poverty, low income, stagnant economic growth, underdevelopment and the threat of inter or intrastate conflict. In fact, countless examples hereof can be observed today in the form of donor, United Nations (UN), OECD and European Union (EU) policies with regard to conflict, development, fragility and post-conflict reconstruction.¹⁴

Second, the insight has been growing for some time that development is much more than a technical enterprise that can be triggered by stimulating pro-poor economic growth on the basis of neo-liberal free trade and free market principles, or by improving public services.¹⁵ Part of this insight is the realization that development aid and security instruments must be combined to create effective foreign and development policies. In this regard, the notion of human security has helped to some degree to connect the security and development paradigms by complementing the traditional interstate security concept with the individualization of security on the basis of human rights. Policy notions like 'Defense, Diplomacy and Development' (3D) and 'Whole of Government approaches' is also illustrative of the appreciation that due attention must be paid to political and security dynamics in development countries if effective development is to be achieved. However, great reluctance can be found on the part of

¹² For example: Buzan, Waever and De Wilde, op.cit., chapter 1

¹³ Today, the 'war on terror' threatens to securitize development in a similar way.

¹⁴ For example: OECD, *Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States*, OECD, DCD(2005)8/REV2, draft, Paris, 7 April 2005a

¹⁵ Easterly (W.), *The White Man's Burden - Why the West Efforts to Help the Rest have done so Little Good and so Much Ill*, Penguin Books, London, 2006; Ha-Joon Chang, *Kicking Away the Ladder - Development Strategy in Perspective*, Anthem Press, London, 2003

some donors to engage in security issues in developing countries, however necessary this is for sustainable development and for their own security interests.

Fragility: A Security Issue on the Outside, a Development Issue on the Inside

International agreement on an exact definition and list of fragile states has yet to be reached. In no small measure this is due to the strong normative connection of the term. Clearly only states that do not consider themselves fragile label other states as such. The characteristics of fragile states, however, are fairly clear. Generally, fragile states combine (high) conflict (proneness) with inadequate governance – be it administratively or politically. This results in low income, stagnating economic growth, unequal development and an inability to provide minimal public goods. This shrinks the public domain to virtually zero, creates space for the commercialization of public goods and services, often on the basis of the right of the strongest and without much predictability, and voids any legal security.¹⁶ The state is unable to guarantee security for its citizens, unable to maintain the rule of law domestically and unable to deliver basic public services to its citizens.¹⁷ As Fukuyama rightly noted, it is not so much about the scope of state power, it is about its strength in critical public areas.¹⁸ The minimal provision of such collective goods is essential to enable sustainable development, growth and to find a way out of poverty traps. As a result, the Millennium Development Goals stand little chance to be met at current levels of engagement in fragile states. To make things worse, these characteristics are often only the tip of the proverbial iceberg (of fragility) consisting of a complex and interrelated chain of causes, effects and indicators. Specific and situational analysis is required to uncover its key sources in any particular case and to provide political actors with pointers on what successful policy recipes might look like.¹⁹

Today, fragile states are mostly found in the developing world. Yet it would be fair to say that all states have a certain measure of fragility. For example, the situation in Northern-Ireland could long have provided a reason to label the UK a fragile state. Similarly, the compartmentalization of Dutch society from the 1960s through to the 1980s can be taken as an indicator of some fragility. A case could therefore be made not to speak of

¹⁶ For a different view on notions like legal security and the meaning of the public domain in Africa: Chabal and Daloz, op.cit.

¹⁷ World Bank, *Engaging with Fragile States - An IEG Review of World Bank Support to Low-Income Countries under Stress*, World Bank, Washington, 2006; Rotberg (R.), 'Failed States in a World of Terror', in: *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 81, no. 4, July/August 2002, p. 131

¹⁸ Fukuyama (F.), 'The Imperative of State Building', in: *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 15, no. 2, April 2004, pp. 21 et seq.

¹⁹ For a list of common sources of fragility: Fund for Peace and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *'Failed States Index'*, in: *Foreign Policy*, July/August 2005

fragile states but of situations of fragility. After all, Sierra Leone - a fragile state - is wholly incomparable with Pakistan - another fragile state. There are two problems with this approach. First, it does not provide a clear-cut platform for action. The notion of fragile states sits easier with our state-centered conception of the world. They can be pointed out on a map and labeled for action. The notion of situations of fragility, although more nuanced, is analytically more complex and therefore more difficult to address. In the maelstrom of political priorities and events, it is a less useful rally point. Second, as all societies exhibit some fragility, the only reason to deal with it as a dominant label is when it has exceeded a threshold beyond which it cannot be dealt with as part of another dominant label. In many countries, sources and situations of fragility are for example addressed as part of a governmental Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) or a regular development program. The label 'fragile state' is a label most usefully applied for policy and action purposes to those states that exhibit fragility in the extreme. It is the view of the author that a critical determinant is the likelihood of conflict to erupt - against the backdrop of poor governance, low income levels and stagnant development.²⁰ Today, fragile states probably cover around 80-90 % of those existing situations of fragility that have a high conflict probability. As long as this parallel holds, the use of fragile states as a prism for analysis and action is helpful.

Fragility, of course, is nothing new. History has seen a long list of fragile states pass by. The normal consequence of fragility used to be that fragile states ceased to exist because they were conquered (e.g. the Italian city states, the Austrian-Hungarian empire and the Ottoman empire), because they imploded (e.g. Czarist Russia and Yugoslavia) or because they lost part of their territory or resources to outsiders who took advantage of their fragility.²¹

What is new is the combination of an unprecedented scale and incidence of *state* fragility on the one hand, and evolved notions of sovereignty and morality on the other. A cursory glance at political history shows state fragility to be of European making. In Europe, state formation occurred through a lengthy competitive process of elimination between various non-sovereign entities from roughly the 12th through to the 18th century. It was only thereafter that the European state became the globally dominant form of political organization. It did so by being exported beyond the continent through the processes of colonization and decolonization. In particular in the period of decolonization (1945-1975) former colonizers organized

²⁰ Poor governance generally takes the shape of inadequate administrative capability to deliver public services, of disputed legitimacy of political leaders or both.

²¹ I want to differentiate wars between strong (or at least functioning) states from wars within fragile states and from wars between a strong state and a weak state. After all, to equal defeat in battle with state fragility because security has been insufficiently provided by the losing side would represent a circular argument. Conflicts between strong states are decreasing (HSR, op.cit., 2005).

their decolonized territories in the image of the European state.²² One can take the position that the Western concept of the state was imposed on societies to which it was alien, particularly in the case of Africa.²³ In addition, the notion of sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention grew stronger during the Cold War for reasons of prudence and to minimize conflict. After the period of decolonization they were also eagerly seized by non-Western countries to safeguard their newly found independence against foreign intrusion. These notions act as breaks on addressing fragility, in particular before it erupts into conflict.²⁴ Although this is an extremely rough portrayal of events, it probably helps to explain the existence of clusters of fragile states – such as in Western Africa, the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa.²⁵ It almost makes sense to speak of fragile regions instead of fragile states.

This has two serious consequences. First, when a fragile state is surrounded by fragile states, there is hardly any danger of state fragility resulting in state disappearance. More benignly, there are no strong states that have an interest in acting as regional policeman. Even South Africa has so far not undertaken this role with much gusto vis-à-vis, for example, Zimbabwe. Second, fragility all around stimulates warfare by proxy as state forces are non-existent or insufficient to achieve objectives. However, proxies generally come to lead a life of their own and attempt to carve out local power bases. They may form states within the state, adding an additional layer of complexity. The wars in the Great Lakes region, and in particular the situation in Eastern Congo, provide examples hereof.

Fragile states, let alone fragile regions, are territories in which public control is wanting and power vacuums wait to be filled. This creates opportunities for the unscrupulous to engage in violent activities such as criminality, conflict and terrorism. Investment in such activities creates incentives to protect and to continue them. Alternatives become less and less attractive because of sunk costs and because warlord rule makes more lawful investment extremely risky as one cannot be sure that profits can be reaped in due time. These activities in turn create or reinforce migration, poverty and stagnation. Because the world today is global and

²² Van Veen (E.), 'Order in world politics - an inquiry into the concept, change and the EU's contribution', UNU, Centre for Regional Integration Studies, *Occasional Paper O-2006/17*, Bruges, July 2006, pp. 9-10

²³ Bayly (C.), *The Birth of the Modern World - 1780-1914*, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 2004, pp. 254-255; The state was not 'exported' as a fixed blueprint but rather as a malleable one that could be adapted and merged with local traditions and institutions. For instance in India and China it amalgamated with the strong local bureaucracies and dynasties of the Mugal and Qing empires. In Africa less developed forms of local governance existed and hence the state model was more alien and imposed more holistically. (Ibid, pp. 255-260)

²⁴ Once conflict has erupted, the chance of international intervention has in fact increased since 1989. The number of UN peacekeeping operations (61 as of 1948) for example grew significantly: 1948 (2); 1950's (2), 1960's (6), 1970's (3), 1980's (5), 1990's (35) and 2000's (8, so far).

²⁵ Also: Fukuyama (F.), *op.cit.*, p. 18; Kaplan (R.), *The Coming Anarchy - Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War*, Vintage Books, New York, 2001

interconnected as never before, such situations are also of paramount concern to those far-off – both for moral reasons and out of self interest. The role of Colombia and Afghanistan as centers of global trade in cocaine and heroin is illustrative.

To sum up, the problems that beset fragile states cause security threats to Western national security interests. Because the institutions that are tasked with ensuring national security usually have a domestic and inward focus, they often take measures that securitize these threats. In the short term this is likely to be effective. However, insecurity and instability are not usually the causes of fragility, but the effects. As a result, they cannot be addressed effectively by short term securitization measures. Instead, they require long term engagement from a development perspective. To meaningfully ensure national security, relevant domestic institutions need a stronger outward orientation, in particular towards fragile states. They must combine short term securitization measures with being part of a long term development agenda. For the latter such institutions need to ally with departments for development cooperation.

Conditions for Successful Engagement in Fragile States

Engaging in fragile states is not business as usual. A tailor-made approach, based on good situational analysis, is required. Nevertheless, some general principles for engagement can be distinguished.²⁶ This section explores the consequences of some of these principles from a Western national security perspective. In particular it looks at what they may mean for domestic institutions charged with ensuring national security.

First, because the causes of fragility are many and complex, a broad range of parallel interventions will be required to assist the host government to create some semblance of order that might lead to development. Unfortunately, national capacity is usually very weak. As a result, priorities need to be set and appropriate sequencing is critical. This can only be done on the basis of continuous and careful analysis. In most cases, restoring some measure of security first will be critical. Without security there can be no rule of law and without rule of law there can be no economic reconstruction or development.²⁷ Security Sector Reform is an important and relatively new area for action.²⁸ As the national government

²⁶ For example: OECD, op. cit.; World Bank, 2006, op. cit.

²⁷ For example: Steiner (M.), Seven Principles for Building Peace, in: *World Policy Journal*, Summer 2003, p. 91; According to the World Bank, the main generic drivers of economic growth are: 1) a stable and conducive investment climate, 2) predictable conditions for investors, 3) rapid accumulation of physical and human capital, 4) efficient resource allocation, 5) technological progress and 6) sharing the benefits of growth. Clearly, these drivers can only work when an adequate degree of security and stability has been established (World Bank, *Economic growth in the 1990s - Learning from a Decade of Reform*, Washington, 2005).

²⁸ For example: OECD, *Security System Reform and Governance*, DAC guidelines and reference series, OECD publishing, Paris, 2005b; Schnabel (A.), Ehrhart (H-

generally lacks the security apparatus, the skill and perhaps even the intent to accomplish these ends, strong donor action might be required. In addition, this action needs to be integrated in the sense that it involves all key domestic security actors, such as military, police, customs, intelligence and legal professionals. In search of their *raison d'être* after the Cold War, quite a number of Western militaries have effectively made the turn from homeland defense to international peacekeeping. The necessary shift in doctrine, training and toolkits is still in full swing. As a result, involvement of the military is not usually an issue. The challenge for the military is not so much the switch from classic battlefield warfare to flexible and rapid response at all levels of violence, but the need to operate more as a reinforced police force with a development mindset rather than as military units. The goal has ceased to be the achievement of a set objective through the maximum application of force. Instead, it has become the achievement of changing objectives through the minimum application of force.²⁹ Engagement of Western police forces and legal professionals in fragile states, however, needs urgent attention. Usually police and legal systems are already strained to deliver security and justice domestically and as a consequence often lack the resource for large scale international engagement. Creative enablers must therefore be found. Financing a permanent capacity for such engagement with Official Development Aid, for example, is not inconceivable to relieve stretched domestic budgets.

Second, because capacity in fragile states is usually weak, coordinated multilateral engagement is often to be preferred over bilateral engagement. This requires national militaries, police forces, intelligence and legal professionals to cooperate closely internationally. This proves extremely difficult, as the current situation in Afghanistan for example shows. Not only is confidentiality an issue for some of these organizations, also national preferences and views may stand in the way of creating common responses when insufficient willingness exist to compromise. This observation points to two suggestions. First, collaborative frameworks in for example the EU and UN between police, justice and intelligence organizations must be strengthened. For instance, the EU's third pillar (regarding the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice) must come to include a broader developmental perspective and it must be joined up much closer with the second pillar (the European Foreign and Security Policy area).

G.) eds., *Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Peace Building*, United Nations University, UNU Press, Tokyo, 2005

²⁹ Smith, op.cit. It may be argued that such force transformation is long underway and that this is old news. However, the Brahimi report, the current struggle of coalition and American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and the changing requirements of the military in peace keeping operations suggest rather differently. Also: Kuhne (W.), *UN-Friedenseinsätze in einer Welt regionaler und globaler Sicherheitsrisiken - Entwicklung, Probleme und Perspektive*, ZIF, Analyse 06/05, 2005

Third, the good governance agenda is not wholly appropriate for fragile states. The predominant challenge is to establish governance, not necessarily good governance. An increase in the effectiveness of governance will work to increase legitimacy – but only in the longer run and without immediately role modeling best practices in the field of human rights. Such an approach requires extreme flexibility on the part of donors, and for example on the part of legal professionals, to accept practices that they would regard as bad, corrupt or inadequate. Governance arrangements need to be flexible and tailored to local circumstances. As Daloz and Chabal attempt to demonstrate, Western political and legal thinking will most likely need to be discarded or modified in many instances.³⁰

Fourth, long term engagement is required for success. The causes of fragility cannot be effectively addressed in the short run. Donors will need to engage substantially and for a long time if they want to have an impact. This requires capability, which is not as evidently available as it might seem. Collier, for example, has argued that ‘over-the-horizon’ security guarantees have proven to be effective conflict prevention measures. Yet they require large military presence and capability.³¹ Overstretch of many coalition forces in Afghanistan illustrates that if donors want to engage more intensely and lengthily in fragile states, they need to be willing to raise (for example) defense and police budgets substantially for longer periods of time. In order to ensure national security in the long run, politicians must be able to convince taxpayers that part of their money is more effectively spend abroad.

Finally, donors need to be willing to run substantial risk for engagement in fragile states to be effective. In particular in such states, Official Development Aid is high risk venture capital. It invests where no commercial organizations dares to, backed up by moral considerations and the taxpayer’s purse. Returns on investment are extremely uncertain and nine out of ten investments fail. The reason for continued investment is the expected profits of a successful investment. At least four main risks can be distinguished. To start with, engagement in the field of security runs a substantial risk of having to accept casualties. The expectations of military and police forces, but in particular those of publics in developed countries must be managed in such a way that the level of casualties cannot be manipulated as a variable by local spoilers to hasten retreat. Moreover, the risk of corruption looms large. Western taxpayers probably will have to accept that bribery functions as a sort of risk premium and increase the cost of engagement. Another risk is that newly-built (security) institutions can be captured by individuals with an agenda they seek to impose through the use of violence. This may cause relapses and discourage donors from continuing their engagement. Finally, in their attempts to initiate a

³⁰ Chabal and Daloz, op.cit.

³¹ Collier (P.), ‘African Security, what the statistics suggest’, in: Bates (R.), Collier (P.), Hale (D.) et al., *African Security, Commodities and Development*, Whitehall report 4-06, The Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies, 2006, p. 10

momentum towards order, donors may have to do business with unsavory local figureheads. This puts a premium on channeling part of the engagement through civil society (if existent) to forestall solidification of conflict-based power structures that generally favor a specific party, are unlikely to be unrepresentative and might contain the seeds of future conflict.

Conclusion: National Security Requires the Development of Fragility

Some threats to Western national security interests today find their origin in fragile states. To a large degree this can be ascribed to the end of the Cold War that 'unfroze' an existing array of fragile situations and conflicts, which were hitherto largely held in check by it. Attention for and awareness of many situations of fragility, which already existed, increased after the Cold War because politicians, media and publics shed their exclusive focus on the superpower standoff.

At the moment, the incidence of state fragility is high and a cause for concern. Fragile states themselves hardly pose threats to Western national security. It would, after all, be rather implausible to label a state that is torn by conflict and at the bottom of the global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) pyramid as a threat. It is rather the privatization of public space in fragile states that offers opportunities to entrepreneurs who engage in harmful activities. These activities and their consequences are likely to spread globally. Examples are not only criminality and terrorism, but also environmental degradation, human trafficking and the increased spread of diseases like AIDS. Such entrepreneurs have the chance to do so because the state fails to execute its core tasks. Their activities stall development. Lack of development, in turn, fuels insecurity. As a result, engagement in fragile states should be driven by security *and* development concerns and objectives. Because of the urgency of security threats, the tendency exists for issues to be securitized. Yet the causes of state fragility are too complex, plentiful and interlinked to be successfully securitized. It is the development agenda that stands the best chance of making the causes of fragility more manageable. From this perspective, at least four key recommendations emerge if donors aim to engage effectively in fragile states:

First, to ensure high-level strategy setting and coordinated responses, donor countries should create a mechanism at cabinet level that institutionalizes 'Whole of Government' analysis and engagement. Involvement of only ministries of development cooperation will stand a much lower chance of success. Second, the involvement of national security institutions of developed countries must be increased (police, justice, intelligence and customs in particular). This requires enhanced capacity, different doctrines and training, which should be coordinated and paid for by ministries for development cooperation (for example out of current Official Development Aid (ODA) budgets). Third, developed countries have to reduce their bilateral policies to a minimum. Instead, multilateral organizations should be given a broader mandate for field operations and be allowed to fulfill a stronger leadership role. Naturally,

this should come with increasing accountability to deliver. As a consequence, multilateral strategies for engagement in fragile states might have to be accepted that only partially reflect domestic preferences. Fourth, within donor countries a critical debate on risk-taking needs to take place between parliamentarians and ministers. The significant risks of engagement in fragile states will have to be recognized and democratically managed. Chief amongst those risks is the possibility of failure with taxpayer's money since development and peace usually occur when local actors are ready.

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