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## Regulated Private Security Companies versus a Professional Security Sector: A Cautionary Tale

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### Abstract

In a culture, where regulation trumps responsibility, perceptions count more than reality, and means triumph over ends, it is unsurprising that calls for the regulation of private security companies should come before the professionalisation of security practitioners. The pursuit of transparency and openness are to be admired, but they do not of themselves guarantee honesty or defeat deception. In the private security sector, where private security companies are but one part, the strategic direction of its myriad organisations is ultimately conducted through the fingertips of individual human beings. It is at this individual level that fundamental differences between the right and wrong of all matters security might have greater traction.

## Introduction

Private Security Companies (PSCs), as actors in the international arena, appear to be suffering from a crisis of legitimacy. Unsurprisingly, their regulation is being demanded from organisations 'outside' their own industry. Curiously, honourably even, it is desired by their own organisations. This paper argues that the recent establishment of the British Association of Private Security Companies (BAPSC) and its call for regulation may very well be a sincere and genuine endeavour to discard a tarnished image, but fundamentally, it is an inappropriate solution to a mis-diagnosis of the problem. Regulation is not necessarily the deliverer of legitimacy. Furthermore, the private security sector needs professionalisation for the many rather than regulation for an elite few.

## Legitimacy

Set aside the geo-political legitimacy of military engagement in Iraq, and to a lesser degree Afghanistan. Set aside the wisdom of strategic decision-making that cut military resource in the post-Cold War era. Set aside, even, the combination of these two features, which catalysed a questionable private sector boom time for 'security'. What you have left is an unquestionable burgeoning of the function of security being conducted by the private sector because the state cannot or will not.<sup>1</sup> In the UK, at least, this can range from the bizarre inclusion of wheel clampers at one end of the scale to the coordination of aspects of coalition intelligence activity in Iraq at the other. Somewhere in between, it is now possible to be caught for a crime and be placed in custody without ever seeing a traditional policeman empowered with the authority of Constable.<sup>2</sup> It is this privatisation of security rather than the organisations it has fostered, which should be seeking legitimacy.

The purpose behind the (self-imposed) call for regulation of PSCs in the UK centres crucially on this issue of legitimacy - the legitimacy of sub-state actors to act, tacitly or explicitly, as part of a broader nation state foreign policy. Yet, this purpose seems to be centred more on the perception of their actions - image - than the reality of their contribution - outcome.<sup>3</sup> The discussion surrounding the form of such regulation dissolves to three basic options: a government-centred regulatory body; an independent ombudsman dealing with 'grievances'; or 'aggressive' self-regulation.<sup>4</sup> This paper attempts to show that, notwithstanding the undoubted sincerity of the call, it is misjudged contextually and operationally.

It is misjudged contextually because it simply pre-empts a solution to the nation-state versus globalisation debate, whose impact we are only just beginning to fathom (notwithstanding its identification as a phenomenon by Leavitt in 1983).<sup>5</sup> Happily, globalisation is not the subject of this piece. It is misjudged operationally for three reasons: first, it elevates the status of PSCs beyond that of the security sector as a whole; second, it misplaces its faith in the power of regulation; and third, it has failed to recognise that meaningful outcome trumps risk management in an

enlightened world. To address these operational deficits, action might better be centred on a broader professionalising of individuals practising within the wider private security sector than the regulation of PSCs.

## **The wider private security sector and the 'security commons'**

The delivery of security, whether at an operational level in terms of countering threats to assets, or in an ontological sense in terms of delivering the feeling of being secure, is no longer (if it ever was) within the gift of the state alone. Contemporary governments have of course come to see it as their primary responsibility, largely because they have forgotten that their primary responsibility is to set goals, objectives and ends, before enabling the means to achieve them. In doing so, deliberately or otherwise, they disastrously exchange means for ends.<sup>6</sup> But, again, that is another debate.<sup>7</sup> Security today has become, rightly or wrongly, a society-wide affair - public, private, academic, non-governmental, and private citizen. Indeed its individual executors are taken from society in order to deliver security through their various sectors on behalf of society. Metaphorically speaking, they return back to that broader society at the end of their respective working days. The interesting question is, not so much that the private sector now shares part of the national security burden, but at what point it become a competition between the sectors? Again - another debate.

The composition of this private security sector today extends some way beyond the activities currently undertaken by private security companies (PSCs).<sup>8</sup> Some of the biggest companies are household names. Group 4 Securicor alone employs some 400,000 people, works in 110 countries, has a market capitalisation of £2 bn plus, and, just like Tesco, is answerable to its shareholders and ultimately regulated by the FSA by virtue of being publicly listed.<sup>9</sup> Meanwhile Securitas the Swedish-founded security company is reckoned to control 12 percent of the security market across Europe and America.<sup>10</sup> One of the most significant UK assets - Canary Wharf - whether weighed-up in terms of critical national infrastructure or global financial worth, is entirely privately 'policed'. And all of this discounts the defence industry contribution to security matters, and who are almost entirely contained within the private sector.

There are already some 60-plus private security sector associations operating in the UK who offer some sort of practitioner 'guidance' for their various members. Yet, their membership overlaps, their members migrate internally around the sector, and they belong to several such associations at the same time. Some of these associations are genuinely interested in pursuing excellence. Others are merely collections of administrative functionaries and disenchanting factions. They are all unregulated, unfederated and formally disparate and would be the first to recognise their own lack of cohesion.<sup>11</sup> For some of them, the Security Industry Authority (SIA) was the outcome of similar calls for regulation, and the recent issue of the somewhat childlike British Standard 8549:2006 (by the British Standards Institute not the SIA) is the first attempt at proscribing 'security consultants'.<sup>12</sup>

## Risk and regulation

Western societies, the US and UK in particular, have become increasingly atomised and individuated for a variety of socially constructed reasons.<sup>13</sup> It is unsurprising that organisations and individuals alike clamour for a pseudo-sense of security, oriented towards a formalised regulatory-based approach rather than more meaningful trust-based arrangements. This is entirely commensurate with the unchallenged dominance of perception over reality in a 'risk society' age.<sup>14</sup>

There has been little inclination for the UK government to pursue regulation of what have euphemistically come to be called PSCs since its 2002 green paper.<sup>15</sup> In that original paper the notion of a PSC was blended with that of a private military company (PMC). Regrettably, the association with the application of organised violence - or even more euphemistically guns for hire and the soldier mercenary - persists. Indeed the distinction between the two is often reduced to whether the company bears arms or not, rather than any meaningful function they serve by doing so. This stereotype simply fails to acknowledge a realistic assessment of the circumstances in which they conduct business. Thus, it is the perception of what they might do with such weapons rather than what they actually do, that has become important. This emotional distinction is unhelpful.

Since 2002, but more pertinently since 9/11, PSCs have broadened out into other areas of practice corresponding with the perceived changing character of risk that face society as a whole and the commercial world in particular. Their scope seems to cover four key areas:

- Private information and analysis brokerage
- Support to nation-state conflict operations
- Support to post-conflict operations
- The facilitation of commercial operations in difficult environments

Of course there are many other taxonomies.<sup>16</sup> Broadly, it might be argued at least that the management of risk, if not explicit to the varied roles of PSCs, is certainly tacitly what they are about. Indeed, 'new' risks, including environmental and political, as well as the creation of resilient systems to combat them, are now felt to be within their purview.<sup>17</sup> However, the assumptions underpinning the treatment of risk are fashionably but woefully skewed towards the precautionary and pre-emptive. Whatever the motives - commercial or altruistic (or, more likely, some combination thereof) - precaution and pre-emption as principles are intellectually incoherent.<sup>18</sup> They invariably invoke the law of unintended consequences more often than treating the originating hazard.<sup>19</sup> Suffice to say that the PSC desire for regulation may be a perfect simile for the precautionary principle. Popper had withering advice for the precautionary advocate: "Can we expect to get anything more than the irresponsible reply of the soothsayer if we ask a man what the future has in store for mankind?"<sup>20</sup>

Iraq since 2003 has been a key catalyst to the viability of PSCs commercially if not efficaciously.<sup>21</sup> Similarly, Iraq and Afghanistan have returned the debate to the necessity or otherwise for PSCs to be regulated. Arguably, as Coalition presence in Iraq declines then the necessity for PSCs may similarly decline. Of course, the opposite argument may also pertain: the necessity of PSCs may increase as conventional forces decline.<sup>22</sup> There are many other contributing motives for PSC regulation: the sense that PSCs are short-termist and profit-oriented; that they are legitimised by forceful deterrence rather than community acceptance; that they are un-punishable, un-governable and thus unaccountable in both humanitarian and commercial senses; that they undermine government and inter-governmental policy; that they operate a 'revolving door' and plausible deniability policy with governments; that they are secretive rather than transparent.<sup>23</sup> On the face of it, these are truly Platonic charges of tyrannical and anti-democratic proportions that warrant heavy censure let alone control?

Yet, there is a downside to regulation, particularly when exercised in the contemporary climate of political disengagement, social disaggregation, and scientific disbelief.<sup>24</sup> It becomes a government's lazy way of exercising power rather than its more exhaustive duty of debating ideas in areas of uncertainty that in turn necessitate wise judgement and leadership as key parts of the political process. Managerialism *becomes* the politics - risk management particularly so. Thus, it is somewhat ironic that we have recently witnessed the Head of the Health and Safety Executive exhorting us to 'get a life', when we are witness to the demise and fall of so-called risks like sunbathing, the MMR vaccine, avian flu, vCJD, GM foods, obesity or 'size zero' thinness (which is it?), salt intake, alcohol intake, sugar intake, to suggest just a few examples of moral panic.<sup>25</sup> Indeed, the Better Regulation Commission has identified the 'regulation spiral' by which public perception becomes erroneously interpreted by government as a call for something to be done.<sup>26</sup> Government obliges. Unintended consequences occur, and public frustration spirals further away from reality as risk communication efforts compound the error. PSCs will equally be damned by the false promises of regulation, whether the government does it to them or whether they do it themselves.

Of course, there are many cases where regulation does prove effective; but it is usually when the outcomes are well known and highly positively correlated to their likelihood. Scientifically, likelihood can only be determined when sufficient data is available to constitute authentic probabilities. Yet, regulation will call for measurements and targets, regardless of the meaningfulness of their data, and all in the face of uncertainty, which by very definition militates against quantification in the first place. It is much more that the climate, which calls for regulation as default, is the pernicious one. The emotional urge to be seen to be doing something is more powerful than the rational necessity to be logical. It seems simplistic to say so; but regulators regulate – they find things to do to justify their existence. Thus, once risks are given their own autonomy and are in some way set free, perceived at least to ravage our lives without any interdiction by human beings actively managing them, then precaution becomes the only tool to deal with them. In the absence

of data, regulation becomes precautionary absent the logic of cost-benefit analytical judgement.

## A government role

The UK government, for its part does not appear keen to engage in the direction of PSC activity? This does appear surprising, given their recent propensity to regulate nearly every aspect of contemporary life, informally through pronouncement if not formally by statute. It may be that they are genuinely attracted to the notion of limiting additional regulation.<sup>27</sup> It may be that they wish to remain at arms length from the very image that PSCs themselves feel that they create. It may be that a politically sensitive regime, oriented entirely to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, is too busy, too pre-occupied, or too paralysed to act now. It may be too difficult given the intractability of defining the units of the phenomenon in the first place: what is a PSC versus a PMC; what is security precisely; why do we differentiate it as 'private' when we see no need to label Tesco a '*private*' food retailer' for example. It may be that they are having their fingers burned by the teething problems of the SIA, established to deal with standards, employment conditions, and inherent criminality aspects of the domestic UK private security sector. Alternatively, it may be that there is only a perception of illegitimacy rather than any reality and thus perhaps no real case to answer.

One of the challenges of PSC regulation is its international dimension. Any international effort to legitimise PSCs through an international regulatory framework seem intractable in the light of all other efforts to engage politically at an international level, whether it is over climate change, justice, or conventional military intervention.<sup>28</sup> The globalisation of issues, in other words the diminution of the significance of nation-state boundaries, makes the present system of international government, rather than genuine global government, fraught with difficulty. In practice the notion of an international regulatory system being open and available to plaintiffs from developing or unstable countries seems intuitively unworkable, if not one-sided, in the contemporary hegemonic environment. Furthermore, the regulation of other national PSCs by their own countries let alone other nationals employed by UK PSCs seem marginally less problematic but no less important. In the absence of an international regulatory system, PSCs should concentrate on winning arguments in the global public domain based upon the meaningful outcomes that they profess to be capable of delivering. It is the audience that need to be persuaded, not the rest of the cast.

From historical and philosophical perspectives it seems extraordinary that any government chooses to break the link between it and the application of organised violence that has characterised the *nature* of war since Clausewitz.<sup>29</sup> The nature of war remains the application of organised violence for political ends; whatever forms its *character* may take – asymmetric, effects-based, 4<sup>th</sup>-generation, or network-centric.<sup>30</sup> Yet, what happens after war, or perhaps more accurately, the bits in between, which might loosely be described as 'peace', is not so easy to define. Yet, it is in peace where security as a concept most comfortably resides. It is

unfortunate that the Pope has banned the concept of 'limbo', since it rather neatly represents the notion of security and security operations as the activity essential to transit us from war to peace in many non-pacific contemporary societies. The canon of literature on the application of violence for political ends leaves no doubt that government must play a directing role or be accused of totally abandoning the field of political engagement and any understanding of what power means. Furthermore, as Nye has warned, the application of power has both hard and soft elements.<sup>31</sup> The soft is about winning a battle of ideas, values and principles. This might be the more appropriate route for the BAPSC in the conduct of their external public relation effort rather than the harder route of regulation.

## **A professional project**

The central argument of this paper has two sides to it. First, and to summarise so far: rather than pandering to regulation and other knee-jerk reactions, like so many institutions do in a Pavlovian response to so-called crises, PSCs might do better to win the more substantive battle of perception by arguing for and demonstrating the reality of their efficacy. Second, that they are missing the bigger opportunity and necessity to engage in a professional project across the entire security sector in order to confer legitimacy upon individuals who practise the art of security. In much the same way that doctors, lawyers and accountants ply their respective professions under the auspices of statutory professional 'councils', it is the practitioners themselves who constitute collective behaviour. A professional project is of itself a proactive, expansive, and inclusive project rather than a limiting one. A professional security project would attend to the individuals that move around the private security sector, while its companies remain static (or worse transient). Ultimately, it is more often the illegal or unethical behaviour of individuals as part of a group endeavour that will impact upon the reputation of companies striving collectively to do the right thing. The reality can be tackled at the individual level, but the group must argue the perception.

There is a considerable literature on the nature of a profession and the conduct of a professional project.<sup>32</sup> Broadly, a professional project has five key stages:<sup>33</sup>

- Engagement in a 'conversation' to check whether there is 'desire' for and 'consensus' around the notion of professional status
- The development of a capability for occupational negotiation
- Definition of the boundary of what the profession does
- The closing-down of the occupational boundary by professional qualification
- Creation of a professional monopoly by dominating the supply of professionals

Arguably, the BAPSC is implicitly engaging in such an activity already. The establishment of association, programme of debate, and call for regulation, reflect the first three steps at least. It may also reflect the

beginning of a creation of monopoly, although more by subjective proclamation than objective qualification. However, to claim or proclaim professionalism absent from any supporting framework is another matter.

The nature of a profession has some equally agreed common characteristics:<sup>34</sup>

- A set of standards and code of ethics
- Recognised fora for discussion
- A body of knowledge, learned writing, and a historical perspective
- An examinable set of core competencies together with a certification programme
- An educational discipline to prepare students and practitioners in the functions and philosophies of the profession

Neither regulation nor professionalisation will deter illegal or unethical activity. However, a profession will address it more closely at the individual level and independently set the determination of standards, ethics, certification, and knowledge. Already in this short piece several significant shapers of contemporary security have been set aside for debate elsewhere: globalisation; the precautionary principle; cost-benefit analysis; political objectives and decision-making; the nature of security; and risk society. They seem less within the purview of regulation than the key components of a professional body.

## **The perception argument**

The notion of perception is important. The most useful example of the paralysis of perception is the animal experimentation industry and the activist and violent extremist organisations ranged against it. Animal experimentation is itself highly regulated; yet the perception of an uncaring, cruel and unnecessary endeavour has persisted, until quite recently, despite the regulation. It is of course frightening and intimidating to be subjected to the constant abuse and attention of such a bunch of losers, loners and cranks; but the real debate about the efficacy of animal experimentation has been effectively subducted by the perception of it, abetted by the fear, that its protestors have created. It is only recently that those engaged in animal research have had the courage to challenge that perception publicly, to engage in a public debate and demonstrate exactly what animal testing does for humanity (let alone animals).<sup>35</sup> In the same way that claiming a grievance forecloses debate in the atmosphere of the politics of fear today, so too does failing to stand-up for what you believe to be right. There are very genuine issues to be discussed about the ethical necessity of such experimentation, but to be permanently debating the perceptions rather than the realities is paralysis. Regulation does not help them against activist protest; winning the arguments does. In the case of PSCs, one might ask how it is that the general perception and transparency of NGOs, 'competitors' to PSCs in the humanitarian environment perhaps, is such that they retain an image of being the 'good guys' in this work, often at the expense of PSCs. Whereas the reality of some NGO effort, most recently in the 2004 tsunami for example, can be seen as deeply unattractive.



The notion of transparency is important here. If by transparency it is simply meant something approximating to the opposite of secrecy then transparency will not defeat deception.<sup>36</sup> Transparency in that sense - compliance and audit - will not stop transgression. Rather transparency and accountability become organising principles in their own right absent any purpose for organisation in the first place.<sup>37</sup> However, if transparency is an endeavour to confer legitimacy in the sense of trust creation, then that needs to be done by demonstrating efficacy and winning arguments. The general Medical Council did not stop Harold Shipman, the Criminal Records Bureau could not have stopped the Soham murders, and Enron happened despite the plethora of corporate regulation. It is interesting that in all these cases there has been a call for more regulation. And more regulation has been delivered, shifting the emphasis of societal activity from meaningful outcomes as ends to meaningless process as ends in itself. Regulation and the application of the precautionary principle can only preserve and conserve reputations at best - an inevitably degenerative process. The new medical regulation for general medical practitioners is unlikely to stop a similar Shipman, but it may deter another Louis Pasteur!<sup>38</sup>

## Conclusion

The quest for legitimacy, regardless of who wants it, should lie less in the sophistry of regulation and more in the demonstration of meaningful outcomes. Additionally, it should lie less in deference to the efficacy of nation-states to govern internationally and more in the trust conferred (or not) upon PSCs by other globalised actors, as they themselves display trustworthiness. Most importantly, it should lie less in pandering to the perception of risk and more in determining the reality of risk. Decisions and policies can then be made in support of real objectives as ends, rather than means to ends becoming objectives. Regulation in response to the perceptions of image rather than the reality of their activity seems a negative approach based upon a false prospectus.

Legitimacy can be conferred to a very great degree upon individuals through the pursuit of a professional project aimed at the individual rather than the corporate entity. Strategy may be fashioned by the collective wisdom of institutions of power, but ultimately it has to be exercised through the fingertips of people engaged in real work. Nothing has changed in the nature of people so much that they can no longer distinguish right from wrong for themselves. However, much has changed in the character of institutions of government to trust them to do so.

Regulation cannot pick the bad from the good in any sophisticated manner where uncertainty prevails. It is a broad-brush approach, as likely to lead to mediocrity, bureaucracy and risk aversion as it is to the eradication of genuine hazard. More likely, it is risk-taking, the pursuit of excellence, and a 'light touch' that may add meaningful value. Indeed, there is no silver bullet to guarantee the legitimate conduct of any set of practitioners. Individual behaviour is as varied and unpredictable as there are

individuals. A doctor, lawyer or accountant is broadly legitimised to practice anywhere, having conformed to the intellectual, practical and ethical standards set by the relevant profession. These standards and requirements reside with, and are conferred upon, the individual not the employer. Thus, it is the broad church of the security 'industry' which should be looking to a professional project centred on the individual, rather than the apparent self-flagellation of a few organisations hell-bent on regulation. PSCs should spend more time tending their reputation than their regulation, and be careful what they wish for. They may get it!

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<sup>1</sup> George, B., Button, M., 2000, *Private Security*, Leicester: Perpetuity Press Limited, ISBN: 1-8999287-70-1.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> For an example of the image portrayed for them, see: Mathieu, F., Dearden, N., 2006, *Corporate Mercenaries: The Threat of Private Military and Security Companies*, War on Want, London. Accessible at: <http://www.waronwant.org/Corporate+Mercenaries+13275.twl>

<sup>4</sup> These were the three options outlined for the First British Association of Private Security Companies' Conference held at the Royal United Services Institute 30-31 October 2006.

<sup>5</sup> For an interesting if somewhat controversial analysis of the broader deficits of nation-state-centred diplomacy in a globalised world, see: Ross, C., 2007, *Independent Diplomat: Dispatches from an Unaccountable Elite*, London: Hurst & Company, ISBN: 978-1-85065-843-6.

<sup>6</sup> Gibson, S.D., 2005, In the Eye of the Perfect Storm: Re-imagining, Reforming and Refocusing Intelligence for Risk, Globalisation and Changing Societal Expectation, *Risk Management: An International Journal*, 7, 4, 23-41.

<sup>7</sup> For a useful treatment of this demise, see: Furedi, F., 2005, *Politics of Fear*, London: Continuum. ISBN: 0-8264-8728-9.

<sup>8</sup> George, B., Button, M., 2000, *op cit.*

<sup>9</sup> Contrast this company alone to all the UK PSCs combined as described in BAPSC's 'Insight, Information, Influence' pamphlet, available at: <http://www.bapsc.org.uk>

<sup>10</sup> See: <http://www.securitas.com/en/About-Securitas/>

<sup>11</sup> It must seem slightly paradoxical that many of these same associations are able to combine to form a Guild of Security Professionals before actually creating a profession. Establishing a Guild is a prerequisite to becoming a livery company of the City of London. Livery companies have varying degrees of association with the craft trades they originate from and are as equally devoted to charitable as 'professional' work. See: <http://www.professionalsecurity.co.uk/company/index.htm>

<sup>12</sup> See: <http://www.bsonline.bsi-global.com/search/results/1> and enter '8549:2006'. You can read the Security Institute response here: [http://www.security-institute.org/Press\\_Release\\_on\\_BS\\_8549-71.html](http://www.security-institute.org/Press_Release_on_BS_8549-71.html) (they don't approve), or a pro response here: <http://www.securityconsultants.org.uk/content/news.asp?ret=home&ID=304>

<sup>13</sup> For a treatment of this development, see: Putnam, R., 2001, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*, London: Simon & Schuster. ISBN: 0-743-20304-6.

<sup>14</sup> Mythen, G., 2004, *Ulrich Beck: A Critical Introduction to the Risk Society*, London: Pluto Press, ISBN: 0-7453-1814-2.

<sup>15</sup> Return to an Address of the Honourable the House of Commons, 12 February 2002, Private Military Companies: Options for Regulation, HC 577, The Stationery Office: London, available at: [http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/mercenaries\\_0.pdf](http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/mercenaries_0.pdf) ; House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee: Private Military Companies, Ninth Report of Session 2001-02, 1 August 2002, HC 922, The Stationery Office: London, available at: <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect/cmaff/922/92202.htm> ; Ninth Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee: Private Military Companies - Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, October 2002, Cm 5642, The Stationery Office: Norwich, available at: <http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/cm5642.pdf>

<sup>16</sup> See Whitehall paper: Donald, D., 2006, *After the Bubble: British Private Security Companies after Iraq*, Royal United Services Institute, ISBN: 0-85516-122-1, Whitehall Paper 66; Delves, C., 2006, *RUSI-BAPSC First Annual Conference*, Olive Group, speech to conference, 30 October 2006.

<sup>17</sup> Delves, C., 2006, *op cit*.

<sup>18</sup> For a useful repudiation of the precautionary principle and an interventionist approach, see: Sunstein, C.R., 2005, *Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ISBN: 0-521-61512-7.

<sup>19</sup> Sunstein, C.R., 2005, *op cit*; Ormerod, P., 2005, *Why Most Things Fail: Evolution, Extinction and Economics*, London: Faber and Faber, ISBN: 0-571-22012-6.

<sup>20</sup> Popper, K.R., 1945, *The Open Society and its Enemies - Volume One: The Spell of Plato*, Routledge & Keegan Paul, 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed & Reprint 2005, ISBN: 0-415-23731-9, p.xix.

<sup>21</sup> Kinsey, C., 2005, Regulation and Control of Private Military Companies: The Legislative Dimension, *Contemporary Security Policy*, 26, 1, 84-102.

<sup>22</sup> For an explanation of the 'Iraq Bubble' see: Whitehall paper: Donald, D., 2006, *op cit*. It is interesting to note that Bechtel and Kroll have recently given notice that they intend to disengage completely from business in Iraq - Stratfor Morning Intelligence Brief 3 November 2006.

<sup>23</sup> Mathieu, F., Dearden, N., 2006, *Corporate Mercenaries: The Threat of Private Military and Security Companies*, War on Want, London, accessible at:

<http://www.waronwant.org/Corporate+Mercenaries+13275.twl> ; Finch, C.J., 2005, *The Privatisation of Security: Introducing Professional Standards and Accredited Qualifications to Private Security Companies*, Masters Dissertation, Department of Defence Management and Security Analysis, Cranfield University.

<sup>24</sup> Better Regulation Commission, 2006, *Risk, Responsibility and Regulation: Whose Risk is it Anyway*, Better Regulation Commission, London, accessible at:

[http://www.brc.gov.uk/publications/risk\\_report.asp](http://www.brc.gov.uk/publications/risk_report.asp)

<sup>25</sup> For a comprehensive treatment of some of these risk issues see: Feldman, S., Marks V., 2005, *Panic Nation: Unpicking the Myths We're Told About Food and Health*, London: John Blake Publishing Ltd, ISBN: 1-84454-122-3.

<sup>26</sup> Better Regulation Commission, 2006, *op cit*, pp.8-11.

<sup>27</sup> As characterised by the establishment of the quasi-government body - the Better Regulation Commission, *op cit*.

<sup>28</sup> Ross, C., 2007, *op cit*.

<sup>29</sup> Gray, C.S., 2005, *Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, ISBN: 0-297-84627-2; Howard, M., 2002, *Clausewitz: A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, ISBN: 0-19-280257-7.

<sup>30</sup> When did an opponent not look for asymmetry by way of advantage? For that matter, since when has warfare not been 'effects-based' or 'network-centric'? Even here, to spin the form and forsake the

substance, demonstrates that the inversion of means for ends has become complete; but that is another debate.

<sup>31</sup> Nye, J.S., Jr., 2004, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, Cambridge MA: Public Affairs, ISBN: 1-58648-225-4.

<sup>32</sup> Friedson, E., 2001, *Professionalism: The Third Logic*, Polity Press: Oxford, ISBN: 0-226-26203-0; Larson, MS., 1977, *The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis*, University of California Press: Berkley, ISBN: 0-520-02938-0.

<sup>33</sup> McGee, A., 2007, Corporate Security's Professional Project: An Examination of the Modern Condition of Corporate Security Management and the Potential for Further Professionalisation of the Occupation, Masters Dissertation by Research, Department of Defence Management and Security Analysis, Cranfield University.

<sup>34</sup> Simonsen, C.E., Manunta, G., 1996, Is Security Management a Profession?, *International Journal of Risk, Security and Crime Prevention*, 1, 3, 229-40.

<sup>35</sup> For further explanation and the origin of the 'fight back' see: <http://www.pro-test.org.uk>

<sup>36</sup> O'Neill, O., 2002, *A Question of Trust: The BBC Reith Lectures 2002*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ISBN: 0-521-52996-4.

<sup>37</sup> Power, M., 2004, *The Risk Management of Everything*, London: Demos, ISBN: 1-84180-127-5.

<sup>38</sup> For further treatment of this argument see the case study of the 'Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Bill', whose argument *for* is available at: <http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2006/rp06-035.pdf> and argument *against* at: <http://www.manifestoclub.com/files/THE%20CASE%20AGAINST%20VETTI%20NG.pdf>