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Governability and Contemporary Forms of Military Intervention: Expanding Ecuadorian and Turkish Models

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Introduction

Observers have long struggled to explain the wave-like character of military interventions during specific eras.¹ While the historical conditions of global regions, including selective economic and political sanctions and rewards, seem to explain some aspects of such waves, and a worldwide learning curve, increasingly influential in the information age, others, it is clear that the examination of key cases, “exceptions,” or perhaps “bellwethers,” remains vital if we are to understand the coming “waves” of democratization and, perhaps, military intervention.

Ecuador and Turkey are two widely separated and otherwise disparate countries that have bng marched to their separate interventionist drum beats. The frequency and character of their recent military interventions have been significant, however, particularly considering the overt pressures for electoral democracy that have come from world economic and political powers since the end of the Cold War. Of greatest interest in these two cases is their applicability, almost as two analytical models, to other culturally and politically similar countries. The growing subtlety and complexity of military intervention in these countries is at the heart of this study. Moreover, the current economic and political circumstances of both Ecuador and Turkey point to the possibility of further interventions at precisely the moment when world opinion is the most stridently discouraging of such moves. Both countries are beset by problems and pressures that are typical of their respective geographical regions and both have recently experienced historic national elections that have intensified the political contention between various social sectors.

These two countries would seem, then, to be interesting cases through which to examine a possible “next wave.” They evince contrasting causes of their military penetration of the civilian political sector, have regional implications in each case as well as comparative elements, and may well point to new global tendencies in the post-Cold War era. Ecuador is surrounded by threats to its internal stability, from civil war in neighbouring Colombia to rapid and potentially impacting political transformations in Venezuela, Peru and even Brazil. In a sense, the traditional insularity of Ecuador is fast becoming frayed by the intrusive pressures of regionalism. The clearest evidence of this are the surprisingly similar “irregular executive transfers” that have occurred in both Ecuador and Bolivia over the past year. Turkey, on the other hand, is torn between intense and competing bi-regionalism, that is, the tensions between Europe (and “Europeanization”) and the Muslim Middle East, which have in turn intensified the traditional internal Turkish tensions between secular nationalism and Islam. The case of Algeria seems to resonate with the same kinds of dynamics as are, perhaps more vividly, evinced in Turkey. It is clear that in both the Ecuadorian and Turkish cases, then, that “governability” continues to pose severe questions, and that military “solutions” are always close at hand.

CORRELATES OF MILITARY INTERVENTION

Post Cold War world history has arguably moved *between* paradigms as regards the complex questions of national political tendencies and global political pressures. The “Third Wave” of electoral democratization seems to have obfuscated potentially deeper authoritarian patterns, although it is most difficult to identify such patterns based upon the simplistic criteria of electoral democracy. Authoritarian “solutions” comprise a continuum, of course, from quiet (almost invisible) military pressure on a civilian government to overt intervention. Military interventions, and their consequent “irregular executive transfers,” are unquestionable benchmarks in the politics of a country. They represent the mailed fist of a contemporary political taboo, they are at immediate odds with world public opinion, and they typically incur immediate and severe economic and political sanctions. Nonetheless, they remain as very real options in many countries.

Military interventions in their many expressions, moreover, have evinced a number of commonalities, or correlates, over the past fifty years.² Several of these stand out in particular: the presence of civilian groups that encourage or call upon the military (or sectors of the military) to intervene in the national political processes; apparent civilian executive impotence during political and economic crises; the prominence of “nation-building” as a central tenet of military institutional culture; the related presence of a strong *and* ideologically indistinct nationalism; a recent national history of military interventions; cross-border pressures, including military engagements; direct threats to “military prerogatives;”³ the victory of populist parties, or parties at odds with national military thought, at the polls; allegations of corruption; severe economic crisis;⁴ the democratic election to national leadership of charismatic military officers;⁵ failed civilian transitions to democracy, and so on. It remains clear that while no one of these causal factors has ever been uniquely sufficient to explain fully a given case of military intervention, virtually every case of military intervention over the past forty years has involved at least one of these.

Such “internal” case considerations, however, invariably miss the important dimensions of world opinion and international pressures. Numerous attempted coups over the past decade, particularly in Latin America, have failed when US or European powers simply refused to accept their putative results. “Failed” coup attempts in Guatemala, Paraguay and Ecuador (2000) are cases in point. Restraining factors would appear to have been responsible for drastically diminishing the incidence and effect of military interventions over the past decade. The strong desire, especially evident within the Turkish officer corps, for Turkey’s admission to the European Union (EU) seems to constitute such a restraint, for example. Globalization is thought to be gradually leading to global pressures in favour of electoral democracy, although the next several years appear to be critical in this regard.

On the other hand, the possible benefits of globalization in favour of democracy and civilian governance may be offset by the increased emphasis on security in the aftermath of the September 11 attack, and war-like efforts to eradicate terrorism. The political distraction created by this struggle will almost certainly provide opportunities for the elite in some countries to avoid the global pressures for democracy in favour of more facile authoritarian solutions.

THE ECUADORIAN “MODEL”

Ecuador, like Turkey, has had a long and very distinctive history of military intervention that extends up into the very recent past, and has evinced its own version of many of the correlates noted above. Ecuadorian interventions have tended to be relatively non-violent, however, and have not involved the deep societal polarization and consequent civil war that have beset some of its Andean neighbours.⁶ While most of Ecuador’s interventions have merely secured a transfer of executive power from one civilian to another, the last two periods of military rule, 1963-1966 and 1972-1978, were also especially mild dictatorships in the Latin American context.⁷ The military has hence remained one of the most popular institutions in the country, according to opinion polls.⁸ It maintains a fundamental commitment to nation building, moreover, and is deeply involved in civic action projects.

Its interventionist past remains its most striking characteristic. Historically, the Ecuadorian military has intervened directly and openly in the country's political processes dozens of times. Moreover, repeated states of emergency over the past two decades point to a weak and divided political elite, along with the rapid emergence of new political groups, and the military has often been asked to resolve resultant national political deadlocks in one way or another.⁹ Most recently, Ecuadorian military officers removed elected presidents in 1997 and 2000. These interventions took place during times of severe economic crisis and allegations of civilian corruption, and the military quickly stepped aside to allow civilian successors to take power in what amounted to quasi-democratic celebrations. In the context of growing problems with "governability," and the established expectation that the military is a key actor in executive transitions, it would now appear that military passivity during a political crisis has become an additional form of tacit military intervention.

There is some evidence that the age-old pattern of the competitive emergence of successive civilian groups, punctuated by short-lived military interventions, may be about to change in Ecuador, however. Over the past decade, the country has seen a succession of populist presidents who, once in power, have drawn the nearly universal ire of society, and then precipitated broad scale governmental dysfunction, by implementing policies of fiscal restraint at the behest of such international organizations as the International Monetary Fund. Moreover, they have tended to become involved in personal scandals. Civilian groups have subsequently pressured the military to intervene.

This was clearly the case in the overthrow in 1997 of President Abdalá Bucarám, known widely as "El Loco" because of his erratic and often histrionic public demeanour. He had been elected as a populist and, in an all too familiar pattern, quickly moved to institute the much hated "conditionalities" of fiscal austerity. After charges of corruption were levelled against him, a nationalist army general, Paco Moncayo Gallegos, brokered a quasi-constitutional succession of the Vice President.¹⁰ Moncayo, who had reluctantly guaranteed Bucarám's accession to the presidency earlier,¹¹ argued in his 1995 book, *Armed Forces and Society*, that

“The nature of the Armed Forces [in Ecuador] is derived from its condition in the middle, as a recourse of last resort for the success of the purposes of the political system; to be one of the tools of the strategy, to be called upon depending upon its best interests, convenience and abilities. The establishment of its size, condition, means, doctrine, are decisions of the political system, in consort with its own interests and projections.”¹²

One of the key coup conspirators of 2000, who was arrested and briefly detained after removing President Jamil Mahaud from power, Colonel Lucio Gutierrez, was elected President of Ecuador in late 2002. At the time he seemed to be much in the mould of President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, and, indeed, Gutierrez’s election, and subsequent forceful removal from office by Congress in April, 2005, suggests that the pattern of civil-military relations in Ecuador has been strikingly reinforced.

From a cursory perspective, the election and subsequent removal of Gutierrez involved several elements that place Ecuador at risk of further interventions. First, the expectation that pressure groups can retain an interventionist veto is a striking element of “*ingovernabilidad*,” particularly as this is tacitly reinforced by a military establishment that chooses not to exercise its long-established prerogative to reinforce executive power. The civilian group perhaps most responsible for encouraging the military intervention of 2000, the Confederation of Ecuadorian Indigenous Nationalities (CONAIE), celebrated the election in 2002 of Gutierrez, and initially formed part of his governing coalition. Gutierrez’s immediate moves, in January and February of 2003, to instigate policies of fiscal restraint angered and alienated CONAIE, however. By early 2005, Gutierrez faced the mobilization of a number of civilian groups, all of which felt that they had the tacit power (granted by the military) to remove an elected president. Civilian (including, in this case, Indian) mobilization reflects a significant deepening of social polarization in Ecuador, and the speed with which it occurred indicates the continuing volatility of this intervention-prone system.

Second, Gutierrez, as a charismatic, populist former coup conspirator, represented a profound threat to the “political rules” in Ecuador. In the past, at least, the emergence

of charismatic former coup conspirators in Latin America (e.g., Juan Perón in Argentina) have tended to compromise the “constitutionalist” political role of military establishments, and such leaders then threatened and alienated the very military establishments from whence they had come. The United States government, already at odds with Venezuela’s Chavez, was initially poised to respond to Gutierrez in a similar way.¹³ The fact that Gutierrez practiced political and economic restraint while pursuing neo-liberal policies effectively neutralized external pressures for his removal, and hence clarified the emerging Ecuadorian model: it represents growing “*ingovernabilidad*,” buttressed with selective and tactical military passivity. The strategically passive role of the military in the recent resignation of President Mesa in Bolivia, and the potential break-up of that polity, suggest the growth of the Ecuadorian model in the region.

Latin American countries have demonstrated a special tendency to engage in wavelike periods of military intervention and democratization. Ecuador, nonetheless, has retained its own very distinct historical, cultural and political circumstances that point to the character of its civil-military relations and, moreover, provides a clear contrast with Turkish military politics. Relative non-violence has been the norm in Ecuador, and during the last two periods of military dictatorship there were very few human rights abuses.¹⁴ Moreover, even the vague patina of ideology typical of most military governments in Latin America and elsewhere has been largely absent during Ecuador’s last two periods of military rule.¹⁵ Moncayo’s observation remains crucial: the Ecuadorian military has served as the unwilling buffer between competing civilian groups. Increasingly, it has tactically and effectively allowed such groups to clash.

THE TURKISH “MODEL”

While the Ecuadorian armed forces may act as a buffer, their Turkish counterparts have been trusted or have assigned themselves the role of chief custodian of the republican and secular nature of the state, and the bulwark against the Islamization of the country’s political landscape. While the Turkish military has done everything they “could so that they would not feel obliged to escalate their moderating role to a guardianship role,” nevertheless the weakness of Turkey’s political system, once again

the “governability” question, along with corruption, the rise of Islam, and excessively competitive, unstable, and petty politics, have prevailed repeatedly upon the military to act.¹⁶

Since the inception of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the nation’s armed forces have intervened directly three times (1960, 1971, and 1980), and have exerted their influence in what have been referred to as *coups by memoranda* on numerous other occasions, including in 1997, when they forced the resignation of the Islamist-led but popularly elected government of Necmettin Erbakan. The generals flexed their muscle again in late 2002, following the landslide victory of the Justice and Development Party (AKP)—a movement rooted in political Islam. They denied AKP leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan the premiership by prevailing on the country’s judicial system to disqualify him from running for office. This decision was based on the fact that he had recited Islamic poetry a few years earlier in a public venue. As Metin Heper and Aylin Guney state, despite increased democratization of the Turkish regime, the military’s prerogatives remain intact.¹⁷ Guney encapsulates the unique role of the Turkish military, noting that “the dedication to preserve the secular and democratic order makes the Turkish military different from other militaries in the world.”¹⁸ What is the origin of this Turkish exceptionalism and how does it manifest itself?

The roots of the Turkish military’s guardian role can be traced all the way back to the Ottoman Empire. Like all empires, the Ottoman edifice was built by the sword. However, unlike most empires, “the Ottoman government had been an army before anything else.”¹⁹ Throughout its existence, and especially in the last couple centuries of its life, the empire “was virtually ruled by an oligarchy of the military, the civil bureaucracy, and the religious institution.”²⁰ When the sick and weak Ottoman structure came to an end during World War I, the task of overseeing its dissolution was assigned to a military officer, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Instead of carrying out the sultan’s orders, Kemal rallied the army, dissolved the dying empire, proclaimed the nation-state of Turkey, and engaged in a successful struggle to rid his country of foreign occupation troops.

This created a renewed military establishment that came to be virtually synonymous with the modern Turkish state. The military played a crucial role in nation and institution building; with it came a protector/guardian posture and mindset which is still prevalent in the ranks of the country's officer corps. The implications of this are unmistakable and far-reaching:

“At the end of the independence war the new state was left with generals, lieutenants and other army officers, on one side, and a highly illiterate, leaderless, devastated, and extremely poor society on the other....Thus the ideological roots of the nation-building process that would follow were shaped within the military corps and the military pioneered the project that would transform Ottoman identity to Turkish identity.”²¹

Under the circumstances the military emerged as the most stable, trusted, and legitimate institution in Turkey.

The founder of Turkey, Kemal, and his collaborator and eventual successor, Ismet Inonu, defined the role of the military as the ultimate guardian of the nation, tasked with protecting and preserving the key cornerstones of the Republic: “secularism, democracy and the integrity of the country.”²² This role was subsequently institutionalized by the state's constitution as well as the all-important Internal Service Act of the Turkish Armed Forces, which states that “the military is responsible for defending both the Turkish Fatherland and the Turkish Republic” against all threats “internal and external, if necessary by force.”

The 1982 constitution, currently in effect, assigns matters of defence exclusively to the National Security Council (MGK). The military commanders and the head of the gendarmerie are the major voices in the MGK. The constitution stipulates, moreover, that the Council of Ministers shall give “priority to the recommendations of the MGK to maintain the existence and independence of the State and the integrity and the indivisibility of the country.”²³ Turkey's domestic and national security policies, then, are ultimately shaped and implemented by the nation's armed forces.

The military officer corps is legally, institutionally, and culturally empowered to step into the political process whenever they judge that the situation requires it. Despite differences in detail and level of military involvement in governance, the last three direct interventions had two things in common: they were prompted by social upheaval and violence that threatened the country's security and/or they were precipitated by political fragmentation and inability by the political class to ensure effective governance in accordance to the principles of Atatürkism. The 1960 coup was prompted by the inability or unwillingness by the government of the Democratic Party (DP) to control the rising influence of Islam. The coup decapitated the DP leadership and paved the way for the return to power of a party that the military had helped create a few decades earlier: the Republican People's Party (RPP). Domestic instability was associated in the public eye with the rise of Islamism, the Kurdish question, and the left and right wing militant groups. Military government thus created a lasting rationale for its *cause célèbres*.

The 1971 intervention was widely welcomed as an opportunity for "the military to come to grips with spreading violence and anarchy."²⁴ The 1980 intervention, on the other hand, was stimulated by "the gradual alienation of the military from the RPP" due to "divergence of opinion between the party and the military on social classes, Atatürk, nationalism, secularism, and reformism, which had hitherto been glossed over."²⁵ When the military commanders forced Erbakan's resignation in 1997, they did so out of concern that his open tolerance of political Islam "caused anxiety among the officers and the rest of the Westernized elite in Turkey about the future of the secular-democratic state."²⁶ Similar considerations were behind the decision to bar Erdogan from running for office and the coolness the military have shown toward the AKP government that came to power following last November's electoral triumph.

While the military allowed the Islamic-rooted AKP to take office, and may even accept Erdogan's accession to the premiership, the future of army-AKP relations and with it the posture of the Turkish military, is unclear at this juncture. Despite its Islamic origins, since its election the AKP has gone out of its way to show its Western sympathies, and is pushing hard to gain admission of Turkey to the EU. While the

military support admission to the European club, they have made it known that there are limits as to how far Turkey would go in order to meet accession demands requested by EU officials.²⁷ The government has even shown a willingness to accept the UN-sponsored solution to the Cyprus problem, which is based on formula that would bring about the reunification of the ethnically divided island. In so doing the AKP is seeking to appropriate one of the main pillars of Atatürkism, Western-inspired modernization. This would deprive the country's Western-minded elites and the military of one of their most salient issues. While it is not yet entirely clear how AKP leaders intend to balance political Islam and western style modernization as an immediate political strategy to pre-empt intervention, they seem to have been very successful thus far. In the face of military concerns AKP leaders appear to have made compromises and seem to have watered down their Islamism. For example, in a recent visit to Washington (June 2005) Prime Minister Erdogan assured President George W. Bush that his party has abandoned the more radical elements of their program.

In their short tenure, the new Turkish leaders seem to be more populist than Islamist. This may change rapidly as they confront difficult and controversial choices in domestic and foreign policy. For example, despite overwhelming popular sentiment, and obvious foot-dragging in Parliament, the Cabinet and the MGK agreed to the US request to allow the use of Turkish facilities against Iraq despite the increasingly apparent identity of Turkey as a fellow Muslim country. If the AKP runs into difficulties it is conceivable that it may be forced to turn to its Islamic base for support.

The unanswered question is whether the military would be willing to sacrifice an erosion of secularism, modernization, Europeanization and, perhaps, governability. If the Turkish military bite the bullet and allow erosion of secularism, they run the risk of ceding to the Islamists the role of guardian of the Atatürkist edifice they have sworn to protect and defend. The landscape is less than diaphanous and despite changes in the international and domestic environment, these are not grounds enough to conclude that the Turkish struggle with governability, its exceptional pattern of civil-military relations, is about to end. Despite progress, democracy has had difficulty establishing itself and the country's democratic institutions are still wanting. Tanel Demirel blames these shortcomings on the pervasive role of the military. His assessment could be more

damning: “Turkey’s experience with military regimes is one of the significant reasons why political actors, including the military, have found it difficult to internalize the indispensability of a democratic regime, or see democracy as the only game in town.”²⁸ These problems are likely to bedevil Turkey for some time to come. In Aylin Gunes and Petek Karatekelioglu’s words, Turkey’s “armed forces are not ready to become a post-modern military yet, and the second generation problems of democratic consolidation, effectiveness, and efficiency will continue to persist in the near future.”²⁹

A Parting Word

A host of historical, societal, and geographic factors are ultimately necessary to explain the Ecuadorian and Turkish models. History tells us, moreover, that a mixture of unpredictable and unforeseen international and domestic developments can easily turn exceptional circumstances into paradigms. This is more likely to occur when domestic issues conflict with international currents. Thomas Nichols’ remark that “it is in the civil-military relations arena that the problems of domestic politics and foreign policy collide most directly” is quite germane.³⁰ Offering a further observation in this vein, Michael C. Desch states that “civil-military relations is an ideal place to look for such a relationship.”³¹

The current state of affairs appears to match that collision environment that Nichols and Desch discuss. Globalization may turn the world into a “global village,” but at the same time it makes people increasingly conscious of their own identity and culture. Added emphasis on national and international security in the aftermath of September 11 requires that governments justify constraints on civil liberties and democratic politics. The post Cold War environment is almost tailor-made for a collision between domestic and foreign policies, and hence, ultimately, for an intensification of struggles involving the governability of many states.

As they regard exceptional cases, regional and even global learning curves should not be discounted. The Algerian experience displays a number of striking similarities in terms of origin, mission, and nature. Like their Turkish counterparts, the Algerian military “make frequent references to national liberation struggle” and perceive

themselves as the guarantor of country's independence. But this has harmful consequences on the emergence and viability of the democratic milieu and relevant political institutions. Lahouari Addi's is clear: "By monopolizing legitimacy to the detriment of the general development and refinement of state institutions, the army has in fact prevented the integration of conflicting movements into the institutional structure of power." These in turn hamper "the emergence of any real sense of citizenship and [smother] the emergence of an autonomous civil society."³² One can even discern some patterns of similar behaviour in the distant and otherwise different Burmese case.

The Turkish model resonates in parts of the former Eastern bloc. For example, in Central Asian countries such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which already share an array of cultural, religious, and other similarities, look to the Atatürkist paradigm for inspiration. The same is true in Russia where many officers in the Russian military view Atatürk and the Turkish experience very favourably. The statue of the founder of modern Turkey adorns one of the public squares in the Russian capital. Meanwhile, the specifics of the Ecuadorian "model," strategic military passivity in the face of "ungovernability," complemented by a long tradition of strategic military intervention, seem to be echoed in nearby countries such as Bolivia, and may ultimately cause ripples in the troubled waters of neighbouring Venezuela and even Argentina and Brazil.

There is little evidence to support a prediction of a new wave of praetorianism; nevertheless, the current environment is ripe for the Ecuadorian and Turkish "models" to become more "normal." The Turkish and Ecuadorian cases clearly have much wider relevance than had previously been thought.

NOTES

¹ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1988).

² Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971); Janowitz, *Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977); S.E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1969); Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Jose Nun, "The Middle-Class Military Coup," *The Politics of Conformity in Latin America*, ed. Claudio Veliz (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 66-118; Alfred Stepan, *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973).

³ Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988).

⁴ There has been significant criticism of Guillermo O'Donnell regarding his attempt to relate bureaucratic authoritarianism to economic processes and systems.

⁵ The case of Juan Perón is by no means an isolated one in this regard. Alfred Stepan and Guillermo O'Donnell, among many others, have examined the tendency in the 1960s and 1970s of military establishments in Latin America to seize power qua institutions, and to ensure that the military presidents of these "authoritarian," or "bureaucratic authoritarian" regimes were devoid of charisma. O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in south American Politics* (Berkeley: Institute for International studies, University of California, 1973).

⁶ José Antonio Lucero clarifies this point well in his article, "Crisis and Contention in Ecuador," *Journal of Democracy* 12 (2) April 2001, pp. 59-73.

⁷ J. Samuel Fitch, a leading observer of Ecuadorian military politics, notes that these two military governments "were mildly reformist and politically ineffective, but free of widespread human rights abuses that marked military governments in Central America and the Southern Cone." Fitch, *The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), p. 63.

⁸ Lucero, "Crisis and Contention," pp. 64-65.

⁹ Writing in 1987, Catherine M. Conaghan noted that "the ephemeral ties [in Ecuador] between parties and the masses, between parties and party leaders, and the inability of the party elite to resolve conflicts among themselves have created chronic and destructive struggles that have undermined their legitimacy." Conaghan, "Party Politics and Democratization in Ecuador," *Authoritarians and Democrats: Regime Transition in Latin America*, ed. by James M. Malloy and Mitchell A. Seligson (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987), p. 146.

¹⁰ Fitch, *The Armed Forces*, p. 91. Fitch concludes that the "resolution of the crisis without a coup further enhanced the military's image as 'the guarantors of democracy.'"

¹¹ Fitch, *The Armed Forces*, p. 90.

¹² Paco Moncoyo Gallegos, *Fuerzas armadas y sociedad* (Quito: Corporacion Editora Nacional, 1995), p. 32.

¹³ Congressman Henry Hyde's recent warning of a new "axis of evil" in the Western Hemisphere (referring to Chavez, newly elected Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in Brazil, and Gutierrez) is a case in point.

¹⁴ Fitch, *The Armed Forces*, p. 63.

¹⁵ Fitch noted that "Ecuadorian politics remains largely centered on personalities and clientelism, rather than parties or platforms. Reflecting its history of segmental incorporation of non-elite groups, Ecuadorian political culture is intensely moralistic and sectarian, but not particularly ideological." *The Armed Forces*, pp. 62-3.

¹⁶ Metin Heper and Aylin Guney, "Civil-Military Relations, Political Islam and Security: The Turkish Case," in Constantine P. Danopoulos, Dharendra K. Vajpeyi and Amir Bar'or, eds., *Civil-Military Relations, Nation Building, National Identity and Security: Comparative Perspectives* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2004).

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Aylin Guney, "The Military, Politics and Post-Cold War Dilemmas in Turkey," in Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt, eds., *Political Armies: The Military and Nation Building in the Age of Democracy* (London and New York: Zed Books, 2002), 163.

¹⁹ Quoted in Guney, Ibid, 163.

²⁰ Heper and Guney, "Civil-Military Relations."

²¹ Guney, "The military," 163.

²² Heper and Guney, "Civil-Military Relations."

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Kemal H. Karpat, "Military Interventions: Army-Civilian Relations in Turkey Before and After 1980," in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds., *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 147.

²⁵ Ibid., 149.

²⁶ Heper and Gaylin, "Civil-Military Relations."

²⁷ Aylin Guney and Petek Karatekelioglu, "Turkey's EU Candidacy and Civil-Military Relations: Challenges and Prospects," *Armed Forces and Society* 32 (3), Spring 2005, 455.

²⁸ Tanel Demirel, "Lessons of Military Regimes and Democracy: The Turkish Case in a Comparative Perspective," *Armed Forces and Society* 31 (2), Winter 2005, 264.

²⁹ Guney and Karatekelioglu, "Turkey's EU Candidacy and Civil-Military Relations," 458.

³⁰ Thomas M. Nichols, *The Sacred Cause: Civil-Military Conflict over Soviet National Security, 1917-1992* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 23.

³¹ Michael C. Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 131.

³² Lahouari Addi, "Army, State and Nation in Algeria," in Koonings and Kruijt, eds., *Political Armies*, 199.