

Journal of Security Sector Management

Published by
Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform
University of Cranfield
Shrivenham, UK

ISSN 1740-2425

Volume 2 Number 4 – December 2004

Demilitarisation, Non-State Actors and Public Security in Africa: A Preliminary Survey of the Literature

Jeffrey Isima

Introduction

The search for security has been one of the most crucial concerns of nation-states since Westphalia, which conferred on the state the obligation of securing and developing its citizens. The logic of external state sovereignty requires that states, with their divergent and often conflicting interests, take into their own hands the responsibility of maintaining their respective survival in the absence of an external guarantor. This is in spite of the (unrealistic) optimism and dreams of the new peace and greater security in the new world order with the cessation of super power confrontation at the end of the 1980s.¹ The costly preoccupation of states with security concerns appeared to have yielded relief as the spectre of a nuclear threat was replaced by the hope of greater international cooperation and an unprecedented pace of globalisation.²

However, rather than ushering in an era of global peace and security, the end of the Cold War and aspects of globalisation have exposed the declining capacity of the state to fulfil its key traditional role as the provider of security (here the use of the word "security" means the protection of citizens from physical violence). The universal acceptance of this role received the greatest inspiration from the works of modern political thoughts, which regard to security as a public good, with the most influential of this thinking coming from Max Weber (1964). He argues for state monopoly over the instruments of legitimate violence as the most fundamental characteristic of statehood³.

The growing inability of the state to fulfil this function had become evident even before the end of the Cold War. The state's monopoly of legitimate violence is being boldly confronted by actors other than the state, which have emerged on the scene to share in the use of organised violence; thus forcing the state to falter in its responsibility to protect the lives and properties of citizens. In Africa, the loss of this monopoly is

¹ Optimists of the post-Cold War peace and cooperation include Steven van Evera, 'Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War', *International Security*, 15: 3, Winter 1990-1991, pp. 7-57; Carl Kaysen, 'Is War Obsolete?' *International Security*, 14: 4, Spring 1990, pp. 42-64; and Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994.

² Many writers have condemned as premature the euphoria of global peace that the end of the Cold War generated. See Richard H. Schultz, Jr., Roy Godson and George H. Quester, 'Introduction', in Richard H. Schultz, Jr., Roy Godson and George H. Quester (eds), *Security Studies for the 21st Century* (Washington: Brassey's Inc., 1997).

³ This argument is based on the assumption that the state is an impartial bureaucratic entity that exercises this monopoly to protect the entire population without discrimination and that it is accountable to those it claims to protect. See Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right*, translated by T. M. Knox (Oxford: 1952; originally published in 1821), pp. 188f; and Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, edited by G. Roth and C. Wittiche (New York: 1976; originally published in 1923), pp.48ff.

most evident in the unchecked proliferation of a broad range of private security forces, including armed drug lords, war lords, trans-border violent criminals, gangs, militias, vigilante groups and private military and security providers (Taulbee 2002: 2-3; Hutchful 2000: 219-222). Most of these forces, already in existence, were unleashed by the sudden abdication of super power commitments to maintain regimes that lacked a broad domestic legitimacy base for upholding the 'right' ideology (Taulbee 2002: 3).

This global strategic change also coincided with a drastic reduction of the political influence of the military and security agencies of the state (demilitarisation)⁴ as part of the broader agenda of democratisation in the region. Demilitarisation is seen as a prerequisite for democratic consolidation (Luckham 1998: 589), since it is the military and security forces of the state that had mostly, directly or indirectly, dominated the political space to keep undemocratic regimes in power. Demilitarisation in Africa has thus required the altering of civil-military relations to create a political context in which the military become democratically accountable to the civil society through elected representatives in government.

Yet demilitarisation requires a further probe beyond democratic governance of the state's armed security forces. This has become particularly urgent in the course of democratic transition in Africa, where physical security had become the pre-eminent concern of citizens as the state lost the capacity to provide what Hutchful (2000: 211) calls 'the fundamental conditions for protection of life'. This paper seeks to inquire into the process of demilitarisation carried out by democratic governments in Africa and how it has impacted on the physical security of their citizens as individuals and communities, with the growth of non-state forces. This is attempted by considering the concepts and problems of demilitarisation and public security in Africa. It also undertakes a tentative exploration of the extant literature to unravel what is known so far and to highlight uncharted areas for further research. In this regard, rather than providing answers to a set of questions, this paper will attempt to generate more questions and provoke thought in the issues.

Demilitarisation and Public Security

The recession of authoritarianism and the consequent transition to democracy in sub-Saharan African countries, sparked off since the dawn of the 1990s, opened a window of opportunity for rapid improvement of human security by permitting the evolution of a supportive political and constitutional climate. In pursuit of the broad project of democratic

⁴ Various authors have defined demilitarisation differently. However, the common thread is that it is concerned with the reduction of military power, influence, resources and activities in the policy of a given government. It is used here to mean the reduction of the power and influence of armed forces in domestic politics. For an elaborate definition of the concept of demilitarisation, see UN Research Institute for Social Development (1995), p.209; Darryl Thomas and Ali Mazrui, 'Africa's Post-Cold War Demilitarisation: Domestic and Global Causes', in *Journal of International Affairs*, Summer 1992, vol. 46, no. 1, pp157-174; Guy Lamb, 'Reflections on Demilitarisation: A Southern African Perspective', in *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 7, no. 3, Autumn 2000; and Alex de Waal (ed), *Demilitarising the Mind: African Agenda for Peace and Security*, Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press Inc., 2002.

consolidation, some of the new democratic governments in the region, most notably South Africa, Nigeria and Ghana, have sought to demilitarise their societies. They have achieved this through the establishment of accountable democratic control over their armed forces (Cawthra 2003: 38; Fayemi 2003: 67; Hutchful 2003: 85-86) and to balance civil-military relations in favour of civilian supremacy through a host of institutional reforms, including the agenda of security sector reform (SSR)⁵. The assumption behind these initiatives is that democratic governance of stable, unified armed forces is necessary to put transitional countries (including Africa) back on the path of stability, security, economic growth and sustainable development (Cilliers 1996: 85; Hendrickson & Karkoszka 2002; DFID 2002). These initiatives are thus necessary to create the enabling environment for improved public security following democratic transition from the era of state coercion and the violent political crises generated as a result.

While these measures have succeeded, to some extent, in putting the military back in the barracks and bringing it under a greater degree of democratic accountability and control they seem not to have improved the physical security of citizens in the public domain. What is observable is that new forms of insecurity emerging from within the civil society have accompanied the process of demilitarising the state, almost immediately. With a few exceptions, populations in most of SSA countries no longer fear the spectre of a military 'comeback' (now regarded as anachronistic)⁶ or any intention of the armed forces to return to defiance of the democratic order, as anywhere else in the post-Cold War global strategic environment (Luckham 2003: 10). Rather, a more important threat to the security of citizens in many African countries today comes from the phenomenal growth of armed violence precipitated by the activities of emerging non-state militant actors that challenge the position of the state as the sole security actor even in peacetime.

⁵ Security sector reform (SSR) became the popular term for promoting good governance within the security sector since 1998 when Nicole Ball developed a proposal for the UK government on the subject. See Nicole Ball, *Spreading Good Practices in Security Sector Reform: Policy Options for the British Government*, (London: Saferworld, December 1998). But it is the UK Department for International Development (DFID) that placed SSR on the international agenda as argued by Dylan Hendrickson in, *A review of security sector reform*, Working Paper 1, Centre for Defence Studies, University of London, 1999, p 9.

⁶ The triumph of liberalism and the end of super power ideological competition in Africa since the end of the 1990s, combined with the simultaneous influence of globalisation, made the post-Cold War era an unfavourable climate for the survival of military regimes or intervention in politics, both in the domestic and international environments. However, it is arguable to state that in order to adapt to an unavoidable wind of democratic change, military rulers in many African countries have managed to stage a come-back to power through guided democratisation (a process through which retreating military rulers negotiate the democratic transition to secure the continued political power of the military) or transmutation (a process where a military ruler contests elections and manipulate the outcomes to become a civilian president succeeding himself). Democracy or democratisation under former military rulers such as Rawlings in Ghana, Guei in Cote d'Ivoire, Jammeh in The Gambia, Museveni in Uganda, Kagame of Rwanda, Buyoya in Burundi as well as Abacha and Obasanjo (currently the president) in Nigeria, exemplify the continued influence of the military and casts doubt on the genuineness of the transition. In transitional civilian dictatorships like Cameroun, Kenya, Zimbabwe, democratisation did not goe farther than allowing multi-party elections, even if this has helped to weaken the power of such rulers.

Hutchful and Bathily (1998:) aptly put it when they argue that, the earlier problem of whether governments could maintain control over their military forces is being displaced by the question of whether the African state could maintain its monopoly over the instruments of violence. With the demilitarisation of the state, militarism has mutated and reproduced itself in the emergence and growth of several actors outside the state whose agendas have seriously undermined the state's monopoly of violence in Africa. This development defies the traditional analysis of African civil-military relations which focuses on the subject of civil control of the armed forces. The continued legacy of militarism, in the form of societal violence, calls for a questioning of the adequacy of conventional approaches to demilitarisation of the state and a search for an alternative mode of demilitarisation which would bring all forms of armed groups under effective control to ensure the security of citizens in a democratic context. The fact that formal demilitarisation of the state is being accompanied by the deterioration of public security in peacetime also necessitates a probe beyond the existing concerns of civil-military relations into the relationship between state violence and societal violence perpetrated by non-state security groups or forces (Luckham 2003: 10).

A critique of the literature

The literature on the relationship between the military and society, as well as militarisation and demilitarisation, is broad and complex. One of the earliest works in this field is the historical account of pre-World War II militarism given by Alfred Vagts (1937). As Lamb (1999: 3) notes, the subject of demilitarisation began to receive academic attention in the early twentieth century with emphasis on questions associated with imposed reduction of the military capabilities of defeated nations after hostilities by victorious powers. During the Cold War it became part of Peace Studies with its scope widened to embrace the reduction in the role of the military in politics. Since the end of the Cold War, however, the concept has generated much interest from a multiplicity of academic frameworks.

Within the geographical context of Africa, Hutchful (1998) examines five ways in which the state attempts to demilitarise politics:
...downsizing military budgets; demobilisation and reintegration; redefining roles and missions of armed forces; restructuring governance structures in the security arena; and reforming paradigms and structures (cited in Lamb 1999: 5)⁷.

The common theme running through these processes is that they deal with the reform of the security institutions of the state to achieve a desired pattern of civil-military relations. This review will begin with the literature on civil-military relations. It will also examine the literature on conflict, disorder and lawlessness, as well as the privatisation of security. Civil-military relations have been understood from two broad dimensions. One is the set of political relations between the military and civilian governments over the control of coercive force. The second is the social

⁷ This argument was presented in a paper entitled, *Demilitarisation in Africa* for the Conference on *Leadership Challenges of Demilitarisation in Africa*, Arusha, Tanzania on 22-24 July 1998.

relations that exist between the military and the wider society (Dandeker 2000: 29; and Nelson 2002: 160). This review will look at the second strand, with particular emphasis on the literature that impacts on the military in a wider society.

There appears to be a theoretical agreement among authors that in relating to the military, the wider society is represented by the civilian government. Whether this representation is unilaterally assumed by such governments or conferred on them by society is not an issue, especially in the early literature. It has also been argued that two major strands of scholarship on civil-military relations existed during the Cold War. One was the school of international security, whose concern was with the influence of military command in making defence and foreign policy by the super powers. The second strand was made up of Third World scholars who focused on the question of human rights and democratisation in military dictatorships (Diamond and Patter, 1996). Diamond and Platter have pointed out that the end of the Cold War blurred this intellectual divide in two ways: a post-Cold War policy and intellectual concern with the threat of the military to the survival of democracy in newly emergent democracies; and a shift in thinking about the roles and missions of armed forces from the concerns of the communist threat and left-wing insurgencies to new security dilemmas like the right size of the military and defence budgets (1996: 1). Kruijt & Koonings (1999: 8) challenge this position when they assert that the traditional concern of civil-military relations was how to assure civilian control of the military, and related to this, the reasons for military coups, the nature of military rule and democratic transition from military dictatorship. While the latter position of Diamond and Platter emanates from the realities of the new global security environment as well as from the pressure for good governance in the developing countries, the former, arguably, had already begun to receive intellectual attention in the hey days of the Cold War.

Early studies on civil-military relations were centred on the question of civilian control of the armed forces, especially in established democracies where it was argued that the military must be subject to civilian authorities to guarantee stable political order. This argument is logically set out by its proponent, Huntington (1957), who focuses attention on resolving the conflict between the growing power of the military in the West (particularly the United States) and the desire of the civilian authorities to bring the military under control. For Huntington the solution to this tension is objective civilian control and the key to achieving this objective control is professionalism of the armed forces, especially the officer corps. (1957: 81-85)⁸. The argument for professionalism has, however, been discounted by another body of argument developed by such writers as Janowitz (1971), Finer (1962), and Abrahamsson (1972), having proved that professionalism of the military does not necessarily guarantee its subordination, citing instances where acclaimed professional armed forces had attempted to subvert their own governments. Janowitz takes the

⁸ Huntington defines objective control as enhancing the strength of the military and making it a tool of a neutral state for missions based on verifiable facts on behalf of the society. This is contrasted against subjective control, which is sought by competing civilian groups to acquire or maintain power over their rivals in a divided society.

argument further than professionalism which he acknowledges as necessary but not sufficient to achieve civilian control. It is important to integrate the military within the values of civil society (1971: 420). In spite of their disagreements, these approaches are united in the concern for a goal of civilian control of the armed forces.

This early literature of civilian control narrowly preoccupies itself with the relationship of the military and the government, that is, the political dimension of civil-military relations that the social dimension is neglected. Besides, the above studies were based on immediate post-World War II issues of civil-military relations and focus on problems specific to the west, particularly the United States. Civilian control as a dominant strand of a civil-military relations study of the 1950s and 1960s had not become a serious security problem at the time in developing countries, including Africa. The fact that they focus on western political and military traditions limits their relevance for universal application.

Much newer followers of the civilian control strand have replaced the argument for professionalism with other antidotes to military insubordination to civilian authority. Desch (1999: 11) discounts the elements of leadership, military institutions, state structures and societies as the fundamental factors of effective civilian control. While viewing them as intervening variables he contends that structural factors, especially threats, are primary determinants in the ability of civilians to control the military. His conclusion is that the patterns of civilian control are shaped by the interaction of the internal and external environments of these factors. In his earlier work (in Diamond & Platter 1996: 13), Desch sets out three scenarios of this threat – civilian control relationship. The first is the optimum pattern of civil-military relations where the state is faced with a traditional, external military challenge, as witnessed between the Cold War rivals. Such a challenge forces the institutions of civilian authority to become cohesive and resolved to deal with the military in a unified way. The second scenario is one of exclusively an internal threat environment, in which the institutions of civilian authority are weak and deeply divided, leading to Huntington's concept of subjective control. This he qualifies as unhealthy civil-military relations, citing Argentina, Brazil and Chile in the 1960s and 1970s as typifying this pattern. The third scenario is one in which a country is faced with both an internal and an external threat, as France was from 1954 to 1962 (1996: 14). But, just like his classical predecessors, Desch's analysis ends up preoccupied with the concept of civilian control and the politico-military side of the equation. Furthermore his optimum pattern of civil-military relations requires a perpetual existence of an external military threat to the state. This begs the question as to whether such a condition should be sought after in order to achieve the optimum civilian control.

Moreover, from the late 1990s the subject of civilian control had begun to lose its appeal in the literature. At the conceptual level, Luckham (1998) discounts 'civilian' control for 'democratic' control, arguing that the quest for stable civil-military relations should be concerned with securing the loyalty of the armed forces to institutions (democratic control) rather than to a particular set of civilian rulers (civilian control), which enables such rulers to repress dissent and defy public accountability (1998: 593-596).

Chutter (2000) sets out this distinction most forcefully. Using the examples of Germany under Hitler, and Chile under Pinochet, he demonstrates the dangers of civilian control and proposes instead the concept of 'civil' control. (2000: 30-34). In the above instances, civilian leaders were either former military officers or had strong military backing but operated largely as civilian chief executives who maintained their regimes by keeping the military weak, under resourced and under equipped, relying rather on strong paramilitary forces or infiltrating the military and manipulating it against political opponents all for the end of regime survival. Civil control (Luckham's democratic control) ensures that the military is part of the state and governed by an elected government on behalf and in the interest of society. This creates the guarantee that an elected government is the primary source of control of the armed forces, while the government is supported by the parliament as 'a surrogate for public opinion', and the judiciary 'to ensure constitutionalism' (2003: 6). It is arguable, though, whether this civil or democratic control of the military in its pure form is achievable in realpolitik, even in established democracies. However, the presence and effectiveness of the institutions and mechanisms of accountability in a country do impose heavy limitations on the extent to which elected authorities misuse the agencies of the state, including the security sector.

Although civilian control had become an important concern of civil-military relations in the developing world from the 1970s through the early 1990s, the relationship of the military and society continues to be neglected. But even beyond the question of civilian control, the literature on civil-military relations in the developing world had by then generated enormous debate in other directions. Prominent among them are the causes of military intervention (Finer 1988, Khuri and Obermeyer 1974), the nature of military rule (Mazrui 1974), military politics in socialist states (Prifti 1974 & Wiatar 1974), the role of the military in politics, ethnic segmentation of the military (Guyot 1974 and Enloe 1980), economic performance in military dictatorships compared to democratic economies, as well as military disengagement from politics (Bienen and Morell 1974). These concerns began to receive the attention of the literature on civil-military relations just as the armed forces took over power and dominated the political landscape in many Latin American, African and Asian countries.

Much has also been written on the conditions that influence the disposition of the military to disengage from politics (Danopoulos 1988 & 1992, Huntington 1991 and Hamburg 1988). Danopoulos (1988: 14) categorises these conditions into forces external to and those within the military as an institution. Developing the argument on the basis of a comparative study of ten countries drawn from Africa, Latin America, Eastern Europe, Central America, Asia, and Middle East, he advances explanations for the differences in type and nature of post-military democracies.

Huntington's comparative study of 16 countries of Southeast Europe, Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean in transition from military rule to democracy points to the legacies of the military that have challenges for democratic consolidation after transition (1991). Democracies following the one-party rule face the problem of what he

calls 'departisation' of the military and bringing it under subjection to a multi-party system (1991: 232). Those following military regimes that relinquished power voluntarily are faced with concern about continuing power and influence of the military leaders who made democratisation possible (1991: 232, 243-248). Also drawing from cases in Latin America, Central America, the Caribbean, Africa and Europe, Danopoulos (1992) explores the links between long-term disengagement and the factors in society that prompted military intervention in the first place. He focuses is on the trends in society that prompted intervention, which must be reversed for military withdrawal to be sustainable. Hamburg links the success of any disengagement to societal pressure (as was the case in Sudan); military defeat (citing the example of Argentina in 1982), serious domestic policy failure; intra-military cleavages; international pressure; and the crisis of governance faced inherently by military regimes (1988: 1). Finer links the success of any disengagement to the combination of three conditions: the breakdown of the original praetorian group; increasing conflict of interest between political and military leaders; and political difficulties faced by the military regime (1962: 191). The goal is to seek to demilitarise politics or depoliticise the military, especially in developing and transitional countries, where the military had dominated almost every facet of society. Within this thinking, demilitarisation is concerned with reversing the militarisation of politics and society, where militarisation is seen as the preponderance of the armed forces in the political, economic and social life of a country⁹. The final emphasis is on demilitarising politics, that is, the disengagement or withdrawal of the military from politics in societies where it has been involved in governance.

But these are all preoccupations with the traditional subject of control restated in a different context of democratisation in the Third World. While these writers have been concerned with the arguments and counter argument of the subject of civilian control, Kruijt and Koonings (1999) argue that such approaches to the study of civil-military relations had become limited even before the end of the Cold War. They preach a shift in analysis to the fact that the reduced political visibility of the military since democratic transition has not curtailed its political influence (1999: 8). They suggest other concerns: the role of other security apparatuses; privatisation of violence and the emergence of non-state armed formations; the spread of armed conflict and its impacts on human security; and the implications of all these for democratic governance (1999: 10). The continued political influence of the military after democratic transition may not characterise a serious shift in the literature since it is still concerned with what the military does under a different climate from official political leadership. The role of other security apparatus falls within the consideration of civilian autocratic regimes relying on

⁹ For nuanced definitions of the concept see Robin Luckham, "The Military, Militarisation and Democratisation in Africa: A survey of the 'Literature and the Issues'", in Eboe Hutchful and Abdoulaye Bathily (eds), *The Military and Militarism in Africa*, (Dakar: CODESRIA, 1998); Sunday Abogonye Ochoche, 'The Military and natural Security in Africa', in Eboe Hutchful and Abdoulaye Bathily (eds), *The Military and Militarism in Africa*, (Dakar: CODESRIA, 1998)

paramilitaries to undermine the power of the military, and its implications for politico-military relations. It also has relevance for the social element of civil-military relations, as an undisciplined security agency of the state can be a source of threat to society. The privatisation of violence by non-state armed groups is clearly a new departure. It suggests the relevance of non-state armed groups as important players in civil-military relations, though this is not strongly linked to the relationship between the military and society as an aspect of civil-military relations. However it takes the analysis in the subject of civil-military relations beyond the common theme running through that the military is an institution that needs to be regulated by the state in order to guarantee internal political, social, and economic stability as well as security. The general trend in the traditional literature is a preoccupation with the direct interface of military and political power. This relationship has been studied within the tradition of understanding the problems, politics and challenges of stemming or managing the direct political power and influence of a supposedly dangerous agency of the state – the armed forces.

A second manifestation of this shift is an emerging perspective away from the direct political power and influence of the military to the indirect impacts of military politics on society. This concern could aptly be referred to as the ‘negative externalities’¹⁰ of the militarisation of politics, since it looks not at what the military, either in or out of power, intentionally does in relation to the state or society, but at the unintended fallouts of historical militarism that have relevance for reference to military power or influence vis-à-vis society. This should not be confused with the general unintended effects of militarisation on society, which are well known issues (including the impacts of military governance on national economic performance, the quality of governance, military professionalism, etc). This thinking links the past political activities of the military to the emergence of the non-state armed groups of Kruijt and Koonings (1999), mentioned earlier. This is a sharp departure from tradition in that it takes the interaction of the civil and the military from the physical to the psychological plane. It suggests the examination of this relationship in the physical absence of the military, particularly the psychological consequences of military politics in producing the conditions for the emergence of non-state security forces that engage the civil side of security calculations. This means that civil-military relations are being extended beyond the fixation on the balance of power between the state and its military.

¹⁰ The concept of ‘externalities’ was used by J. M. Buchanan, ‘An economic Theory of Club Goods’, *Economica*, 32: 1, 1965, pp. 1-14; R. Cornes and T. Sandler, *The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods*, 2nd edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) in the study of the nature of public goods. It is used to mean the unintended consequences of an activity or a set of activities on a party or parties other than the actors. Those consequences could be positive or negative on the external party, and it is the degree to which they can be controlled that determines whether a good should be provided publicly or privately. For its application to defence and security studies, see Kevin Siqueira and Todd Sandler, ‘Models of Alliances: Internalizing Externalities and Financing’, *Defence and Peace Economics*, 12, 2001, pp 249-270.

A view in this direction is provided by Fayemi (2002) in his study of militarism and the future of democracy in Nigeria. His study reveals that years of military repression in Nigeria have conditioned many communities to adopt military strategies in responding to any form of domination. Thus 'the greatest challenge in combating the scourge of political militarism is addressing the psychology of militarism that has become reified in the context of exclusionary politics' (2002: 226). In a similar study of civil-military relations in Southern Africa, Cilliers (1996: 84) confirms the argument of political and social alienation as eroding social norms and producing gangs and warlords. The study also notes that this psychology of militarism is a paradox of democratisation and demilitarisation, not only in Nigeria but also across post-Cold War Africa (Fayemi 2002: 226). The idea of the psychological legacy of militarism is re-echoed by the same author more recently, using the phrase, 'societal militarism and violence', as a legacy of years of military rule in Nigeria. This he explains as the loss of the culture of compromise, dialogue and accommodation in the resolution and management of conflicts. Other important issues raised in this work include what he refers to as 'reclaiming the militarised mind', which is a consequence of a 'deep-seated experience of social exclusion under military rule', as a critical challenge for rebuilding stable civil-military relations in the country (2003: 65). This study brings into perspective the social dimension of civil-military relations, but also raises further questions. Though the term 'demilitarisation' is not used, the argument for reclaiming militarised minds requires scrutiny in that direction. Another way of putting his proposal is 'demilitarising the mind', even though the ways and means of doing so are not specified. So, how should this be done to contribute to civil-military relations?

Demilitarising the Mind?

Within the literature of demilitarisation, three main dimensions clearly stand out: the political, the economic and the social/psychological/cultural. While the political and the economic deal with the question of civil control of the military and the resource concerns of demilitarisation, corresponding to demilitarisation of the state, the social/psychological/cultural deals with demilitarisation of society (Lamb 1999: 6).

A most important finding of Lamb's study is that the demilitarisation of the state may contradict the demilitarisation of society. The two have been linked in the report of a seminar on post-conflict peace-building held in London by the Committee for Conflict Transformation Support (CCTS)¹¹. The report examines different forms of demilitarisation needed to achieve security and stability in society. It argues that this goes beyond changing institutions to changing 'values, attitudes and mindsets of ordinary people', particularly attitudes towards violence and its causes (2001: 1, 2). In a

¹¹ This seminar, on Demilitarising Minds and Societies, was held on 7 December 2000 at the John Adams Hall, 21 Endsleigh Street, London. CCTS is a network of civil society organisations that work in the area of post-conflict peace-building and conflict transformation. It holds seminars and conferences as well as publishes newsletter series.

discussion paper on which the seminar was based, Clark (2001) throws this distinction in bolder relief. He identifies two levels of demilitarisation, namely surface demilitarisation and deep demilitarisation. While the former is concerned with disbanding forces, surrendering arms and implementing ceasefire agreements, the latter 'seeks to address the roots of militarisation and to undo the legacy of war and militarisation as part of an effort to reconstruct society on a different basis (Clark 2001: 1). The former is a top-down approach and institutional, requiring the reform of security forces, while the latter requires a bottom-up process initiated at the community level (2001, 5 & 6). Chachiua (2000) characterises these two dimensions as quantitative and qualitative demilitarisation. Quantitative demilitarisation deals with the process of withdrawing tangible military instruments such as defence expenditure, force level, arms procurement and military intervention in politics. Thus processes of rightsizing, disarmament and demobilisation as well as other elements of defence reforms are quantitative. The qualitative is the non-tangible side which reverses 'militaristic ideologies and values' and de-emphasises violence as a means of resolving conflict (2000: 2). Even though the CCTS works in the area of conflict and related issues and the arguments mentioned above are set within the framework of post-conflict demilitarisation, the thinking about alternatives to institutional reforms can be applied in the analysis of societies that may not be in conflict but are faced with non-state militarism.

Conclusion and further questions

This paper attempts to probe the long-term impacts of state violence on the growth of non-state violence in the post-reform period by examining the trends and strands in the literature on the relationship between the military, militarism and civil society. But because it focuses on the problem of militarism in society, the literature on demilitarisation is also considered.

One observation that is very clear from the literature so far surveyed is that the preoccupation with limiting the political power and influence of the military and other state security forces (demilitarisation of the state) in Africa has become inadequate in addressing the urgent security concerns of citizens. This has necessitated a search for an alternative or complement, which would tackle non-state armed and security formations embedded in society (demilitarisation of society). This has been differently referred to as 'deep' demilitarisation, qualitative demilitarisation or the demilitarisation of the mind. But how is society demilitarised? And why has societal violence increased with the process of formal demilitarisation of the state in Africa?

A second observation is the existence of a yawning gap in the literature itself on two counts. First, the literature conspicuously neglects the critical place and role of non-state armed groups in the civil-military equation. This analytical neglect is puzzling in the light of grave security dilemmas these groups produce in African societies. The second is an intellectual disconnect between the theory of civil-military relations and conflict analysis. How do we explain the potentials of dysfunctional civil-military relations for conflicts in Africa? How do we situate the interface of the

society and non-state forces involved in communal violence or major armed conflict so endemic in many African countries today?

These are gaps and questions resulting from this tentative literature survey, and are meant to open up new challenges in thinking about demilitarisation and analysis of violence in African societies.

Bibliography

- Abrahamsson, B. (1972) *Military Professionalization and Political Power*, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Bienen, H. and D. Morell (1974), 'Transition from Military Rule: Thailand's Experience', in Kelleher, C. (ed) *Political-Military Systems: Comparative Perspectives*, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, Inc.
- Cawthra, G. (2003) 'Security Sector Transformation in Post-Apartheid South Africa', in Cawthra G and R. Luckham (eds), *Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of Military and Security Establishments in Transitional Democracies*, London: Zed Books.
- Chachua, M. (2000) 'Demilitarisation of Post-Conflict Societies: The Case of Demobilisation of Youth in Mozambique'. Found at <http://www.katu-network.fi/Artikkelit/kirja01b/Martinho.htm>
- Chutter, D. (2000), *Defence Transformation: A Short Guide to the Issues*, Pretoria, Institute for Security Studies Monograph No. 49.
- Cilliers, J. (1996), 'Security and Transformation in Southern Africa', in Diamond, L. and M. Platter (eds), *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*, Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press.
- Clark, H. 'Demilitarising Minds, Demilitarising Societies', Committee for Conflict Transformation Support Newsletter, No.11, winter 2001. Found at www.c-r.org/ccts/ccts11/demltris.html, downloaded on 18 august 2003.
- Committee for Conflict Transformation Support Newsletter, No.11, winter 2001. Found at www.c-r.org/ccts/ccts11, downloaded on 18 august 2003.
- Danopoulos, C. P. (1988), 'Military Dictatorship in Retreat: Problems and Prospects', in Danopoulos, C. P. (eds), *The Decline of Military Regimes: The Civilian Influence*, Boulder: Westview Press Inc.
- Danopoulos, C. P. (1992), 'Intervention, Withdrawal and Civilian Rule: Notes and Perspectives', in Danopoulos, C. P. (ed), *From Military to Civilian Rule*, London: Routledge.
- Dandeker, C. (2000), 'The Military in Democratic Societies: New Times and New Patterns of Civil-Military Relations', in Khulmann, J. and J. Callaghan (eds), *Military and Society in the 21st Century Europe: A Comparative Analysis*. Hamburg: Transaction Publishers.
- Desch, M. C. (1996), 'Threat Environments and Military Missions', in Marc, L. D. and Platter, F. (eds), *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*, London: The John Hopkins University Press Ltd.
- Desch, M. C. (1999), *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment*, Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press.

- DFID (2002) *Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform*, London.
- Enloe, C. (1980) *Ethnic Soldiers*, Harmondsworth, Penguin.
- Fayemi, 'K. (2002), 'Militarism and the Future of Democracy in Nigeria', in Koonings, K. and D. Kruijt (eds), *Political Armies: The Military and Nation Building in the age of Democracy*, London: Zed Books.
- Fayemi, 'K. (2003), 'Governing the Security Sector in a Democratic Polity: Nigeria', in Cawthra G and R. Luckham (eds), *Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of Military and Security Establishments in Transitional Democracies*, London: Zed Books.
- Finer, S. (1962), *The Man On Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, 2nd edition, Boulder: Westview Press Inc.
- Guyot, J. (1974), 'Ethnic Segmentation in Military Organisations: Burma and Malaysia', in Kelleher, C. (ed) *Political-Military Systems: Comparative Perspectives*, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, Inc.
- Hamburg, R. (1988), 'Military Withdrawal from Politics', in Danapoulos, C. P. (ed), *Military Disengagement From Politics*, London: Routledge.
- Huntington, S. P. (1957), *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil Military Relations*, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Hutchful, E. (2000) 'Understanding the African Security Crisis', in Musah, A. and Fayemi, J. K. (eds), *Mercenaries*, London: Pluto Press.
- Hutchful, E. (2003) 'Pulling Back From the Brink: Ghana's Experience', in Cawthra G and R. Luckham (eds), *Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of Military and Security Establishments in Transitional Democracies*, London: Zed Books.
- Kaysen, C. (1990) 'Is War Obsolete?', *International Security*, 14: 4, Spring.
- Khuri, F. and G. Obermeyer (1974), 'The Social Basis for Military Intervention in the Middle East', in Kelleher, C. (ed), *Political-Military Systems: Comparative Perspectives*, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, Inc.
- Kruijt, D. and Koonings, K. (1999), 'Introduction', in Koonings, K. and Kruijt, D. (eds), *Societies of Fear: The Legacy of Civil War, Violence and Terror in Latin America*, London: Zed Books.
- Lamb, G. (1999), 'Demilitarisation: A Review of the Concept and Observations from the South African Experience', SCDI Working Paper, No.7.
- Luckham, R. (1998), 'Taming the Monster: Democratisation and Demilitarisation', in Hutchful, E. and Bathily, A. (eds), *The Military and Militarism in Africa*, Dakar: CODESRIA.
- Luckham, R. (1998), 'The Military, Militarism and Democratisation in Africa: A Survey of Literature and Issues', in Hutchful, E. and Bathily, A. (eds), *The Military and Militarism in Africa*, Dakar: CODESRIA.
- Mazrui, A. (1974), 'Piety and Puritanism under a Military Theocracy: Uganda as Apostolic Successors' in Kelleher, C. (ed), *Political-Military Systems: Comparative Perspectives*, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications Inc.
- Nelson, D. N. (2002), *Definition, Diagnosis, Therapy: A Civil-Military Critique*, *Defence and Security Analysis*, 18: 2, pp157-170.
- Russett, B. (1994) *Grasping the Democratic Peace*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

- Schultz, R. H. Jr., Godson, R., and Quester, G. H. (1997), 'Introduction', in Schultz, R. H, Jr., Godson, R., and Quester, G. H. (eds), *Security Studies for the 21st Century*, Washington: Brassey's Inc.
- Taulbee, J. L. (2002) 'The Privatization of Security: Modern Conflict, Globalization and Weak States', *Civil Wars*, 5:2, Summer, pp. 1-24.
- Thomas, C. (1999) 'Introduction', in Thomas, C. and Wilkin, P. (eds), *Globalization, Human Security and the African Experience*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc.
- Vagts, A. (1937) *A History of Militarism: The Romance and Realities of a Profession*, New York: W. W. Norton.
- Van Creveld, M. (1996) *The Fate of the State*, *Parameters*, XXVI: 1, Spring.
- van Evera, S. (1990) 'Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War', *International Security*, 15: 3, Winter 1990-1991.
- Weber, M. (1964) *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, New York: Free Press.