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Police Reform, Peacekeeping and SSR: The Need for Closer Synthesis

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Abstract

From operational experience the international community has learnt of the relevance of the police component in the reform of a state's security sector. The establishment of an effective and professional police force is essential if the transition from a militarised society to a civilian one is to be successful. This paper briefly traces the development of the Security Sector Reform and Peace Support Operation concepts and why police reform must now be given a major role within them in order to achieve the stability necessary for economic development and civil well-being.

The appropriate manner in which to provide security has grown more complicated in recent times. There is a common understanding that in a modern and increasingly integrated global economy, violent conflict has international consequences such as the loss of regional stability; the collapse of markets and investments; the creation of large numbers of displaced persons and the demand for resources from donors for aid or peace support operations, prompting the international community to play a more active role in promoting global stability. The end of the Cold War has led to a new climate of cooperation, reflected in the increased number of interventions in conflicts and humanitarian disasters. Particularly in the Post September 11th era, these missions and interventions have increasingly been justified by various sovereign states' desire to preserve security.

The interdependent nature of national economies and politics, has been magnified by globalisation to such an extent that the repercussions of insecurity are not isolated to individual regions, countries, cultures or groups as they once might have been. International markets and economic interests have become increasingly integrated, seemingly beyond the point of no return. This globalisation of interests has been accompanied by a parallel globalisation of the local threats to those interests – with implications for all states' understanding of the security concept.

In the modern world, insecurity threatens to undermine life and development across the globe. The acknowledgement of asymmetrical threats that constitute a challenge to national security, but do not seek to challenge the states' existence directly, has provided a quandary for those that seek to formulate security policy. Extreme poverty, drugs, terrorism and the spread of diseases such as HIV/ Aids all contribute to insecurity on a global level without presenting a specific entity through which they can be opposed. As these new challenges have been incorporated into the debate, policy recommendations and mechanisms at the core of the international community's efforts for combating these threats have struggled to keep pace. There is a need to look beyond the local military mechanisms and institutions for providing stability, safety and the rule of law – perhaps to the incorporation of existing local and/ or cultural structures – but primarily to the strengthening of internal civilian security structures such as the police.

From the post-war period until the late 1980's the Cold War provided a deceptively simple looking paradigm for those looking to define security. This bipolar conflict provided observers and academics with black and white certainties: communism versus capitalism; the United States versus the Soviet Union. The fact that the pursuit of national security has summarily been extended beyond national borders to include areas of perceived insecurity overseas constitutes a novel development in the field of international relations. The interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan are the most recent and extreme examples of this phenomenon but the international community can be seen exerting its influence in many other theatres across the globe including Jammu-Kashmir, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Sierra Leone, Sudan, the Balkans and East Timor. The multitude of training, aid and assistance programs designed to bring about sustainable peace and development are massively expensive and can be politically

precarious, thus demonstrating their importance to the international community.

The variety of military interventions by the international community in the last decade has highlighted the crucial relevance of the police component in the reform of a state's security sector. In doing so the international community has illustrated the growing importance of police reform to the modern security agenda. From the executive police missions in East Timor and Kosovo; to the current drive in Iraq to produce over 60,000 police officers capable of maintaining civil order in a country divided along ethnic, religious and cultural lines.

The international community provides humanitarian assistance to a massive range of people and countries across the globe. The form and scope of this assistance varies widely depending on the donor and the context. In some cases there is a unilateral or bi-lateral approach - in others resources are pooled and channelled through multi-lateral institutions such as the United Nations. The protection of human rights and the provision of basic human needs are principles at the core of this assistance.

Given the importance attached to these interventions it is understandable that the international community seeks to provide assistance in a manner that takes a long-term perspective. In most cases, if not all, this requires working with the conflicting parties to identify and resolve the root causes of the conflict and must be accompanied by reforms that will address any institutionalised resentment through the creation of a democratically accountable security sector¹, thereby helping to ensure the long term stability of the state and enabling its continued development – this process is widely known as security sector reform (SSR).

The SSR approach is a relatively recent emergence from the field of conflict prevention. Its assertion of the need to combine the economic and social aspects of security with traditional military reforms is designed to provide a holistic solution to the challenge of rebuilding formal security mechanisms in a post-conflict society. Despite SSR's clear message of the need to incorporate non-military areas of reform in the post-conflict rebuilding process there is still a certain amount of Cold War 'inertia' to overcome before civilian security institutions are prioritised alongside their military counterparts.

“A democratically run, accountable, effective and efficient security sector helps to reduce the risk of conflict while at the same time...ensures the precondition for stable development, encourages investment and thereby contributes to the reduction of poverty, which is so often at the core of societal instability.”²

These arguments have led to a growing appreciation amongst the international community that the establishment of an appropriate, accountable, and affordable security sector will not only contribute to poverty reduction by reforming state apparatus to make it more efficient but that it will also help to sustain the peace by breaking the conflict cycle. This is possible because the democratic control of the security sector will

help to provide the political stability and institutional professionalism required for sustainable development to become a realistic goal. Security sector reform transforms the security apparatus of a given state, typically viewed as an obstacle to development, into a partner for the creation of a professional and accountable security sector whose components provide a function appropriate to the needs of the country.

It is clear that in many developing countries people suffer due to the expensive maintenance of armed forces disproportionate to that country's strategic needs. Equally, many have witnessed various limbs of the state apparatus, such as domestic intelligence organisations, being used unlawfully for political coercion or quashing any threat to the political leaderships authority. Often this kind of abuse is visible in countries with no state provision for healthcare or welfare, leading to tensions and frustrations that may eventually culminate in a violent backlash. By ensuring the professionalism and appropriate sizing of the actors in the security sector, SSR helps to prevent this kind of dissatisfaction from building to a critical mass. Parallel institutional reforms that establish democratic norms of governance for the control of the various elements of the security sector will also take place to prevent any regression once the international community has withdrawn. When carried out alongside disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes and Small Arms/ Light Weapons (SALW) programmes, it is clear to see how security sector reform can play a key role in laying the foundations within a society for sustainable peace and development.

Security sector reform does seem to provide an excellent focal point for post-conflict assistance programmes. It hopes to address the issues that are at the heart of many, if not all, of the new wave of conflicts that have emerged in the wake of the Cold War. It can function as a complement to established aid programmes or as a strategic base upon which to build in new post-conflict situations. At the core of SSR theory lies the vision of an appropriate 'security end-state' that has been achieved in co-operation with the host country and the wider donor community to the benefit of all involved. This 'end-state', free of conflict and rooted in democratic principles and mechanisms can confidently attract foreign investment, contribute to regional stability, and continue its rehabilitation as part of the global community.

The desire to incorporate the SSR approach has important implications for those members of the international community who seek to broker peace and provide the necessary assistance to enable countries to make the transition from hostility to harmony. Throughout the 1990s the international community constantly found itself faced with difficult decisions to make over whether or not intervention was justified, and if so then in what manner should assistance be provided?

Historically, any form of ceasefire or peace agreement would deal with the source of the dispute enabling a withdrawal from contested ground and two separate processes of reconstruction and rebuilding. Accordingly, peacekeeping operations from the 1950s onwards required a UN Security Council mandate and the authority of the conflicting parties. On this understanding, the UN presence acted in a supervisory capacity – ensuring

that both sides held to the cease-fire while the international community helped the peace agreement signatories to reach a political conclusion to their problems. While it could be argued that the constraints on peacekeeping forces were mainly put in place to prevent any conflict of interest between the two superpowers of the day, it also helped to establish the UN's impartiality and practice of using force only in self-defence³.

This traditional model was soon to be found wanting in the 1990s as the new conflict environment was defined by heavily armed violent groups, operating without clear geographical boundaries and engaging in acts of genocide and ethnic cleansing. With these new atrocities came new humanitarian emergencies such as displaced peoples, starvation, widespread rape and transmission of disease and the destruction of livelihoods. These symptoms of modern conflict move beyond the borders of the states involved turning the conflict into a regional problem. Cease-fires and peace agreements often prove ineffective. For example, rebels in Angola broke their agreements with all parties when they realised it would mean losing control of the resources in the territories they had come to hold and Charles Taylor proved a serial saboteur of accords made in Liberia. These displays of contempt for the international community's efforts began to tarnish the image and reduce the effectiveness of any interventions by the UN. With every violent conflict that occurred in a territory supposedly under the protection of a peacekeeping mission it was understood that something had to change.

Recent attempts to update the traditional peacekeeping model to the more adaptive and comprehensive 'peace support operation' (PSO) can be traced to UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's *Agenda for Peace*⁴ in 1992. In this document the Secretary General laid out a full range of processes and approaches that would have a mandate based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This was a key turning point as traditional peacekeeping operations had been based on Chapter VI of the UN Charter, which encourages nations to settle disputes peacefully. The move to base PSO mandates on Chapter VII would allow the use of armed forces to restore peace – enabling UN PSO's previously unheard of powers to enforce peace upon a country or region. It was also decided that in the interests of international security a UN peacekeeping mission would no longer require the authority of the warring parties to intervene given the multitude of peripheral damage and problems caused to civilians and neighbouring countries in many of the modern conflicts. The first clear example of this new approach was given in 1995 when the UNPROFOR mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina was replaced by the multinational military force IFOR under the auspices of the Dayton Peace Agreement⁵. This new implementation force was established under the command of NATO with United Nations authorisation and included within its mandate were robust rules of engagement should the use of force become necessary to protect the fragile peace.

This overhaul of peacekeeping operations showed an early understanding of the broader mandate that was going to be required in order to effectively create and sustain peace. For many conflicts the new PSO doctrine has proved to be a useful framework from which to begin the rebuilding process. However, the fragmented nature of post-Cold War

conflict requires a far more complex range of matters be addressed if the parties involved are to hold to an accord. The cessation of violence is not considered a sufficient end as it can often be with cross-border conflicts, but rather it is the first condition of an arduous process that will enable those previously at war to live together in peace. The challenges of such a task should not be underestimated when often “what is required is a complete regeneration of the core functions of society and government”⁶. It is only when the implications of this task are considered fully that it becomes clear that it cannot be completed by a military force alone. The use of UN approved military force, empowered and mandated under Chapter VII, is appropriate in order to achieve the cessation of violent conflict and to maintain the peace in the immediate post-conflict environment. However, having accomplished this, there are a variety of other actors who will then need to engage in the process of returning the country or countries involved in the conflict to a normal existence. One of the complex challenges faced by those trying to re-establish a peaceful society is the future structure and nature of the security sector since durable peace and development will be reliant on its stability.

The establishment of an effective and professional police force is absolutely essential if the transition from a militarised society to a civilian one is to be successful. Often, the police force that existed previously will have become dilapidated during the time of conflict and many of their duties will have been taken over by a military with far greater resources. It is vital that a clear distinction of duties between the police and the military is made as soon as possible, followed by a swift programme to re-train and re-equip the remnants of the old force in order to prevent a prolonged security vacuum in the immediate post-conflict environment. Not only will it prove invaluable during the period of transition from conflict to peace but also once the international community has departed, the rule of law institutions will be the key to providing the expectation and assurance of human security – a crucial service if return to violent conflict is to be prevented⁷. In many cases, reform will include regaining the trust of a society that has lost its faith in the police force. In democratic societies, the police are the most visible element of the security sector and their public image has a particularly strong effect on the public perception of their own individual security. It is no different in a post-conflict situation where the re-introduction of a police force can help to inspire confidence in the apparent return to peace. By approaching policing with a community-based public servant mentality rather than a self-serving public official mentality the donor agencies and host country can begin to win the confidence of the public in the reform process.

This is far from being the only benefit of swiftly re-introducing a civilian police force. The ability to demonstrate to the public what has changed is a powerful tool in gaining the support of the community. By removing the armed forces from the streets and replacing them with a civilian police service the government is making a strong statement about the end of hostilities and their intentions for the future governance of the state. It is a symbolic gesture with a powerful message. In addition to this, policing within almost any democratic model is a process that necessarily involves the community that it serves. In most, if not all, post-conflict situations this interaction with the community will be a novel experience that will

again demonstrate the direction that the government of the day wishes to pursue. This will contribute to an important psychological battle to maintain the country's support as the difficult reform process gets underway. It must be emphasised that the police alone are in this unique position to demonstrate publicly, on a daily basis, the benefits of the reform process.

Post-conflict police reform theory is divided into several schools of thought, not all of which gel together. Should the onus of a reforming police force be on winning trust through the involvement of the community it polices or should 'problem-based policing' be emphasised?⁸ Are opportunities being missed in the reconstruction phase to incorporate 'crime prevention through environmental design' which has been shown to greatly complement 'problem oriented' approaches to policing?⁹ Similarly, research into 'situational crime prevention' has shown its complementary strengths.¹⁰

Amongst various models of policing, 'community-based' policing provides the appropriate relationship between police and community for building trust and providing feedback¹¹. However, this model requires strong support from either the nation or organisation leading reform and the local political leaders to delegate authority and autonomy to local communities, along with financial support. This problem is one of many that are faced by the international community when attempting to fashion a new police force that will fulfil the objectives of crime prevention and investigation, the maintenance of law and order and uphold the ideology of public servant rather than public official - while trying to adhere to foreign working practices and methodologies with foundations in human rights and democratic oversight.

CIVPOL is the United Nations' instrument for implementing police reforms. In the past this has been accomplished primarily through monitoring local law enforcement agencies and measuring them against acknowledged human rights standards. CIVPOL missions around the world have a broad range of responsibilities that have grown out of their monitoring role including overseeing public security, encouraging a neutral political environment, acting as a liaison between factions/ NGOs/ UN agencies, and assisting in humanitarian activities. While CIVPOL performs an admirable function where it is deployed, the missions are often limited by their 'monitoring' pretext and could achieve more were it to employ something other than what is a largely passive approach to reform. The officers that make up CIVPOL missions are largely capable professionals in their home policing environments but that does not necessarily qualify them for training local law enforcement agencies, yet this has become part of their mandate. The EU and OSCE are regional organisations that also undertake police missions¹² as part of complex, multi-faceted PSOs, each bringing separate mandates representative of their member states. The mandated levels of co-operation and co-ordination between these bodies needs to be examined with a view to determining what effect it has on the police missions at an operational level.

Despite the lack of appropriate tools, the post Cold War era has been dominated by attempts to shore up failing states, quell violent civil uprisings and mediate between parties at conflict. The optimistic peacekeeping missions of the 1990s were, on reflection, ill equipped to meet the incredibly complex challenges they faced simply because they failed to acknowledge the root causes of the humanitarian problems their mission was mandated to bring to an end. The freedom to intervene in other countries affairs on humanitarian grounds has not been mirrored by an evaluation of the tools available to the international community with which to do so.

The provision of security is a challenging concept. It is challenging in its scale, challenging in its ambition, and challenging in its application. It requires the close co-ordination of several distinct processes to produce the desired security end-state. There has been a slow and painful learning process with regards to intervention. Handicapped by a lack of institutional memory on behalf of many of the donors, a lack of strategic unity between various components of the missions and a failure to engage the underlying causes of conflict have led to long and expensive campaigns.

The goals of SSR are clear and broadly desired by the members of the international development community but there are some implications of its implementation that the donor community needs to reconcile if it is to be embraced fully.

First, there is the delicate issue of intervention in the security sector by large development agencies. United Nations (UN) agencies, World Bank and European Union (EU) amongst others have proved reluctant to adopt SSR practices as part of their core mandates as it represents politically sensitive ground. This has not prevented them from beginning to look at how the security sector impacts on their own development agendas but wholesale adoption remains an elusive goal. The fact is that many member states of international organisations see SSR as a violation of sovereignty with which they are uncomfortable. This uneasiness, combined with the fact that SSR is a lengthy and expensive process due to its comprehensive nature has made for a somewhat daunting combination for many in the development community.

These drawbacks, while not insignificant, can be overcome with sufficient time and resources and already there are signs of acceptance within the donor community that the long-term benefits of SSR could well outweigh the short-term political difficulties linked with greater commitment. Several EU member states have now developed their own SSR policy approach and the United Nations Development Programme's Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (UNDP BCPR) has established a 'Justice and Security Sector Reform Team' to provide technical support and assistance to regional bureaux and country offices¹³. The World Bank, still conscious of its desire not to interfere politically, has introduced some SSR principles under its poverty reduction and economic growth programmes¹⁴. The World Bank's stance on 'good governance' will also allow it to scrutinise security sector financial management.

Second, it is difficult to overlook the intangible requirements needed for successful SSR, such as the need for local political will. Beyond this, introducing the levels of professionalism required to overcome institutionalised corruption in various forms will often require a change in the working culture if reforms are to prove permanent. The need to appreciate and facilitate the process of cultural change needs to be recognised and not glossed over if the structural transformation is to be paralleled in the human element. It is not difficult to understand why the donor community is reluctant to provide the necessary increases in spending with which to incorporate SSR given the length of time that may be required to see a final 'product' (if that can ever be achieved) for the extra funds is more appropriately measured in terms of decades than in election cycles. This political need for short and medium-term dividends from SSR must be accommodated during the planning phase if political will and therefore funding is to be maintained for important aspects of reform that address these intangible requirements.

Third, there is an important question surrounding the correct sequencing of reforms. Given that the security sector as a whole needs to be addressed and the finite resources available, how are the resources to be distributed in order to prevent reforms in one area from being undermined by the lack of reform progress in another, related sector. For example, if police reforms are not accompanied by parallel reforms in the Judicial and Penal sectors then the improvement in crime detection and arrest rates will most likely be undermined. An unreformed court system may prove incapable of processing an increased number of cases. The penal system, often a loser in terms of reforms, may be already at full capacity (or more) and pre-trial detention will not be viable – leading to greater problems with processing cases through the courts and a reluctance to make arrests on the part of the police. Integrated sequencing of reforms throughout the security sector is a question that will need to be addressed at the strategic level, preferably prior to deployment, but will equally need to be constantly revised as the operational realities of implementing SSR in a given context come to light.

Finally, SSR requires extensive strategic planning and inter-agency coordination if reforms are to be correctly sequenced and implemented. It is this aspect of SSR that will likely prove the most challenging for many in the donor community. To create a cross-agency, cross-donor, unified end-state vision that universally feeds the integrated strategic planning of reforms at all post-conflict stages is a mighty challenge. Even with a unified strategic vision there would need to be unprecedented levels of communication at an operational level to ensure the necessary levels of co-ordination. Throughout all of this it is vital for the local leadership to be included to maximise the understanding of the local context throughout the planning stages. Alienation of any of the parties involved would be particularly damaging to this process as it relies so heavily on openness and communication between actors¹⁵. It is vitally important to appreciate that security sector reform is not simply about achieving a final 'product'; witnessing and engaging in the process that will finally deliver the desired security end-state is the key experience that will educate local politicians, civil servants, and civil society. Their participation in the process contributes directly to the legitimacy of the reforms.

Given the time-pressure that usually surrounds re-introducing the police force, the involvement of local stakeholders and the development of local ownership are particularly critical aspects with regard to security sector reform. The planning of reforms for the police and associated rule of law institutions should take into account the need to reflect societal norms and not prove unrecognisable to the population at large. Equally, interim international policing missions should not undermine or contradict later approaches adopted for local police reform. Indeed, international policing missions would do well not to contradict themselves – a difficult task given the range of policing styles from different countries in any particular mission. All of the above conditions represent the high expectations of the local community and their complexity emphasises the need for clear definitions of security and policing if these ambitions are to be realised.

The challenges in convincing policy makers to take up SSR as a development objective are not inconsiderable. There is a concerted effort among policy makers and academics around the world that are proponents of SSR to create a vibrant dialogue between themselves and those who have yet to subscribe fully to the holistic approach that SSR relies upon¹⁶. There are three approaches to advancing the security sector reform agenda. First, there are several countries receiving donor aid where the concepts of SSR are being woven into their ongoing reform packages. Second, there are specific SSR capacity building projects taking place – education and training of field practitioners and civil servants from security sector governing institutions. Finally, the members of the international community who advocate security sector reform actively must continue to overcome donor agency doubts by refining approaches and designing strategic models that demonstrate the need for a holistic approach to the rehabilitation of security in the post-conflict context.

Police reforms need to be coordinated and sequenced with appropriate reforms in both the judiciary and penal systems in keeping with SSR theory. As the thesis will focus on police reform practiced in the post-conflict environment it will also be necessary to explore the implications of the peace support operations that will by and large be providing the civilian police presence that will be used to implement the reforms. Given that CIVPOL monitoring teams range in size from 26 to 3500 and contain officers drawn from over 50 UN member states¹⁷, it is fair to ask whether the sustainability of CIVPOL police reforms are threatened by theoretical incoherence? Has the evolution of PSOs since the end of the cold war produced an appropriate mechanism for providing police reform?

The central question here must be whether or not the international community always has a clear idea of the type of police force it is trying to produce, or will its intervention legacy be a flawed service that could eventually undermine the rest of the security sector? Surely, the effectiveness of the policing mission will go hand in hand with the clarity of the mandate. With such a mixture of civilian police missions and member state agendas there are questions to be raised not just over which reform ideologies ought to be pursued but also regarding the organisations through which it is delivered. There has been a slow and painful learning process with regards to intervention as recent missions have been

handicapped by a lack of institutional memory on behalf of many of the donors, a lack of strategic unity between various mission components and failure to define internal security as a police role. This has led to long and expensive campaigns with questionable results as the recent setbacks in Kosovo and Haiti have shown. There is a need for the international community's mechanisms and tools to evolve beyond their immediate post-Cold War limitations and embrace the expanded concept of human security.

However, the most crucial need of all is the international community's need to understand the immediate and imperative role that police reform must have in a post-conflict environment. If SSR is to continue gathering momentum as the desired approach among donors, and if a genuine effort at this holistic approach is to be made, then the obstacles to effective police reform outlined above will need to be addressed. If this can be achieved, it is likely that as the donor understanding of police reform's importance increases, so too will the operational effectiveness of the Security Sector Reform approach.

Endnotes

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- ¹ The 'security sector' includes the armed forces, paramilitary units, the police/ intelligence services and non-state security bodies (e.g. PMCs, political party militias, liberation armies). It also includes the civil authorities mandated to control and oversee these agencies - this may include legislatures, judicial systems, defence, finance and interior ministries, national security agencies, and civil society groups that play a 'watch-dog' role.
- ² Security Sector Reform Policy Brief. (2003) London: HM Government (UK)
- ³ Spillmann, K., Bernauer, T., Gabriel, JM., Wenger, A. eds (2001) Peace Support Operations: Lessons Learned and Future Perspectives. Bern: Peter Lang
- ⁴ Boutros-Ghali, B., (1992) Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping Document A/47/277 - S/241111. New York, UN
- ⁵ 'Annex 1-A: Military Aspects' of the Dayton Peace Agreement. "The IFOR will have the right to monitor and help ensure compliance with the agreement on military aspects and fulfil certain supporting tasks. The IFOR will have the right to carry out its mission vigorously, including with the use of force as necessary. It will have unimpeded freedom of movement, control over airspace, and status of forces protection."
- <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/dayton.html>
- ⁶ Tanke Holm, T. & Barth Eide, E. (2000) "Peacebuilding and Police Reform", London, Frank Cass
- ⁷ Sedra, M. (2003) "Confronting Afghanistan's Security Dilemma", Bonn, Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC)
- <http://www.bicc.de/publications/briefs/brief28/content.html>
- ⁸ Broeder, J. (1998), How to Recognise Good Policing. Washington, D.C.: National Police Executive Research Forum/ Sage
- ⁹ Saville, G. (1999), 'Using Urban Design to Help Eradicate Crime Places', in Sole Brito, C & Allen, T (eds). Problem Oriented Policing: Crime Specific Problems, Critical Issues, and Making POP Work, Vol 2. Washington, D.C.: National Police Executive Research Forum
- ¹⁰ Felson, M & Clarke, R. (1998), 'Opportunity Makes the Thief: Practical Theory for Crime Prevention. Police Research Series, Paper No.98. London: Home Office Policing and Reducing Crime Unit
- ¹¹ Trojanowicz, R. & B. Bucqueroux. (1994), Community Policing: How to Get Started. Cincinnati: Anderson
- ¹² The European Union has demonstrated its policing capabilities in Bosnia (EUPM) and in Macedonia (Proxima). OSCE runs police assistance programs across Eastern Europe and central Asia. The European Commission is taking on responsibility for the training of the International Police Unit in Kinshasa, DRC.
- ¹³ UNDP BCPR's JSSR team's "programmatic approach" is available at <http://www.undp.org/erd/jssr/docs/jssrprogramaticapproach.pdf>
- ¹⁴ Hendrickson, D. (1999) The Conflict, Security & Development Group Working Papers: A Review of Security Sector Reform. London, Centre for Defence Studies

¹⁵ Chanaa, J. (2002) *Security Sector Reform: Issues, Challenges and Future Prospects*. New York, Oxford University Press

¹⁶ For example, the Clingendael Institute in The Netherlands has published a SSR pre-reform assessment framework that will greatly assist donors in the strategic planning process. The drafting process involved the foreign affairs and development ministries from several OECD countries.

¹⁷ Hartz, H. (2000), 'CIVPOL: The UN instrument for Police Reform', in Tanke Holm, T. & Barth Eide, E. (2000), *Peacebuilding and Police Reform*. London: Frank Cass