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Personal Security, Governability and the Military in Latin America

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Abstract

This article examines two questions: first, is the erosion of personal and economic security in Latin America directly related to increasing claims of the region's increasing "ungovernability"? Second, must these two conditions necessarily imply an increasingly interventionist role on the part of national military establishments? The ultimate argument of this study is that the acuity of military perceptions of insecurity in their societies will ultimately determine their political responses. By examining some of the salient critiques of the last "wave" of authoritarian dictatorships, it is hoped that some light will be shed on a future course of action.

"The military man tends to see himself as the perennial victim of civilian warmongering. It is the people and the politicians, public opinion and governments, who start wars. It is the military who have to fight them."

Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*¹

There has never been a more appropriate time to consider the broad concept of personal security in its Latin American and world contexts. The "Third Wave" of democratisation,² while continuing at an unprecedented, yet not always robust pace, is increasingly being defined by its changing sociological, political and economic premises.³ Latin America, along with other world regions, has seen a dramatic breakdown in perceptions of personal economic and physical security, while national economic conditions have exacerbated and, in some cases, blended with individual security concerns. Terrorism has intruded as well, in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Peru, Mexico, and so on, joining Latin America in a world wide drift toward insecurity. In some countries, such as Venezuela, an entire middle class has become threatened. The implication of such threats for the governance of Latin American countries is of increasing concern, as evidenced by the growing use of the term "governability." Furthermore, because military establishments in Latin America are frequently charged with addressing security threats of all kinds, as Huntington's opening quote avers, the breakdown of personal security has immediate implications, through its connection with governance.

This article is driven by two, related questions: first, is the apparent erosion of personal and economic security in Latin America over the past five years directly related to increasing claims of the region's increasing "ungovernability"? Second, must these two conditions—erosion of personal security and putative "ungovernability"—both of crucial concern for the region's middle classes, necessarily imply an increasingly interventionist role on the part of national military establishments? It is the role of academia to examine social phenomena closely, and to clarify social reality through analytical distinctions. The ultimate argument of this study is that the acuity of military perceptions of insecurity in their societies will ultimately determine their political responses. By examining some of the salient critiques of the last "wave" of authoritarian dictatorships, it is hoped that some light will be shed on a future course of action.⁴

This article recommends that military strategists make several crucial and determinate distinctions in their analyses. Paramount among these is the distinction between societal and national security, on the one hand, and

group or class security and interests on the other. Of central importance to our understanding of this complex subject are the general improvements in civil-military relations in Latin American countries since the end of the authoritarian period.⁵ Military establishments have, for the most part, regained their prestigious position in national public opinion polls,⁶ and hence are once again in a position to be called upon by civilian authorities—or coerced and intrigued by them—into assisting in addressing fundamental problems of governance. This should not be taken to imply that the military establishments of Latin America have ever, in most cases, fully withdrawn from governance, nor for that matter, that they are always disinclined to expand their governance roles. It merely points to the growing potential, during this historical wave of dissatisfaction (if not insecurity), for Latin American military establishments to come to exercise a greater political impact upon their societies, for better or for worse.

Thinking About Security in the Latin American Context

“Security” is a broad and slippery term. It ranges from **individual security**, with all of its possible definitions, to **class security**, suggesting that whole economic and social classes may “feel” the presence or absence of adequate physical and economic security, to **national, regional, and international security**. During the years of the National Security states in Latin America, military establishments redefined “security,” or operationalised its definitions, as often as every year.⁷ Since the 1980s, varying personal, class and national security perceptions have become easily disparaged as unattainable and even undesirable goals. Political (electoral) democracy has been given priority in their place. There is abundant evidence to suggest, however, that popular attraction to political democracy has been based upon the spurious assumption that it included economic and personal order and well-being, largely defined in middle class terms. Hence, current popular discontent with political democracy in Latin America would appear to be related directly to its inability to deliver personal security in its physical and economic terms.

The term “security” could easily be replaced with the following descriptors: stability, law, order, and moderate, continual and at least somewhat distributed economic growth. Security, moreover, is primarily a perception on the part of specific groups of people, rather than the indisputable “existence” of this set of circumstances “in the concrete.” As has been often observed, the lower classes in Latin America—the majority of the population—have never had even a modicum of personal security—at least in the middle-class sense of the term. Their conditions have waxed and waned, been somewhat “more secure,” or drastically “less secure,” but have not been comparable to even the most modest middle-class standards

of security. Historically, impoverished workers and *campesinos* have been willing, and even eager, to risk destroying “the system” to better their immediate circumstances; the middle class, when it has been threatened, has been willing to abide all manner of authoritarianism to reaffirm their “*sistema*”.

Security, then, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder. The first definition in the Oxford English Dictionary of the term “secure” is, in fact, tied to perception, and frankly pejorative:

*Feeling no care or apprehension; without care, careless; free from care, apprehension or anxiety, or alarm; over-confident.*⁸

In its basic psychological conceptualisation, **security** and **insecurity** remain perceptual phenomena of particular people and groups of people, rather than descriptions of objective reality. Hence they remain terms requiring contextual definition and clarification.

Furthermore, notions of security are inevitably laden with a “static bias.” Change threatens most conceptualisations of security. At the very least, changing circumstances cannot be understood in the context of security. During periods of rapid economic and political change conservative and affluent groups tend to see “insecurity” whilst the poor and disenfranchised tend to see “opportunity.”

Striking insecurity in Latin America over the past five years, stemming from petty and interpersonal crime, corruption, economic stagnation and collapse, civil wars, terrorism, international crime, political polarization, and the consequent breakdown of behavioural norms, the global economic climate and ultimately the failure of national economies, has underscored the inadequacy of terms such as “national security” and even “social security”, and has pointed to the need for a new analytical focus. As the Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle⁹ should remind us, the way that a society understands “security,” the perceptual and interpretive act of **security analysis**, clearly has an impact upon the nature of the security being observed, and how institutions such as the military ultimately deal with it.

Several observers have suggested the need to distinguish between the **insecurity** of groups and that of society,¹⁰ and to aggregate a number of factors in order to understand better the impact of insecurity upon policy. The insecurity of ethnic, religious, or other social groups is all too often confused with the insecurity of the state,¹¹ with potentially dire consequences. As Ole Weaver, Barry Bazan, et al. argue:

*If society rather than the state is made the central focus of security analysis, then a new policy agenda and a new set of causal dynamics come clearly into view. This tactic does not remove the state from security analysis, but it does shift it off center stage: it puts more of the "national" back into "national security."*¹²

Weaver, Bazan et al. propose an alternative analysis of "societal security," that is posed in the European context, but that has obvious applicability to Latin American countries.¹³ In this perspective, José Nun's decades old analysis of military intervention, "The Middle-Class Military Coup," as an almost unconscious act of the military establishment on behalf of an insecure middle class, might be usefully resurrected: military establishments that clearly recognised and contextualised middle class insecurity (as one element of many in societal security), and acted accordingly, and appropriately, would, indeed, be taking a major step towards putting the "national" back into "national security."

An immediate and effective analysis should disclose to the observers when the "nation" is threatened, and, alternatively, when a group (even a very influential group) is seeking to make that case, or is having that case made for it, for its own ends. While it is clear that most Latin American countries are currently suffering some level of what Weaver, Bazan and their collaborators refer to as societal insecurity, there are numerous groups within each of those societies that are striving to confuse their acute needs and crises with the crisis of the nation. The burgeoning of terrorism reinforces these concerns and blurs the distinction between state oriented national security and societal security even further.

Governability: Old Wine in a New Bottle?

The increasingly omnipresent term "governability" is very new, so new, in fact, that most dictionaries have not yet recognised it. Nevertheless, cursory checks on the World Wide Web reveal hundreds of references to governability, most of them regarding Latin America.¹⁴ Related to the more recognised term *governable*¹⁵, "governability" both asks a question and, by implication, answers it: can some societies be governed (it implies)? No, it tacitly answers itself, apparently not. As a self-defining term, it thus makes a strong, if somewhat circular, statement. It does not, at a cursory glance at any rate, break new conceptual ground, however. Terms like *legitimacy*, *sovereignty*, *authority*, and, ultimately, *power*, long ago defined the same conceptual region. Machiavelli, in *The Prince*, provides a handbook for governing based on the premise that all city-states

in Italy were, indeed, at least potentially “governable,” if only the prince would follow a prescribed set of instructions.¹⁶

The currency of the term *governability* in contemporary Latin American politics comes from its strident connotations: the nexus of rapidly intensifying circumstances, including local, regional, national and international crime, corruption (an especially problematic category of crime), interpersonal violence, economic deterioration and widespread dissatisfaction. It also refers obliquely to the struggle of new democracies to establish and respect the norms and institutions necessary to ensure their survival. The concept of *ungovernability* is hence the implied message. Colombia, Argentina, and even Chavez’s Venezuela are cases in point.

Of much more relevance in interpreting the “ungovernability” of a given Latin American country is competition between self-interested groups. Because of a tradition of strong presidential government, coupled with “irregular executive transfers” and elite manipulation of the process of succession, such social groups often conduct themselves more as *factions* than as loyal constituents of the national political process. The problem of “governability” runs deeper than this, however. In his work, *Strong Societies, Weak States*, Joel Migdal argued that the systematic undermining of strong institutions by leaders in developing countries who have felt personally threatened by them has left a legacy of weak institutions. In most Latin American countries over the past century, only the Roman Catholic Church and national military establishments have maintained the kind of continual institutionalisation, with strong procedures and conventions that routinely outlast charismatic personalities, necessary for political development. Furthermore, over the past fifteen years there has been a dramatic increase in the formation of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), many of them grass-roots. While this bodes very well for the growth of democratic consciousness, in the short term it has put great pressures on developing national institutions capable of perpetuating themselves intact through the decades.

One of the central pressure points in the governability question involves the continuing status of unrestricted property rights. With growing economic pressures, and the growing aspirations of the poorest classes and groups within Latin American societies, efforts to achieve greater distribution of economic resources are increasingly focusing upon property ownership rights. This bedrock issue tends to be linked by elite interests to governability; in essence, challenges to unrestricted property rights are equated with societal insecurity by some groups, while the persistence of huge, exclusive properties is decried as the root cause of national insecurity by others.¹⁷ Latin American military establishments, moreover, have tended in most cases to be unequivocal in their support of unrestricted rights to property ownership¹⁸ as an article of national security. This is likely because of their own anti-communist legacies,

although it is important to add that virtually every Latin American military establishment evinces profound ideological divisions among its officer corps, and frequently such divisions devolve upon this fundamental question.

One of the most difficult putative causes of “ungovernability” in Latin America involves regional and national participation in the global economic system. The currently unfavourable position of Latin American economies in the global economic system has triggered a series of national crises that threaten to exacerbate the governability question further. Economic dysfunction in Argentina, rapid weakening of the *real* in Brazil,¹⁹ the widespread economic crisis in Venezuela (coupled with the recent struggle for executive power in that country), and the recent re-nationalisation of utilities and other sectors in Uruguay, to name some examples, point to the reason for Latin America’s growing disenchantment with the global economy. Terms such as “global corporate predation,” and “globalised corruption” are increasingly common in the daily language of Latin American media.

Of a more threatening, if less immediate, nature is the security threat posed by the “ungovernability” of a neighbouring country.²⁰ Governability, in this sense of an external threat, makes clearer sense in a national context. The current case that is receiving most attention in Latin America is that of the ongoing civil war in Colombia.²¹ The Colombian “spillover effect” has been repeatedly cited by military authorities in Brazil, for example, as a threat to Brazilian security, although ramifications of Colombian “ungovernability” affect a number of other countries in one form or another.²²

It is clear that there is a propensity for governability crises in some countries in contemporary Latin America. However, it is important to note that the concept of “governability” is very clearly an old and familiar wine in a new bottle. It easily serves in many cases as another bid for power through the manipulation of public opinion, an undeniable, if circular demand that certain groups or class interests be elevated above those of others. Elite groups in society may not be able to govern in their own interests, but in an electoral democracy, they can usually veto key elements of the governing process. Claims of “ungovernability” suggest the use of such vetoes. The subsequent appeal to the military by self-interested groups to resolve the “governability crisis” may thus lack complete sincerity.²³ Even though the relationship between individual and group insecurity is not necessarily linked to “governability,” nevertheless, there is genuine cause for concern. The putative relationship between security (broadly defined) and “governability” has repeatedly justified military intervention in Latin American history. Chile in 1973 and Argentina in the 1970s are but a few cases in point.

Military Establishments, Ungovernability, Nationalism, and Intervention

Military establishments had a combination of political and economic motives for their *bureaucratic authoritarian* interventions into the political systems of Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s. Political motives included national political stalemates, a military phobia for Marxism,²⁴ the invitation and even insistence of civilian politicians to intervene, charges of civilian corruption, and a growth of grassroots organisations that threatened “order,” not to mention elite interests. The Cold War, and the mistrust and fear of populism in the region by elites, and by the United States government, further encouraged the wave of dictatorships that overtook the region.

Economic and social causes are far more difficult to identify, although they clearly constituted critical motivations for the wave of interventions. Guillermo O’Donnell, originator of the “bureaucratic authoritarian” interpretation of the subsequent military regimes,²⁵ has been most stridently criticised for the economic causal and descriptive variables (*e.g.*, import substitution industrialisation) that he associated with the dictatorships,²⁶ although these governments clearly had ideological economic approaches in dealing with their national development problems.²⁷ As noted above, José Nun, an Argentinean Marxist, wrote an influential article in the mid-1960s that linked the military interventions to middle-class interests.²⁸ Nun argued that the middle class does not have a sense of itself, although it does have very palpable interests, and if they are ignored, the military will tend to intervene—if unconsciously—on behalf of those middle-class interests. While Nun was somewhat imprecise about the hierarchy of interests that might stimulate direct military intervention, it remains clear that there are certain interests that remain fundamental. The unrestricted right to property ownership appears in most cases to be one of those. Personal security and economic prosperity (more specifically defined) are others.²⁹

Each of these issues has immediate ramifications in police functions. Writing in the 1970s, Morris Janowitz noted that

...the increased capacity of the regimes in [developing] nations to rule has been a function of institution building, and especially of the increased growth and effectiveness of their police agencies—those instruments of repressive control. In the

process of institution building, one important feature has been the extension of direction and control of the police and the paramilitary by the central national military establishment.³⁰

The growth of democratisation in Latin America beginning in the early 1980s underscored these comments. While extreme mechanisms of social control, involving petty criminality as well as more severe threats to individual and middle class security, had been openly practiced during the military dictatorships, middle-class public opinion in the 1980s and 1990s did not appear to embrace social and economic democracy with the same fervour with which they flocked to political democratisation.

Most Latin American military interventions of the 1960s and 1970s cited civilian corruption,³¹ the growth of communism (often confused with threats to unrestricted property ownership), insecurity (again, broadly defined), and civilian political gridlock as rationales,³² although the ultimate ideological expression of all of them was **nationalism**. The consequent national security states reinforced the policing of political and criminal “violators,” and in many cases military personnel became directly involved in these police functions. The national security states in Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and, to a lesser extent, Brazil, involved direct military policing actions, including arrest, imprisonment, torture and murder of both political and criminal suspects. The objects of their arrest, imprisonment, torture, and summary executions were invariably cast as “internal enemies” of the nation. The legitimacy of their actions remains a hotly disputed legal and political subject today.

Military establishments, even those involved in the national security states of the 1960s and 1970s, typically resent and avoid police functions, while recognising their critical importance to political order.³³ While personal and group security are accepted by the military as fundamental precepts of an orderly society, the military has never willingly entered this arena. Civilian political and economic elites, on the other hand, tend to regard the military as a kind of “super police”³⁴ waiting in the wings, and frequently call upon them in this capacity. It should be stressed, however, that even during the height of the Latin American military dictatorships of the 1960s and 1970s, military establishments maintained a distance from these functions, as Janowitz, writing in the late 1970s, explained:

When the military is actively involved in internal constabulary operations, it is often more prone to display force than to use force. It seems to operate on the assumption that minor day-to-day resort to force weakens its organisational capacity to

intervene successfully with shock tactics and with overpowering impact. This appears to be an application of the military theme of conservation of resources. Paradoxically, such reluctance to be involved in police work increases the ability of the military to intervene in a political crisis period; thereby, the military is frequently free of the stigma of having "pushed people around" and having engaged in "undercover police work."³⁵

Additionally, military personnel are not appropriately conditioned or trained in most cases for police work in civil society. This ultimately leaves civilian elites who aspire to using the military in a policing capacity with the need to confuse personal, group or class security with the larger notion of "national security."

The worldwide intensification of expressions of nationalism, anti-globalism, and ethnic, religious and racial bigotry, while separate phenomena, share many of the same causal variables. Nationalism, in particular, seems to have taken on a very distinct and paranoid vision in Latin America, and military establishments have proven themselves particularly vulnerable to it. As observed in an earlier work,³⁶ one popular book among Latin American military officers³⁷ stresses an alleged conspiratorial role of the United States and Europe in undermining Latin American sovereignty. It formulates a direct appeal to the "national security" of Latin American countries, even if its evidence is a patchwork of often unrelated "facts." The extreme nature of these appeals is disturbing and—in view of their apparent acceptability—somewhat mystifying.

Anti-global sentiments within Latin American military establishments are far easier to understand. The profound economic and social crises of the major Latin American countries seem to link in many respects to the dynamics of global business and culture. The pejorative economic position that Latin American countries currently occupy, for example, in international commodity markets almost guarantees that regional growth and prosperity will be delayed for decades. It would be a mistake to assume that globalism is a new phenomenon, however. It has existed in varying forms for centuries, and has periodically waxed and waned. The immediacy afforded by modern technology has served to intensify its impact in some respects, but may not represent a qualitative change.

In assessing the complex relationship of security, governability, and the worldwide intensification of ethnic, racial, religious and cultural intolerance, the "instrumental" value of such appeals is continually

evident. Military establishments, because of their fundamental devotion to protecting the nation, are particularly vulnerable to such appeals. Political elites, particularly those threatened by growing grass-roots democracy and the effects of prolonged economic crisis, can easily manipulate such “primordial” hatreds. While the breakdown in personal and group security makes people far more susceptible to such emotional responses, however, the “necessary” connection between them and “governability” as a pretext for military intervention is oblique at best.

Conclusions

Few would deny that another critical moment in civil-military relations in Latin America is at hand. Terrorism, economic dysfunction, globalism (and its complex demands), middle-class insecurity, and fundamental political problems have once again been coupled with an almost universally higher popular regard for national military establishments *qua* institutions. Moreover, frequent claims of national “ungovernability”—typically made by specific political groups—are being lodged at just the juncture when the military establishments of the region, responding to the most pejorative elements of globalism, have found increasingly strident forms of nationalism to be most alluring. Civilian politicians are again showing signs of turning to the military to resolve their most intractable political problems. Ecuador in 2000 and Venezuela in the last several years are but a few of the more glaring examples where the civilians turned to the armed forces to overthrow undesirable presidents.

There is a critical and enduring need for military establishments to see questions of security and insecurity clearly,³⁸ to distinguish between state/national insecurity and other, more localised forms, and to respond appropriately to civilian political claims of national ungovernability. As the wavelike process of world history continues, it would be unreasonable to assume that the ultimate forces of coercion will not be called upon once again to resolve local political power struggles in the name of security. As important as the growth and prosperity of the middle classes is to the region, the military establishments of Latin America should not allow themselves to become the tools of the middle—or any other—class.

In this regard, it remains absolutely imperative that military establishments be able to contribute to societal security—including police functions—without confusing group, or class insecurity with nationalistic conceptualisations of state security. It may be useful to return at this juncture to the central questions posed at the beginning of this study: is the apparent erosion of personal and economic security in Latin America over the past five years directly related to the region’s increasing “ungovernability”? Second, do these two conditions—erosion of personal security and putative ungovernability—both of crucial concern to the

region's middle classes, necessarily imply an increasingly interventionist role on the part of national military establishments? A provisional "no" must be maintained in response to the first question. Continuing competition between mostly elite groups appears to explain the "governability" crises in most Latin American cases. Although grass-roots organisations have grown dramatically in strength, the vetoing of normal governmental functioning (i.e., ungovernability) ultimately and always represents a "conservative" elite tactic.

It is ultimately the nationalistic response of military establishments to conditions of insecurity that should remind them of the dangers of a previous era, and the vulnerability of their own nationalistic precepts. At the close of World War II, in what is described as a striking exposition of political realism, E.H. Carr concluded that

...it is the failure of the nation-state to assure military security or economic well-being which has in part inspired the widespread questioning of the moral credentials of nationalism.³⁹

About the Authors

Constantine P. Danopoulos teaches political science at San Jose State University. He has written or edited 11 books, numerous articles and book chapters, and dozens of conference papers. His publications deal with civil-military relations, national security, poverty, the bureaucracy, and the environment.

He served as election observer in Bosnia (1996) and editor of the *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*. He is the West Coast associate editor of *Mediterranean Quarterly* and serves on the editorial board of *Armed Forces and Society* and the *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*. From 1993 to 1999 he was president/chair of the Research committee on Armed Forces and Society of the International Political Science Association. Dr. Danopoulos was an OECD election observer in Bosnia (1996).

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A former U.S. Peace Corps volunteer in Northeast Brazil (1970-72), he was a Fulbright senior lecturer at the University of Dar es Salaam (Tanzania—East Africa) during the 1989-90 academic year. He has published in academic journals on democratization, economic development and civil-military relations in Brazil as well as in Africa and Eastern Europe. He co-edited two books (with Constantine Danopoulos) applying the lessons of the recent history of Latin America and Southern Europe to civil-military relations in Eastern Europe, the most recent of which is *The Military and Society in the Former Eastern Bloc* (Westview, 1999).

Endnotes

¹ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State; The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1957). Pp. 69-70. Huntington has long served as a foil for critics of his thesis that professionalization of the military is conducive to democratic civil-military relations.

² Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1988).

³ President Fernando Henrique Cardoso of Brazil noted in his 2000 address to the World Movement for Democracy that "...today democracy has a worldwide reach that probably has not been equaled at any other moment in the history of mankind," although fundamental problems with human rights and poverty severely qualify this accomplishment. Cardoso, "Democracy as a Starting Point," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (January 2001), pp. 8 ff.

⁴ Basic to this approach is Arnold Toynbee's interpretation of the cyclical nature of history, and hence the assumption that a more authoritarian political period is in the offing.

⁵ Huntington argued in a 1995 article that "the new democracies [throughout the world] have overall done better with civil-military relations than they have with most of their other major problems...[and] with one exception, civil-military relations are in better shape in the new democracies than they were in the authoritarian regimes that these democracies replaced." Huntington, "Reforming Civil-Military Relations," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 6, No. 4 (October 1995), p. 11.

⁶ A 1999 transnational survey demonstrated that the armed forces had once again become the most trusted institution in Latin America, with about 49% of the public expressing trust for their national militaries. Cited in: Marta Lagos, "Between Stability and Crisis in Latin America," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (January 2001), p. 143.

⁷ The Brazilian military establishment represented an interesting example of this, going to great lengths through its Superior War College to forge a working meaning for the term in collaboration with civilian technocrats. See, in this regard: Alfred Stepan, *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973).

⁸ Oxford University Press, *The Oxford English Dictionary* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 367.

⁹ Formulated by Werner Heisenberg (1901-1976), one of the great physicists of the 20th century and the "discoverer" of

quantum mechanics, it stipulates that "the more the position (of something) is determined, the less precisely the momentum is known." From this simple statement, called the "principle of uncertainty," we can argue that the nature of phenomena are changed by the process of observing them.

¹⁰ As Ole Weaver, Barry Bazan, et al. observe, "Societies are often made insecure because important groups within them feel insecure....This, however, has to be kept conceptually separate from the security of a society, societal security. Societal security is not social security." Weaver, Bazan, et al., *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), p. 27.

¹¹ Weaver, Bazan, et al. note that "state security is the referent object in four sectors: political, military, economic and environmental. State security can be influenced by the security or insecurity of a society on which it is based, but this has to be seen as a two-step procedure different from state security in the four other sectors. The referent object of societal security is society." P. 26.

¹² Weaver, Bazan, et al., p. 196.

¹³ They note that "Societal security, like other concepts in social science, can be seen as a kind of analytical lens, able to give an insight into familiar problems from a new perspective. Like all lenses it gives a partial view, making some things clearer and pushing others into the background. In this case, what is made clearer is the importance of society as an independent variable in European security logic, and consequently the significance of identity, Europeanization and migration as security issues." P. 185.

¹⁴ www.google.com and www.metaeureka.com were the search engines used. Recent references are cropping up to governability in Africa and Central Asia as well.

¹⁵ Which also fails to have a reference in the *Oxford English Dictionary*.

¹⁶ With the important caveat that *virtu*, the ability to think and act resolutely and intelligently in order to achieve one's ends, could assure an outcome *at best* half of the time. Conversely, *fortuna*, or fate, always controlled, in Machiavelli's view, at least half of all outcomes.

¹⁷ The struggle over the past 15 years between landowners and the Landless Movement (MST) in Brazil is a clear example of this.

¹⁸ There are notable exceptions, including the Peruvian military dictatorship that assumed power in 1968.

¹⁹ When this is combined with the severe downgrading of Brazil's investment rating, and the precipitous decline in the São Paulo stock market, it lends to this case the sense that the Argentinean crisis may be contagious.

²⁰ Michael Dziedzic stresses this aspect of governability in a 1998 work: "When internal unrest either causes a government meltdown or provokes draconian spasms of repression, the consequences can spill over the border, destabilizing the surrounding region. In turn, transnational forces such as massive refugee migrations, guerrilla movements, and international criminal syndicates have increasingly been unleashed or exacerbated, threatening surrounding states." Dziedzic, "Introduction," *Policing the New World Order*, ed. by Robert B. Oakley, Michael J. Dziedzic and Eliot M. Goldberg (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1998), p. 5.

²¹ Civil war is, indeed, a clear and indisputable case of "ungovernability." It might be added, however, that the term "ungovernability" does not bring any additional understanding to the concept of "civil war."

²² Other neighboring countries such as Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador and Panama, as well as countries affected by migration and illegal drug trade, including the United States.

²³ One can compare this with the story of the child who, after murdering his parents, throws himself upon the mercy of the court because he is an orphan.

²⁴ The Cuban Revolution in 1959, in particular, spurred military resistance. Che Guevara had presided over the summary execution of as many as 500 Cuban military officers, thus sending a very personal message to the rest of the region's military officer corps that Marxist systems must be prevented at all costs.

²⁵ O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics* (Berkeley: Institute for International studies, University of California, 1973).

²⁶ For a critique of O'Donnell's "socioeconomic determinism," see, for example: Karen Remmer, *Military Rule in Latin America* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 13-14.

²⁷ The Peruvian dictatorship that seized power in 1968 often served as a counter example because of the generals' left-leaning (populist) policies, at least during the first two or three years.

²⁸ Nun, "The Middle-Class Military Coup," *The Politics of Conformity in Latin America*, ed. Claudio Veliz (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 66-118.

²⁹ It is important to note that while the military may have intervened on behalf of middle class interests in the 1960s and 1970s, it was precisely the middle classes that soon became most dissatisfied.

³⁰ Janowitz, *Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), pp. 6-7.

³¹ Somewhat disingenuously, it might be noted. As Shawn Smallman has observed, "Armies in [Latin America] have long constructed roles for themselves as 'the moral guardians of the nation.' Yet many Latin American armies have suffered from corruption pervasive enough to affect their ties with civil society." Smallman, "Shady Business: Corruption in the Brazilian Army before 1954," *Latin American Research Review*, Vol. 32, No. 3 (1997), p. 40.

³² Again, it is important to note that elite civilian *politicos* frequently urged military intervention as a political gambit. Janowitz, writing in the 1970s, noted that "...military leaders in Latin American nations were, in general, crucial in regulating factional disputes among existing elite groups. They served as active elements in maintaining a political balance or stable unbalance. But the perspective of the military in South America—and, in particular cases, in Central America—has been converging with that of the new nations. These military establishments have become more involved, seeking to direct and arbitrate sociopolitical change. The self-imposed tasks of these military establishments and their paramilitary agencies have thus become enlarged and intensified." *Military Institutions and Coercion*, p. 6.

³³ Janowitz noted that "Not only do the military regimes take the local police and paramilitary formations for granted, but they also seek to fashion and direct them. *Though military regimes and professional officers resist the direct exercise of the police function*, they recognize that political power rests in part on the performance of such a function by a 'lower grade' of agents." *Military Institutions and Coercion*, p. 20. *Emphasis added.*

³⁴ Janowitz made this observation, noting that "it is because these [developing nations'] military establishments are mainly infantry battalions, which can be deployed in urban centers or in rural areas, that they have maximum potential for involvement in domestic politics. They are in essence a form of super-police." *Military Institutions and Coercion*, p. 109.

³⁵ Janowitz, *Military Institutions and Coercion*, p. 113.

³⁶ Zirker, "The Brazilian Military Paradox: Growing Nationalism in a Global Environment," XXIII International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, Washington, D.C. (6-8 September 2001).

³⁷ According to James L. Zackrison, writing in the *Joint Forces Quarterly* in 1996, the book by the Executive Intelligence Review (a group headed by the notorious US right-wing activist Lyndon LaRouche), *The Plot to Annihilate the Armed Forces and the Nations of Ibero-America* (Washington, DC: EIR News Service, Inc, 1994), had "sold thousands of copies in Latin America, and the Mexican military printed a special edition of more than 500 copies. It is reportedly on the required reading list at several regional military academies and staff colleges." He concluded at the time that "the book is currently commanding a growing following within the militaries of Latin America." Zackrison, "Of Cabals and Complots [book review]," *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Spring 1996), pp. 135-136.

³⁸ Security, it almost goes without saying, would be undesirable in the extreme. *Webster's Seventh Collegiate Dictionary*, for example, reminds us of an insightful, if archaic definition of the word secure: "Unwisely free of fear." A Merriam Webster, *Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary* (Springfield, Massachusetts: G. & C. Merriam Company, 1971), p. 780.

³⁹ Carr, *Nationalism and After* (London: Macmillan and Company, 1945), p. 38.