Democratic Governance and Common Security in Southern Africa: Mozambique in Focus[1]

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Abstract

Democratisation in Mozambique is taking place by the interlinking of state institutional performance, both at political and economic levels, and the more procedural and dynamic nature of societal actors' intervention upon the structures in order to co-opt them or mould them to a favourable outcome to its own interests. In the interface between democratisation and security, this paper argues that the existence of a national security concept in Mozambique is not a straightforward assumption. Both the gaps in the legislation and the absence of a clear programme reinforce this view. Nonetheless, overall legislation informed by such a conception exists and accounts for democratic progress in the accountability and subordination of the security forces to the political power. This has allowed for relative stability on the internal plan enabling the country to play an increasingly proactive role within SADC, especially in relation to the development of the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS).

Introduction

Democratisation processes are a common feature of the Southern African region in the post-Apartheid era. The transitions mainly initiated within the coinciding period of the end of the Cold War are still ongoing, although having gained different features across the region. The different types of constitutional arrangements, political and electoral systems condition the outcome of the political bargain, as much as do the understanding and positioning of the ruling elites, the opposition parties, the civil society and the people at large of a determined country. The impact of this transition period indicates the existence of major re-structuring within the security sector of each country, to comprise democratic oversight over the security forces, but also according to the new threat perceptions. These perceptions have been influenced not only by the need for maintenance of power by the regimes in government, but also from major regional conflict trends and transnational menaces. In line with this, the regional security scene has also been undergoing changes as regards the construction and operationalisation of its methods to deal with security matters, from the point of view of political dialogue, the development of other peaceful conflict resolution instruments and of the creation of intervention mechanisms.

These processes do not always occur within peaceful environments and at times analyses spring between reverse and consolidation of the democratisation process in a determined country or the region as a whole. To understand how specifically the general trends above-mentioned developed in the case of Mozambique, which is seen to be an illustrative process of successful simultaneous transitions, this work revolves around one main underlying question: 'How have the processes and practices of democratisation and democracy in Mozambique influenced the state's perception and practice of national security? What effect has this had on its approach to regional security?'

In order to respond to the question, this paper initiates by describing and analysing the main features of the democratisation process in Mozambique, its context and the practice developed. The second section goes on to discuss the national security architecture as regards the nature of the re-structuring of the security sector and within it the process of policy-making and decision-making. Finally, the last section provides an insight on how Mozambique has been engaged in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) regional security processes and how it contributes to the development of practices within this environment.

1 Democratisation in Mozambique

1.1 Drivers of the Process

The vibrant and dynamic process of democratisation in Mozambique, despite its wide appraisal by the international community as a success story, has strikingly demonstrated the feebleness of the so celebrated end of history, and is revealing the shortcomings of the triumph of the market economy that underlined the immediate post-cold war mood.

The democratisation process through which Mozambique is undergoing is proving to be a complex process characterised by deep feelings of uncertainty as a result of the intertwined nature of the multilayered transitions. In a country ravaged by sixteen years of war between the Government of Frelimo and Renamo, the drivers of the process are found at various levels, as a result of the creation of synergies between the international, the regional and the national variants. At the international level the end of the Cold War meant that the sources of support to the belligerents would be strained and that a generalised discourse of liberalisation of the economy would be strengthened in a context of democratisation. On a regional perspective and certainly determinant, was the coinciding fall of the Apartheid regime which constituted the major cause of destabilisation in Southern Africa on the late seventies and throughout the eighties. Thus, the removal of the determinant cause for aggression in the region, and of the major source of support of Renamo, as well as the related events of democratisation in South Africa and the independence of Namibia, generated positive stimuli for the establishment of democratic systems elsewhere in the region. On a national level, the exhaustion of the belligerents, the intense internal public appeal towards the end of the war and the state decaying legitimacy, constituted crucial factors, which pressured effectively for the achievement of the Rome Peace Agreement, entailing all correspondent changes concerning the re-structuring of the political system.

Despite all the positive achievements and with the irreversibility of the process of change, the simultaneous transitions started to exert their mutual transformative effects in the sensitive period of reconciliation. As such, the effect of the evolving situation from centralised economy to a market economy (started in 1987), the transformation from a one party rule to a multiparty system, the change of war into peace would be the determinants to shape the democratisation process.

1.2 The Elusive Boost of the Economy: *Quo Vadis* Social Development?

The economic discourse in the immediate after war period increasingly emphasized the need for privatisation, attraction of foreign direct investment and attainment of a strong macroeconomic balance, as *sine qua non* for a strong and vibrant economy. Massive injections of external aid in the last decade have contributed to the celebration of high growth rates, on average 8 to 9% from 1995-2001 (National Human Development Report, 2001: iii), and increasing economic recuperation. These macroeconomic benefits, commended over time by the IMF[2], including the increasing ability of the country to repay its debts (as a result of the country enrolment in HIPC), and of controlling the level of inflation do not seem to be matched by correspondence in the microeconomic arena, not to mention its extension into the improvement of common people's daily lives. This celebratory mood is however counteracted by studies that show that the tendency of the economy is to recede. The Composed Indicator of the Economic Activity in Mozambique shows that if from

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[2] See the article 'Mozambique: Macroeconomic policy commended by IMF', where states that the organisation decided to give more concessional financial assistance to the country in the cadre of the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facilities (PRGF), www.irinnews.org, 24/06/03.

1991 until the end of 1995 the real economic activity of the country really boosted, as a result of the end of the war, relocation of people into their origin zones, emergency rehabilitation processes and the recovery of normal activity of the enterprises, the same is not valid from 1996 onwards. In this study it is argued that even with a strong movement of privatisation that in turn raised the numbers of unemployed, the economy stagnated until 1999 and after that, the decline was aggravated as a result of the floods in 2000. The average growth rate for this period can thus be only attributed to the mega projects that initiated in this period, namely Mozal and the Maputo Corridor Project, whose investment and income generated numbers, mislead the overall situation of the country (Tibana 2003: 5-7). On the other hand the figures for foreign direct investment in 1999 amounted to US$1.706 billion against only US$ 294 billion from national investment (Grobbelaar and Lala 2003: 27), what reveals the weakness of the national entrepreneurship financial capacities, deteriorated by the difficult access to credit with the elevated interest rates, and thus leading to a situation in which the bulk share of the business activity is controlled by external capital. This tendency is due to persist with the new capital-intensive investments like Mozal Phase II and the Pipeline Gas into South Africa (Economist Intelligence Unit -Mozambique Country Report 2003:10).

On the issue of investment it is increasingly revealing that the Mozambican political elite in power is reacting by associating with the major projects, transforming themselves into a business elite, through partnerships they are allowed to make due to their decision-making power over investment and the economy[3]. The same conditions for 'self-empowerment' (!) are unfortunately not created on the level of medium and small enterprises which are shrinking with a low level of entrepreneurship trust (Ratilal 2002: 253) and are increasingly getting pushed into the informal sector, whilst the economy is mostly being dominated by monopolies and oligopolies.

The economic structure is one where commerce and services are rating high (with about 48% of contribution[4]) followed by agriculture (with between 25-30%) and manufacturing and construction (with about 24%) (National Human Development Report 1998: 38). This is so despite the fact that on average 80% of the labour-force works in agriculture (from which 72% rely on subsistence agriculture), only 15% work on the services sector, whilst about 5% are in the industry (Instituto Nacional de Estatísticas, Censo 97, 1999).

Nonetheless, the government policy priorities have been to reduce poverty and in order to achieve that the Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty (PARPA) was adopted in April 2001, on the basis of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper elaborated in conjunction by the country and the World Bank. The PARPA goal is to reduce poverty by 30% by the year

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[3] The book 'Transforming Mozambique' by Anne Pitcher presents an extended analysis of this process and the Mozambique Country Report from the Economist Intelligence Unit, 2003 accounts for major ongoing and future projects, and presents the level and actors responsible for major financial capital investment.
[4] Different sources present different data, the Economist Intelligence Unit- Mozambique Country Report accounts for 55%.

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2010, and taking into account the Millennium Development Goals of halving the proportion of people living in extreme poverty in the period 1990-2015, the country stands average chances (Report on the Millennium Development Goals- Mozambique, 2002: 2). Available data shows that 69.4% of the population live under the poverty line (Mozambique Common Country Assessment 2000: 16) and the human poverty index of the south of the country accounts to 39.8%, whilst the centre accounts for 60% and the north for 64.3%, revealing that there is a long way to go in addressing inequalities (National Human Development Report 1999: 32). The sectors of investment priority have been education and health and data reveals that the human development indicators are surprisingly rising, despite the hardships of economy and the impact of the 2000 floods[5]. But the figures still remain among the lowest in the world; with the country rating a human development index of 170 among 173 (Report on the Millennium Development Goals- Mozambique, 2002: 4). Also of extreme concern is the impact of HIV-AIDS, which is expected to reduce the life expectancy from 50.3 years to 36.5 in 2010, meaning the prospects for a strong reversal of the epidemic is not foreseen, entailing impact into the economic and social development environment.

The data presented above lead us to a panorama in which promotion of exclusionary tendencies between Mozambicans and foreigners, as well as within the Mozambican society, exacerbation of regional differentiations[6] and steering of social tensions will increase the overall level of mistrust in the society. Despite the commitment towards poverty reduction and consequent achievement of human development, the adoption of the neo-liberal policies seems to be accompanied by high levels of criminality and rampant corruption, contributing to the rise of human insecurity, and overall throwing Mozambique into the direction of a more conflict–prone society within an already disturbing path of democratisation.

1.3 Character of Democratic Practice

1.3.1 Shortcomings of the institutional framework
The changes towards the democratisation process started on a formal basis with the adoption of a new constitution by the country in 1990. This document paved the way for multipartism and for the inclusion of different sensitivities in the political system. However, its approval occurred in a troubled environment, as the ruling party Frelimo made the discussion and changes, whilst the peace negotiations with Renamo were still ongoing. Renamo argued this was not a legitimate Constitution, as they had not taken part in the revision process. This was understood as a Government strategy to pre-empt all major demands from Renamo and render their negotiation position irrelevant, which elevated the level of suspicion between the parties (Lala 2002:27, Ostheimer 1999:3, Rocca (1998) and CSIS Africa Notes (1991).

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[5] The human development index presents a rise of 4.4%, from the figure of 0.362 in 2000 to 0.378 in 2001 (National Human Development Report 2001: 20).
[6] The Centre for Promotion of Investments declared strong concern by the fact that the majority of (declining investment in 2002, in the order of 57% in comparison to the previous year) investment was concentrated in the south due to the lack of infrastructures in the central and northern provinces, despite their natural resource potential (Correio da Manha, 23/01/03).

Due to the recognition that the Executive was holding strong powers despite the argument of a semi-presidential regime, the first post-elections period (the first elections were held in October 1994 with over 88 per cent participation of the population), which saw a parliament constituted by 44.8 % seats belonging to Renamo and 55.2% to Frelimo, went through an extensive process of country-wide consultation on various legislation matters (financed by the international community) and work towards the revision of the Constitution. Paradoxically, the major proponent of its changes- Renamo- refrained from its adoption, as the second elections were approaching and their belief of victory, lead them to preserve the status quo, frightened by the scenario of reduced presidential powers leading to the direction of having to enter a power-sharing agreement. The first attempt to change the constitutional rule into one more reflective of the general will of the country, whilst taking into account concerns of the minorities, and aiming for the minimum shift from constitutionality to constitutionalism[7] was deemed to failure.

Additionally, the country's' electoral system does not enable any further political inclusiveness. On the one hand being one of a proportional representation, but with the establishment of a threshold of 5% of votes at the national level to achieve a seat in the parliament, the multiparty system, in reality become a bi-partisan one. On the other hand, the nature of its competitiveness is such that the parliamentary interaction can be characterised within the 'winner takes all' equation between Frelimo and Renamo. If this could have been a depurative system to ensure political stability and continuity in an immediate post-war situation, in which the proliferation of political parties, especially due to announced economic dividends[8] and uncertainty concerning Renamo's build-up as a political party[9] might have compromised the transition, currently all indicates that this model is reaching exhaustion. The additional layer where more pluralism would be allowed is the decentralisation process, through which municipalities were instituted and local elections established. In 1998 the municipal elections took place with a low level of voters' participation and within a boycott by Renamo that precluded itself from participation as well their electorate for having an opportunity of at least locally, being represented and form part of a structure that runs their daily lives.

The Parliament, in its quality of the highest institution for governance oversight and for conflict resolution is failing. Demonstrative have been the developments since the second general elections held in 1999,

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[7] J.K.Fayemi in the article 'Democratic Governance and the Challenge of State Reconstruction in Africa: Reviewing Indicators and Benchmarks for Democracy & Good Governance in Nepad's Peer Review Mechanism' argues that: 'The change in focus from *constitutionality*- where these documents are merely legal instruments with no standing with the people to *constitutionalism* - where constitutions are now seen as a tool for bridge-building among members of civil society, represents the first and perhaps most critical step in shifting state ownership from the leaders to the people. Yet, focus remains mainly on government, giving less importance to consensus building amongst civil society and between the ordinary citizen and the state'.

[8] Many parties proliferated, as there was an announced U.N fund for party support for the first elections. The majority did not have strong constituencies or clear political stands, as they did not survive after the elections. Most of these party leaders showed external signs of apparent wealth after being able to benefit from the funds.

[9] Renamo parliamentary composition revealed that only 18 of 112 MPs were former bush guerrilla fighters, indeed the party recruited an average number of expatriates and other supporters with respected academically and professionally qualifications, despite tensions generated between the two groups. For more see Ostheimer's article 'Transforming Peace into Democracy: Democratic Structures in Mozambique'.

conferring presidential and parliamentary victory to Frelimo, amidst vivid protest of Renamo[10]. Renamo claimed incorrectness in the electoral vote-counting practices to the constitutional court, the latter having ruled-out the possibility of fraud. After this, the Renamo-UE almost turned the Parliament non-operational with its boycott throughout the year 2000. In November, the party held demonstrations across the whole country, which ended violently with clashes between the police and demonstrators in the northern province of Cabo Delgado, leading to incarceration of the latter and resulting, a few days later in 119 deaths. These occurred as a result of suffocation, due to overcrowd in a cell of reduced dimensions.

The Parliamentary Commission in charge of the investigation never reached consensus over the findings of the report produced and the representative of the opposition refused to sign it at the last minute. However, the report became public through the media, and held responsible both Police officers and opposition members. On a more recent occasion, due to the lack of agreement in the discussion regarding the status of MPs that had been expelled or defected from Renamo, the Parliament become the stage of opposition for MPs demonstration, by impeding work with noise and disorder. The situation reached such a disturbing stage that the intervention of the Police was needed to restore order, an occurrence regarded as odd by the general public opinion manifested in the media, since coming from the maximum representatives of the people in the supposedly highest representative institution of democracy.

As regards governance oversight the level of MPs education, preparation and experience for the task counts determinately, resulting in a stronger executive, with more legislative capacity, and which does not allow access to all the relevant information. The fact that this is an emergent democracy where there is a lack of tradition in democratic practices implies a longer time frame for the effectiveness of the Parliament to develop.

Inter-party dynamics has also been determinant for peoples' perception over political developments. In a phase where Frelimo was amidst vivid turmoil and controversy about the choice of the next presidential candidate, after the memorable step down of President Chissano as a concurrent for the next elections, Renamo went through divisions and quarrels, having had to nominate a new and unknown secretary-general, after the previous one had been charged with incapacity and mismanagement. Also, the President of Renamo seems to have embarked in a campaign to obliterate all the possible strong successors, as was the case of Mr Domingos, (the chief negotiator of the peace agreement), expelled from the party (in late 2000) on the grounds of accusations of having served Frelimo interests. This divide and rule strategy is likely to backfire into Renamo results in the next elections, once Mr Domingos has

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[10]Renamo-Electoral Union, (the coalition with other 10 smaller parties) won in 6 of the 10 provinces. These votes account for 57% support for Renamo and 43% for Frelimo. Nevertheless this did not correspond to the number of seats in the assembly, being that for example Renamo only won with more than 50% in 3 of its 6 provinces, whilst Frelimo won in all of its with at least 62% (Tollenaere 2002: 239). The final result meant that Frelimo got 133 seats and Renamo-UE 117 (compared respectively with 129 and 112 -only Renamo- in the last legislature).

established a party (Partido para Paz, Democracia e Desenvolvimento, PDD) and will run for the elections, with the likelihood of spreading opposition votes.

Looking at the role of the non-parliamentary opposition, it is possible to see how active they attempt to be in the social arena, trying to lobby the Government and the Head of State in certain initiatives. Recognising their role, President Chissano encouraged an informal network through which they are consulted as regards the country's major projects, such as in the pre-1999 constitutional revision, the land tenure discussion, or even the Agenda 20-25, that the Government decided to leave in charge a group of notable personalities from various religious, academic, political and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) background, and which preliminary draft was made available in June 2003.

There was concern also about the process of election of the new National Elections Commission. The legal framework established that candidates could be presented by CSOs in an attempt to promote wider empowerment, participation of the people and reassurance of election of a respected and integrity-renowned personality. However, there was protest about the timelines (10 days) given for the candidates to be presented by the associations and organisations, and allegations that this prevented the necessary publicity for a more inclusive process (Imparcial, 21/01/03). Also, Renamo was invariably overridden by votes in the choice of the president of the commission, which once again is a reverend, Arão Litsuri, proposed by the Christian Council of Mozambique, and said to be a relative of the Frelimo party. Some media acknowledged the tendency for alliance between the Frelimo party and the church, as a trend of concern (Mediafax 22/01/03, 23/01/02, Imparcial 23/01/03).

1.3.2 Socio-political dynamics and governance performance

A decisive stand on the route the democratisation process will take is how state policies address the rebuild, maintenance or reinforcement of their legitimacy. Because democratisation is also about creating people's empowerment and the perception that the structures and institutions work towards the achievement of common good, governance comes into the picture. Within this notion, the transparency and accountability of the decision-making processes as well as policy implementation effectiveness remain crucial in state management of public affairs and directly relate to the degree of vertical and horizontal legitimacy of the state. Fayemi argues that*:*

'Fundamental to the notion of governance is the ability of the state to provide efficient and well functioning institutions and infrastructures of government – legally backed and socially coherent – that together establish and maintain an enabling environment in which human security and human development take place' in 'Democratic Governance and the Challenge of State Reconstruction in Africa: Reviewing Indicators and Benchmarks for Democracy & Good Governance in Nepad's Peer Review Mechanism' (Fayemi 2002: 1).

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Having this assumption as a background for analysis of the Mozambican state capacity to deliver public goods, we will notice that this capacity is very limited, with low rates of people with higher education in the state apparatus and with reduced salaries that lead to corruption down-the-scale in the state bureaucracy. Efforts to transform this situation are being held through the public sector reform. However, at present this is implicating a reduction in the number of jobs, in a society with very weak schemes of social security, and without correspondent improvement in the delivery of services. This is mostly due to the fact that the state does not pay attractive salaries, implicating simultaneously a loss of its qualified people into the private sector. Schemes to address the salary increase have been set within the context of reform, but due to its gradual (in terms of a pay rise) and phased nature (in terms of ministries contemplated) increases become obliterated by inflation rates and monetary devaluation. On the other hand, although progress is being achieved in the education and health sectors, in the police, justice and penal sectors the main deficit remains, contributing to the decline of state legitimacy and increased feelings of insecurity. Problems are related to lack of Police effectiveness in the face of rising in street criminality, organised transnational crime and corruption. Also factored in are the lack of enough qualified personnel, inefficiency and chronic delays in the resolution of processes. But more strategically relevant is the lack of an integrated vision of the whole judicial sector, which needs to work in a co-ordinated manner. Profiting from these weaknesses, the criminal and corruption networks seem to have taken root in these two sectors. Political will towards change in this state of affairs needs to be high, and measures such as the dismissal of the attorney general and six of his senior staff related to fraud allegations (Mozambique Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2000, US State Department) although important, represent only 'the tip of the iceberg being broken', since strong claims exist that the major beneficiaries of these criminal nets are linked into the higher governmental and party structures. Illustrative of the lack of trust of the people in the Police is data showing negative appraisal in the order of 12%, compared with less than 7% in relation for example to the National Commission of Elections, the Parliament and the Supreme Court (Inquérito Nacional de Opinião Pública 2001, 2002:10). As regards opinion in relation to the justice system the majority think that the rights of citizens are not protected, whilst the majority demonstrates respect towards the political institutions (idem, p8). Concerning human rights records, reports account for an improvement in the situation as regards Police maltreatment of prisoners, but show increasing apprehension with the judiciary system and duration of imprisonment before trial. On the other hand, as some analysts rightly noted the trials of the detained people in Montepuez, in November 1999, after Renamo demonstrations, took place in record time, evaluating by the normal and delayed pace of occurrence of trials (Grobbelaar and Lala 2003: 53). The controversial investigation and trial in November/December 2002 of the accused murderers of Carlos Cardoso (the journalist which through investigative journalism uncovered one of the major corruption scandals in the banking sector, and one of the most mourned deaths of the Mozambican contemporary history) killed in November 1999, was seen as a one-time event to attempt to regain the dignity of the criminal justice system. Despite the openness of the trial to

the media, the fairly competent way in which the process was handled by the judges and the conviction of the accused, the perception that the moral authors were not found or punished prevails in the Mozambican society. This understanding has been especially reinforced in face of the difficulty to find evidence to determine the most polemical and potential responsible as a suspect: Mr Nyimpine Chissano, one of the sons of the President. Also, the episodically appearance of the main accused who was a fugitive and had been trialled in absentia, on the day the sentence had been proffered, strengthened the perception of a flawed process. Mr Anibal dos Santos was captured by the South African Police, but rumours point out that he had always been hidden in South Africa, after having been released to escape, by high ranking Mozambican police and prison officers, in order not to reveal the masters of the crime, during the trial. Once the process finished, he was then allegedly allowed to return to complete his sentence. The trials of the Police officers that were indicted with the charge of enabling his runway are also going to take place. Great expectation remains also in what concerns the investigations around the assassination of Siba-Siba Macuacua, the bank administrator in charge of clearing up the process of another bankrupted bank (Banco Austral).

Crucial to the development of governance practices is the role of the media as a watchdog, but also as an actor engaging in the fostering of information and constructive dialogue in society. The democratic pluralism has been helpful and the Mozambican media has grown steadily, both in numbers and on the capacity of intervention in the society. The media have been vibrant in raising debate about the most controversial economic and political aspects of the Mozambican society and the diversity of ideas has been widespread, with critical stands both to the opposition and the government. However, sometimes the debate degenerates into extremist positions which contributes to polarise the society, and thus to the rise of the conflict potential.

After the events of the deaths referred above the media professionals were constantly harassed and threatened when reporting on these and other corruption-related situations, but they kept an informative and challenging posture, not becoming intimidated. However, a major challenge stills persists which is that of improvement of the quality and depth of their coverage, which allegedly has not many incentives due to small salaries and lack of adequate training (www.irinnews.org, 13/11/02). A constraint to the impact of their action is nonetheless the high level of illiteracy and the limited circulation of newspapers in the rural areas, making the radio the most effective means of information.

Overall the country seems to rate well in terms of press freedom, being one of the few in Southern Africa with empowering legislation. The environment is one in which both the government and opposition seem to tolerate their criticisms, and therefore have merited support from UNDP and UNESCO (idem). Indeed, the Afro-barometer report, acknowledges the fact that Mozambicans strongly connote the notion of democracy with those of personal freedom and freedom of speech (Afro Barometer paper 22, 2002: 6).

Accounting for a major positive development in the socio-political plan are also the roles played by an increasing rise of movements from within the civil society who play a role of deflector of tensions. They constantly appeal and take initiatives towards dialogue when political crisis emerge or when political leaders make public suggestions to violence imagery[11]. Also noticeable is the role of Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs), also in rising numbers, in coping with various socio-economic community activities and political issues such as civic education, which remain beyond the state limited capability to perform. Despite the controversial financial and ideological nature of some of these NGOs and of them being regarded as defending external interests, rather than the internal good for the country, the fact that they were able to organise themselves into a network, LINK, and that they have been working more co-ordinately with the Government is improving the level of trust.

Remarkable has been the role of religious institutions and traditional authorities in solving conflict at the community and local level, with its multiplying effect towards the wider society reconciliation process. Their recognition by the state after a decade of exclusion[12] constitutes *a priori* a new source of partnerships for the state and the reinforcement of its legitimacy.

Notwithstanding the progress made by these three actors, i.e., CSOs, NGOs and traditional authorities, a national survey demonstrated that a gap exists between the interests of the urban civil society and the majority of the rurally based population. The survey shows that NGOs partially face a problem of recognition, as people stressed they rarely consult the communities; and that there is unevenness throughout the country, concerning the attitude of traditional chiefs consulting their communities (Inquérito Nacional de Opinião Pública 2001, 2002: 41-43).

In the view of Mozambicans the governance concept does not seem to be directly associated with democracy. The Afro-barometer report claims that governance rates only as 1% in the understanding of democracy. On the other hand, if we include the element performance in governance, the same report shows that people rate the delivery capacity of the state as very low, being only near positive assessments in the area of the fight against HIV-AIDS (49%) and in the educational sector (46%) (Afrobarometer paper 22, 2002:10). Thus this has a major influence on state legitimacy, which is relevant for the trust in the democratisation process and institutions.

1.4 Summary Analysis
The democratisation process in Mozambique is taking place within a multitude of complexities entailed by the interlinking between the state institution performance both at political and economic levels, and the more

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[11] Indeed this is an instrument that seems to be recurrent from the part of Renamo when Frelimo outvotes them in crucial issues and the level of tolerance diminishes. Mr Dlakhama has mentioned he cannot prevent the revolt of the people in case of fraud in the next elections in an interview whose title was 'If fraud occurs, the country will burn'' (translated by the author) (Zambeze, 06/02/03).
[12] See Decreto de Conselho de Ministros 15/2000.

processual and dynamic nature of societal actors' intervention upon the structures in order to co-op them or mould them to a favourable outcome to its own interests. Thus a collision of interests is inevitable in a society where political-business elite is trying to consolidate its position, in an extremely exclusionary process for the majority. This is aggravated by the societal context that is one in which the diversity stems from the political, through the religious, the cultural, the linguistic and ethnic spectrum, not to mention other class, strata, and ideological based identity affiliations. Only increasing pluralism will allow for an accommodation of interests and for a platform where the competing ideas, can be presented and accepted by its merit, as the general will, through an inclusive process.

Mozambique is heading towards the third round of democratic elections, which indicates that a consolidation process should be underway. In this particular case, the analysis of this argument is difficult, as it does not allow for clearly drawing any line between transition and consolidation. Moreover the existent deficits strengthen the 'grey zone' and the electoral system gaps need to be addressed and overcome, before any strong "position" en route to democracy might be established. This seems to be reinforced by the fact that a high number of Mozambicans believe that the country possesses a democracy with major problems. In comparison with the region, only Zimbabweans have a more negative assessment and perspective of their democracy. Mozambique's democracy gap (between level of popular support for democracy and the perceived extent of democracy) rates as the third highest in the region only superseded by Zimbabwe and Tanzania (Afrobarometer paper 12, 2002: 7,8). Thus, the next period of general elections will be crucial for Mozambique, from the point of view of alternance, insofar as the opportunity for it has never been so close, with President Chissano stepping down and enabling Mr Dlakhama to contest with a new Frelimo Presidential candidate, Mr Guebuza. Even so, a scenario of a mixed result, with a president coming from one party and the parliamentary majority from another is also plausible, opening a Pandora box. Its result will depend on the behaviour of both the political leadership and the people, which will hopefully refrain from violence, notwithstanding the results achieved.

The situation which is denominated as transition, might as well perpetuate itself into some middle way to the ideal democracy, where all the actors interact within a certain limit of disagreement and conflict, until a critical point achieved either reverse the democratisation process or rather strengthen it. Whether the critical point is at stake in the next elections, might be a rather pretentious position to assume, as even if the actual opposition wins and Frelimo agrees to play the role of opposition, the major rule determinants of the political system remain unchanged, and these are the ones to be addressed, in order to strengthen the process.

2. The National Security Conundrum

2.1 The Context for Change

The transformative process of the country, from war to peace constituted the ground on which changes would be pursued in the national security arena. The historical context was finally allowing Mozambique the turn from the main concern with external security into a more inwards

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approach to public security, whilst recognising its interdependence with the security concerns of the region and the need to cope with transnational threats, at least at the concept level.

The country was faced with the major challenge of reconciliation and the underpinnings of this, implied at the time, that the armed forces should retreat from their prominent role, (due to the war, but not because they were out of control of the political elite), in the country's affairs. These should now be dominated by reconstruction of the country, and rehabilitation of the social trust within the society.

The armed forces as the main instrument and actor of the war were then the object of stigma and negativism from both the society and the country major donors[13].

Thus a major feature of the post-war, which indeed was rooted in the General Peace Agreement (GPA), was strong donor conditionality as regards the re-structuring of the defence sector. In relation to the armed forces, the Protocol IV established that the armed forces should not have more than 30,000 men[14], regardless of any critical analysis of the extension of the country and future threats that could arise. The fact that the eminent regional threat disappeared led donors and some nationals to think that there was no strong role for the armed forces to play in peace time, relegating issues like the protection of the Economic Exclusive Zone of the country, border protection (which indeed became a task for the Police), support for the people in case of natural disasters and involvement in peace missions.

Priorities had to be set in relation to the reconstruction of the country and face to this, the combat to poverty was the discourse which would lead the way. The national elite was therefore left with very few room of manoeuvre, even because the country needed massive injections of aid[15] to stimulate the take-off of the economy. Also, the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) expectations towards the country were high, once they needed a laboratory for a successful account, which so far was not the case, as the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) had been implemented in Mozambique since 1987, but the war did not allow for any progress. The IFIs were also very reluctant to see any role played by the armed forces and the prescription was to downsize and cut their budget, without any concern on how the re-structuring ought to be made[16]. On the other hand there was an extreme polarisation between the concepts of human security and state security, and the notion that one could only be obtained at the expense of the other. This thought would take root generally across the society, despite the fact that in the history of the

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[13] In the last years of the war, people who were incorporated stayed in the armed forces for longer periods than usually normal and the logistic system came to a complete breakdown in terms of support to provide food and even uniforms, to say nothing of lack of payment. The morale of the troops was very low and that was reflected in the immediate after war-period, with the armed forces bearing a strong negative image. On the donors side the prejudice against the armed forces came mostly because of the latter's reputation for corruption, though we can contend this was a general phenomena across the whole state apparatus, nevertheless more visible in this institution due to all state efforts being concentrated there.

[14] General Peace Agreement, protocol IV, I, ii.1.

[15] Illustrative of this was the speech by the former US Ambassador do Mozambique Dennis Jett, mentioning the imperative of choosing between 'Guns or Butter', in 'Mozambique File', September 1995, p15.

[16] For more on donor conditionality in the immediate post-war see the article 'Donor Conditionality and Security Sector Reform in Mozambique', in CSD, Volume 3, nr 1, April 2003.

country, the development of its armed forces was always linked to the formation of the independent state, and during the struggle for liberation and in the immediate post-independence the armed forces were seen as the guarantor of the nation and had organic ties with the people[17]. This image was completely eroded when the armed forces stopped being able to offer protection to the people during the war, and started to rely often on their food provisions to be able to survive.

Amidst this environment and the fact that the armed forces, after the demobilisation of all the troops, had to be re-built to comprise, on a fifty-fifty basis, men from both the guerrilla forces and the governmental troops, the political elite reacted by adopting the argument for the need to build armed forces with reduced numbers but highly professional and efficient. However, the elite security concerns in the immediate post-war phase, in a situation where the country was nearly dispossessed of any sovereignty due to the strong presence of the UN, remained unaddressed. These concerns might have been aggravated by regional developments, with the negative impact of the results of the elections in Angola, which returned to war. This factor mounted insecurity as to the development of the process in Mozambique, especially having taken into account Mr Dlakhama's threats to boycott the process throughout the period that led to elections in 1994. With the state of affairs in the new armed forces – Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique (FADM) - which no longer served to protect both the country and their interests, due to its efficiency weakness, but also to the fact that integrated ex-Renamo fighters, the decision was to take refuge in the Police[18]. This was done by transferring to this force the best operational command men from the former government troops that decided to remain in the security forces[19] and the few operational weapons existent.

This short-term security concern moulded the framework that would be the basis for the new re-shaping of the security sector. Despite this, there was already an acknowledgement of the need to concentrate in the internal security, as the Police had remained a marginal force throughout the war, and would now be faced with the task of providing a stable environment to the country, above all in order to attract foreign investment.

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[17] For an elaborated discussion on this issue see 'Civil-Military Relations in post-war Mozambique', presented in the ACSS Civil-Military Relations Project Seminar, held in Arlington, Washington, D.C, 5-6/12/2001.

[18] The GPA did address the issue of Police, but only in terms of regulating their behaviour during the transitional phase (section V Protocol IV, on 'Depoliticisation and restructuring of the police forces') and not implicating any merge of forces, as it did for the armed forces. This highlights the need for Peace Agreements to cover the re-organisation of all the security forces and not only the armed forces. In doing this, however because the country in question will be fragilised during transition there will be a crucial role for a well organised and adequately mandated peace mission, otherwise the strategy might backfire with formal forces breakdown and degeneration into non-statutory forces to protect various stakeholders security interests.

[19] The demobilisation process implied that the best and well-trained personnel decided to leave for the more attractive private sector. The armed forces could not compete with the level of salaries being paid outside and a whole generation of trained people in various specific aeronautic and naval matters, *inter alia*, was lost to the armed forces, implying that levels of efficiency would be dramatically low. On the other hand, the positive feature is that the armed forces through the 'release' of these people into civil life contributed to the society in general and to the private sector development, by having invested in the training of these professionals.

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2.2 The Security Sector New Institutional Build-Up

The foundation of the new security sector is enshrined in the Constitution approved in 1990, as the framework for functioning of the sector within a democratic system. The Constitution establishes the goals of National Defence as being the defence of national independence, preservation of the country's sovereignty and integrity, and guarantee of the normal functioning of institutions and the security of citizens against any armed aggression[20]. It determines that the armed forces owe fidelity to the Constitution and the Nation as a basic principle of democratic control of the armed forces.

It defines the President as the Commander in Chief of the armed and security forces[21], and invests him with the powers to declare the state of war and its termination, curfew or a state of emergency, to celebrate treaties, to declare general or partial mobilization, to preside the National Defence and Security Council, and to appoint, exonerate or dismiss the Chief of General Staff, the Police Commander, the branch Commanders of the armed forces and other superior officers of the defence and security forces[22]. In order to establish checks and balances the National Assembly must, sanction the declaration of curfew and of state of emergency, ratify and denounce international treaties and define the defence and security policy, once heard the National Defence and Security Council. Its oversight competencies are also safeguarded through the deliberation over the Plan and State Budget, meaning an eye-watch over the defence and security budget[23].

The establishment of the National Defence and Security Council[24], is also a positive factor insofar as provides the President with a consultation organ which will support him with informed and professional understandings over the issues at stake for decision-making. By having representatives from all the security forces assembled in the same organ, apart from an accurate status of the situation on the ground, it assures consideration of the issues will be made from various perspectives, and will in principle, lead these forces to act in co-ordination with a certain goal.

However, since the Peace agreement in 1992 and until the elections in 1994 there was no clear policy direction to the armed forces apart from the GPA itself, whose provisions are generalist. Indeed it was only in 1997 that further legislation was approved creating the pillars of orientation for the defence and security forces. The Defence and Security Act (17/97) determines the main principles as being those of, *inter alia,* prohibition of the defence and security institutions to have and express any political affiliation; priority for prevention and negotiated solution of conflict; commitment towards a policy of peace; recurrence to force only in case of

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[20] Article 59, Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique, 1990.

[21] Article 117.4), Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique, 1990.

[22] Article 122, Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique, 1990.

[23] Article 135,2.e) h) i) k), Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique, 1990.

[24] Article 158, Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique, 1990.

legitimate defence; commitment to contribute for a peaceful and secure climate in the region, continent and internationally[25].

Its goals reinforce those stated in the Constitution and are defined, among others as the guarantee of independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability; protection of state security (internal and external); providence of security for the citizens, their possessions, rights and fundamental liberties[26].

The Act also sets the re-structuring of the sector according to the new roles and missions that are now separately defined, according to an external orientation for the armed forces and internally driven ones for the police. As such, Defence, remains engaged with, among others, the guarantee of the integrity of national territory, the sovereignty; the liberty of the citizens and the security of the means of development of the nation; prevention and rescue of populations in case of calamities or accidents, the participation in actions towards peacekeeping and the maintenance of peace and respect to international law[27].

The Public Order sector receives the responsibility over, *inter alia*, the assurance of public order and respect to the legality, prevention and combat of crime, as well as acts contrary to the law and the guarantee of border patrolling[28].

The Act also covers the intelligence sector and refers to the State Security agency responsibilities of compilation, research, production, analysis and evaluation of information to assure the security of the State. Additionally it refers to its role of prevention of acts against the Constitution and the functioning of the state organs, and the combat of espionage, sabotage and terrorism[29].

The Act is supposed to precede sector legislation from each of these areas, in order to specify these general dispositions into more oriented policy. So far the Defence sector is the only one that presented the National Defence and Armed Forces Act. Neither the Public Order nor the Intelligence domains have been further legislated though the process of its elaboration is said to be underway.

The positive aspects of these advances in legislation are considerable within the context of Mozambique, since the country never had any legislation to guide the sector, being that all orientation and command in the past came exclusively from the Commander-in-Chief[30]. Also, it

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[25] Article 2, Defence and Security Act, (17/97).

[26] Article 3, Defence and Security Act, (17/97).

[27] Article 10, Defence and Security Act, (17/97).

[28] Article 13, Defence and Security Act, (17/97).

[29] Article 15, Defence and Security Act, (17/97).

[30] The following quote elucidates: 'The President of FRELIMO, in his capacity as the President of the Republic, was the Commander-in-Chief of the FPLM and had overall control of the FPLM. He was assisted by the Minister of Defence running the MOD, the Chief of General Staff (CGS), who was the principal military advisor, and the National Political Commissar (NPC) who was the principal political advisor making sure that the FPLM maintained its loyalty to FRELIMO. The Minister, the Chief of General Staff and the National Political Commissar were all members of FRELIMO's highest organ - the Politburo.' In 'Civil-Military Relations in post-

represents the country's first step into the inclusion of the security sector under the scrutiny of the democratic elected institutions.

On the conceptual part of it, the inclusion of dispositions like prevention and rescue of populations in case of calamities or accidents, or the protection of the people and their assets, are positive. They are indicative of the wider vision where the action of the security forces will revert in favour of public good, namely to human security. Despite this, the performance of the security forces falls short of the standards needed to provide security for the people, as revealed by the growing criminality levels and the incapacity of the armed forces, for example to deal with natural calamities as evidenced in the 2000 floods. Lack of financial resources is on the basis of this problem, but issues like the general management of the institutions, the co-ordination between them and the re-structuring of the forces down the line are also part of it.

The new institutional set-up in the area of Defence implied the creation of a Defence Ministry (MoD) detached from the military and as part of the mechanism of civil oversight over FADM. The FADM thus, subordinates in administrative and legal matters to the MoD. The Minister of Defence has to account for the sector, being responsible before the parliament and the public for the performance of the armed forces. He is responsible for chairing the Defence Council, which comprises the Chief of General Staff and the Commanders of the three Services (Army, Air Force, and Navy). Thus, the armed forces are only left with the operational aspects, namely the preparation for execution of their missions. As a new structure, in its civil role the MoD is still confronted with serious capacity-building challenges in terms of management, recruitment and maintenance of skilled personnel. Also, its articulation with the FADM and especially with the General Staff Headquarters needs to be improved. The process of clarifying the dividing lines between the daily activities of the organs of the MoD and the departments of the General Staff Headquarters is demonstrating to be a timely one, perhaps revealing a need for a major revision of both structures and respective specific competencies.

The National Council for Defence and Security performance is another example of a shortcoming in the sector, as, since its legal creation, it only started convening in 2002 due to the need to decide upon the participation of the FADM in the Burundi peace mission. This reveals that co-ordination among the institutions of the security sector is very weak and that the discussions that should be evolving about improving the sector as a whole are dormant or are made partially only between the Head of State and the minister of the area[31].

The Parliament Committee for Defence and Public Order constitutes an embryonic organ for the growth of accountability, since the average MP has to deal with the need to educate itself about the functioning of a democracy, about its own role and general parliamentary procedure and

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war Mozambique', presented in the ACSS Civil-Military Relations Project Seminar, held in Arlington, Washington, D.C, 5-6/12/2001.

[31] This does not mean to underestimate the fact that all major decisions and policy have to pass through the Council of Ministers for discussion and approval.

only then about the specific issue for which he is responsible. Those who work in the Defence and Public Order Committee have also another disadvantage, which arises from the fact of the security sector being a closed area and about which information is difficult to obtain. Notwithstanding the weakness, their existence has affected and already generates preparation and caution of the executive in the policies and programmes implemented as they know they can be called to respond for it.

Under the whole process of re-structuring probably the most significant achievement towards the democratisation process is the fact that the party no longer controls the armed forces. They are an independent institution, which so far, despite all its problems has remained trustworthy to democratic rule, never attempting to reverse constitutional order.

2.3 Developing a National Security Policy

From a pure legalist approach it is arguable that Mozambique possesses a national security policy. It is one which pillars are finally sustained on an internal orientation approach, i.e., taking into account the country domestic needs instead of the previous external approach, always determined by the need to face external aggression. The underpinnings of it are legislated in the Constitution and in the Defence and Security Act (17/97) as shown in 2.2. However, the process entailed in the elaboration of that national security conception, matters for the quality of the argument.

There are no records of a major vulnerability, threat and risk analysis having been consistently done in order to inform the policies on Defence and Security. On the one hand they were conceived because there was a legal vacuum under which the sector institutions were performing, and on the other because there was a need for a framework to start the re-structuring of the sector. The Acts were drafted mostly with the support of foreign co-operation advisors and, especially concerning the Defence and Armed Forces Act (18/97) no due study of what best organisational structure would suit the country, bearing in mind the legacy of the structures of FPLM and the constraints of the newly born FADM, was taken into account.

Also, the initiative of law, in this case was from the Executive, in spite of the Constitution disposition commending that task to the Parliament for the case of the Act on Defence and Security[32]. This shows the weakness of the Parliament in terms of their main legislative task, but the positive contribution was that it refused to pass the Defence and Armed Forces Act (18/97) before having the general policy on National Defence and Security, which is due to be the umbrella of all posterior legislation in the security arena. This situation once again led to a precipitated process in which this policy on National Defence and Security, instead of having been drafted on a wide co-ordination process between all the relevant state institutions, was left to the MoD. Assuming this is the general security policy which dictates much of the orientations of the following legislation; it would have been wiser to have at least a strong commitment to its

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[32] See article 135.2) i., Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique, 1990.

elaboration from the part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, since especially the external missions assigned to the military, are supposed to derive from political foreign policy objectives. This is not to say the foreign policy objectives perspective is missing in the national defence and security policy, indeed they are enshrined in the basic principles of the Act[33], but it is to call attention to how sequencing and the actors involved might play a determinant role in assuring that the conditions for its implementation will be put in place.

It is nonetheless the case to realise that in practice it was probably counter productive to wait for any determinant contribution from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is always overstretched by time and resources. Up to date it still did not present any proposal of an Act containing the foreign policy of Mozambique, despite the fact that the country is usually internationally praised for its foreign policy posture and determination, as well as for the capacity of its diplomats.

In the process, there was hardly any contribution of the civil society. The consultation process was very weak, and there was only a major seminar organised by the MoD with the support of the Africa-American Institute, which allowed for discussion about security and defence in the post-war Mozambique. It has to be recognised however, that around security issues there has been built a culture of secrecy throughout times in the Mozambican society. Therefore, as a no go area there were not many people who could discuss it apart from the high ranks of the security forces or the senior political decision-makers. This implied that the Mozambican civil society, being itself under construction, either had a limited understanding of the issues or felt constrained. Their willingness to participate and debate defence-related issues revealed to be limited, despite their necessary role as both a watchdog and as a contributor which could serve as a channel to express the needs and the security view of the people[34]. Over time however there seems to be a changing tendency, with the CSOs being much more interventive in the discussion about military conscription, and with the MoD assuming a more open posture of receiving people and organising seminars to discuss with them or accepting to go to media programmes and engage in debate.

Since then it seems that not much evolved within the policy formulation arena in the MoD. The ad *hoc* working group established in December 1994 comprising representatives of the Services, and civil servants at MoD which prepared the draft of the Acts on respectively, Defence and Security Policy, Defence and Armed Forces, and Military Conscription, seems to be in need of revitalisation. According to Macaringue in the article Civil-Military Relations in Mozambique[35], the group was on the final stage of drafting the first-ever Defence White Paper, but so far it does not seem to

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[33] See Article 2 from g) to j), Defence and Security Act, (17/97).

[34] The paradox is that it is dubious to trust the CSOs as representing the needs of the grass-roots people. In Mozambique they are a new construct, are mainly a urbanised phenomena and can be considered as of an elitist nature. For more on the discussion of civil-society participation and their perceptions, see 'Security Sector Reform and the Defence Establishment in Mozambique'.

[35] See 'Civil-Military Relations in post-war Mozambique', presented in the ACSS Civil-Military Relations Project Seminar, held in Arlington, Washington, D.C, 5-6/12/2001.

have been completed. This seems to be at least a right step to reinitiate re-structuring within the defence sector. With a proper threat analysis developed, there will then be a basis to formulate the missing Strategic Defence Concept (which once again should merit contribution from other ministries) to elaborate the Military Strategic Concept, and a concise Strategic Plan of Institutional Development for the MoD. These are all documents, which are allegedly being worked on simultaneously. That being the case, once again sequencing will be at stake and the process may be overridden.

Despite these processes, the *formulae* presented, as the concept of national security in the 17/97Act was not widely contested. It has been the implementation process of it entailing gaps and fallacies, which have brought outrage from the part of the general public. This has been the case as regards the incapacity of the Police to deal with daily criminality as well as with organised crime. Indeed the shape, the training and quality of database information of the Police has been questioned in face of the mounting threats linked to drug trade and trafficking, money laundering, trafficking of human body parts, smuggling of goods, vehicle theft and bank robberies, organisation of assassination groups, penetration of the state and business by criminal networks, obstruction to justice and corruption by criminal networks[36]. Indeed the last two have been leading to the expansion of the discussion into the whole criminal justice system and the mechanisms for internal co-ordination of its institutions. The issue of how these threats are to be dealt, when and with which resources remains to be clarified as there is not yet a sector policy, despite the fact of the Ministry of Interior undergoing the process of elaboration of a strategic planning for institutional development. People involved in the process reveal concern for the order of priorities as all the work done towards the latter reveal gaps that can only be fulfilled by the elaboration of the missing Public Order Act. This is understood as a management problem, and also as the result of lack of enough human resources capacity, as those existent become absorbed by the daily tasks (which are in themselves an emergency, due to the nature of the sector) and no spare commitment is done to complete the elaboration of the policy. This added to the fact that the Intelligence sector also did not present its Act is leading to the reinforcement of the public image that the security sector remains a closed arena[37].

Public discontent was also noticed when the major floods of the year 2000 hit the country and the FADM did not have enough capacity or organisation to intervene effectively, implying massive support from its neighbour countries militaries to deal with the situation. Major questions then arose about the general state of the defence and armed forces sector and appeals were made for the Government to revise this situation and provide minimal adequate resources for the operability of the FADM, especially taking into account its new tasks such as disaster relief, peace-support operations, assistance in fishery protection and coast patrol. Although Government programmes in the two post-war mandates, stressed

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[36] For a more detailed and informative report about these threats see 'Mozambique: Threats posed by the penetration of criminal networks' by Gastrow and Mosse.
[37] Interview with an Official from the Ministry of Interior, April, 2003.

very little about defence issues, it mentioned them. The problem was that no decisions followed as to the medium and long term composition, equipment, training and deployment of the FADM, or about the resources needed to perform their missions. Illustrative of how marginal are the FADM in the Government priorities is the fact that they failed to see them as a possible contributor in the reconstruction phase, and ultimately as incapable of contributing to the combat of poverty, otherwise there would be a note on defence issues on the PARPA.

The performance of the Intelligence sector has been less questioned but the events of Montepuez, i.e., the dislocation of a massive group of demonstrators (from other parts of the country to the village in question), which were allegedly more than the locals, led some people to ask whether if this information had been passed to the police in time, the tragedy could have been avoided. Another issue about this sectors' performance concerns their capacity to support the Police in the identification of the national and transnational criminal networks that operate in the country. It is noticeable that most people in Africa rate poverty and lack of basic needs as the main threat to human security. According to data prepared to contribute to the Report of the Africa Project on Human Security, denominated 'What makes us secure: African views of Security' elaborated by the Commission on Human Security and the Africa Institute of South Africa (October 2002), the concern with poverty is followed by the preoccupation with war, violent conflict and refugees. Next follows poor governance, dysfunctional state, political instability and human rights abuse. Surprisingly HIV/AIDS threat comes only in seventh place after exclusion/marginalisation, globalisation/international financial system, lack of spirituality and morality.

Faced with the above description the prioritary concern with combat to poverty is understandable, however the question now is how to use all the instruments/institutions available and make them work for that goal. On the other hand having war, violent conflict and refugees as the second major threat should certainly lead to more careful dealing with the management of the security forces, because they are the main actors/instruments in these situations, but above all because prevention and action to cope with it also comes from them.

Having this data in mind and taking into account the situation of the country as described in this and in the previous chapter a bell rings for strong action to revert human insecurity and a path towards violent social conflict, which more often than not degenerates into some sort of reversal of the democratisation process.

2.4 Summary Analysis

The existence of a national security conception in Mozambique is not a straightforward assumption. The main basic legislation, which is informed by such a conception, exists and accounts for democratic progress in turning the security forces independent, accountable and subordinate to the political power. Nonetheless, both the gaps in the legislation of some arenas within the sector, and the process, which contributes to the

elaboration of the existent legislation, reveal that there is lack of clarity as regards that conception. Reinforcing this view is the absence of clear programming which should reveal how the concept should materialise through operationalisation. Hence, the reality presents the deficient performance of the under resourced security forces in the implementation process, giving the impression that the means are dictating the ends, and therefore turning the existent concept and policies, at minimum into a secondary plan and at most irrelevant. The actual lack of a clear security sector strategy in the case of Mozambique can be seen as taking root in its historical past, as the country never had to organise the sector in peace times nor within a democratic context. Being now faced with this challenge and dispossessed of any institutional memory, the danger of a strongly personified and under informed decision-making process becomes prominent.

It is a fact that nowadays threats are more difficult to identify due to grey boundaries between them and to their volatility. This implies that prioritisation among them becomes also an increasingly hard task, however there is a need to leave the refuge of arguing for no existence of threats which can be dealt with by military, and engage in the exercise of actually mapping those threats and deciding which institution and which resources should address them in a co-ordinated framework, to maximise results, achieve complementarities and avoid underutilisation of resources by lack of planning. In this exercise, it becomes clear that there is room for clearing and strengthening relations between the civilians and the military not only in order to build trust, but also to achieve results, which reflect the real security concerns of the people. This means that the security forces and those responsible for the management of the sector have to be more open to the involvement of the people in security affairs, and also that the society at large and the politicians have to create an environment conducive to a healthier and effective oversight of the security forces by the democratic institutions.

3. Regional Security Engagement

3.1 Mozambique: Profiling within the SADC project?

SADC is an organisation in a region that has suffered permanent mutation and turmoil in the last decades. The majority of countries within it are experiencing some degree of transition and/or post-conflict transformation. Mozambique is one of the Southern African countries, which have been adopting a strong pro-regional posture. Its foreign policy is characterised by a peaceful approach and a commitment towards integration. The Constitution states that the country shall pursue a policy of peace and only resort to force in the case of legitimate defence; and shall support the primacy of a negotiated settlement of conflicts.[38]

Due to its recent history of conflict and successful achievement and maintenance of a peace agreement, other countries have seen it as a credible intermediary in conflict situations. The country's performance in

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[38] Art.65, Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique, 1990.

conciliatory and broker positions, both in intra and inter-state conflict situations, often playing a role on behalf of the region has been of praise. Mozambique has been involved in the Burundi peace process, has acted when the Comoros crisis erupted, participated in the easing of tensions in Madagascar and around the Zimbabwean crisis, among others. Its devotion to the regional project originates from an historical legacy of strong engagement as an active member of the Front Line States (FLS). Since then the country was deeply involved in the creation of Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) and in the transformation into SADC. Recently Mozambique has been committed to the development of the political-security leg of SADC, namely the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS). It has been engaged since its inception in 1996, in managing and overcoming at a political and technical level, the different existent approaches as to how the OPDS should be structured, which decision-making process should be adopted and who should take its leadership, until its formal creation in 2001, in the Malawi Summit. From there it has continued to play a role of mediator between the divergent positions from the region's countries as a co-chair. At present the country holds its presidency for the second consecutive year and has been engaged in furthering the institutionalisation of its structures. One of the major achievements during this presidency is the operationalisation of the Committee for Politics and Diplomacy and respective subcommittees on International Relations (to forge a common position over international initiatives) and on Good Governance (which discusses apart from politics and government, human rights and the rule of law). The Defence, Interior and Intelligence sectors already have a strong legacy of institutionalised cooperation through the Inter State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), which now also operates under the OPDS. One of the main tasks of the troika in charge of the management of the OPDS (Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Lesotho at the time of writing) was the elaboration of the Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ (SIPO). Mozambique set-up a special task force constituted by representatives of all the relevant areas of Government to integrate the wider team constituted by the troika to draft the document. The SIPO was elaborated in order to operationalise the vision and mission of the OPDS, by providing guidelines for the implementation of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation for the next five years. It clarifies strategies and activities to achieve the objectives set in the Protocol, which are *inter alia* to establish early warning systems in each Member State; to define common standards to identify conflicts; to enhance the capacity for conflict prevention, management and resolution and encourage the contribution of civil society in conflict prevention, management and resolution.

Mozambique is also taking active part in the other mechanisms of SADC, which deal with security operational issues, such as the Southern African Regional Police Corporation Co-ordination (SARPCCO), and has participated in regional peacekeeping exercises that took place in Zimbabwe and South Africa, respectively, 'Blue Hungwe' in 1997 and 'Blue Crane' in 1999.

Relevant issues about the region and the consolidation of SADC merit some consideration, if Mozambique's position has to be put on perspective. Despite the country entire engagement, the SADC integration project is an ambitious endeavour that has many strands yet to be reinforced. So far, the project has evolved mainly from the common politico-historical regional factor and determinately from the mutual understanding of the 'historical' leadership (Chissano, dos Santos, Mugabe, Nujoma). The challenge of constructing common political values, shared and pragmatically implemented by every member is one which is still evolving, and which becomes increasingly relevant for the maintenance of stability in the region, with the prospects of emergence of a 'new' political leadership.

The organisation is thus at a stage of generation of these values, and not yet in the phase of their application within a shared vision and understanding. The OPDS is a major initiative towards forging these shared values and the discussion over the Defence Pact is demonstrating an awareness of the need for collective security, much more as a confidence building measure among the countries of the region than as an instrument against any eventual external threat. Nonetheless, there are strong disagreements over its article six about 'Collective Defence', which states that an armed attack against a state party shall be considered a threat to regional security and that **all** state parties must respond with immediate collective action[39]. Some countries want to safeguard their right not to intervene, when so judged at a national level, as a way of preventing themselves from entering into legitimacy quests of other countries. The experience of the war in the DRC has been particularly elucidative as regards this aspect, symptomatically showing that the shared political common values are still in a long way towards consolidation. This is crucial if the Pact is going to work, otherwise it will become just another of those amorphous collective security agreements which various regions possess, but that in timely occasions never work.

Mozambique's position towards this arrangement is a favourable one according to two interviewees. The country trusts the mechanism as a source to deter major outbreaks of violent armed conflict in the region, despite the understanding of the need to improve the encapsulated procedures (Interviews with Mozambican senior government officials, Maputo, April, 2003). If on the one hand, in the last ten years the country has been fragilised in its defence and security structures, on the other its political endeavours for regional stability have been remarkable. Some opinions point out that a recognised regional position would fill the national security vacuum, by preventing any external threats (at least conventional) to rise and by being able to draw on regional military support if need arises. However this position should not underestimate the country's vision when addressing security issues on a wider perspective, where interdependence plays a determinant role, as showed historically by the legacy of mutual support with Zimbabwe (Mozambique support towards Zimbabwe's independence and Zimbabwe's support to Mozambique Government during the civil war) and as are showing presently the impact of the Zimbabwean crisis on the Mozambican

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[39] Draft SADC Mutual Defence Pact, 28/02/02

economy, or the influx of refugees from the DRC and Burundi into the country.

A major question that could be raised is the extent to which Mozambique would be able to meet and maintain its commitments within the Pact, should such need arise, since it possesses debilitated armed forces. Surprisingly, this does not seem to constitute a major problem for the country's support to this initiative. Two of the interviewed people referred that the contribution does not necessarily have to be with deployment of men, but that it can be made from a political standpoint, or in areas such as communication, command, among others, in which Mozambique can be helpful. Also, not all the countries will need to intervene at the same time and in every situation, but there must be a clarified procedure in order to assure this. So instead of understanding the issue solely as a handicap it should also be looked upon as an opportunity for the country to start re-organising its forces in order to meet regional commitments (Interview with Mozambican senior government official, Maputo, April, 2003).

The decision to participate in the AU mission to Burundi is already an indication that the country feels the need to have a capacity to engage in peace missions as derivative of its continental and regional commitments, but also as a means to strengthen its conflict resolution initiatives, with some operationalisation apart from the political standpoint. Indeed, the fact that Mozambique went through such pacification and is undergoing a democratisation process in a peaceful way has prompted international and especially continental pressure for the country to be visibly represented in peace missions in order to share its experience and to encourage the mission recipient country. Nonetheless, the issue remains on whether the country is really ready to engage in a mission such as the one in Burundi. The country has previously sent observers to the DRC and had a small military police unit in East Timor (UNTAET), these being the only prior engagements in such a type of missions. The latter happened with external logistical support of Portugal and in the case of Burundi this support will come from the U.K, which raises the question of sustainability of the participation of the country in further missions. However, if considered as a good option for lifting the political profile and status of the country, and positive for Mozambican defence forces to be submitted to such an experience, the question of its effectiveness, even if integrated with South African and Ethiopian forces, in such a volatile situation as the one in Burundi, remains unanswerable until we see the results.

In general SADC internal structure is undergoing a major re-organisation, but will only gain a determinant decision-making role, when the member states develop the political will to abdicate of part of their realist 'sovereign loss bias', and allow the regional structures to institutionalise and consolidate their role. Until then the cost will be procrastination of the process of building common political awareness and shared values, as well as the risk of proceeding with the actual high reliability on an individual centred decision-making basis.

Concerning the impact of the domestic context of democratisation on the regional dimension, one interviewee argued the regional image of the

country is proportional to the internal developments in that country, as regards the institutional management and the guarantee of the liberties of the citizens. He also emphasised that as a major factor of credibility for involvement in conflict resolution processes (Interviews with Mozambican senior government official, Maputo, April, 2003). The fact that various countries, like South Africa, Namibia and Mozambique are undergoing democratisation processes, in his view are positive in terms of generating the perception of the impossibility to escape that process, thus helping to forge the sense of the need to create common values. However, situations like Zimbabwe and the trends in Swaziland, (which currently seem to be turning more flexible in terms of openness to dialogue from the King's side) show that the positive impact is limited, insofar as each country is following its particular way within different degrees and understandings of democracy. This helps to explain some retrenchment of the countries in discussing and engaging systematically in the regional debate and consolidation of SADC structures, i.e., the fact that their state building process is occurring simultaneously along the lines of contested democratisation transitions still makes them very wary of security issues on an internal basis. This results in a situation where either the countries do not want to be confronted with a regional discussion and position towards their situation, or they want to bring it to the forefront of the discussion agenda to legitimise, and attain regional support for a determined cause, which is often linked to the maintenance of a certain elite in power.

The concern over how human security issues are addressed in SADC, according to one interviewee is preserved by the fact that the Organ possesses a wide definition of security, raising issues as HIV-AIDS, Gender and Human Rights that directly impact on people. These issues merit discussion also in other SADC *fora* and certainly within the sector approaches. The major shortcoming is that the security discussion is still a closed one, only held by state representatives and not allowing space for CSO voices as regards the OPDS matters. However the priority seems to be to consolidate structures for operationalisation and creating confidence building among states, revealing in practice the adoption of a collective security posture instead of a common security approach. The fact that the CSOs in the region are still in formation, especially those who deal with security matters, and that they have a strong external funding, also reinforces this exclusion, under the fear of foreign interference (Interview with Mozambican senior government official, Maputo, April, 2003).

3.2 Summary Analysis

Mozambique regional security engagement is an uncontested reality, despite the still fragile security arrangements of the region. The consolidation of the SADC as an organisation, and of the security wing as a concomitant, look irreversible, though it must be seen realistically, as an enterprise whose build-up must be understood in a long term approach, where decisions must not be rushed. The process of consensus building by which SADC is ruled requires extensive political consultation, dialogue and lobbying, as revealed by the Mozambican experience in wanting to steer the process of creation of the OPDS. Positive is the fact that the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation is finally near to

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entering force this year, since seven countries have ratified it (Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Tanzania and Namibia) and South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe seem to be on the process to it[40].

The SADC agenda contemplates the issues of governance and human rights, as well as other directly related human security concerns, and these are raised again within the OPDS domain. However, the democratisation processes which the countries are undergoing seem to confront them with national security challenges, not invariably linked with regime survival, which prevent them from ranking these issues high on the priorities of discussion, either because states are more concerned with their macro security structures and institutions or because the discussion of these issues would denude the actual government poor records in performing towards the achievement of human security. Security issues are still under closed discussion, and the evidence is the existence of two directive troikas, one general for SADC and a different one for the OPDS, in order to improve performance since chairing both implies enormous devotion of the country's human, institutional and financial resources, but evidencing also an attempt to prevent donor interference.

Also, common values are still to be consolidated in the region in order to have the countries equally engaged in building-up regional structures and empower those who act and perform within them. One blatant case of the SADC apparent tied-hands is the case of Zimbabwe, in which a soft position is being taken, mostly due to historical reasons, whilst numerous outcries are being made by the Zimbabwean CSO for the region to take an active role in solving the situation.

Thus, the democratisation processes occurring within countries are having impact, although limited, in terms of one such replicate process at the SADC decision-making level. Indeed, the similar trends which seem to be prominent are characterised by shortcomings: high level of exclusion of participation of CSOs, questionable level of legitimacy due, *inter alia*, to the lack of consolidation of the regional parliament structure, and also a questionable regional rule of law, because of the remaining inexistence of the regional Court.

Conclusion

Democratisation in Mozambique reveals a highly exclusionary process, both from the political and economic point of views. The way out in the actual direction of creation of an extremely polarised society is the increase of pluralism and tolerance before competitive views and interests. The highly disputed attempt at power maintenance or achievement occurs at the expense of the creation of a more integrative, sharing and cohesive society, thus reiterating the contentious discussion around the substantive quality of democracy in Mozambique.

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[40] South African Foreign Policy Monitor, March/April 2003,p.1.

The impact of democratisation, mainly shaped at its initial phase, by the end of the internal war in 1992, upon the national security perceptions was determinant insofar as the country totally re-organised its security sector, by conceding priority to public security imperatives. Also it implied the introduction of new practices as regards the oversight of the security forces by the democratic institutions, which need themselves to be strengthened, particularly as regards non-violent means of conflict management and resolution. The improvement of the security sector management, resourcing and performance remain as a pending challenge, in face of the conception that security must be treated as a public good to be delivered to the people. This adopted approach embracing both state and human security is anchored in the actual and first ever-existent national security policy Act. Its implementation, along with the consolidation of the practices of transparency and accountability, as well as the improvement of the democratic control structures will constitute a major achievement towards the democratic governance of the sector, so far embryonic.

The end of the internal war, the national security conception renovated around emergent different types of threat, as well as the historical commitment of the country towards integration of the region, have led to the present situation where regional structures build-up and rate high in the country's agenda. Mozambique is totally committed to the regional cooperation goal and its presidency of the OPDS is demonstrating that it can assume a steering pivot position, despite the fact of not being a regional power. The extent to which the country's devotion to the regional agenda might be curtailed, seems to be only a remote scenario, eventually created either by a halt of the internal democratisation process with a new emergent armed conflict (unlikely), or by a power change into a less politically and technically capable government with shortcomings in mobilising its regional counterparts around determinate agendas.

About the Author

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